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Abstract 
 
 
The purpose of this research is to analyse and understand the role of state power in 
transboundary water relations, providing an in–depth analysis of the evolution of interstate 
relations in Central Asia in the field of water in the period 1991-2011. Taking as a case 
study the planned construction of the Rogun and Kambarata dams in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, the research looks at the various forms of overt and covert power shaping 
interstate relations and at the way hegemonic and counter-hegemonic measures are put in 
place in an international river basin. The overarching hypothesis driving this study is that 
the intimate correlation between the concepts of power and hegemony can offer key 
insights to the analysis and understanding of transboundary water relations. While, on the 
one hand, the analytical focus is placed on state power, on the other hand, hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic tactics represent the ways in which power is wielded and observed.  
This research makes an original contribution to the literature on hydropolitics in Central 
Asia, offering fresh theoretical interpretations to the subjects of power and counter-
hegemony in the Aral Sea basin and presenting the original “circle of hydro-hegemony”, an 
analytical framework in which the various forms of power are “connective” in the function 
of hegemony. A further value is added by three timelines expressly created for the research 
and that represent, at the time of writing, the most detailed reference-supported collection 
of events of this kind for the Central Asian region in the period 1991-2011.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
 
Water does not resist. Water flows. When you plunge your hand into it, all 
you feel is a caress. Water is not a solid wall, it will not stop you. But water 
always goes where it wants to go, and nothing in the end can stand against it. 
Water is patient. Dripping water wears away a stone. Remember that, my 
child. Remember you are half water. If you can't go through an obstacle, go 
around it. Water does.  
Margaret Atwood, The Penelopiad, 2005 
 
 
 
The abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991 was one of the crucial events of 
the twentieth century. Never before in history had an event of this social and political 
magnitude emerged with almost no violence (Kramer, 2003). Besides its global impact, that 
marked the end of the Cold War and of the bipolar international system of superpowers1 
(Huntington, 1999), the vanishing of the last multinational empire gave birth to fifteen 
countries, as the fifteen constituent republics of the USSR all in a sudden acquired the 
status of sovereign states2. Among them, the five Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which never existed before as 
distinct states, were the less prepared to manage an unexpected and not necessarily sought 
independence (Mandelbaum, 1994).  
These five countries were literally thrust out of the USSR when Russia, Belarus and 
Ukraine decided to re-form themselves as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
                                                     
1
 The bipolar system of the Cold War had two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, whose relations 
were central to international politics. According to Samuel Huntington (1999), with the breakdown of the 
USSR a new “uni-multipolar” system emerged, populated by one “lonely superpower”, the United States, and 
several major powers, such as Germany, France, China and Brazil. It is worth noting that Stanley Hoffmann, 
the eminent liberal politologist, acknowledged the end of the postwar bipolar world already in 1972, based on 
his conception of world politics in terms of distinct issue areas, that he defined alternative chessboards 
(Hoffmann, 1972) 
2
 The three predominantly Slavic countries, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, were joined by the Baltic republics, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the Caucasian ones, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and the five Central 
Asian states. 
 2 
 
in December 1991 (Olcott, 1996: 4). One of the implications of this premature birth was 
that the old economic and political ties established by the USSR ceased to exist, and with 
them the centralised Soviet resource distribution system that managed the exchange and 
allocation of water, energy and food supplies among the republics. A whole new set of 
international relations emerged, and the newly formed Central Asian governments had to 
redefine the policies related to the exchange and sharing of their natural resources. The 
interconnections and interdependence that emerged from this complex scenario, and the 
related power dynamics in interstate relations in Central Asia3, are the subject of this thesis.  
This chapter first provides a literature review of the recent academic debate on the 
politics of transboundary waters and of large dams, to then introduce the two case studies 
adopted for this research. Subsequently, it illustrates the research questions driving this 
study, its main objectives, and the structure adopted to carry out this analysis. Finally, it 
outlines the originality of the research, explaining where it stands in relation to 
hydropolitics and Central Asian Studies. 
 
1.1. The politics of international waters 
This section reviews hydropolitics literature, presenting different views on how water 
resources can affect interstate relations. After a discussion of the two main approaches, the 
Neo-Malthusian and the Cornucopian, critical hydropolitics will be introduced and 
subsequently linked with the main studies that delved on the relation between water 
management and the distribution of power within states. This digression is relevant to the 
understanding of the political rationale behind the construction of large dams such as the 
Rogun and Kambarata, and also to outline where this study stands in relation to the 
hydropolitical debate. 
                                                     
3
 To avoid ambiguity, throughout this study the term Central Asia refers to the region formed by the five 
former Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan. The current understanding of Central Asia as the region formed by these five countries comes 
predominantly from the common past that these countries share as territorial colonies of the Russian Empire 
and, after 1917, of the Soviet Union (although, as John Heathershaw noted, “it is not universally accepted 
when or to what extent Central Asia was, is or will be historically postcolonial”) (Heathershaw, 2010: 88). On 
the geographical delimitations of Central Asia, Frederick S. Starr (2008) called for the revamp of the 
historical idea of a “Greater Central Asia”, a broader region that also includes the Chinese Autonomous 
region of the Xinjiang and Northern Afghanistan. An even wider Central Asian region includes the Khorasan 
province of Iran, the northern part of Pakistan, inner Mongolia, the Russian area of Tatarstan, Kashmir, Tibet, 
Qinghai and Gansu (Cowan, 2007). 
 3 
 
Water is a quintessential component for life and for the development of societies. Water 
is also an irreplaceable and transient resource, which crosses political boundaries in the 
form of rivers, lakes and groundwater aquifers. Freshwater resources account for only 2.5 
% of the total world water
4
, and this relative scarcity further increases their political and 
economic relevance. 
While Peter Mollinga (2001: 733) concisely observed that “[a]t a general level, the 
statement that “water is politics” hardly needs any defence”, initially, the study of 
international transboundary waters has been linked primarily with security studies. In this 
regard, the end of the Cold War set a milestone causing the falling-off of the traditional 
security threats and the development of a new global political agenda. Problems that 
disregard national borders, such as global warming, water scarcity and heavy pollution, 
emphasized the world's growing environmental interdependence, redefining the concept of 
national sovereignty and stressing the need for regional rather than national solutions. A 
crucial contribution to the debate was brought by Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School 
(Buzan et al., 1998), which stretched the classic notion of security within the field of 
international relations to include the new key concepts of “securitization”, “sectors” and 
“regional security complexes”. As Buzan observed, “something is designated as an 
international security issue because it can be argued that this issue is more important than 
other issues and should take absolute priority (…) and it is presented as an existential 
threat”. This applies also to the environment and to current water challenges, that “reflect 
the larger struggles among states to secure their boundaries and establish control over their 
territories” (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). Hence, as explained by Turton (2003), the association 
between security concerns and water management brought to the “securitization of water 
resource management”. 
Towards the end of the 80s, with a ground-breaking article published in the review 
Foreign Affairs, Jessica Tuchman Mathews (1989) called for a redefinition of the concept 
of national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues
5
. A few 
                                                     
4
 Of this 2.5 %, only 0.3 % (around 105 000 km
3
) is constituted by freshwater lakes and rivers. 
5
 Jessica Tuchman Mathews (1989: 164) argued that an important paradox has to be taken into consideration 
when examining natural resources: nonrenewable resources (such as coal and oil) are in fact inexhaustible, 
while renewable resources can be finite. On the one hand, humankind will find substitutes and alternative 
technologies to nonrenewable resources as they become scarce and more expensive. On the other hand, this 
 4 
 
years later, in 1994, Robert Kaplan’s pessimist and highly debated article “The Coming 
Anarchy” (1994) defined the environment as the key national-security issue of the early 
twenty-first century, the one that will set the tone for international relations in the years to 
come. It is in this context that water management became associated with security issues, 
and a new debate emerged among those who saw the use of shared international 
watercourses as a vector of conflict or cooperation, initiating a new field of IR called 
hydropolitics. 
If, on the one hand, the connection between water and politics had already been studied 
in 1957 by Karl August Wittfogel (see paragraph 1.1.4), on the other hand, the term 
hydropolitics appeared for the first time in the title of a book by John Waterbury (1979) that 
discussed tensions originating from diverging interests in the use of the river Nile. Since 
then, many scholars have used it as a keyword in their research (e.g. Ohlsson, 1995; Wolf, 
1995; Elhance, 1999; Trottier, 1999; Allan, 2001; Turton and Henwood, 2002). As defined 
by Elhance (1999: 3), hydropolitics is “the systematic study of conflict and cooperation 
between states over water resources that transcend international borders”. Starting from this 
dual dimension of the discipline, marked by conflict and cooperation, two main branches of 
thought can be distinguished: a Neo-Malthusian school, which sees water as a potential 
reason for conflict, and a Cornucopian ramification, which underlines the cooperative 
potential of water. These two branches correspond to the two main discourses forming the 
rationalist paradigm of IR, realism and liberalism, that since the late 1980s have been 
theoretically countered by the constructivist approach to IR
6
 (Katzenstein et al., 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
will not be possible for renewable resources, since an overfished fishery will not recover, extinct species will 
not reappear and eroded topsoil cannot be replaced. 
6
 As Katzenstein et al. noted, rationalist theories of IR take into consideration a world formed by “rational 
actors with unproblematically specified interests, competing in a situation characterized by scarce resources”. 
Conversely, “constructivist theories look to the humanities and sociology for insights into how ‘‘reality,’’ 
including the interests that partially constitute the identity of actors, is socially constructed” (Katzenstein et 
al., 1998: 646). 
 5 
 
1.1.1. The Neo-Malthusian approach and the water-war theory 
In the neo-Malthusian
7
 conflict scenario, rapidly growing populations will cause 
degradation and scarcity of natural resources, consequently increasing the risk of violent 
conflict over scarce resources (Urdal, 2005: 418). Neo-Malthusian authors (among the 
others, Falkenmark, 1992; Gleick, 1993; Gleditsch, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1994 and 1999; 
Toset et al., 2000; Klare, 2001; Russell and Morris, 2006) have observed that when 
countries share a common resource such as water, if this resource becomes scarce 
governments will take all necessary measures to defend it, including actions that lead to 
conflict. According to these authors, scarcity exacerbates the interdependence of river 
riparians and brings them to competition and disputes.  
This leads us to the water-war thesis, that became particularly popular in the early 1990s 
(Cooley, 1984; Starr, 1991; Villiers, 1999) with the emergence of the new and broadened 
understanding of security. In a widely cited article, Joyce R. Starr (1991: 17) asserted that 
“as early as the mid-1980s, U.S. government intelligence services estimated that there were 
at least 10 places in the world where war could break out over dwindling shared water […] 
into the perilous zone where all available fresh surface and groundwater supplies will be 
fully utilized.” Similarly, Michael T. Klare (2002: 23) predicted military conflicts resulting 
from freshwater needs and identified three main factors that will increase tensions: i) 
escalating demand; ii) resource shortages and iii) the proliferation of ownership contests. In 
an interview released in 2008
8
, Klare also stated that between oil and water, “the more 
likely conflicts will be over water”. Likewise, Leif Ohlsson (1995: 20) supported the water-
war theory, asserting that conflicts over water have already been a major contributing cause 
of war and annexation of territories in at least one case: the 1967 Six-Days Arab-Israeli 
War. 
But what does exactly the term “water scarcity” mean? The Swedish hydrologist Malin 
Falkenmark (Falkenmark at el., 1989) created the widely adopted “water stress index”, that 
defined water scarcity as the condition when the amount of renewable freshwater available 
for each person each year in a given country is below 1,000 cubic meters. When the amount 
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 Modern Malthusianism or Neo-Malthusianism takes its name from Thomas Malthus’ Essay on the Principle 
of Population (1798), which predicted that demography-induced resource scarcity will eventually lead to 
either famine or war. 
8
 Big Think Forum, “Which is More Likely: Oil Wars or Water Wars?”. Available from: 
http://bigthink.com/ideas/1883 [Accessed 4 January 2012]. 
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is below 1,700 cubic meter per person per year, a country is in a “water stress” situation, 
and when it is below 500 cubic meter, the condition is of “absolute water scarcity”. 
According to Falkenmark (1990), water problems such as water pollution, water scarcity, 
and land degradation will be in the future exacerbated by population growth and this “water 
barrier” to success will limit the security of livelihood, socioeconomic development, and 
quality of life in developing countries. On obstacles to development, Phillips (2006: 19) 
added that “conflict arises over water resources when riparian States feel constrained in 
their ability to realize their national goals and objectives, generally as a result of one or 
more coriparians unilaterally using the resource”. It is worth noting that Malin Falkenmark 
(2007) later revisited and expanded the concept of scarcity focusing not only on physical 
scarcity but also on issues related to power structures and social contexts. 
Water being a finite resource, Thomas Homer-Dixon (1994) from the Toronto Group 
made a distinction among non-renewable and renewable resources, identifying for the latter 
three main sources of scarcity: unequal social distribution, environmental change and 
population growth. Through the analysis of numerous water disputes around the planet, 
Homer-Dixon concluded that “the renewable resource most likely to stimulate interstate 
resource war is river-water” (1994: 19), since environmental scarcity causes violent 
conflicts both at the internal and (to a lesser extent) at the international level. A few years 
later, however, Homer-Dixon (1999) revised his position and questioned the often-cited 
statement of the World Bank’s Vice President for Environmentally Sustainable 
Development, Ismail Serageldin, that in 1995 had declared that “the wars of the next 
century will be fought over water” (Crossette, 1995). Homer-Dixon (1999: 139) countered 
that “in reality, wars over river water between upstream and downstream neighbors are 
likely only in a narrow set of circumstances [and] There are, in fact very few river basins 
around the world where all these conditions hold now or might hold in the future.” 
Some of the most well-known water-war declarations
9
 were also quoted by Peter Gleick 
(1993: 79) to affirm that “water and water-supply systems are increasingly likely to be both 
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 In 1979, the then-Egyptian President Anwar Sadat declared that “the only matter that could take Egypt to 
war again is water”. Likewise, in 1988 the then-Egypt’s foreign minister, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (who later 
became the UN Secretary-General) declared that “The next war in our region will be over the waters of the 
Nile, not politics”. Gleick also cited Israeli Premier Levi Eshkol's speech at Tiberias in 1965, in which the 
politician stated that “Water is a question of life for Israel," and that therefore "Israel would act to ensure that 
 7 
 
objectives of military action and instruments of war as human populations grow, as 
improving standards of living increase the demand for fresh water, and as global climatic 
changes make water supply and demand more problematic and uncertain”. Gleick 
supported his assertions with a detailed chronology in which he classified 54 historical and 
ongoing disputes and conflicts over freshwater resources
10
 (1998: 25–31). Additionally, 
Gleick (1993) argued that there are four factors or characteristics that make water likely to 
be a source of strategic rivalry: 1) the degree of scarcity; 2) the extent to which the water 
supply is shared by more than one region or state; 3) the relative power of the basin states 
and 4) the ease of access to alternative fresh water sources
11
.  
Linking water and politics, Miriam Lowi examined the Jordan River basin and the 
dispute between Israel and Palestine to explain how problems related to water have to be 
analysed in the context of “low politics” of water, and “high politics” of war and diplomacy 
(Lowi, 1993: 9). In other words, the solution of water problems is closely linked and 
subordinated to the solution of broader political issues (such as territory or statehood). Her 
realist approach is then the exact opposite of the functionalist belief that collaboration in the 
water sector will have a positive spillover effect on larger political issues. Lowi also adapts 
the neo-realist Hegemonic Stability Theory to the water sector, arguing that when the 
upstream riparian is also the hegemon (i.e. the most powerful state in the basin), the 
chances that cooperation takes place are low since it has no interest or incentive in doing 
so. Cooperation is more probable when the hegemon is located downstream and it has a 
critical need of water. However, Dinar et al. (2007: 150) efficiently contradicted Lowi’s 
argument, taking as an example the Colorado River salinity issue between the United States 
and Mexico. In this case, the former – being both the hegemonic and the upstream state – 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
the waters continue to flow" (Gleick, 1993: 85-86). For more declarations prospecting water-wars see also 
Toset et al. (2000: 972-973). 
10
 In all these cases, water was an instrument or a target of war, not the cause. In the website of the Pacific 
Institute “The Wolrd’s Water”, Gleick provides an even larger chronology of 265 water conflicts 
(http://www.worldwater.org/conflict/list/ [Accessed 21 November 2013]) stretching from 3000 B.C. to 2012, 
in which water was either a military goal, a military target, a military tool, a political tool, a development 
dispute or a terrorism target. 
11
 Moreover, according to Gleick (1998) it is in particular the mismanagement and misallocation of water 
resources that hampers the resolution of water conflicts in various regions in the world. 
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not only entered into an agreement with Mexico but also paid the high costs of desalinating 
the waters flowing downstream
12
. 
Several researchers associated with the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) in 
Oslo also contributed to the debate. Toset et al. (2000) confirmed the link between scarcity 
and conflict, adding that probabilities for conflict rise when a river crosses a border rather 
than when it forms it, as “the upstream/downstream relationship appears to be the form of 
shared river most frequently associated with conflict” (2000: 972). However, they seem less 
convinced than other authors in establishing a connection between water and conflict. For 
instance, they comment the work carried out by Malin Falkenmark and Peter Gleick stating 
that “these authors have not demonstrated that problems of water-sharing have actually 
played an important role in escalating conflicts to war” (2000: 978), concluding that “we do 
not have much solid evidence for saying that sharing a river provides a major source of 
armed conflict, or that water scarcity is the only or even the main issue in whatever such 
conflicts do occur” (2000: 993). 
Further exploring the relation between water and conflict, Nils Petter Gleditsch (1998: 
382-383) included water in a list of five resources considered as worth fighting for, the 
remaining four being territory, strategic raw materials, energy and food. Gleditsch based his 
arguments on a causal chain of events that sees population growth leading to deteriorated 
environmental conditions, increasing resource scarcity and a subsequent harsher 
competition for resources that thus augments the risk of violence. A few years later 
however, Gleditsch et al. (2006: 362) wrote that “support for a scarcity theory of water 
conflict is somewhat ambiguous”. According to this study, it is the size of the basin – larger 
basins reduce the probabilities of having a conflict – and not the number of river crossings 
or the share of the basin upstream that is associated with conflict. Thus, the authors share 
neo-Malthusian concerns but they do not find evidence for water wars, as, in their opinion, 
shared waters resources can stimulate low-level interstate conflict but also be an important 
incentive for more cooperation. And indeed, a large end expanding epistemic community 
has stressed the cooperative sides of water rather than the conflictual ones, as outlined in 
the following paragraph. 
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 The United States government decided to cooperate because it wanted to preserve a good regional and 
international image, and also because by doing so it hoped that Mexico would encourage a similar 
cooperation on other sensible matters such as drug trafficking and immigration. 
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1.1.2. The Cornucopian or neoliberal approach 
The gloomy scenario predicted by Neo-Malthusianism clearly diverges with the 
optimistic perspective often referred to as Cornucopian
13
. Detractors of the water-war 
theory argue that such predictions are too alarmist and that there is no historical evidence to 
support them. Zeitoun and Mirumachi (2008: 298) observe that such view was propagated 
in part by sensationalist media articles and declarations released by various UN Secretary-
Generals, recalling pessimistic statements from Boutros Boutros Ghali and Kofi Annan
14
.  
Towards the end of the 1990s, numerous studies started to emphasize the cooperative 
aspect of water resources (e.g. Deudney and Mattew, 1999; Elhance, 1999; Wolf and 
Hamner, 2000; Allan, 2001; Jägerskog, 2003; Phillips, 2006; Wolf et al., 2006; 
Dannreuther, 2007; Hamner, 2008; Dinar et al., 2011). This shift towards cooperation led to 
a “desecuritization of water resource management” (Turton, 2003: 96), bringing issues 
related to water back to the sphere of political negotiations, and out of crisis mode where 
threat perceptions impede a constructive dialogue. Marwa Daoudy (2010) viewed this 
“desecuritization” of transboundary water resources as a factor that could both facilitate 
negotiated agreements between states and contribute to the diffusion of the concept of 
benefit sharing, that, according to Phillips (2006: 53) “needs to be significantly developed, 
if it is to become of real utility in the debate on trans-boundary water resource 
management”.  
In 2000, a ground-breaking study carried out at the Oregon State University by a team of 
scholars led by Aaron Wolf (Wolf, 2000 and later) produced a decisive paradigm shift 
towards a discourse of cooperation
15
. Based on 1,831 instances of conflict and cooperation 
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 Named after the cornucopia, the horn of plenty, a symbol of abundance in ancient Greek mythology. 
14
 More recently, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon underlined the potential that water has in fueling 
wars and conflicts (Lewis, 2007). However, in 2011 Ban Ki Moon shifted the focus from scarcity to 
mismanagement, urging “governments to recognize the urban water crisis for what it is – a crisis of 
governance, weak policies and poor management, rather than one of scarcity” (United Nations Secretary-
General, 2011). 
15
 Significantly, in 2006 during the highly influential World Water Week (an event organized yearly by the 
Stockholm International Water Institute) this move towards a cooperative discourse was reflected in the 
statements released by participants. Among the others, Arunabha Ghosh, co-author of the 2006 Human 
Development Report, declared that “Water wars make good newspaper headlines but cooperation 
[agreements] don't […] and there are plenty of bilateral, multilateral and trans-boundary agreements for 
watersharing - all or most of which do not make good newspaper copy”. Likewise, Asit K. Biswas declared 
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occurred within an international river basin of the world from 1948 to 1999, the 
“Freshwater Transboundary Dispute Database” (FTDD) shows that riparians are more 
inclined to cooperate rather than entering into conflicts. The analysis demonstrated that 
during the last 4,500 years there have been 3,600 water related treaties and only one known 
water war between nations, happened in 2,500 B.C. between the Sumerian states of Lagash 
and Umma in the Tigris-Euphrates basin (Wolf 2007: 20). The reason for this 
predominance of cooperation is that water is too important to fight over it. At the sub-
national level, water can exacerbate existing tensions and even cause conflicts, but at the 
inter-state level things go differently (Wolf et al., 2006).  
With an approach that recalls the functionalist perspective, water negotiations are seen 
as a vector that bring countries together building trust and prevent conflicts also at the 
“higher” political level. As stated by Wolf, a comprehensive approach to water-based 
conflicts is needed as well as more research aimed at understanding how an “international, 
indispensable, and emotional” resource as water (Wolf et al., 2006: 5) best contributes to 
cooperation and peace among nations. Corroborating Wolf’s findings, Hamner (2008: 93) 
asserts that “there is a global history of water-related violence, but at the sub-national 
level”. Tensions connected to water are thus acknowledged, along with the fact that 
existing tensions between countries cannot be attributed to the only issue of water sharing 
but also to broader pre-existing sources of conflict (Lasserre, 2009; Phillips, 2006). 
 
1.1.3. Critical hydropolitics 
In juxtaposition with this dichotomous approach to water politics, the latest tendency in 
the hydropolitics debate has been to analyse the connection between conflict and 
cooperation (Postel and Wolf, 2001; Wolf et al., 2003) and the coexistence of these two 
phenomena (Mirumachi and Allan, 2007; Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008; Earle, Jägerskog 
et al., 2010; Zeitoun et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, a critical approach to hydropolitics emerged in contrast to mainstream 
rationalist studies of water politics, to delve on underdeveloped aspects of transboundary 
water conflicts and cooperation. Sneddon and Fox (2006) sketched the outlines of a critical 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
that water wars are “absolute nonsense because this is not going to happen - at least not during the next 100 
years” (Inter Press Service, 2006). 
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hydropolitics, to examine the ways in which discursive strategies influence interactions 
among basin riparians, identify nodes of water conflict (e.g., a large dam), and explore how 
images and representations of political actors shape particular geopolitical orders. Along a 
similar line, Warner and Zeitoun (2008) brought forward a new approach that mixes IR 
critical theory to transboundary water issues
16
 to understand political processes and power 
relations in international river basins. The aim of this new framework of analysis it to apply 
“critical and Realist IR theory to hydropolitics in a way that avoids ‘water wars’ or ‘water 
peace’ discourses and, by pointing at the layered nature of hegemonic struggles, opens up 
the scope to consenting and non-consenting victims of water deals between states” (Warner 
and Zeitoun, 2008: 809).  
Based on the assumption that transboundary water management is a political process, 
and that the unit of analysis is not the watershed but the “problemshed” (Allan, 2001), the 
critical hydropolitics approach adopted by several scholars associated with the London 
Water Research Group
17
 is aimed at developing a more robust understanding of key 
political factors in transboundary water interactions. Overt and covert forms of power, 
discursive processes and social constructions are here used to bring a new perspective to the 
study of water relations.  
Most of all, the main tenets of constructivism and the concepts of power and hegemony 
form the theoretical core of critical hydropolitics and also of this thesis, as it will be 
outlined in Chapter 2 that presents the analytical framework informing this research. 
However, before concluding this literature review and moving to the presentation of the 
two case studies, the following illustrates how scholars have linked large hydraulic 
infrastructures to the distribution and control of political power within the nation. While 
this area of study does not traditionally pertain to the hydropolitical scholarship, I argue 
that a connection between these two disciplines can offer useful and yet unexplored insights 
to the study of how state power is wielded in an international river basin.  
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 Warner and Zeitoun (2008) articulated their article as a response to a paper in which Kathryn Furlong 
(2006) dismissed the IR approach to analyse transboundary water issues, as in her opinion it obfuscates many 
crucial factors of transboundary watercourses.  
17
 Based at King's College London and the University of East Anglia, the London Water Research Group 
refers to a global network of academics, researchers and professionals committed to the promotion of critical 
water research. As stated in the group’s website (http://lwrg.org/about-us.html), active members of the group 
include Professor Tony Alan, Dr Dave Phillips, Dr Mark Zeitoun, Dr Jeroen Warner, Dr Ana Cascão, Dr 
Naho Mirumachi and Dr Mark Mulligan. 
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1.1.4. Hydraulic infrastructures and political power 
Major dams
18
 are among the largest structures built by humans and are perhaps the most 
spectacular way to tame water resources. Apart from serving practical purposes (e.g. 
generating electricity, controlling water flows and allowing irrigated agriculture), dams are 
also powerful political symbols that can be used to build and reinforce national identities 
(Mitchell, 2002: 44). Massive dams not only physically alter the landscape, but also shape 
perceptions and ideas as they symbolize the might of the state that built them, often 
becoming a favourite of nation-builders around the world (McCully, 2001: 237). 
The nexus between the construction of large hydraulic infrastructures and political 
power has long been studied, and in this regard the work of Karl August Wittfogel has 
become a classical entry point. In his seminal book Oriental Despotism, Wittfogel (1957) 
introduced the concepts of hydraulic society and hydraulic despotism, arguing that those 
who control water in arid or semi-arid regions also control political power. The so-called 
“hydraulic regimes” might increase their grip on power by building and managing 
hydraulic infrastructures such as dams and network of canals, which would allow 
bureaucrats to exert control over people and rivers. While Wittfogel’s study was originally 
interpreted as one that linked water management with authoritarian political regimes (both 
ancient ones, like Mesopotamia and the pre-Columbian societies, and modern ones like the 
USSR and China), Erik Swyngedouw (2006: 16) noted that the Wittfogelian perspective 
has also been used to understand power relationships in modern capitalist forms of 
development.  
For instance, Donald Worster (1985) placed the control of water resources at the centre 
of the development of the arid West in the USA in the early 1900s, identifying a small 
group of technocrats from the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) that detained most of the 
political and social power. As Worster noted, the decisions taken by the IID appeared “so 
utterly rational, so perfectly wise, that ordinary citizens did not challenge them, did not feel 
confident enough in their own knowledge to question or oppose them. […] Water had 
indeed made this desert bloom, and the crop was oligarchy” (Worster, 1985: 206). Also 
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 The International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) defines a major dam as a dam with a height of 150 
meters or more from the foundation, a reservoir storage capacity of at least 25 cubic kilometres and an 
electrical generation capacity of at least 1000 megawatts. 
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Marc Reisner examined water politics in the American West, tracing the story of William 
Mulholland and of other powerful engineers in 20
th
 century Los Angeles
19, that “tended to 
view themselves as a godlike class performing hydrologic miracles for grateful simpletons 
who were content to sit in the desert and raise fruit” (Reisner, 1993: 119). 
Likewise, Swyngedouw (1999) investigated how ruling political elites can increase their 
influence and preserve social control through large hydraulic projects, in the so-called 
“hydraulic mission” to control nature and conquer the desert. Based on Wester (2009), the 
hydraulic mission can be defined as the belief that the state should develop hydraulic 
infrastructure to capture as much water as possible for human uses, since all water flowing 
to the ocean is considered wasted. Behind the hydraulic mission there is the hydrocracy, “a 
group of actors such as ministries or governmental organizations mandated to plan, design 
and implement various features of water resources management” (Mirumachi 2013, 8).  
During the twentieth century, hydraulic missions were launched worldwide, and some of 
the largest and most iconic dam projects were realized around the world, becoming highly 
symbolic both within the nation and outside (Frey, 1993). Examples are the Marathon dam, 
hailed as the greatest achievement of Greece after the Parthenon (Kaika, 2006: 297), and 
the massive Hoover Dam in Nevada, that led US Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes to 
declare that with its completion “pridefully, man acclaims his conquest of nature” (McCool, 
2012: 23). Similarly, in 1954, at the inauguration of the high Bhakra dam, Prime Minister 
Jawahar Lal Nehru audaciously described dams as the “temples of modern India”20 
(Sharma, 1989). In Nasser’s Egypt, the gigantic Aswan High Dam, completed in 1971 with 
Soviet support, became “the centrepiece of postwar nation making” in a country in which 
“large dams offered a way to build not just irrigation and power systems, but nation-states 
in themselves” (Mitchell, 2002: 44-45). John Waterbury observed that as relations between 
Egypt and Britain deteriorated in the 1950s, “Nasser and his associates could no longer 
regard the dam as simply a big engineering project, but rather came to hold it up as the 
symbol of Egypt’s will to resist imperialist endeavors to destroy the revolution” 
(Waterbury, 1979: 108). If, on the one side, those who supported the Aswan High Dam 
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 The struggle for power and the conflicts between different water users in California in the early 1900s (also 
known as California Water Wars) have also been narrated by Roman Polanski in his 1974 movie Chinatown. 
20
 However only four years later, in 1958, Nehru seemed to have changed his opinion on the matter, deploring 
the quest for big dams as a “disease of gigantism” (D’Souza 2008, 112). 
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were treated as patriots, on the other side, those who criticized it were “thought of as 
subversive or even treasonous” (Waterbury, 1979: 117). Indian activist Arundhati Roy 
identified a similar correlation between patriotism and dams on her analysis of the Sardar 
Sarovar Dam project in India
21
, and McCully noted that critics of the planned Castanho 
Dam in Brazil were accused by the local governor Tasso Jereissati of using “wicked 
insinuations and unfounded and unpatriotic criticisms” (McCully, 2001: 264). 
Therefore, having acknowledged that large dams can have an important political value, I 
argue that a critical approach to their study – one that recognizes both their performative 
and discursive impacts – can bring useful and unexplored insights to the analysis of 
transboundary water relations. This is because large dams also have a foreign dimension, as 
they often are at the origin of regional conflicts and controversies. If a dam is portrayed as a 
symbol of the nation, those who question it become the enemies of the nation. The 
hydrocracy can thus portray the construction of a dam against the will of a neighbouring 
country as a symbol of internal cohesion that incarnates the nation’s right to self-
determination. This link between the symbolic meaning of dams and transboundary water 
relations appears to be relevant to the analysis of the two case studies adopted in this 
research, as it will be illustrated in the following paragraph.  
 
1.2. Choice of the case studies  
The two case studies selected for this research can be considered case studies within a 
case study, with the latter being the Aral Sea basin and the former being the Rogun dam in 
Tajikistan and the Kambarata dam in Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, while the main area of 
analysis is the Aral Sea basin in Central Asia and interstate relations among the upstream – 
(Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) and downstream (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) 
countries, the specific focus is on the political confrontation around the construction of 
these two major dams and its power dynamics.  
The decision to focus on the issue of major dams rather than on other questions (such as 
the desiccation of the Aral Sea or water pollution of the Amu Darya or Syr Darya) comes 
from several considerations. First, water issues in Central Asia have traditionally been 
centred around water quantity rather than water quality, thus making the construction of 
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 See for instance the 2002 documentary “Dam/age”, directed by A. Seth and produced by First Run/Icarus 
Films. 
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large dams (that can considerably impact on the water flow) particularly relevant. Secondly, 
the impact of major dams is such that they are equally important both at the national and at 
the regional level. Thirdly, it can be argued that the revitalisation of the two dam projects in 
the 2000s has become the key to understand Central Asian water politics, strongly 
influencing all matters related to the distribution and sharing of regional water resources22. 
At present, the resolution of regional water problems seems subordinated to the resolution 
of the ongoing dam dispute. Fourthly, the analysis of major dams in Central Asia allows 
touching upon a number of central issues in regional water politics, such as the revision of 
Soviet water allocation, sovereignty over natural resource and the assertion of national 
interests. 
As for the choice of these two particular dams (see also Table 1), they were selected as 
they present a number of common features that make them comparable and particularly 
suitable to carry out a comprehensive study of power dynamics in the Aral Sea basin. In 
particular, both projects:  
i. are being built by the furthest upstream country of the river basin (Tajikistan in 
the Amu Darya river basin, and Kyrgyzstan in the Syr Darya river basin) and will 
have an impact on downstream countries (Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in the 
Amu Darya river basin, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in the Syr Darya river 
basin); 
ii. are major dams that will create a massive water reservoir on top of a cascade 
system made of several downstream reservoirs; 
iii. are extremely costly and cannot be funded by national resources alone, and 
therefore, both proposing countries need to find external investors willing to 
participate in the project;  
iv. would generate large amounts of hydroelectricity in countries with significant 
energy deficits;  
v. would give to the upstream countries full control of the water flow, allowing 
them to use water as a strategic tool (for example by pressuring downstream 
riparian states to pay for water releases);  
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 This consideration comes, among other things, from the author’s professional experience gained working 
on high-level regional water negotiations for the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy 
for Central Asia (UNRCCA) in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, from January until December 2009.  
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vi. are strongly opposed by downstream countries and in particular by Uzbekistan; 
vii. are highly politicized, and favouring or impeding their realization has become a 
matter of primary importance for both upstream Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and 
to downstream Uzbekistan. 
 
Table 1: The Rogun and Kambarata dams compared. Source: Schmidt, 2007; Tetra Tech, 2011. 
 Rogun Kambarata 
Location River Vakhsh, Tajikistan River Naryn, Kyrgyzstan 
River basin concerned Amu Darya Syr Darya 
Basin riparians concerned 
Tajikistan Afghanistan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan  
Estimated Cost (US$ 
billion) 
2.9 2 – 4.9* 
Height (meters) 335 275 
Water reservoir volume 
(km
3
) 
13.8 4.65 
Electricity generation 
(MW) 
3.600 1900 
Average annual 
performance 
(billion kWh) 
13.1 5.1 
Genesis of the project 
(period) 
1960s 1970s 
Beginning of construction 
works 
1982 1986 
*While the cost estimated by the Kyrgyz government is US$ 2 billion, a report prepared by the consultant 
Tetra Tech ES Inc. for USAID, the United States Agency for International Development, assessed the cost to 
amount to US$ 4.9 billion (Tetra Tech, 2011: 64). 
 
What is perhaps the most relevant aspect is that if these dams are completed they would 
change the status-quo in regional water management. Each of them could be the first major 
dam ever finalized in Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, thus reversing a 
situation in which the upstream countries of the Aral Sea basin have not been able to tap 
their significant hydroelectric potential.  
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Moreover, the dams are extremely controversial, since there seems to be a fundamental 
disagreement on the way government officials in the upstream and downstream countries 
frame the management of shared water resources. Framing of environmental issues reveals 
differences in how stakeholders form interpretations of what is at stake and what should be 
done (Dewulf et al., 2005), implying that the dominant framing will bring highly 
differential benefits to the actors involved. For instance, as Brugnach at al. observed 
(2008), a water shortage situation can be framed by one actor as a problem of “insufficient 
water supply”, and by another as one of “excessive water consumption”. The former will 
focus on the amount of water available, and will possibly oppose the realisation of 
infrastructures that might disrupt the water flow (e.g., a dam), while the latter is more likely 
to suggest a change in the water use (e.g., switching to a less water-intensive crop). The 
dominant framing forms the “sanctioned discourse”, that, as it was defined by Anthony 
Turton, “is the prevailing or dominant discourse that has been legitimised by the discursive 
élite within the water sector at any one moment in time. It represents what may be said, 
who may say it and how it may be interpreted, thereby leading to the creation of a dominant 
belief system or paradigm” (Turton, 2002: 39). 
For what concerns the Aral Sea basin, while regional hegemony is disputed between 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (Deyermond, 2009), regional hydro-hegemony (i.e. hegemony 
over water politics) is detained by Uzbekistan. This is because the Uzbek government has 
successfully managed to impose its sanctioned discourse on regional water issues keeping 
its advantageous Soviet water allocation unchanged, effectively thwarting the hydropower 
ambitions of upstream countries, thus continuing to practice the water-intensive cotton 
monoculture whose income is needed by the Uzbek political elites to support the existing 
system of social, political, and economic control (Weinthal, 2006). 
Conversely, it is manifest that both upstream countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are 
nor hydro nor regional hegemons, being the economically and politically weaker countries 
among the five Central Asian republics. However, through the construction of the Rogun 
and Kambarata dams the two countries are challenging a status-quo in which they have not 
been able to take advantage of their upstream position and exploit their hydroelectric 
potential. If completed, the two dams could give the Tajik and Kyrgyz governments almost 
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total control of the regions’ water resources, thus significantly challenging the current 
power setting.  
 
1.3. Aim of the thesis and research questions 
This thesis takes a critical hydropolitical approach and applies it to interstate relations in 
the Aral Sea basin in Central Asia. The aim of this thesis is to analyse and understand the 
role of state power in transboundary water relations, and to provide an in–depth analysis of 
the evolution of interstate relations in Central Asia in the field of water in the period 1991-
201123. The study looks at the various forms of overt and covert power that shape interstate 
relations and at the way hegemonic and counter hegemonic measures are put in place in an 
international river basin.  
The main research question that the thesis aims to answer is:  
 
How state power is wielded in transboundary water relations? 
 
 Two sub-questions, that will help answering the main question, will also be addressed. 
Namely, i) how did water relations in Central Asia evolve in the period 1991-2011?, and ii) 
which counter-hegemonic and hegemonic measures have been put in place to favour and 
obstruct the construction of the Rogun and Kambarata dams in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?. 
The overarching hypothesis driving this study is that the intimate correlation between 
the concepts of power and hegemony can offer key insights to the analysis and 
understanding of transboundary water relations. Discursive and social constructions 
influence interactions among basin riparians, and help explaining the conflictive or 
cooperative nature of transboundary water relations. As it will be thoroughly discussed in 
Chapter 2, power is seen as a multifaceted concept, one that can be defined as the ability, or 
capacity, of one actor to get the desired outcome through coercive, bargaining and 
ideational/discursive means. The success in getting the desired outcome leads to hegemony, 
that from a critical neo-Gramscian perspective can be defined as an expression of widely-
based consent supported by material resources and institutions. 
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 These two dates, 1991 and 2011, represent respectively the year in which the Central Asian countries 
gained independence and the year in which this doctoral research started. Most of the data were collected in 
2012, and so 2011 seemed the most appropriate cut-off point for this analysis.  
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While, on the one hand, the analytical focus is placed on state power, on the other hand, 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic tactics represent the ways in which power is wielded 
and observed. Therefore, based on the assumption that the construction of the Rogun and 
Kambarata dams would irreversibly change the status-quo of water politics in the Aral Sea 
basin, the ways in which these projects are being supported and opposed can be categorised 
as counter-hegemonic and hegemonic measures, meaning respectively measures that are 
put in place to contest and maintain a certain hegemonic order.  
 
Figure 1: Narrowing down the scope of the research 
 
 
Within this analytical framework, three states are thereby examined in particular detail, 
the hegemonised ones, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and the hegemon, Uzbekistan. Although 
more in general, events in the rest of the region are discussed and illustrated, since 
understanding and explicating the evolution of water relations in Central Asia seems a 
 20 
 
necessary step to carry out a comprehensive analysis of power dynamics in an international 
river basin.  
Narrowing down the scope of the research (as shown in Figure 1), the general focus of 
this study is placed on hydropolitics (or the politics of international waters), a branch of IR. 
Within this disciplinary area, the basin of the Aral Sea is used as a background and as a 
platform to discuss the two case studies, which can be considered the empirical foundation 
for a study that essentially focuses on the analysis of power and hegemony. The ways in 
which this research has been designed to answer its research questions is outlined in the 
following section.  
 
1.4. Outline of the dissertation 
As it was mentioned, this study aims to explore how power is wielded in an international 
river basin and what measures states put in place to contest and maintain hegemony. To 
carry out such analysis, the thesis has been divided into seven chapters and four annexes 
(see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Schematic overview of the thesis structure and of its research questions. 
 
 
This first Chapter introduces the research, its objectives and its research questions. It 
also provides a literature review of the academic debate on hydropolitics, outlining the two 
main branches of the discipline, the Neo-Malthusian (or neorealist) and the Cornucopian 
(or neoliberal). It then briefly sketches the main traits of a critical approach to 
hydropolitics, and links it with studies exploring the connection between large hydraulic 
infrastructures and the distribution and control of political power. It finally illustrates the 
originality of this research and its main contributions to IR literature and to Central Asian 
studies.  
Chapter 2 defines the theoretical, analytical and methodological framework used in this 
study. After an introduction on critical hydropolitics, the key concept of power is reviewed, 
focusing on the different facets and interpretations of the term that emerged from multiple 
disciplinary angles. Three dimensions of power are identified and included in the two 
macro categories of hard and soft power, that are then connected with the concept of 
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hegemony and its two main approaches in IR theory. Subsequently, the analytical tools 
adopted in this research – the “circle of hydro-hegemony” (a conceptual redefinition of the 
framework of hydro-hegemony) (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006) and the TWINS matrix 
(Mirumachi, 2007; 2010) – are presented, explaining how they help addressing the research 
questions and describing how data were collected and analysed.  
Following these two introductory and explanatory chapters, the empirical analysis 
begins in Chapter 3, which serves as a background to introduce water relations in Central 
Asia and the two case studies, and to answer the first sub-question of this research. The 
chapter is organised in three sections. Initially, it provides some key definitions and 
delineates the main principles of international water law. The second section introduces the 
Aral Sea basin and the ways in which water has been perceived by the Central Asian 
peoples and managed by the Soviet Union. The third section outlines the evolution of 
interstate water relations in Central Asia, providing a general analysis of coexisting conflict 
and cooperation and identifying three stages in regional water relations. The focus is finally 
narrowed down to examine bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. 
Chapters 4 and 5 present and analyse the two case studies, respectively the Rogun dam 
in Tajikistan and the Kambarata dam in Kyrgyzstan. Both chapters begin with an overview 
of the dam and of its objective impact at the national and regional level. Successively, the 
dispute around the dams is used to examine how state power is wielded in international 
transboundary water relations, and to identify and categorise the various counter-
hegemonic tactics that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have put in place to favour the realisation 
of the projects and fulfil their hydraulic mission. 
Chapter 6 concludes the empirical analysis, presenting and examining Uzbek hegemonic 
tactics, which offer an alternative and opposing perspective with respect to that offered by 
the Tajik and the Kyrgyz governments. As the Uzbek government tends to treat the Rogun 
and Kambarata dams as a nearly unique entity, hegemonic tactics aimed at opposing the 
realisation of both projects and at maintaining the status-quo unchanged are merged and 
discussed in a single chapter. 
Chapter 7 concludes, assessing and comparing the two case studies and their impact on 
regional water relations. The research questions are reviewed and answered, and 
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successively an analytical summary is provided. The chapter ends illustrating the 
contributions of this study to the hydropolitical debate and identifying areas for future 
research.  
Four Annexes complete this thesis. Annex 1 delves into some methodological aspects 
that were deliberately skipped to make Chapter 2 more concise. The rationale and the 
methods behind the creation of the three chronologies are explained in greater detail, along 
with speech acts theory and some notions of discourse analysis. Finally, Annex 2, 3, and 4 
contain the three chronologies in their entirety.  
 
1.5. Originality and scientific value of the research 
The topic of this research is narrow and at the same time broad. Narrow, because it looks 
specifically at how states employ power in transboundary water relations. Broad, because it 
touches upon at least two different disciplinary fields and one geographical area of study. 
Such approach originated from the decision to adopt a critical hydropolitics perspective to 
examine water politics in the Aral Sea basin. This implies delving on aspects that relate to 
political geography, such as geographical configurations, transboundary issues and water 
distribution and use, but also to critical IR theory, such as power analysis, discursive and 
social constructions. Insights from Central Asian Studies, both at the governmental level 
(concerning the nature and structure of national political systems) and at the societal level 
(regarding among other things ideologies and political cultures) have also informed this 
research and offered precious understandings of regional hydropolitics.  
For instance, the fact that with independence the Central Asian governments had to re-
evaluate or reconstruct their pasts (Roy, 2000), in what seems a continuous quest for 
legitimacy (Mellon, 2010; Matveeva, 2009) aimed at maintaining power (Cummings, 2002) 
with the support of symbols and images (Cummings, 2010), appears relevant to an analysis 
of power and hegemony in transboundary water relations. Likewise, the review of literature 
exploring how the construction of large dams can be linked to the distribution and control 
of political power within the nation, made a valuable contribution to the examination of the 
two case studies.  
The research brings a contribution to knowledge at several levels. As Grix noted, a 
“substantial contribution to knowledge” implies that “you must have produced original 
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research on a given topic and embedded it firmly in the ‘received wisdom’ of a particular 
field” (Grix, 2001: 108). The originality of this research lies in its interdisciplinary 
approach to water politics in Central Asia. There are, to the author's knowledge, no studies 
that carried out a comprehensive analysis of transboundary water relations in Central Asia 
using insights from critical IR theory and placing the focus on the issue of large dams. The 
only contributions on power dynamics in the Aral Sea basin are an article on the journal 
“Water Policy” written by Kay Wegerich (2008), which examines hydro-hegemony in the 
Amu Darya basin, and a partial analysis of water relations using the TWINS matrix carried 
out by Sojamo (2008).  
At a conceptual level, this research brings to the fore an original theoretical contribution, 
as it revisits the analytical framework of hydro-hegemony, proposing a redesign of the 
structure of hydro-hegemony, which has been named the “circle of hydro-hegemony”. 
Furthermore, besides a few contributions (see paragraph 2.5.1), little attention has been 
paid to how the hegemonised attempts to reverse the status-quo in an international river 
basin. Hence, this research will also provide an original contribution to the literature on 
hydropolitics in Central Asia, offering fresh theoretical interpretations to the subjects of 
power and counter-hegemony in the Aral Sea basin.  
A further value is added by the three timelines expressly created for the research (see 
Annex 2, 3, and 4). The aim is to publish them after discussing this thesis, and to make 
them widely available for research and other suitable uses. They represent, at the time of 
writing, the most detailed reference-supported collection of events of this kind for the 
Central Asian region in the period 1991-2011.  
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Chapter 2. Theoretical framework and 
methodology  
 
If you beat your head against the wall, it is your head that breaks and not the 
wall. 
Antonio Gramsci, Letters from Prison, 1930 
 
 
 
This chapter delineates the theoretical, analytical and methodological framework used in 
this study. The first section goes back to critical hydropolitics and illustrates more in detail 
a constructivist approach to the discipline. It then outlines the notions of power and 
hegemony and how these two are correlated. The key insights of the framework of hydro-
hegemony (FHH, Zeitoun and Warner, 2006), namely the acknowledgement of the role that 
power and power asymmetries play in interstate water relations are used to answer the main 
research question, how state power is wielded in transboundary water relations?, and one 
of the two sub-questions, which counter-hegemonic and hegemonic measures have been put 
in place to favour and obstruct the construction of the Rogun and Kambarata dams in 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan?. The remaining sub-question, how did water relations in 
Central Asia evolve in the period 1991-2011?, which is considered propaedeutic to 
approach the two former questions, is answered with the support of a hermeneutic tool, the 
TWINS matrix (Mirumachi, 2007; 2010). The final section clarifies the operationalization 
of the research, explaining how data were collected and analysed.  
 
2.1. Constructivism  
Initially associated with the work of Nicholas Onuf (1989), constructivism is a 
theoretical approach to social sciences that was developed after the end of the cold war as 
an alternative to the two dominant paradigms, the realist and the liberal. According to 
constructivism, “people make society, and society makes people” (Onuf, 1998: 59). Social 
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relations make or construct people into what they are and people construct the world what it 
is. Consequently, countries are social constructions, and order between societies is socially 
constructed, and not merely determined by objective material conditions. Although many 
strands of constructivism can be identified due to a significant growth of constructivist 
literature during the 1990s, an overall distinction can be made between modern 
(conventional) and postmodern (critical) constructivism, On the one hand, as Thierry 
Balzacq (2009) explains, postmodern constructivism – which is sceptical towards the core 
positivist notions of truth, objectivity and reason – aims to study world politics stressing 
how the social discourse shapes and gives meaning to actions. The focus of postmodern 
constructivism is to understand, not to explain. On the other hand, modern constructivism, 
which does not reject positivist conventions, “while expecting to uncover differences, 
identities, and multiple understandings, still assumes that it can specify a set of conditions 
under which one can expect to see one identity or another” (Hopf, 1998: 183). 
Nevertheless, conventional and critical constructivism share the same theoretical 
fundamentals, as both wants to study how human agency – being agency the ability of 
actors to act and think independently – and social constructions produce identities and 
institutions. 
According to Wendt (1999: 1), a modernist systemic constructivist
24
, the two basic 
tenets of constructivism are: “1) that the structures of human association are determined 
primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces and 2) that the identities and interests 
of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature”. 
Thus, Wendt outlines a reflexive relationship, where the actors influence the structures and 
the structures influence the actors. Agency and structures are mutually constituted through 
intersubjective understandings: agency influences structural continuities and processes of 
change and it is influenced by the social spatial and historical context (Klotz and Lynch, 
2007: 3-12). For constructivists, normative or ideational structures, or in other words, 
norms and ideas, are just as important as material structures, such as military and economic 
power, and therefore “systems of shared ideas, beliefs and values also have structural 
characteristics and exert a powerful influence on social and political action (Reus-Smit, 
2001: 216-217).  
                                                     
24 
Following the neo-realist Waltzian third-image level of analysis, systemic constructivism concentrates on 
how States relate to one another in the international domain. (Reus-Smit, 2001: 219) 
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Realities and identities in constructivism are created through speech acts, which are “the 
most important way that we go about making the world what it is” (Onuf, 1998, 59). 
Speech act theory was originally developed by a philosopher of language, Austin (1975), in 
his seminal book How to do things with words. The main assumption behind speech act 
theory is that different uses of language, by their utterance, perform an action. If I say to a 
friend that “I will buy a house”, or “I do” during a marriage ceremony, I am promising that 
I will do something by just saying it. This is a performative utterance, one through which I 
am performing an act. Austin identified five categories of performative acts (1975: 151-2): 
verdictives (giving a verdict or an appraisal), exercitives (the exercising of powers, rights 
and influence), commissives (commiting to do something by declaring or announcing it), 
behabitives (relating with social behaviours, e.g. apologizing, congratulating or cursing), 
and expositive (they put an utterance in a context, as in “I reply”, “I assume” or ”I argue”). 
Further elaborating on this, Searle (1975) introduced the following categories of speech 
acts: assertive, directive, commissive, expressive and declarations. Subsequently, Nicholas 
Onuf (1998) analysed speech acts from a constructivist point of view, considering them as 
acts that perform an action and establish a relationship when they encounter a response or a 
reaction from the audience towards which they were directed. Onuf (1998: 66) reduced the 
categories of speech acts to the following three: 1) assertive, through which something is 
asserted, as in “our country is experiencing a difficult situation”; 2) directive, through 
which something is demanded, as in “we need more water”; and 3) commissive, through 
which something is promised, as in “I will pay my debts”.  
 
2.1.1. Constructivism and hydropolitics 
Chapter 1 illustrated that just like constructivism was developed as an alternative to the 
two dominant paradigms in IR, a critical constructivist approach to hydropolitics emerged 
in contrast to mainstream rationalist studies of water politics. This is the case also for this 
study, which adopts a critical hydropolitics approach to examine hydropolitics in Central 
Asia. This is partially due to the dissatisfaction with the two mainstream theories of the 
discipline, neo-realism and neo-liberalism (see Chapter 1), that tend to see water whether as 
a source of conflict or cooperation, overlooking the fact that conflict and cooperation can 
indeed coexist. Most importantly, neither of the two “neo” approaches can provide a 
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plausible justification to the diversity of water water-related interstate relations around the 
globe (Julien, 2012: 45), and explain, for instance, why basins with similar levels of water 
scarcity or similar geographical configurations may have very different levels of conflict 
and cooperation. Le Billion observes that the two mainstream schools of thought provide a 
somewhat deterministic explanation of conflictive and cooperative relations over water, one 
that “fail to take into account the socially constructed nature of resources” (Le Billion, 
2001: 565). As Julien explicates (2010: 10, note 17), it took a constructivist study 
(Kalpakian, 2004), to demonstrate that the Indo-Pakistani wars were caused by issues 
related to identity and not to water scarcity, as previous mainstream hydropolitics had 
hypothesized. To the same extent, several studies (Smith, 1995: 356; Wegerich; 2003: 256; 
IWMI, 1998) have noted that water in Central Asia is indeed abundant
25
 and not scarce as it 
is often stated (recently: US Senate, 2011), thus supporting an approach that goes beyond 
mainstream hydropolitical analysis, to look at other factors beyond scarcity to understand 
regional water relations, as “hydropolitics is what societies make of it” (Julien, 2012). 
Water is a multidimensional resource that besides its strategic and economic dimension, 
bears also a strong social, environmental and cultural significance (Rahaman & Varis: 
2005). It thus seems simplistic to consider water only as a source of conflict or cooperation. 
A constructivist approach to hydropolitics allows acknowledging the importance of the 
strategic and economic dimensions of water, while also trying to understand how the social 
constructions of water influence interstate relations. 
Recognizing the coexistence of structural conflict and cooperation, many scholars 
associated with the London Water Research Group have taken a constructivist approach to 
hydropolitics (Warner and Zeitoun, 2008: 807), studying how formally equal basin 
riparians may be in fact caught up in control relations, thus acknowledging the role that 
asymmetries of riparian power play in influencing transboundary water relations. If, on the 
one hand, the absence of war does not mean the absence of conflict or the presence of peace 
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 Water in Central Asia is certainly unevenly distributed and used inefficiently, but overall the region cannot 
be considered as water scarce. The Aral Sea basin has a total renewable water flow of 115.60 km
3 
per year 
(http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/fussr/index8.stm), on which around 64 million 
people rely. For instance, there is a striking difference between the Aral Sea basin and the Nile river basin – 
generally considered water scarce – which has a total renewable water flow of 80 km3 per year to sustain more 
than 200 million people (http://www.nilebasin.org/newsite/attachments/article/145/5%20-%20Summary%20-
%20The%20State%20of%20the%20Nile%20River%20Basin%202012.pdf). For more information on water 
distribution in the Aral Sea basin see Chapter 3.  
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(Zeitoun and Warner, 2008: 807), on the other hand, the signing of a treaty does not mean 
that cooperation is actually happening (Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008). A critical 
hydropolitics approach is aimed at developing a deeper understanding of key political 
factors in transboundary water interactions, recognizing the relevance of overt and covert 
forms of power, discursive processes and social constructions to the study of water 
relations.  
It is based on these assumptions – and taking inspiration from the Copenhagen concept 
of the construction of security – that the two frameworks employed in this study, TWINS 
and the FHH, were conceived. Both frameworks acknowledge the importance of the role of 
power and power asymmetries in international transboundary water relations, and both also 
utilise the constructivist notion of speech acts. Before reviewing the FHH and TWINS in 
detail and explaining how they will be used in this research, the next section illustrates the 
two central concepts of this study, power and hegemony.  
 
2.2. Power  
Power is an essentially contested concept in politics, one that can be given different 
interpretations and meanings (Lukes 1974; Berenskoetter, 2007), and its appropriate 
definition remains a controversial matter (Waltz, 1986: 333). The first modern analysis of 
political power can be traced back to the work of Niccolò Machiavelli (The Prince, 1513) 
and Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan, 1651). Machiavelli’s realist and pessimistic ideas on the 
separation of ethics and politics, created the image of a Prince that would rather be feared 
than loved, that would often use military force, violence and cunning to guarantee the 
prosperity of his kingdom and to possibly get total power. According to Machiavelli, power 
is not to be considered as a means to an end but as the end itself, thus making of The Prince 
an handbook on how power can be acquired, retained and expanded. Conversely, in 
Hobbes’ view power is linked to sovereignty and consent. State power is centralised and 
absolute but originates from a contract through which people – which are egoistic and 
violent – voluntarily confer their power to a man or to an assembly of men, that will act in 
their interest guaranteeing peace and stability. Two centuries later, Karl Marx (The 
Communist Manifesto, 1848), who to a certain extent can be associated to the realist 
thought of Machiavelli and Hobbes, theorised a political system in which political power is 
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based on economic power, or in other terms, on the possession of the means of production, 
through which a dominant social class would obtain its supremacy.  
The end of the Second World War and the progress of political science brought an 
increasing interest to the study of power in the social sciences. In particular, Max Weber’s 
Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1947) had a strong impact on future 
theorisations on power. According to Weber, power is the capacity of one actor to realize 
its will in a social relationship, despite the opposition of other actors. The concept of power 
is therefore associated to that of domination. In Weber’s view, political power is not based 
on social and economic factors but on three different sources of legitimation: charismatic 
authority (of a particular leader or of a certain institution, as in the case of dictatorial 
regimes during the last century); traditional authority (based on tradition and longevity, 
typical of pre-modern societies); and rational-legal authority (typical of modern societies 
and based on the belief that rationally established rules are legal). Following up on Weber’s 
ideas, Robert Dahl, who implicitly considered power as a relation among people from a 
behavioural science perspective, defined it as the ability of A “to get B to do something that 
B would not otherwise do”26 (Dahl, 1957: 203). In his study of power dynamics in the city 
of New Haven (1961), Dahl noted how political power in the United States is pluralistic, 
being distributed among a number of competing groups and not to a single ruling-elite, as it 
was argued for instance by American sociologists Floyd Hunter (1953) and Charles Wright 
Mills (1956).  
 
2.2.1. Three dimensions of power 
Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1962) partially agreed with Dahl in his critique to 
elitists, but further expanded the concept of power and developed a new theoretical model 
to include “what does not happen” in decision-making processes. They argued that none of 
the two main notions of power given by sociologists and political scientists of the time – 
which respectively saw power as highly centralised (elitist) and widely diffused (pluralist) – 
provided the “whole truth of the matter” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962: 947), and presented 
their central thesis of the two faces of power. The first face of power, or overt, is related 
                                                     
26
 Dahl brings the example of a professor that threatens to fail a student if he doesn’t’ read a particular book. 
In this case, the amount of power that the professor exerts can be calculated as the difference between the 
chance that the student would read the book before and after receiving the threat.   
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with Dahl’s idea of A imposing its will to B, and is directly observable in the decision 
making process, where a group makes decisions that directly affect another group. 
However, they observed that: 
Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. 
But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social 
and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to 
public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the 
extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from 
bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s 
set of preferences? (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962: 948) 
 
This introduces the second face of power, which involves the dynamics of the non-
decision making process, and resides in the ability to create and reinforce “barriers to the 
public airing of policy conflicts” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962: 949). Otherwise stated, the 
second dimension of power consists in the use of influence to limit the breadth of a 
discussion and to avoid conflicts from even being bought up to the political forum. Just 
because something did not happen, it doesn’t mean that nothing happened.  
Using as a starting point the work carried out by Dahl and by Bachrach and Baratz, 
Steven Lukes (1974, 2005b) further developed the study of power. According to Lukes, the 
two-dimensional view of power is inadequate as it relies on the supposition that power – 
when associated with conflict – can actually be observed. Moreover, previous 
interpretations of power did not consider the ability of an actor to influence the norms and 
values accepted by others. For instance, “A may exercise power over B by getting him to 
do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, 
shaping or determining his very wants” (Lukes, 2005b: 27). Since power can be hidden and 
not always visible, Lukes ideated a theoretical framework with three dimensions of power. 
The first, overt or hard dimension of power, is similar to Dahl’s idea of power, and it is 
represented by the material capacity of A having B doing something against his will. The 
second dimension of power is less visible, covert, and refers to Bachrach and Baratz’s 
second face of power: it is the ability to control the political agenda and to create barriers 
that would impede certain issues to be discussed. But the original contribution that Lukes 
brings to the debate is the third dimension of power, which he considers as the most 
effective among the three. This third dimension, power through domination, is hidden and 
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goes beyond the domains of decision-making and setting of the political agenda, to 
encompass the area in which the preferences and perceptions of others are formed and 
shaped. As Lukes put it: 
A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also 
exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. Indeed, is 
it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want 
them to have - that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? 
(Lukes, 1974: 23) 
 
This is the ideological dimension of power, which can be defined as power over ideas or 
ideational, inspired by the Gramscian concept of hegemony (see paragraph 2.3) to explain 
how the powerful secures the willing compliance of those they dominate (Lukes, 2005b: 
12). Subsequently, in the second edition of his book published in 2005, Lukes included two 
new chapters that reveal the influence of two French thinkers on power, Michel Foucault 
and Pierre Bourdieu.  
Foucault’s vision of domination framed in Discipline and Punish, is seen by Lukes as 
helpful in understanding how domination can be secured through acquiescence, as well as 
Foucault’s ideas on the link between power and knowledge and on power as a productive 
force. In the History of Sexuality (1998), Foucault introduced the popular concept of 
power/knowledge, to explain how power is formed by accepted forms of knowledge and 
truths. Power is ubiquitous, and it cannot be wielded but it is rather part of discourses. 
Power must be understood as the multiplicity of force relations within the context in which 
it operates. According to Foucault, “Power is everywhere; not because it embraces 
everything, but because it comes from everywhere....power is not an institution, and not a 
structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one 
attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society” (Foucault, 1998: 
93). This notwithstanding, Lukes considered the work of Foucault as too radical and 
misleading.  
For what concerns the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Lukes used his ideas on symbolic power 
to examine how power as domination is enhanced by its normalization, from the moment 
that unequal and arbitrary conditions may appear to actors as fair and normal (Swartz, 
2007). As a result of his analysis, Lukes finally defined an actor’s power as “his ability to 
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avoid or resist performing positive actions” (Lukes, 2005a: 480), bringing the example of 
how the US under the Bush Administration showed its power by not performing certain 
actions, such as ratifying the Kyoto protocols or joining the International Criminal Court. 
In relation with the work of Lukes and Foucault, and therefore with the connection 
between knowledge, ideas and power, it is worth noting that also English scholar Susan 
Strange (1994) recognised the existence of a third dimension of power, which originates in 
the “knowledge structure”. This third level of power, is the level at which power is 
exercised by the strong over the weak in the realm of ideas, to the extent that the weak 
“believe that the value-judgments of the strong really are the universally right and true 
ones” (Strange, 1994: 176). In her study of power relations in the field of finance, Strange 
made an interesting distinction between structural power and relational power. She noted 
how in the postwar period, the United States have used their structural power “to extend or 
restrict the range of options open to others” (Strange, 1990: 259), while Japan have used its 
relational power thanks to its global position as a major creditor and aid donor. If, on the 
one hand, relational power is clearly seen by Strange as “the ability of A to get B by 
coercion or persuasion to do what B would not otherwise do” (Strange, 1989: 145), on the 
other hand, the definition of structural power is less straightforward. Structural power, 
which has four dimensions – security, production, finance and knowledge – is eventually 
defined as: 
The power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within 
which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their 
scientists and other professional people have to operate. […] Structural power in short 
confers the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks 
within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises. 
(Strange, 1998: 24-25) 
 
It seems then that structural power, seen as the ability to shape and influence relational 
frameworks, can be associated with Lukes’ ideational power and the Gramscian notion of 
hegemony.  
In an attempt to identify conditions that might lead to hegemony, Gill and Law (1988) 
drew from the work of Lukes to identify three dimensions of power. If the first two 
dimensions (open or overt and covert power) are in line with those already observed in this 
analysis, it is with the third, structural power – which derives from Lukes’ third dimension 
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– that they brought a fresh contribution to the debate. According to Gill and Law, structural 
power is the “definite attraction and limitation systems with the physical and normative 
aspects to shape the relations of parties” (Gill and Law, 1988: 74). This dimension of power 
encompasses both material and normative aspects, that work together in the creation of a 
system of incentives and constraints. 
 
2.2.2. From hard to soft power 
What emerges from this overview is that power is not a single entity but it represents a 
variety of concepts and ideas. One aspect nevertheless appears clear. As Haugaard and 
Clegg noted, “power as domination, which is linked to (the capacity for) violent agency, is 
the dominant perception of power in everyday speech […]. However, if we look to the 
academic social science literature, increasingly the conception of power as essentially 
grounded in coercion represents a minority view” (Haugaard and Clegg, 2009: 3). Thus, it 
seems that the focus has moved from “hard” to “soft” power, the first being visible and 
concrete, and the latter being hidden and more sophisticated. On the one hand, hard power 
corresponds to Dahl’s definition of power, or to Lukes’ first dimension, and is the ability to 
coerce, which derives from a country’s military, economic and technological might and, 
especially in hydropolitics, from a country’s geographical position, (i.e. being upstream or 
downstream). On the other hand, soft power, as it was originally defined by Joseph Nye:  
Is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. 
When you can get others to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on 
sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. Soft power arises from the attractiveness 
of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate 
in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced. (Nye, 2004: 256) 
 
A few years later, Nye added to his analysis a new form of power, “smart power”, which 
he defined as “the ability to combine hard and soft power into a successful strategy” (Nye, 
2007). Nye’s concept of soft power can here be revised and used as a concept to represent 
the second and third dimensions of power analysed previously, as it proves efficient in 
encapsulating power in its more abstract dimension, especially if compared with hard 
power. Moreover, Nye’s soft power is partly corresponding to Bachrach and Baratz second 
face of power. Thus, based on the analysis of power carried out so far, it is possible to 
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attempt an initial schematization (Figure 3) of the different dimensions (or faces) of power 
observed, that will be subsequently adapted to the more specific application of the concept 
of power to water relations.  
 
 
Figure 3: Schematic representation of the three dimensions of power (source: Author). 
 
As it was observed, defining power in politics can be challenging, as it is a concept that 
can be associated to different interpretations and meanings, based on different perspectives 
and epistemologies, and to this day, there is not a universally accepted definition of power. 
Jonathan Gaventa observed that “power is often assumed, rather than defined or addressed 
or used in a coherent manner” (Gaventa, 2003: 12).  
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, power needs to be somehow defined, or at 
least the definition needs to be narrowed from the many available in the literature. Without 
aspirations of being definitive or absolute, the following working definition serves to frame 
the concept of power within this research. Based on the assumption that power is indeed a 
multifaceted concept, power is here seen as the ability, or capacity, of one actor to get the 
desired outcome through coercive, bargaining and ideational/discursive means. These three 
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aspects are intimately correlated and overlap with the Gramscian definition of hegemony 
based on force and consent, as it will be shown in the next paragraph. 
 
2.3. Hegemony 
The term hegemony (from Greek hēgemonia, “to lead”), defined by the Oxford English 
Dictionary as “leadership or dominance, especially by one state or social group over 
others”, originally indicated the predominance of a city state over another in ancient 
Greece. In modern times, however, the revamp and first modern definition of the term 
hegemony can be attributed to the Italian philosopher Vincenzo Gioberti, that in his work 
Del rinnovamento civile d’Italia (1851) (that was widely cited in the writings of Antonio 
Gramsci) defined it as “that sort of supremacy, pre-eminence, superiority, not legal nor 
juridical in the strict sense of the word, but morally efficient, that among several 
congeneric, unilingual and compatriot provinces, one exercises over the others” (Gioberti, 
1851, vol. II: 203, translated by the author from the original Italian). This definition became 
progressively popular and successfully penetrated the political language, with an increasing 
association of the term hegemony to the term leadership, notably as it was done by The 
Times in 1860 with reference to the Prussian hegemony/leadership over the German 
Confederation. In that occasion the newspaper stated that “it is a glorious ambition which 
drives Prussia to assert her claim to the leadership, or as that land of professors phrases it, 
the “hegemony” of the Germanic Confederation” (The Times, 1860). This last point calls 
for a distinction between the orthodox realist usage of the term in IR – which refers to the 
dominance of one state over one or more other states through the exertion of the Weberian 
“power over” (Gill and Law, 1989: 476) – and the usage originating from the work of the 
Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci, which is the one adopted in this research and that 
inspired Lukes’ third dimension of power.  
Gramsci developed the theory of hegemony in his monumental work Quaderni del 
carcere (1975), that he wrote between 1929 and 1935 while imprisoned by the Italian 
Fascist regime. The Gramscian concept of hegemony refers to the relations between classes 
and between the State and the civil society. In the struggle for hegemony in the civil society 
(“società civile”) a political party, for instance, needs to get ideological and cultural 
consent. Once the consent from the civil society is obtained, the party can act as State and 
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use its force to create a new historical bloc. Thus ideologies, for Gramsci, are assessed for 
their social effects rather than on their effective value (Fairclough, 2010: 62). Hegemony 
denotes the success of a dominant class in presenting its view of the world and its ideology, 
in achieving an intellectual and moral leadership in a way that the other classes accept it 
and consider it common sense
27
.  
As Ekers and Loftus noted, Gramsci's development of hegemony has two related facets. 
The first refers to “the maintenance of one social group's dominance over subordinate 
groups, accomplished through relations of consent and coercion” (Ekers and Loftus, 2008: 
702). The second refers to how hegemony can be maintained, and this is done reproducing 
“the social relations that are foundational to a given social formation” (Ekers and Loftus, 
2008: 702). More specifically, the State consolidates its hegemony and creates in people 
certain expectations and behaviours through a set of “private institutions” usually 
considered outside of the State, such as the Church, trade unions, schools and the 
intellectuals. The latters, are considered an efficacious instrument to affirm hegemony, such 
as the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, described by Gramsci as a “lay Pope” for his 
influence on Italian politics (Gramsci, 1975a: letter 210). If a government is not able to 
create its own class of intellectuals, it will only exercise dictatorship and not hegemony.  
Coercion and consent come together, and they are, in the function of hegemony, 
“connective” (Gramsci, 1975: Q12§1). Although both force and consent are necessary for a 
hegemonic order to survive, it is primarily on consent that a State needs to base its relations 
with the civil society. It is based on these assumptions that Gramsci criticizes the Italian 
Fascist regime, which in his view represents an element of weakness of the bourgeoisie, as 
it is a regime based on force rather than on consent (Mordenti, 1996: 51). Machiavelli’s 
image of the Prince, half beast (lion, fox and centaur) and half man – the metaphorical 
representation of a good ruler – is revisited by Gramsci as the combination of consent and 
coercion necessary to govern, “to the extent that the consensual aspect of power is in the 
forefront, hegemony prevails” (Cox, 1983: 165). To say it with the words of Gramsci:  
                                                     
27
 While Gramsci ideated theories on how to get hegemony from a disadvantageous situation (for example 
through a revolution), Gaetano Mosca (1923) – a main thinker in elite theory and an early political antagonist 
of Gramsci – developed the doctrine of the “political class”, in which he explained how a small minority can 
maintain power. 
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The 'normal' exercise of hegemony in the classic ground of the parliamentarian system, is 
characterized by a combination of force and consent, which balance each other variously, in 
a way that force does not stand above consent, on the contrary, force should appear as if it 
is sustained by the consent of the majority. (Gramsci, 1975: Q13§37, 1638, translated by 
the author from the original Italian) 
 
When the State dominates instead of directing, the result is dictatorship without 
hegemony (Gramsci, 1975: Q15§59), or, in other words, domination and not hegemony.  
 
2.3.1 Hegemony applied to IR 
Now that the concept of hegemony has been outlined, it is possible to introduce how this 
concept can be applied to IR. The notion of hegemony adopted in this study does not refer 
to the dominance of one state over another but rather to the Gramscian notion of coercion 
and consent, which was originally conceived and applied at the State level (referring to 
“internal” hegemony in the era of Italian city-states or in Fascist Italy).  
In IR theory, two main approaches to hegemony can be identified, a conventional realist 
one and a critical neo-Gramscian perspective. As Bieler and Morton observed, 
“conventional IR theory, reduces hegemony to a single dimension of dominance based on 
the economic and military capabilities of states” (Bieler and Morton, 2004: 87). This idea 
of hegemony – that can be linked to the first dimension of power, “hard power”, as it refers 
to domination through coercion – is at the origin of the hegemonic stability theory (HST), 
conceived by Robert Keohane (1984). HST is based on two central propositions: i) “Order 
in world politics is typically created by a single dominant power. Since regimes constitute 
elements of an international order, this implies that the formation of international regimes 
normally depends on hegemony”; ii) “The maintenance of order requires continuous 
hegemony” (Keohane, 1984: 31). Hence, according to Keohane, cooperation, order and 
stability can be achieved through the activities of a hegemonic power (as in the cases of the 
pax Britannica in the nineteenth century and the pax Americana after the Second World 
War), which “must possess enough military power to be able to protect the international 
political economy that it dominates from incursions by hostile adversaries” (Keohane, 
1984: 39). 
In contrast with this approach, the neo-Gramscian perspective of hegemony developed 
by Canadian scholar Robert Cox, broadens the domain of hegemony going back to the 
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Gramscian theorisations, and defines it as an expression of widely-based consent supported 
by material resources and institutions. As in the Gramscian thought, “dominance by a 
powerful state may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition of hegemony” (Cox, 1981: 
139). For Cox, hegemony is based on three spheres of activity: 1) the social forces 
engendered by the production process; 2) the forms of state; 3) world orders (Cox 1981; 
137-8). In addition, within each sphere of activity Cox (1981; 136) identified three 
categories of forces (or potentials) that interact: material capabilities/power (as industries 
and armaments), ideas (intersubjective meanings and collective images of social order held 
by different groups of people) and institutions (a particular amalgam of material power and 
ideas which help maintaining stability). These three forces act together in a reciprocal 
relationship to constitute an historical structure.  
 
 
Figure 4: The relationship of forces in an historical structure. Adapted from Cox, 1981: 136. 
 
In the world order, world hegemony is a “social structure, an economic structure, and a 
political structure; and it cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three” (Cox, 
1983: 172). Therefore, also when hegemony is studied at the world level, it appears as a 
complex of universal norms and institutions which create rules of behaviour for states and 
for the different forces operating within the civil society. The hegemon is the first amongst 
equals, as for example the United States at the UN General Assembly in comparison with 
Canada. Both countries have one vote and are formally on the same level, but the vote of 
the Unites States has a different weight in terms of influence than that of Canada (Zeitoun 
and Allan, 2008: 9). This is the fundamental difference between hegemony and other forms 
of control such as imperialism or mere domination: hegemony can manipulate inter-state 
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relations without a superior body, while, on the contrary, imperialism is based on formal 
rule and military imposition (Keohane, 1991). The key requirement for a hegemonic order 
to survive is that the hegemon has to convince the hegemonised that they are also serving, 
at least in part, their own interests. When consent vanishes and order starts being contested, 
as in the case of Arab states in 2011 for instance, there is not anymore hegemony and 
power can be toppled (Keucheyan, 2012).  
Further contributing on this neo-Gramscian perspective, the Belgian political theorist 
Chantal Mouffe (2008) conceived hegemony and a hegemonic order as something fixed 
through nodal points of power: 
As far as politics is concerned, this means the need to envisage it in terms of a hegemonic 
struggle between conflicting hegemonic projects attempting to incarnate the universal and 
to define the symbolic parameters of social life. Hegemony is obtained through the 
construction of nodal points, which discursively fix the meaning of institutions and social 
practices and articulate the ‘common sense’ through which a given conception of reality is 
established. (Mouffe, 2008) 
  
Whether the notion of hegemony is approached from a realist or from a neo-Gramscian 
perspective, in both cases it is clear how this concept is intimately correlated to that of 
power (see Figure 5). The main difference is that for the former approach, the focus is on 
hard power, for the latter is on a combination of hard (coercion) and soft (consent) power. 
Considering hegemony only as a form of domination based on material capabilities, seems 
somewhat reductive. On the subject of consent, in particular, it can be observed how, over 
the last five centuries, many thinkers have converged on one point: hard power alone is not 
enough to maintain supremacy.  
For Machiavelli, a Prince had to be respected to obtain obedience, as in the ideal case of 
Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius, who “possessed many qualities which earned him great 
respect, all his life he succeeded in holding both of these [the soldiers and the populace] in 
check and he was never hated or scorned” (Machiavelli, 1958: 108). Gramsci, as it was 
widely observed, thinks that force should appear as sustained by consent. Nye, similarly, 
sees the effects of soft power, intended as the power to persuade and to co-opt people rather 
than coerce them, as more effective than those of hard power: “if I can get you to want to 
do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do” (Nye, 
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2002: 9). The reciprocal relationship between material capabilities, ideas and institutions 
devised by Cox, further confirms the idea of several forces acting together in a structure. 
Thus, there appears to be an intimate connection between material power and the invisible 
soft power of persuasion which is at the basis of the concept of hegemony. 
 
Figure 5: Schematic representation of the three dimensions of power overlapping with hegemony 
(source: Author). 
 
It can be argued, therefore, that with respect to hegemony power can be considered as 
the means to an end, with the end being the achievement and maintain of hegemony. Power 
cannot be understood as the end itself (as for instance Machiavelli argued), as it is always 
wielded to get a desired outcome.  
 
2.4. The framework of hydro-hegemony 
Now that the key concepts of power and hegemony have been illustrated, it is possible to 
address more in detail the subject of power and hegemony in water relations. The first 
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attempts to study how control of water resources is indeed related to power dynamics and 
not to the idea of water-wars, can be traced back to Frey (1993), Gleick (1993) and Lowi 
(1993). Among the four factors or characteristics that make water likely to be a source of 
strategic rivalry, Gleick identifies “the relative power of the basin states” (Gleick, 1993: 
84)
28. Lowi (1993), adapts Keohane’s HST to the water sector, arguing that when the 
upstream riparian is also the hegemon (in her acceptation of the term, hegemon stands for 
the most powerful state in the basin), the chances that cooperation takes place are low since 
it has no interest or incentive in doing so; cooperation is more probable when the hegemon 
is located downstream and it has a critical need of water
29
. The theory of Hegemonic 
Stability was of inspiration also for Frederick Frey, who was the first to present a power-
analytic framework. Frey reached the conclusion that the least stable situation in an 
international river basin, is obtained when a powerful nation downstream is in need of 
water and compete for it with weaker nations upstream (Frey, 1993: 62). Although Zeitoun 
and Warner (2996: 436) noted that Frey’s assumption contradicts with the stability of 
Egypt’s water relations with other Nile co-riparians, they recognise the utility of Frey’s 
framework, especially for what concerns the intuition of creating an analytical framework 
based on power to analyse water relations.  
The FHH gives emphasis to power and to the role that asymmetries of riparian power 
play in influencing transboundary water relations. Power relations are seen as a dynamic 
reality, since in international river basins “power and power asymmetry, are constantly 
being contested and challenged” (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010: 30) in a quest to change the 
status-quo. As described by Zeitoun and Warner, the FHH is aimed at analysing 
hydropolitics avoiding the traditional “water wars” and “water peace” discourses (Zeitoun 
and Warner, 2008: 809). Applying the Gramscian concept of hegemony and Lukes’s three 
dimension of power to hydropolitics, the FHH looks at how the basin state with more 
relative power, the hydro-hegemon, “can establish the form of interation [sic] over 
transboundary waters that it prefers” (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006: 455). The FHH is the first 
                                                     
28
 The other three being the degree of scarcity, the extent to which the water supply is shared by more than 
one region or state and the ease of access to alternative fresh water sources (Gleick, 1993: 84). 
29
 Dinar et al. (2007: 150) efficiently contradict Lowi’s argument taking as an example the Colorado River 
salinity issue between the United States and Mexico, where the former – being both the most powerful and the 
upstream state – not only entered into an agreement with Mexico but also paid the high costs of desalinating 
the waters flowing downstream. 
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structured study in the field of hydropolitics that takes power as a key to understand 
riparian relations, and this is where its importance resides.  
The FHH is based on three pillars (see Figure 6), that are at the origin of power 
asymmetries in a river basin. The first and third pillars, are respectively riparian position 
(i.e. being upstream, midstream or downstream of a river course) and exploitation potential 
(the capacity to exploit existing hydraulic infrastructures and to create new ones. Riparian 
position, or geographical power, refers to the advantage that the geographical position can 
give to a country. More precisely, the upstream country – the country where water 
originates – can alter the flow of water in several ways (i.e. building a dam, diverting a 
river, or polluting the water going upstream) affecting the countries that are further 
downstream. Nevertheless, the common example of how being upstream or downstream 
has only a relative influence in power configurations, is that of Egypt in the Nile river 
basin: Egypt is the furthest downstream country, and thus the most geographically 
disadvantaged, but is also the hydro-hegemon in the basin (Cascao and Zeitoun, 2010: 192). 
Geographic position can be particularly beneficial if it is combined with exploitation 
potential, which refers to the technical and financial capacity to carry out hydraulic projects 
such as the construction of a dam or the diversion of a river. But the innovative contribution 
of the FHH is its second pillar, which is the one centred on power. 
 
 
Figure 6: The pillars of hydro-hegemony (source: Zeitoun and Warner, 2006: 451). 
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Lukes’s three dimensions of power are thus applied to hydropolitics to define 
respectively material, bargaining and ideational power. The first and most recognizable 
form of power is material power, which can be associated with the riparian’s position, its 
size, military might and economic strength. A classic example of wielding this form of 
power, consists in the mobilization of troops at the border. The second form of power, 
bargaining, relates to control over the rules of the game and the ability to set the agenda. 
Bargaining power is “measured by the impact that one’s own options and alternatives may 
have on the other” (Woodhouse and Zeitoun 2008: 111). An example of this form of power 
is the ability to block an issue form being discussed in regional talks, as Uzbekistan does 
when it comes to discuss the issue of labour migration at regional meetings (Marat, 2009: 
29) or water allocation. Finally, ideational power – which form the broader category of 
discursive power along with bargaining – is the power over ideas, the power to impose a 
sanctioned discourse and narratives or a particular ideology. It is the most effective form of 
power, as it legitimates and stabilises the existing situation in such a way that the 
dominated do not seek to challenge it. Through ideational power the hegemon convinces 
the hegemonised that the current situation is right and proper. Ideational power can be 
wielded, for instance, by bringing a particular issue at an international forum, such as the 
UN General Assembly (UNGA), to impose a certain discourse and gain international 
support. Ideational power, and the way knowledge or a discourse are constructed, can also 
be associated with the Copenhagen concept of securitisation, to explain why certain issues 
become non-negotiable and how the overturn of normal rights and rules of engagement is 
legitimised (Zeitoun and Warner, 2008: 807). 
Zeitoun and Warner (2006: 445) outlined a series of strategies and tactics – expression 
of the various forms of power – that basin riparians can adopt to control water resources. 
Among them, they list: coercive compliance-producing mechanisms (military force, covert 
actions and coercion through threats); utilitarian compliance-producing mechanisms 
(incentives to cooperate); normative compliance-producing mechanisms (treaties); and 
hegemonic compliance-producing mechanisms (securitization, knowledge construction, 
sanctioned discourse, coercive resources, international support, financial mobilisation and 
riparian position). 
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These forms of power act concurrently to determine who the hegemon is in an 
international river basin, or the hydro-hegemon (HH). The HH is the basin riparian whose 
leadership is buttressed by authority, one that carries an hegemonic strategy based on 
cohesion and compliance and sustained by attraction rather than intimidation, although the 
two elements indeed coexist (Zeitoun and Allan 2008: 9). Force and consent, together with 
the imposition of ideas and dominant discourses, are more relevant in determining water 
use and allocation than other instruments such as international water law, water sharing 
ethics or riparian position (Zeitoun and Allan, 2008: 10). HHs can be both upstream and 
downstream, and conversely the weaker states, non-hegemons, can be both upstream and 
downstream. A few examples of HHs are Egypt (downstream) in the Nile river basin, 
Turkey (upstream) in the Tigris-Euphrates river basin, Israel (midstream) in the Jordan 
river basin, India (upstream) in the Ganges and Indus river basins and the US (upstream) in 
the Colorado river basin. The HH is the riparian that may have interest in maintaining the 
status-quo, as it is most likely satisfied by the existing situation. Further reflecting on this, 
the HH can be seen as the basin riparian that is able to impose a certain discourse – for 
instance, insisting on the principle of absolute integrity of a river, which states that 
upstream nations cannot affect in any way the quantity or quality of the water flowing 
downstream – while being also able to secure control of water resources.  
Hydro-hegemony is not necessarily a negative concept. In cases where the HH has 
negotiated a water-sharing agreement that is positively perceived by the other riparians, 
there is a “positive/leadership” form of hydro-hegemony (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006: 444). 
On the opposite end, when the HH tries to achieve maximum control of water resources 
through unilateral actions, there is a “negative/dominative form of hydro-hegemony. This 
latter setting can lead to unstable water relations, particularly when the riparians are 
approximately equal in power, as it is more likely that the status-quo will be contested with 
an increasing competition among countries. This situation, as it will be shown in Chapter 3, 
seems to be the one that better represents water relations in the Aral Sea Basin, that are 
marked by open confrontation among basin riparians.  
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2.5. Hydro-hegemony revisited 
The above discussion on power, hegemony and hydro-hegemony provides the elements 
to make an argument for a partial re-theorization of the FHH. The FHH offers extremely 
useful insights to the understanding of interstate relations, but does not explicitly shows that 
hegemony and not power is its central element. This is because its current structure based 
on pillars does not seem to be the most appropriate to represent the intimate connection that 
these two elements have. As it was widely observed, an analysis of power can benefit from 
the understanding that power is the means to hegemony, and not vice versa. 
Since the focus is being placed on hegemony and on the ways in which it can be 
maintained or contested, why not placing hegemony at the centre of an analytical structure? 
Moreover, the pillars in the FHH have been used to give estimates of the various levels of 
power (see for instance Cascao and Zeitoun, 2010: 33) in various river basins. While this 
can prompt interesting debates and give an intuitive representation of who is considered the 
hydro-hegemon in a selected river basin, it can somehow be misleading, in the sense that it 
can lead to think that there is something that can be defined as “half-hegemony”. 
Furthermore, since each specific river basin has its own “problemshed”, the relative value 
of a certain form of power can change according to the basin and to the actors involved, and 
this cannot be shown in this schematic representation
30
.  
Therefore, I argue that representing power through pillars and measuring it, even if 
through estimates, does not really benefit the analysis of hegemony. I propose a redesign 
(see Figure 7) of the structure of hydro-hegemony, one that takes into consideration the 
forms of power in a similar way than that adopted by the FHH, but that presents them as 
interconnected, since they are – to paraphrase Antonio Gramsci (1975: Q12§1) – 
“connective” in the function of hegemony, or, in this case, of hydro-hegemony. 
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 This seems to recall Hoffmann’s (1972) conception of world politics in terms of distinct issue areas placed 
on alternative chessboards, each with a different weight. 
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Figure 7: The circle of hydro-hegemony (source: Author) 
 
The “circle of hydro-hegemony” illustrated in Figure 7, embodies the theoretical 
rationale behind the schematic representation of the three dimensions of power overlapping 
with hegemony, as it was showed in Figure 5. It also takes inspiration from Cox’s concept 
of the relationship of forces in an historical structure (Cox, 1981) (Figure 4), to display how 
the three forms of power interact and act together to constitute a hydro-hegemonic setting. 
While the circle of hydro-hegemony might primarily appear as a cosmetic change of the 
original FHH, it sets the basis for a different understanding of the complex relationship of 
forces in interstate relations.  
Hydro-hegemony is here defined as the success of basin riparian in imposing a 
discourse, preserving its interests and impeding changes to a convenient status-quo. This 
definition combines elements from the conventional Gramscian definition of hegemony – 
which denotes the success of a dominant class in presenting its view of the world and its 
ideology – with aspects related to the management and control of shared water resources.  
The three forms of power adopted in the circle of hydro-hegemony are not particularly 
different from those of the FHH. Material power include the riparian’s position, its size, 
military might, economic strength and structural capacities. The latter refer to the capacity 
Hydro-
hegemony 
Material 
Power 
Ideational 
(discursive) 
Power 
Bargaining 
Power 
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of realising large hydraulic infrastructures (such as dams) and to freely exploit those 
already existing. Bargaining power relates to the ability to set a political agenda and to shift 
the balance in negotiations limiting the options and alternatives of the counterpart. 
Ideational (discursive) power refers to the ability to impose a sanctioned discourse or a 
particular ideology. While this last form of power appears indeed as the most effective of 
the three towards the achievement of hydro-hegemony, the relative value of each of the 
three forms of power can vary depending on the situation in which the basin riparians find 
themselves
31
. Accordingly, rather than measuring the relative weight of each form of 
power, what seems analytically relevant is to observe which forms of power are more used 
by each riparian, and trying to understand the reasons behind such choice.  
 
2.5.1. Counter-hegemonic strategies: a neglected concept 
Along with hegemony comes the possibility for counter-hegemony. In his seminal book 
Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance, James C. Scott (1985) 
observed how resistance forms a continuous, almost invisible flux, which can be difficult to 
be observed but also extremely powerful. As Laclau and Mouffe (2001) noted in their 
theoretical analysis of hegemony, micro-strategies of resistance are always possible, even 
in the most totalising hegemonic setting.  
While a relevant body of hydropolitics literature focuses on how a hydro-hegemon can 
use power to influence water relations (among the others, Zeitoun and Warner, 2006; 
Daoudy, 2008; Turton and Funke, 2008; Zeitoun, 2008; Zeitoun, 2011; Chellaney, 2013), 
the ways in which hegemony can be countered and contested have not been studied with 
equal attention. Although Zeitoun and Warner have listed a few strategies – all within the 
bargaining face of power – that non-hegemons can adopt, such as “recourse to morality and 
international law, delay, de-securitization, issue linkage, economic development, alternative 
funding sources, negotiations and generation of positive-sum outcomes” (2006: 454), they 
                                                     
31
 A clear example is that of a weaker upstream country that cannot exploit its hydroelectric potential, as 
Tajikistan in the Amu Darya river basin or Ethiopia in the Nile river basin. In this case, their relative material 
power is considerably lower than that of the downstream countries, Tajikistan and Egypt, although the latter 
are geographically disadvantaged by their position. This is because even if they are upstream, the status-quo is 
such that they cannot take advantage of their position, since the downstream countries successfully impede 
their hydraulic ambitions. Conversely, the relative material power of a hydro-hegemon in an upstream 
position, like Turkey in the Tigris-Euphrates river basin, is considerably higher than that of the downstream 
states, Iraq and Syria. 
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also noted that there is the need for more work in this field. Ana Cascão (2008) has 
explored how, in the Nile river basin, hegemonised Ethiopia has used counter-hegemonic 
strategies – such as reactive and active diplomacy, the mobilisation of international funding 
and construction of knowledge and expertise – to expand its influence on the Nile’s water 
management. Warner (2010), has illustrated how Turkey’s hegemony in the Tigris-
Euphrates basin has been challenged both internally, with domestic opposition, and 
externally, through an action carried out by downstream countries, NGOs and 
archaeologists, that criticized the Turkish Ilisu dam linking its construction with the 
unresolved and controversial issue of repression of Kurdish identity. This action, that 
sullied the image of the Ilisu dam, was successful in influencing international backers to 
pull out of the project. Also, Marwa Daoudy has noted how the process of issue linkage can 
be an effective source of bargaining power, in particular for the weaker party (Daoudy, 
2009: 366), as in the case of Syria’s use of issue-linkage in its water interactions with 
Turkey in the Tigris-Euphrates basin
32
.  
Hence, the ways in which counter-hegemonic strategies are put in place in an 
international river basin could benefit from further analysis, since the research to date has 
tended to focus on how hegemony is maintained rather than countered. For the purposes of 
this study, counter hydro-hegemony (hereinafter “counter-hegemony”) can be defined as 
the process through which a dominant discourse and a disadvantageous status-quo is 
contested and challenged. Counter-hegemony is a continuous process aimed at altering and 
reversing an existing hydro-hegemonic configuration.  
The two case studies – the Rogun and the Kambarata dams – will therefore be used to 
examine how hegemony is countered and contested. As it was noted in Chapter 1, the dams 
are well suited to the analysis of a counter-hegemonic process. Their realization epitomises 
a change in regional water issues, reversing a situation in which the upstream countries are 
not able to develop their hydroelectric potential. More specifically, the focus will be placed 
on the analysis and categorization of the various strategies and tactics that the Tajik and the 
                                                     
32
 An interesting point in Daoudy’s work (2009) is the idea that time can be a source of bargaining power. 
Time, patience and delay, constitute in her opinion an important source of power that may be used both by the 
hegemon and the hegemonised. This aspect, as it will be shown in Chapter 6, appears to be of relevance also 
in the Aral Sea basin. 
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Kyrgyz governments have put in place to favour the realisation of the two projects, that will 
serve as a platform to the analysis of power dynamics.  
The analysis of the two case studies will be preceded by an overview of the evolution of 
interstate water relations in Central Asia. This will be done with the support of the TWINS 
matrix. 
 
2.5. The TWINS framework 
The TWINS framework is used to answer one of the sub-questions of this thesis, how 
did water relations in Central Asia evolve in the period 1991-2011, which is propaedeutic 
to the analysis of power and hegemonies in the two case studies, Rogun and Kambarata. 
Conceived by Naho Mirumachi (2007, 2010), the TWINS framework is a hermeneutic tool 
that allows to draw trajectories of the evolution of inter-state relations over time. The 
framework is informed by constructivism, in the sense that “interaction between states is 
worthy of detailed analysis for its reality-creating effects” (Mirumachi, 2010: 49). The 
TWINS diagram, formed by the axis of cooperation intensity and the axis of conflict 
intensity, allows drawing trajectories that outline the evolution of bilateral interstate 
relations over time.  
 
 
Figure 8: The TWINS diagram (Mirumachi 2010) 
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2.5.1. Conflict intensity  
To categorise conflict intensity, TWINS “applies securitization theory to the issues of 
hydraulic development and control over international transboundary waters” (Mirumachi, 
2010: 57). In securitization theory – developed by the Copenhagen school – “security is the 
move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issues 
either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al. 1998: 23). In this view, 
security is a self-referential practice, and the focus needs to be placed not on what is a real 
existential threat to national security, but on what is intersubjectively constructed as being 
an existential threat to national security. Three types of unit are involved in security 
analysis: i) referent objects, which represent what is seen as an existential threat; ii) 
securitizing actors, who securitize issues by declaring the referent object existentially 
threatened; and iii) functional actors, who affect the dynamics of a sector (for instance 
dams, through their capacity of changing the water flow, can be a functional actor in a 
water dispute, with water being the referent object and governments being the securitizing 
actors). Thus, securitisation theory is particularly suitable for a constructivist hydropolitics, 
as the emphasis is on how an issue like transboundary water management “gets 
(de)politicised, (de)securitised or (de)violised” (Julien, 2012: 59). 
Correspondingly, in TWINS the four levels of conflict are non-politicization, 
politicization, securitization-opportunization and violization and they correspond to the 
stages of the securitization process. In their book Security: a new framework for analysis, 
Buzan, Waever and De Wilde explain that public issues can range from three logic of 
actions. At first, an issue can be nonpoliticized, meaning the state does not deal with it and 
the issue is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision. Secondly, the 
issue can be politicized, meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government 
decision and resource allocation or, more rarely, some other form of communal 
governance. Water, for instance, is a politicized issue in Central Asia context, as it is dealt 
with directly by governments. Thirdly, an issue can be securitized, meaning the issue is 
presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions 
outside the normal bounds of political procedure (Buzan et al., 1998: 23-24). Together with 
this third dimension, a conflict could be opportunized, when “the issue offers such a great 
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chance to improve a situation that it justifies actions outside the normal bounds of political 
procedure (Warner, 2004: 3). Finally, the fourth and highest level is violized, where “an 
already securitised issue such as identity becomes a casus belli over which blood must run” 
(Neumann 1998). However, as it was shown by Wolf and his team at Oregon State 
University (Yoffe, Wolf and Giordano, 2003), it is very uncommon that states will engage 
into violized interactions over water at the international level. Thus, when the perception of 
a certain issue by the state changes, conflict intensity over transboundary waters varies 
accordingly. 
 
2.5.2. Cooperation intensity  
If, on the one hand, the categorisation of conflict intensity in TWINS draws from 
securitization theory, on the other hand, the categorisation of cooperation intensity takes a 
direct constructivist approach, and draws upon the work of Wendt (1999) and Tuomela 
(2000). Through its emphasis on ideas and norms, constructivism allows to examine 
cooperation emphasizing the process of socialization between actors (Mirumachi, 2010: 
59). Using Tuomela’s theory (2000) on how collective actions contribute to the formation 
of collective identities, Mirumachi (2010: 60) applies the elements of collective action – 
joint action, intention of collective action and common goals – to the study of cooperation 
in international transboundary waters, classifying five levels of cooperation intensity: 
confrontation of issue, ad-hoc joint action, common goal formation, common norm 
formation and collective identity formation. When the level is confrontation of the issue, 
“the issue is acknowledged but there is no specific joint action or identification and sharing 
of goals”. The next level of cooperation is ad hoc joint action, which happens once there is 
“joint action but no shared goals”. In other words, two States may want to perform the same 
action, as for instance cleaning a shared river bed, but with a different objective. The third 
level of cooperation is common goal formation, which happens when two States share a 
goal but have divergent ideas on the type of action that might be taken to reach it. This 
happens, for example, when two countries want a clean shared river, but for different 
purposes (i.e., to stimulate tourism or to decrease pollution levels). The difference between 
the second and third intensities of cooperation is that in the former, two actors act together 
but with a different objective, in the latter, the objective is the same but the actions and 
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policies undertaken to reach it may be dissimilar. When there is joint action, shared goals 
and identification of common norms, the level of cooperation is common norm formation. 
In water relations, this is often the case when treaties and agreements on water resources 
management are signed. Finally, the highest level of cooperation is collective identity 
formation, when collective identity is completely formed. At this level of cooperation, the 
internal interests of a State correspond to the collective international interest. 
In TWINS, the social construction of international transboundary hydropolitics is 
studied through the analysis of different types of speech acts. Based on this analysis, certain 
events of importance in interstate relations will be outlined and used to draw a trajectory of 
the interaction between States, that provides a clear image of the state of transboundary 
relations at a point in time and through different phases of a relationship and that help in 
emphasizing the various discourses that guided water relations.  
 
2.5.3. Application of TWINS to this study 
As mention in the Introduction, Chapter 3 will outline the evolution of interstate 
relations in Central Asia in the field of water, to be able to position Rogun and Kambarata 
in the wider Central Asian context. This is done using the TWINS matrix that is 
accompanied by an account of the evolution of bilateral relations. The main reason behind 
the decision of using the TWINS matrix in this thesis is that it provides an overview of the 
state of transboundary relations at a specific point in time and through different phases of a 
relationship. This ability of tracing the state of a relationship at a specific point in time, it is 
of importance as it facilitates an analysis of the impact that these dams have had on general 
water relations. If, on the one hand, the analysis of broader water relations covers a 
timespan of twenty years (1991-2011), on the other hand, the debate around Rogun and 
Kambarata gained prominence in Central Asian water politics only in the 2000s, when both 
projects have been revamped respectively by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This discrepancy 
offers the opportunity for a compared analysis aimed at observing how these two dams 
have impacted on broader water relations, to see if changes in interstate relations can be 
directly linked with developments on the dam dispute and if the launch of these projects 
can be associated with the general conflictual/cooperative relation as it was outlined with 
the TWINS. 
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Although potentially this study could have analysed all bilateral relations in the Aral Sea 
basin, it has been decided to limit the scope of the analysis to two bilateral relations, that 
have been selected for their relevance in relation to the projected Rogun and Kambarata 
dams, and that cover the two main Central Asian river basins.  
For what concerns the Amu Darya river basin, the selected interaction is that between 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the former being the country where the Rogun dam is located, 
and the latter being its most vocal opponent. Likewise, the selected interaction in the Syr 
Darya river basin is that between Kyrgyzstan, where the Kambarata dam is being built, and 
Uzbekistan, that also in this case is the most vocal dam opponent. 
Similarly to the analytical framework of hydro-hegemony, TWINS is based on the 
assumption that asymmetries in power distribution among basin riparians play a significant 
role in influencing water relations (Mirumachi, 2010: 62). In this research, the TWINS is 
used as a platform to outline a trajectory in the interaction between two countries, and then, 
the analytical framework of hydro-hegemony serves to understand – through the study of 
power dynamics and power asymmetries – why interstate relations followed a certain 
direction. This is why the TWINS will be used to illustrate the evolution of water relations 
in the Aral Sea basin and to set the broader political context, to be then followed by the 
more specific analysis on the debate around the construction of Rogun and Kambarata and 
the analysis of power dynamics, hegemonic and counter-hegemonic strategies.  
 
2.6. Data collection and methods of analysis  
The following section summarizes the methods that were used to collect information and 
to analyse them. For more details on the methodology, please refer to the Annex 1.  
The first step of the study has been to create three detailed chronologies (one for general 
interstate relations and one each for Rogun and Kambarata) of relevant speech acts 
representative of cooperative and conflictive interactions. In this research, speech acts are 
studied within Onuf’s three categories, assertive, directive and commissive (see paragraph 
2.1), with the clarification that speech acts can be both verbal and nonverbal facts, as stated 
by Duffy and Frederking (2009) in their speech acts analysis of the end of the Cold War. A 
nonverbal speech act is a physical, concrete action that conveys a meaning, such as 
mobilizing troops at the border, which is an example of a directive speech act. In water 
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relations, an assertive speech act can be for instance a public speech or an official statement 
through which sovereignty on water resources is stated. A directive speech act can be a cut 
in water resources to obtain, for instance, resumption in supplies of another natural 
resource. Finally, a commissive speech act can be the signing of a treaty or a joint 
declaration, commissive.  
Speech acts have been analysed using grounded theory and principles of discourse 
analysis. Being this a study on power and hegemony, it is important to focus on the 
capacity of one actor to impose or control a certain discourse, as the management of social 
representations can be associated with the control over the minds and perceptions of other 
people and thus to hegemony (Van Dijk, 1993: 257). Discourse analysis in this study is 
used in the analysis of speech acts, to ascertain whether they are assertive, directive or 
committive, connecting them with particular periods of water relations in the Aral Sea 
basin, and analysing the audience towards which they were addressed and the meaning that 
wanted to be conveyed. The way discourse analysis is carried out is inspired by techniques 
developed in grounded theory. Grounded theory is a methodology for developing theory 
that is grounded in data gathered and analysed systematically (Strauss and Corbin, 1994: 
273). In this methodology originally conceived by Glaser and Strauss (1967), theory may 
be generated directly from the data or, if other theories on the area of investigation already 
exist, theory may be further elaborated and modified using the data gathered. The former 
approach, applies to the study of counter-hegemonic strategies, which have not been 
theorised in detail and therefore theory will be generated directly from the data. The latter 
approach, on the other hand, will be used for hegemonic strategies. In this case, the data 
gathered will be confronted with the existing theorisation from Warner and Zeitoun (2006), 
confirming or further expanding the categorisation of hegemonic strategies. The data 
collected in the three timelines, is coded and categorised (and sub-categorised) looking for 
relationships, patterns of action and interaction (Strauss and Corbin, 1994: 278) between 
the various basin riparians. As Birks and Mills note, grounded theory is usually derived 
from data sources of a qualitative and interpretive nature (Birks and Mills, 2011: 6), as it is 
also the case for this research.  
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Chapter 3. Water relations in Central 
Asia 
 
Consider the water you drink – was it you who brought it down from the 
rain-cloud or We? If We wanted, We could make it bitter: will you not be 
thankful? 
Qur'an, 56: 68-70 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of transboundary water relations in 
the Aral Sea basin for the period 1991-2011. The chapter is divided into three main 
sections. The first, provides some key definitions and delineates the main principles of 
international water law. The second introduces the basin, its geographical and hydrological 
characteristics, the legacy left by the Soviet Union and the setting that emerged after 
independence. The third section outlines the evolution of interstate water relations among 
the Central Asian countries, initially presenting the general picture and later narrowing 
down the focus on bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan. This will serve as a background for the examination of the two case-
studies of this research, the construction of the Rogun and Kambarata dams in Tajikistan 
and in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, the analysis carried out in this chapter will allow to answer 
the first sub-question, “how did water relations in Central Asia evolve in the period 1991-
2011?”, and will also be useful to place the two dams in the appropriate context, and to 
understand how their revitalisation has impacted on broader interstate relations. 
 
3.1. Background on transboundary waters and international water law 
This section lays out some of the basic definitions that will be used throughout this 
chapter. Furthermore, the key principles of international water law and of Soviet water law 
will be illustrated.  
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3.1.1. Defining transboundary waters 
Water covers about 70 % of the Earth's surface. As UN Water (a UN inter-agency 
coordination mechanism for all freshwater and sanitation related issues) reports, the volume 
of freshwater resources is around 35 million km
3
, that represents 2.5 % of the total volume 
of water on Earth. Of these freshwater resources, 70 % is in the form of ice and permanent 
snow cover in mountainous regions, while around 30 % is stored in underground aquifers. 
The remaining 0.3 %, equal to 105,000 km
3
, is contained in freshwater lakes and rivers (or 
watercourses), that thus represent only a tiny amount (around 0.01 %) of total water 
resources. This, however, does not diminish the importance that freshwater rivers and lakes 
have for humans. On the contrary, they become even more crucial, also because the water 
that they store is the one that can be more easily accessed. 
But what exactly is a watercourse? According to Article 2 of the 1997 UN Convention 
on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (hereinafter, the 
“UN water convention”), a watercourse can be defined as “a system of surface waters and 
groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and 
normally flowing into a common terminus”. Also, an international watercourse is a 
“watercourse, parts of which are situated in different States”.  
Watercourses form river basins, which can be defined as “the area that contributes 
hydrologically (including both surface-and groundwater) to a first order stream, which, in 
turn, is defined by its outlet to the ocean or to a terminal (closed) lake or inland sea”. When 
a perennial tributary of a basin crosses the political boundaries of two or more nations, such 
basin can be defined an international river basin (Wolf, 2007: 245).  
Additionally, there are various types of rivers. When a river forms a border (such as the 
Shatt-al-Arab river, that separates Iran and Iraq) the river is called contiguous, and when it 
crosses a border and generates an upstream-downstream configuration (such as the Tigris 
river, that flows from Turkey through Iraq), is called successive (LeMarquand, 1977: 8). 
Finally, when a river forms a border and also crosses it (as in the case of the Mekong river, 
that forms part of the border between Laos and Thailand and then runs through Cambodia), 
it is referred as mixed (Toset et al., 2000). For what concerns the two largest Central Asian 
rivers, the Amu Darya is a mixed river that flows along and across
33
 the borders of 
                                                     
33
 Until 1991 the Amu Darya marked the border between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. 
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Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, while the Syr Darya is a successive 
river that flows from Kyrgyzstan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. 
Figure 9: Different types of rivers. Figure constructed by the author based on LeMarquand (1977) and 
Toset et al. (2000). 
 
 
Overall, 263 rivers around the world cross the boundaries of two or more nations, and 
their basin areas comprise about 47 % of the land surface of the earth and include 40 % of 
the world’s population (Wolf, 2007). Some of these international river basins did not exist 
until 1978 (when their number was 214), while some other disappeared as a result of major 
political changes that transformed national boundaries in international ones, and vice versa. 
For instance, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, or the 1999 war in the former 
Yugoslavia created new states and numerous new international river basins. Conversely, 
the unification of East and West Germany and of Southern and Northern Yemen, led to the 
vanishing of various international river basins (Dinar et al., 2007: 10-11).  
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The sheer number of international river basins, led to the development of some general 
principles to govern shared freshwater resources that form the core of international water 
law.  
 
3.1.2. Principles of international water law 
As defined by Akehurst, “International law consists of rules and principles of general 
application dealing with the conduct of states and of international organizations and with 
their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural 
or juridical” (Akehurst and Malanczuk, 1997: 1). 
International water law (or international watercourse law) is the branch of international 
law that deals with the use and protection of transboundary watercourses
34
. The sources of 
international law and international water law are identical, and they consist of agreements 
(such as treaties and conventions), decisions of intergovernmental organizations that 
acquire binding force by treaty, and customary international law (Hodgson, 2010: 3). 
Nevertheless, and similarly to other environmental resources, there is not a comprehensive 
legal framework that regulates and ensure the application of the principles of international 
water law, and since there is nothing such an “international water police”, its greatest 
limitation is the lack of enforcement (Gleick, 1993; Waterbury, 1997).  
According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), between 805
35
 and 
1984 over 3,600 acts (declarations, bilateral and multilateral treaties) relating to 
international water resources were negotiated and signed (FAO, 1978; FAO, 1984). Until 
recent times, international water law focused mostly on aspect related to the navigational 
uses of a river and to the generation of hydroelectricity. Starting in the second half of the 
1900s, other matters such as river pollution, water sharing and flood control acquired an 
increasing importance in the treaties that were being negotiated and signed around the 
world (Sironneau, 1996). 
Traditionally, the use of international rivers has been guided by four, universally 
recognized, principles: i) the Harmon doctrine or absolute territorial sovereignty; ii) 
                                                     
34
 For a comprehensive overview of the principles of international water law and their evolution over time in 
different societies, refer to the volume Principles of water law and administration, edited by Dante Caponera 
(2007). 
35
 The first treaty, that concerned the Rhine river in France, was in the form of a unilateral declaration by 
Charlemagne in 805 that granted freedom of navigation to a monastery (Verzijl et al., 1970: 126). 
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absolute territorial integrity; iii) the community theory; iv) limited territorial sovereignty or 
equitable utilization theory (LeMarquand, 1977: 12-13).  
 
 
Figure 10: The four traditional principles of international water law. Figure constructed by the 
author based on LeMarquand (1977). 
 
 
The Harmon doctrine – that takes its name from US Attorney General Judson Harmon – 
is considered the most notorious theory in all of international resources law, and it is today 
identified with the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty. It is based upon an opinion 
issued by Harmon in 1895 concerning a dispute between Mexico and the US for the use of 
a shared river, the Rio Grande. The doctrine basically states that “a country is absolutely 
sovereign over the portion of an international watercourse within its borders. Thus, that 
country would be free to divert all of the water from an international watercourse, leaving 
none for downstream states” (McCaffrey, 1996: 549). Although the US, and more generally 
upstream countries, tended to spouse such an extreme principle, the doctrine was later 
rejected by the US and it lost relevance as a principle of international water law (Wolf, 
1999a). 
Conversely, the principle of absolute territorial integrity (or absolute integrity of the 
river), guarantees the use of the river in an unaltered state, both in terms of water quantity 
and quality, to the lower riparian. The third principle, the community theory, sets the 
Absolute 
territorial 
sovereignty 
(Harmon 
doctrine) 
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territorial 
integrity 
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territorial 
sovereignty  
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obligation to consult the other basin riparians before taking any decision that might affect a 
river. Finally, the fourth principle, limited territorial sovereignty, gives riparians the right to 
use a river’s water to the extent that no harm is done to the other riparians.  
More recently, the International Law Association started to formulate and codify 
customary international water law, and in 1966 drafted the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of 
International Rivers (Dellapenna, 2001). In 1972, the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), adopted the very broad and general Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment
36
, while twenty years later, in Dublin, the non-
binding Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development – a series of principles 
focusing on the economic value of water – was put together by a team of experts on water 
issues. 
But the key document, adopted in 1997, is the UN Water Convention, which is today 
considered the most authoritative legislative instrument concerning international water law 
(Phillips, 2006: 11), Nevertheless, the Convention has not entered into force, since to 
become legally binding at least 35 nations must ratify it, and as of December 2013 it has 
received only 33 ratifications
37
 (UN Treaty Collection [no date]).  
The Convention sets three key principles of international water law: i) equitable and 
reasonable use of shared freshwater resources (United Nations, 1997: Article 5 and 6); ii) 
the avoidance of significant harm to other states through activities related to an 
international watercourse (United Nations, 1997: Article 7); iii) prior notification of works 
which may affect co-riparians in trans-boundary watercourses (United Nations, 1997: 
Articles 11-19).  
 
                                                     
36
 Whose Principle 21 seems to have relevance also for the general principles of international water law, as it 
recognizes that “States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage 
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” (United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, 1972). 
37
 Upper riparians view the Convention as biased in favor of downstream riparians, since they perceive the 
prior notification principle as an instrument that gives downstream countries a veto power over projects 
planned upstream (Salman, 2007). For instance, among the only three countries that voted against the 
Convention, two (China and Turkey) are upper riparians. For what concerns the countries of the Aral Sea 
basin, only Uzbekistan ratified it (in 2007), with the clear intent of hampering the construction of hydraulic 
infrastructures in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as it will be outlined more in detail in Chapter 6.     
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Figure 3: The three principles of international water law set by the 1997 UN Water Convention. 
Figure constructed by the author. 
 
 
However, and unsurprisingly for comprehensive and broad legal instruments such as this 
one, the Convention is considered too vague and ambiguous (Biswas, 2001; Lasserre, 
2009), and countries still prefer to regulate the utilization of transboundary waters through 
bilateral or multilateral regional agreements (Phillips, 2006). This seems to be the case also 
for the countries of the Aral Sea basin, that have tended to solve regional water issues at the 
bilateral and (more reluctantly) at the multilateral level. Over twenty years after their 
independence, the Central Asian countries have yet to sign a long-term framework 
agreement for the sustainable management and sharing of their water resources, and (as it 
will be shown in the second section of this Chapter) they have coped with transboundary 
water issues through short-term (usually annual) ad-hoc agreements. In this regard, despite 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union the key principles of Soviet water law appear to still 
have a relevance for the Central Asian governments and their attitude towards water 
resources. 
 
3.1.3. Principles of Soviet water law 
Unsurprisingly, Soviet water law was designed to facilitate the accomplishment of the 
centralised and planned socialist economy. As Fox noted (1971), however, Soviet water 
law was not flexible enough to facilitate a compromise among the interests of the various 
water users in the USSR (i.e. the hydroelectric and the agricultural sector), as it did not 
foresee a consultation mechanism.  
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The centrality of water in the socialist ideology was already remarked by Karl Marx in 
the Capital: “The soil (and this, economically speaking, includes water) in the virgin state 
in which it supplies man with necessaries or the means of subsistence ready to hand, exists 
independently of him, and is the universal subject of human labour” (Marx, 1867: 125). 
Therefore, being water the universal subject of human activities, the Soviet water law 
envisaged the use of a water body for different purposes at the same time, closely binding 
water law to land law. Article 11 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution (also known as the 
Brezhnev Constitution), recognised that “The land, its minerals, waters, and forests are the 
exclusive property of the state” (Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 1977). Thus, private 
ownership of water was not allowed, as the state (i. e. the Soviet people) had an exclusive 
right of water ownership.  
The basic principles for governing the utilization and protection of rivers, lakes, 
reservoirs and other surface and underground water resources were contained in the 
Fundamentals of Water Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics
38
, adopted on 10 
December 1970. Also this regulation provides that all waters are under state ownership but 
it interestingly draws a distinction between the notions of “water” and “water resources”. 
The former is a natural element, a substance in continuous motion that cannot be property 
of the state. The latter may become a property as a result of lawful activities, such as 
drinking water administered by the municipalities (Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations, 1983: 103). All water resources in the USSR were considered as 
“integrated”, meaning that their ownership devolved to a sole entity, the USSR, and not to 
the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs) or the Soviet Socialist Republics 
(SSRs). 
Overall, the two main principles of Soviet water law, namely that i) water remained the 
exclusive property of the state and that ii) water was inalienable, contrast with the three 
main principles set by the UN water Convention (equitable and reasonable use of shared 
freshwater resources, causing no harm and prior notification) (Weinthal, 2004: 254). With 
the collapse of the USSR, each of the new republics adopted new water laws and water 
                                                     
38
 Two other important acts were the resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On Strengthening 
State Control of the Use of Groundwater and on Measures for Its Conservation” of 1959, and that “On 
Measures for Regulating the Use of and for Strengthening the Conservation of the Water Resources of the 
USSR” of 1960 (Kolbasov, 1987). 
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codes. These legal instruments represent a compromise between the state-centric socialist 
system, and the new trend in water law that recognizes an increasing participation of the 
public in the management of water resources. This seems relevant, considering that the new 
national water laws are resource-development oriented and focus on the maintenance of the 
status-quo, rather than on changes towards integrated water resources management 
(Caponera, 2007: 82). 
 
3.2. Hydrological and geographical aspects of the Aral Sea basin 
Among the basins that emerged recently and as a consequence of a political disarray, 
there is the one of the Aral Sea (see Figure 11), an international river basin formed by the 
two largest rivers of Central Asia, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya. The basin includes 
the territories of the five former Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs), Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – which by convention constitute 
the Central Asian region –, the territory of Afghanistan and a small part of the territory of 
Iran
39
. In ancient times, the two rivers attracted the first Central Asians civilisations. 
Settlers, who cultivated fertile soils and introduced irrigation techniques, gathered around 
the Amu Darya (known as the Oxus in ancient Greek chronicles), while nomadic and semi-
nomadic people from the steppe lived around the Syr Darya. It is in this area, known as 
Transoxiana (the area between the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya rivers), that between the 
sixth and the third centuries B.C. the early protostates and urban centres of Central Asia 
(such as Samarqand in present-day Uzbekistan, Balkh in Afghanistan, Merv in 
Turkmenistan and Khojand in Tajikistan) were created (Abazov, 2008: 6). 
Ecologically, the basin has three distinct zones: i) the mountains, that consist mainly of 
the Tyan Shan and Pamir ranges in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with the highest peaks 
above 7000 meters
40
 and average precipitation (concentrated in spring and winter) varying 
between 600–800 mm per year; ii) the deserts, that are formed by the Kara-kum and the 
                                                     
39
 Although they are part of the basin, Afghanistan and Iran will not be taken in consideration in this thesis. 
This is because both countries were not part of the Soviet Union and have not been included in the regional 
water dialogue over the last decades. While the reasons of this exclusion from regional negotiations are 
understandable for Iran, whose territory only constitutes 2 % of the basin area, they are more controversial for 
what concerns Afghanistan, that contributes 8 % of flow generated in the Amu Darya river basin but has 
never been included in multilateral water agreements and negotiations (Horsman, 2008). 
40
 Including what was the highest mountain in the former Russian Empire and later in the Soviet Union, the 
7,495 meter tall Ismail Somoni Peak in Tajikistan (previously known as Stalin Peak, and, after the de-
Stalinization process, as Communism Peak).  
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Kyzil-kum, and that cover most of the basin area, with average precipitation between 80–
150 mm per year; iii) the Aral Sea with its deltas (Dukhovnyĭ and Sokolov, 2003: 2).  
 
 
Figure 11: The Aral Sea basin. Source: Micklin (2007). 
 
The Amu Darya river flows along and across the borders of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, while the Syr Darya river flows from Kyrgyzstan through 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The Amu Darya is the largest river in the region in terms of 
water volume, and the Syr Darya is the longest. Both rivers terminate their course in the 
Aral Sea. In hydrological terms, these rivers are called exotic, which means that their flow 
originate in well-watered and cool mountains (the Pamir and Tyan Shan) and then 
continues to arid areas (the Kara-kum and Kyzil-kum deserts), where the volume of water 
is substantially diminished by evaporation, transpiration and bed filtration (Micklin, 2000: 
7). Therefore, even prior to the modern age of irrigation, the average inflow of the Amu 
Darya river to the Aral Sea decreased to around 40 km
3 
from the 62 km
3 
coming out of the 
Pamir mountains, while the already considerable lesser flow of the Syr Darya, declined to 
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around 15 km
3 
from the initial 37 km
3
. Some other smaller but still important rivers form 
the basin, such as the Chu, Talas, Assa and Bugun in the Syr Darya basin, and the Tedjen, 
Zerafshan and Kashkadarya in the Amu Darya basin. All of these former tributaries no 
longer flow into the Amu Darya and Syr-Darya rivers (Dukhovnyĭ and Sokolov, 2003: 3). 
 
 
Figure 12: Water flow generation and abstraction (average km3 per year) in the Aral Sea basin. Graph 
constructed by author based on data from cawater-info.net [no date]. 
 
As outlined in Figure 12, upstream Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are water-rich, and supply 
respectively 55 and 25 % of average annual basin river flow, for an aggregate contribution 
of 80 %, that exceeds by far their water withdrawals. While these countries are net donors 
to basin water supplies, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are large net consumers, 
and due to their vast irrigated areas they withdraw 83 % of the basin water, despite the fact 
that they contribute to only 14 % of the Aral Sea basin river flow (Micklin, 2000: 8-9). In 
addition, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have insignificant oil and gas resources, the 
downstream countries are in the opposite situation, and for instance Turkmenistan has 4.3 
% of the world’s gas reserves and Uzbekistan has 0.9 %, while Kazakhstan has 3.2 % of the 
world’s proven oil reserves (Olcott, 2010: 258).  
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Such difference in water usage between upstream and downstream countries is partly 
due to the geographical characteristics of the Central Asian states (Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan are largely mountainous, and therefore not particularly suitable to extensively 
practice irrigated agriculture), but most of all, to the water management practices that were 
set under the Soviet Union, and that the newly born Central Asia republics have inherited. 
Nevertheless, before outlining the Soviet hydraulic mission, it is worth delving into the 
meaning of water for the Central Asians people and to the tradition that the Soviets have 
attempted to alter, since this seems to influence the way water is framed and dealt with by 
present-day Central Asian leaders. 
 
3.2.1. The meaning of water for Central Asian people 
In the ancient world the Central Asian region was known with the Greek word 
Transoxiana, which defines the area between the two “darya” (sea or river in Persian), the 
Amu and the Syr. In the Muslim world, the region was known as Mawarannahr, which in 
Arabic means the area beyond the river (Roy, 2000: 1). Water has thus been used to 
identify a region where, for centuries, generations of people have associated their existence 
and well-being with water. Besides sustaining livelihood, water has also been used to 
delineate and separate territories within the region, leading to the creation of three main 
hydro-historic centres, the khanates of Khiva, Bukhara and Kokand, which correspond to 
the three oases of Khorezm, Sogdiana and Ferghana (Balland, 1997: 98-99). 
The management of water resources is tied with the traditions of Central Asian peoples, 
and with the use of particular irrigation techniques that allowed the formation of 
Wittfogelian hydraulic societies in the Mesopotamia of Central Asia (Dolukhanov, 1994). 
Most notably, the development of the Karez (known in Arabic as Qanat) system over 2000 
years ago, made it possible to easily access water and make land arable in hostile 
environments. The Karez is a system of inclined tunnels that, thanks to gravity, allows 
bringing underground water to the surface (for more information on the Karez system, see 
Beaumont et al., 1989). The management of this crucial and sustainable irrigation system 
has its roots in ancient traditions that have been passed on from one generation to another. 
The social organization behind the Karez had an important role in defining communal 
structures in villages, as irrigation systems and water rights have been crucial both to 
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agricultural production and to social life in the Central Asian society (Eickelman, 1998). 
However, this was not compatible with the massive Soviet irrigation structures, and 
eventually, the knowledge necessary to run the Karez was lost and the system was left in a 
state of abandon. 
Moreover, as both Dukhovnyĭ and Sokolov (2003) and Allouche (2005) observe, water 
has also been historically connected with the two main religions of Central Asia, 
Zoroastrianism and Islam. Followers of Zoroastrianism
41
 worship fire and water (adar and 
aban), and the Videvdat (the main source for Zoroastrian law) utters the sanctity of water 
and regulates its uses.  
Likewise, also for Islam and its sacred text, the Qur'an, water is at the origin of all life on 
Earth. From water every living thing was made (Qur'an, 21:30), and the throne of God was 
laying upon water (Qur'an, 11:7). Water is a God-given gift, one for which humans should 
be grateful and respectful (Qur'an, 56:68-70). The Islamic law, the Sharia (which in Arabic 
means the way or path to water, or the law of water), sets some guiding principles on water 
management based on communal ownership (since water is a gift from God it cannot be 
owned), and on the fact that everyone should equally benefit from a watercourse 
(Wickström, 2010). As pointed out by Cummings (2012: 110), while Sharia has no official 
status in the Central Asian countries and the five regional leaders have declared their states 
secular, they have nevertheless used Islam as a legitimation tool, integrating it (each one 
differently) in their state ideologies.  
Although the Soviets have attempted to instil among the Central Asian people faith in 
modernism and in the superiority of Communism (Pearce, 2007), after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union this effort proved ephemeral. As the Uzbek President Islam Karimov sums it 
up, “After a period of more than a century of totalitarian dependence, this process [the 
revival of spiritual values and national self-awareness] initially took quite naturally the 
shape of the rejection of the recent past” (Karimov, 1997: 85-86). And indeed, the 
revitalisation of the spiritual values and traditions that were frustrated by the Soviets, such 
as Islam for instance, led the Central Asian Presidents to often use religion to underline the 
                                                     
41
 Although the number of Zoroastrians in Central Asia declined, Zoroastrianism has been revived in 
Tajikistan by the President Emomali Rahmon, that refers to Zoroaster as “the first prophet of the Tajiks, 
whose trace on earth has not been erased by the dust of millennia and the ashes left by countless bloody wars” 
(Rahmon, 2002: 14). Rahmon thus put Zoroastrianism (along with the cult of Ismail Somoni and the Aryan 
myth) at the center of an ideological production aimed at reinforcing Tajik nationalism (Marat, 2008a). 
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pure and sacred nature of water, and consequently present it as a non-negotiable matter, as 
it will be illustrated throughout this study. 
 
3.3. The Soviet hydraulic mission 
While more than twenty years have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Soviet 
water management practices still have a great influence on Central Asian water politics. 
From the 1940s until the 1960s, Stalin’s Great Plan for the Transformation of Nature 
(Stalinskiy Plan Preobrazovaniya Prirody) and Krushev’s Virgin Lands Campaign 
radically changed agricultural practices in the Soviet Union to meet the growing needs of 
its population. If, on the one hand, the Soviets managed to bring water and electricity in 
most of their territory (in line with Lenin’s insight “Communism is Soviet power plus the 
electrification of the whole country), on the other hand, their environmental irresponsibility 
has been the cause of countless ecological disasters. As Feshbach and Friendly noted (1992: 
1), “[w]hen historians finally conduct an autopsy on the Soviet Union and Soviet 
Communism, they may reach the verdict of death by ecocide. […] No other great industrial 
civilization so systematically and so long poisoned its land, air, water and people”. And 
indeed, the desiccation of the Aral Sea is possibly the worst man-made environmental 
disaster of the twentieth century. The times are long gone since Alexey Butakoff, a 
Commander of the Imperial Russian Navy, was reporting on his Caspian Tiger sightings in 
the vicinity of Aralsk (Butakoff, 1853), as today the Aral Sea turned into the Aral-kum, a 
desert whose soil is known as solonchak, a mixture of salt deposits, sand and dust polluted 
with agricultural chemicals.  
The Soviets have not been the first to be fascinated by the ability to dominate nature and 
use its power to serve the needs of society. Powerful ancient empires, such as the Chinese, 
Mesopotamian, Egyptian or Maya, used rivers to develop large-scale irrigated areas which 
contributed to their growth and expansion (Wittfogel, 1957; Molle et al., 2009).  
 
3.3.1. Bringing water to the desert 
Thus, between the end of the nineteenth century and the 1970s, hydraulic missions were 
launched worldwide, including the Soviet Union, where the plan was to make “mad rivers 
sane” (Gorky, quoted in McCully, 2001: 17). Through its hydraulic mission, the Soviet 
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hydrocracy pursued mostly two objectives: increase agricultural and electricity production, 
through respectively large-scale irrigation projects and massive hydropower plants. In 
Central Asia, the hydraulic mission engendered the construction of large dams and water 
reservoirs in the mountainous areas of the upstream republics (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) 
which, together with a complex network of canals, made it possible to practice irrigated 
agriculture in the plains of the downstream countries (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan), where water intensive agricultural crops such as cotton, rice, and wheat were 
grown (Rakhmatullaev et al., 2010: 308). This is because the Central Asia climate is 
excellent for growing cotton and other heat-loving crops, and its thermal conditions (that 
allow a growing season of 204 to 288 days per year) were the best of anyplace in the Soviet 
Union (Klotzli, 1994: 6). Moreover, through the construction of dams and canals, the 
Soviet administrators created a situation that would ensure competition between upstream 
and downstream countries, thus reinforcing the national distinctiveness of the republics and 
maintaining a role for Moscow as a dispute settler (O’Hara, 2000: 430).  
The first major irrigation projects began in 1939, with the construction of 45 canals, 
such as the Great, the North and the South Ferghana canals in the Ferghana Valley (Matley, 
1967: 294-295). Thanks also to the momentum gained with the Virgin Lands Campaign 
(launched in the 1950s by Krushev), the total irrigated area in Central Asia increased from 
4.5 million hectares in 1965 to 7 million hectares in 1991 (Wegerich, 2008: 73). Overall, 
over 60 canals divert water from the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, including the Kara-
kum Canal, one of the longest (1,400 km) irrigation canals in the world that taps into Amu 
Darya to bring water in the Kara-kum desert in Turkmenistan. The expansion of irrigation 
diminished the inflow from the two rivers into the Aral Sea, eventually leading to the 
desiccation of what in the 1960s was the fourth’s largest inland water body42 (Micklin, 
2007).  
During the same period, the largest Central Asian hydro-electric dams were designed 
and built, most notably the Toktogul dam on the Naryn River in Kyrgyzstan, and the Nurek 
                                                     
42
 On this regard, Decree 1110 (“Measures for Radical Improvement of Ecological and Sanitary Situation in 
the Region of the Aral Sea, Enhancing the Efficiency and Use to Strengthen the Protection of the Water and 
Land Resources in its Basin”) adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union in 1988, can be 
considered as a formal recognition of the disappearance of the Aral Sea. Although too late have any relevant 
effect, the document specifies annual minimum inflow quota to the deltas of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya in 
the Aral Sea to try to reverse its desiccation. 
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dam in Tajikistan. Other projects were started but never concluded, such as the large Rogun 
and Kambarata dams, whose revitalisation in the 2000s provoked the two regional conflicts 
that are the centre of this study. These abandoned dam projects were not, however, the only 
legacy left by the Soviet Union to the new-born republics. As Dukhovnyĭ and Sokolov 
noted: 
 
While Tsarist Russia left local water law unchanged, especially as it applied to 
communal participation in works related to the operation, maintenance, renovation, and 
rehabilitation of irrigation nets. The institution of “aryk aksakals” and “mirabs” – water 
managers elected by communities – was put on a sound basis. Seventy years of Soviet 
power changed these principles by creating a strict and rigidly controlled system of 
centralized water management that worked in a top-down manner. […] This system 
made it possible to deliver and allocate water successfully by means of a huge water 
infrastructure with vast operational costs, covered at the expense of the federal 
government at inter-farm and up to on-farm levels, and which also included drainage. 
But this water system suffered from two immense shortcomings. First, the opinions of 
water users and consumers were not taken into consideration; as a result, the transition 
of agriculture and the Central Asian economy in general to market principles showed 
many water users to be insolvent and not self-sufficient. Second, environment 
considerations were largely ignored in favor of the needs of water users; hence 
ecological and sanitary requirements, along with the environmental needs of deltas, 
Priaralye, and the Aral Sea itself, were ignored and the scale of the problems was 
understated. (Dukhovnyĭ and Sokolov, 2003: 9) 
 
Besides creating a huge water distribution and irrigation structure, the Soviets also 
imposed a centralised system to manage the region’s natural resources that had the 
downstream countries providing the upstream states with oil and gas, in exchange for water 
releases in summer to irrigate their cotton fields. These regional schemes – centrally 
managed by the Soviet Ministry of Water Management (USSR Minvodkhoz) – regulated 
seasonal water requirements and distribution among the Republics (Vinogradov and 
Langford, 2001), while allowing the upstream countries to keep water in their reservoirs in 
winter, instead of using it to produce hydroelectricity, as their energy needs were already 
met. Water allocation arrangements were based on two complementary components: i) 
centrally controlled water allocation quotas for each SSR, and ii) centrally planned 
deliveries of oil and gas to the Kyrgyz and Tajik SSRs in winter (Libert et al., 2008: 11). 
More precisely, the Ministry of Water Management of the Soviet Union allocated the 
water resources of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya through the adoption of two internal 
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decisions: Protocol 566
43
 for the Amu Darya, and Protocol 413
44
 for the Syr Darya (see 
Table 2). Giving priority to the cultivation of cotton, fodder, fruits and vegetables in the 
downstream countries (The World Bank, 2004: 8), Protocol 566
45
 allocated 48 % of the 
total surface flow of the Amu Darya river to Uzbekistan, 36 % to Turkmenistan, 15 % to 
Tajikistan and 0.6 % to Kyrgyzstan, while Protocol 413 allocated 46 % of the total surface 
flow of the Syr Darya river to Uzbekistan, 44 % to Kazakhstan, 8 % to Tajikistan and 2 % 
to Kyrgyzstan. To make sure that water allocation were respected, in 1986 the Minvodkhoz 
also created two river basin organizations, the BVO Syr Darya and the BVO Amu Darya. 
 
 
 
Water distribution limits in the 
Amu Darya basin (Protocol 566) 
Water distribution limits in the 
Syr Darya basin (Protocol 413) 
Billion cubic 
meter per year 
Share % 
Billion cubic 
meter per year 
Share % 
Kazakhstan - - 10 44 
Kyrgyzstan 0.4 0.6 0.5 2 
Tajikistan 9.5 15.4 1.8 8 
Turkmenistan 22 35.8 - - 
Uzbekistan 29.6 48.2 10.4 46 
Total 61.5 100 22.7 100 
Table 2: Water Distribution Limits in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins according to Protocol 566 
and Protocol 413. 
 
Unsurprisingly, when such a centralised and interconnected system vanished along with 
the Soviet Union, tensions arose between the new-born independent republics over the 
management and sharing of their natural resources (O’Hara, 2000).  
                                                     
43
 Protocol 566: Improvement of the Scheme on Complex Use and Protection of Amu-Darya Water Resources 
by Scientific & Technical Council, Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Management of the Soviet 
Union, September 10, 1987. 
44
 Protocol 413: Improvement of Scheme of Complex Use and Protection of Water Resources of Syr-Darya 
Basin, February 7, 1984. 
45
 With the Protocol 566, the Soviets deliberately left Afghanistan out of water allocation in the Amu Darya, 
although the country is part of the river basin. As Horsman (2008: 66) observed, Afghanistan – that in 1977 
had sent, with no results, a delegation to Tashkent to arrange a water sharing agreement – was not consulted 
in this occasion. Therefore, the 1987 distribution limits ignored Afghanistan’s claims, and assigned to the 
country a quota that was less than what it was using in 1965 (3,850 million m³) . 
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3.4. The water/energy nexus 
Water being not scarce but unevenly distributed (Thorez and Thorez, 2004), the matter 
of discontent among the countries of the Aral Sea basin is on water quantity rather than on 
water quality. Driven by the need to cooperate on water issues (and perhaps still under-
shock for an independence that was not expected nor wanted
46
), in February 1992 the 
Central Asian leaders hurriedly
47
 signed the Agreement on Cooperation in the Area of Joint 
Management, Utilization and Protection of Interstate Water Resources (also known as the 
“Almaty Agreement”). This agreement is significant because its main effect was to leave 
Soviet water allocation unchanged, thus continuing to favour the downstream republics. 
Besides preserving the allocations contained in Protocol 566 and Protocol 413, the Almaty 
Agreement also maintained the two BVOs originally created by the Soviets. What changed, 
though, was that with independence the upstream states began paying market prices for the 
oil and gas that they imported from the downstream countries, while before, their energy 
needs were met by the low-cost imports centrally administered by Moscow. Therefore, 
instead of operating their large water reservoirs in irrigation mode, the upstream states now 
had an interest in storing their water in summer and use it to produce cheap hydroelectricity 
in winter
48
 (McKinnney 2004; Allouche, 2004), thus leading to water shortages in the 
downstream countries during summer, and to flooding in winter (as for instance in the 
Arnasai depression in Uzbekistan), since water was released when it was not needed. 
Moreover, Tajikistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s inability to pay for gas and oil imports resulted in 
frequent energy cuts and in recurrent energy crises.  
 
 
 
                                                     
46
 As Mandelbaum noted, the five Central Asian countries had independence thrust upon them; they were not 
ready nor particularly satisfied with the political earthquake caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. “In 
none had there been popular agitation for secession. None of their leaders sided, during the abortive coup of 
August 1991, with the forces of Boris Yeltsin, whose victory in the confrontation with the coup’s perpetrators 
was the deathblow of the Soviet Union (Mandelbaum, 1994: 2).  
47
 The Almaty Agreement was the first international multilateral agreement over water signed in the Soviet 
successor states (Weinthal, 2006: 8). 
48
 Also, since fossil fuel prices quickly increased after independence, households in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
switched from fossil fuel fired heating to electric heating, thus increasing winter electricity demand.  
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 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Population, total 
(million) (2012) 
16.8 5.6 7.6 5.1 29.8 
Surface area (sq. 
km) 
2,724,900 199,949 142,550 488,100 447,400 
Renewable internal 
freshwater 
resources, total 
(billion cubic 
meter) (2011) 
64 49 63 1 16 
Renewable internal 
freshwater 
resources per 
capita
49
 (cubic 
meter) (2011) 
3,886 8,873 8,120 275 557 
Annual freshwater 
withdrawals, total 
(billion cubic 
meter) (2011) 
21.1 10.1 11.5 28 56 
Annual freshwater 
withdrawals, 
agriculture (% of 
total freshwater 
withdrawal) (2011) 
66 94 91 94 90 
Electricity 
production from 
hydroelectric 
sources (billion 
kWh) (2011) 
7.9 14.1 16 n.d. 10.2 
Electricity 
production from 
hydroelectric 
sources (% of total) 
(2011) 
9.1 93.3 98.8 0 19.5 
Table 3: Key data on water availability and usage in Central Asia. Table constructed by author based 
on data from http://data.worldbank.org. 
 
                                                     
49
 To put this in the global context, in 2011 the amount of renewable internal cubic meter of freshwater 
available per person per year in Canada was 82,647, in the United States 9,044, in Italy 3,005, in India 1,184, 
in Morocco 905, in Libya 115, in Israel 97 and in Egypt 23. 
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The incompatibility between water demands of irrigation and hydropower, also known 
as the water/energy nexus, gave rise to a tense confrontation between upstream and 
downstream states on the use and control of the region’s water resources (Bohr, 2004), 
leading David Smith to write that “nowhere in the world is the potential for conflict over 
the use of natural resources as strong as in Central Asia” (1995: 351). Similarly, several 
scholars have framed regional water issues in Central Asia as a predominantly conflictual 
matter (Klotzli, 1994; Shalpykova, 2002; Sievers, 2002; Spoor and Kutrov, 2003; Allouche, 
2004; Abbink et al., 2009; Bernauer and Siegfried, 2012), and the International Crisis 
Group has repeatedly warned that the countries’ tendency to view water/energy issues as a 
zero-sum game is a constant source of tension (ICG 2002; 2007; 2011). And indeed, 
Central Asian leaders have often portrayed water as an almost non-negotiable matter, as a 
God-given gift with a nationalistic-charged meaning (Allouche, 2005). Politicians in the 
Aral Sea basin have tended to securitize water issues, “taking them out of the normal 
domain of technical management and placing them in the secret and closed domain of 
security officials” (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). 
Yet, before moving to the analysis of interstate relations in the field of water, it is useful 
to further delve on the institutional setting that emerged after 1991 and on the main 
agreements that have been signed by the Central Asian governments to manage their shared 
resources. Since regional institutions and agreements have not been successful in solving 
water problems in Central Asia, it seems useful to understand the reasons of this failure.  
 
3.5. A weak institutional framework 
More than two decades have passed since the Central Asian states gained independence 
and became responsible for the management of their natural resources. However, as of 
2013, a long-term sustainable solution to deal with regional water management issues has 
yet to be found. Nevertheless, soon after independence
50
 the Central Asian countries began 
                                                     
50
 It is worth noting that, as successor states of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian republics also inherited the 
legal obligations of the agreements previously concluded by the Soviet administration with other countries, 
such as for instance, Afghanistan or Iran. According to the 1978 “Vienna Convention on Succession of States 
in respect of Treaties”, a succession of States does not as such affect “rights and obligations relating to the use 
of any territory, or to restrictions upon its use” (Art. 12), nor “[a] boundary established by a treaty; or (b) 
obligations and rights established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a boundary” (Art. 11). 
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negotiating a large number of agreements on the management of transboundary waters, 
both of a binding and of a semi-formal nature
51
.  
The key agreement is the abovementioned 1992 Almaty Agreement, whose main effect 
was to continue allocating water resources as set by Soviet Protocols 566 and 413
52
 (see 
Table 2). This decision was important, because the Almaty Agreement is still the main 
reference for what concerns water allocation, which since then were never renegotiated nor 
readjusted, as they became an almost untreatable topic in high-level water negotiations. The 
Almaty Agreement also established the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination
53
 
(ICWC), a technical authority set to ensure the implementation of quotas and to control the 
activities of the two river basin organizations (BVO Syr Darya, based in Tashkent, and 
BVO Amu Darya, also based in Uzbekistan, in Urgench). The Agreement, however, lacks 
an effective dispute resolution mechanism. While Article 13 states that “All disputable 
matters are solved by the heads of water management agencies of the Republics (i.e. 
Ministers of Water), and, if needed, with participation of a representative of the party 
concerned”, it does not specify which measures should be taken if such disputes could not 
be solved (Vinogradov and Langford, 2001: 13). 
Under the changing geopolitical and economic conditions that marked the post-
independence period, observance of the water allocation proved unfeasible, and the 
republics ended up signing annual ad-hoc bilateral or trilateral barter agreements regarding 
water and energy exchanges. These barter agreements, which aimed at compensating water 
release from upstream countries in summer with imports of electricity, natural gas, fuel oil 
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 Declarations and statements constitute an additional instrument that the Central Asian Presidents use to 
define general principles and directions of water cooperation. Although of a non-binding nature, these “soft-
law” tools have a high political value. Several declarations and statements were issued between 1995 and 
2009 regarding the improvement of the environmental, economic and social conditions in the basin. The 
Nukus Declaration (September 1995), focused on sustainable development of the Aral Sea Basin and on 
financial obligations of the states to ICAS and IFAS. The Almaty declaration (February 1997), declared 1998 
as the Environmental Protection Year in Central Asia and introduced the idea of proclaiming Central Asia a 
nuclear-free zone. The Ashgabat Declaration (1999) stressed the importance of joint actions to address shared 
environmental problems in the basin and promote better quality of life for people living in the Aral Sea Basin, 
while the Dushanbe Declaration (2002) concentrated on improving information exchange on water and other 
natural resources (Menga, 2012). 
52
 Another consequences of this agreement was that upstream countries’ plans to expand their irrigated land 
(Kyrgyzstan wanted to increase its irrigated land total by over 400,000 hectares, Tajikistan by between 
40,000-140,000 hectares) had to be downsized (Micklin, 2000: 44). 
53
 Whose full name is the “Interstate Coordinating Water Management Commission on the problems of 
regulation, rational use and protection of water resources from interstate sources. 
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and coal from downstream countries in winter, often contained artificial and non-
transparent prices that hindered their efficiency (The World Bank, 2004: 8). 
In 1993, the five countries signed the “Kyzyl-Orda Agreement”54. Though the treaty was 
non-binding and did not provide any dispute resolution mechanism, it is significant because 
it created two bodies: the Interstate Council on the Aral Sea Basin (ICAS), with the task of 
coordinating projects and set policies, and the International Fund to Save the Aral Sea 
(IFAS), a political authority aimed at managing financial resources provided by member 
states and donors (Dinar et al, 2007: 302). These newly established regional institutions had 
to coordinate the Aral Sea Basin Programme (ASBP), an action program launched in 
1994
55
 to prepare a general strategy for water distribution, rational water use, and 
protection of water resources in the Aral Sea Basin. ICAS and IFAS merged in 1997 under 
the name of IFAS
56
. The working body of IFAS is its Executive Committee (EC IFAS), 
formed by two representatives for each of the five states. The mission of the EC IFAS – 
that has gradually been enlarged, and particularly at the 2009 IFAS Summit in Almaty – is 
to serve as a regional platform for dialogue and coordination on environmental issues 
(including water) among the countries of the Aral Sea basin. The chairmanship of IFAS 
rotates among the five Presidents, and the location of the EC IFAS varies accordingly
57
. 
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 “Agreement on joint activities in addressing the Aral Sea and the zone around the Sea crisis, improving the 
environment, and ensuring the social and economic development of the Aral Sea region”. 
55
 In the following six years, the five Central Asian Presidents met at least once a year to further discuss and 
develop the ASBP (Roll et al., 2006: 8). 
56
 Initially, the five member states were expected to contribute with 1 % of their annual state expenses to fund 
the functioning of IFAS. However, since it became clear that none of the states was fulfilling its financial 
commitments, contributions have been lowered to 0.3 % of their annual state expenses for the downstream 
countries, and 0.1 % for the upstream ones (Sehring, 2012).  
57
 The EC IFAS has been located in Almaty (1993-1997), Tashkent (1997-1999), Ashgabat (1999-2002), 
Dushanbe (2003-2009), Almaty (2009-2012) and currently in Tashkent. In 2005, the planned move to 
Bishkek did not take place due to the political turmoil that led to the ousting of Askar Akaev.  
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This institutional framework seems however unfit to manage Central Asia’s water 
resources. As Mosello (2008) noted, the main reasons for this inappropriateness are limited 
mandates, interstate rivalries and disputes within the same institutions, lack of technical 
expertise, insufficient financing and the absence of enforcement mechanisms. And indeed, 
the inability to find a solution to the recurrent seasonal water/energy crises, and the Central 
Asian Presidents’ tendency to take decisions unilaterally rather than discuss them at 
multilateral forums, seems to confirm the failure of this framework, as it will be illustrated 
in the second section of this chapter. 
Another significant agreement is the 1998 “Syr Darya Agreement”58, signed by all 
countries except Turkmenistan (not part of the Syr Darya river basin). This treaty seems an 
important improvement over the previous ad-hoc arrangements, as it shows a desire to 
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 “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Government of Kyrgyz Republic, 
the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan Concerning 
Use of Water and Energy Resources in the Syr Darya River Basin”. 
BVO Amu Darya 
BVO Syr Darya 
CA States 
President Council 
on the problems of 
the Aral Sea Basin 
President of IFAS 
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Sustainable 
Development 
EC IFAS 
Figure 13: Simplified overview of the organizational structure of IFAS. Constructed by author based on 
information from http://www.ec-ifas.org. 
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adhere to international law and precedents, and recognizes the need to compensate 
upstream Kyrgyzstan for its energy losses due to its unexploited hydroelectric production. 
This compensation should be paid by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in the form of equivalent 
energy sources (bartering electricity, gas, coal and fuel), or in monetary terms. However, 
implementation of the agreement is difficult, since it does not take into account water 
variability in dry years (McKinney, 2004: 211-212). Since the riparians of the Syr Darya 
had to annually negotiate the exact terms of the barter arrangements, including the actual 
volumes of water releases and the amount of compensation (The World Bank, 2004: 10), 
tension became the norm and cuts in gas deliveries from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan have 
been frequent (Weinthal, 2006). 
A similar approach was adopted with the “Chu and Talas Agreement”59, signed by the 
governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 2000. This arrangement is perceived by 
some observers (Granit et al., 2010) as the way forward in Central Asian water politics, as 
it is the only one that commits the downstream country (Kazakhstan) to pay upkeep costs 
for the use of shared water facilities to the upstream country (Kyrgyzstan). Such 
arrangement clearly contrasts with the traditional water management mechanisms in the Syr 
Darya basin, and could signal a shift in favour of Kyrgyzstan’s requests (see paragraph 
3.6.2) to receive a contribution from downstream countries to the maintenance of upstream 
water installations (Weinthal 2006: 24). The Chu and Talas Agreement remains, however, 
an isolated case, and the numerous deals signed so far by the five republics have not 
managed to effectively cope with the exchange of natural resources in Central Asia, nor to 
solve conflictual relations in what is an extremely interconnected setting. 
Based on the critical aspects outlined so far, the following reviews in detail the evolution 
of interstate water relations among the Central Asian countries in the period 1991-2011, 
first providing the general picture and subsequently focusing on bilateral relations between 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as they reflect the debate on 
the Rogun and Kambarata dams that will be analysed in the next chapters. 
 
 
 
                                                     
59
 “Agreement between the Government of the Kazakh Republic and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic 
on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas”. 
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3.6. Twenty years of water relations 
The following is based on the chronology of general interstate relations in the field of 
water in the Aral Sea basin. The chronology contains around 200 events (or speech acts), 
but not all of them will be reported here, in an attempt of not making this section too 
descriptive. The chronology is however available in full in Annex 2, while Annex 1 
explains in detail how these data were put together and what were the reasons behind this 
collection.  
 
3.6.1. Coexisting conflict and cooperation 
What immediately emerges is that relations among the countries of the Aral Sea basin 
have been marked by a coexistence of conflict and cooperation. Over the years, the 
numerous agreements and declarations of friendship issued by the Central Asian Presidents 
have been flanked by extremely conflictual events, such as cuts in gas and water supplies or 
the deployment of troops at the border. In terms of speech acts analysis, commissive speech 
acts, through which the countries express a commitment to engage in future actions, are 
thus sided by directive ones, through which something is demanded.  
This seems to be in line with the latest tendency in hydropolitics, which takes conflict 
and cooperation as two connected and coexisting phenomena (see among others, Postel and 
Wolf, 2001; Wolf et al., 2003; Mirumachi and Allan, 2007; Zeitoun and Mirumachi, 2008). 
Cooperation is not necessarily associated with agreements or treaties and not all 
cooperation is good, and on the same way, tensions may sometimes lead to reduction of 
conflict and not to its exacerbation
60
. The effectiveness of cooperation may be influenced 
by a particular political context where there is a cooperation of tokenism, or where 
cooperation is only happening at the technical level
61
.  
And indeed, besides the key agreements mentioned previously (the 1992 Almaty 
Agreement, the 1993 Kyzyl-Orda Agreement and the 1998 Syr Darya Agreement), many 
more have been signed in these two decades. Most of them are annual operation agreements 
(AOAs), that are used by the regional governments to barter water for energy. The fact that 
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 For instance, as Zeitoun (2007) notes, in the Jordan River basin there is evidence of both conflict and 
cooperation happening simultaneously, or at least, where someone sees cooperation someone else may see 
conflict, what he calls the ‘cooperation versus conflict paradox’. 
61
 This approach is clearly in contrast with the one of the UNDP, according to which “it makes sense to 
promote and support cooperation of any sort, no matter how slight” (UNDP, 2006: 228). 
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the Central Asian countries resort to these short-term instruments (that solve the problem 
only temporarily), is perhaps the best indicator of the mistrust that dominates interstate 
relations, and of the absence of a genuine political will to reach a compromise. Moreover, 
these AOAs are often hurriedly signed in the depths of winter and summer, as a response to 
an on-going crisis, and not to prevent its occurrence.  
As an example, in 2004 five AOAs were signed between January and July. In January, 
representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan met in Shymkent
62
 to discuss 
measures to prevent flooding from the Chardara dam, a large water reservoir on the Syr 
Darya River in Kazakhstan, which forms part of the Kazakh-Uzbek border. The parties 
reached an agreement under which Kazakhstan committed to supply coal and fuel to 
Kyrgyzstan, while Kyrgyzstan decided to reduce its hydroelectric production and 
Uzbekistan agreed to use its nearby Arnasai Reservoir to lower the water level in the 
Chardara dam (RFE/RL, 2004). A month later, also Tajikistan agreed to reduce its 
discharges from the Qayraqqum reservoir, to ease pressure on the Chardara and put an end 
(at least for the year) to the floods that were hitting several villages near the Kazakh-Uzbek 
border (RFE/RL, 2004). Then, in July of the same year, when regions in Southern 
Kazakhstan badly needed water for their irrigated crops, Kyrgyzstan agreed to increase 
water discharges from the Toktogul reservoir, and in exchange Kazakhstan bought over 1 
billion kWh of Kyrgyz hydroelectricity (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2004a). 
Additionally, also Uzbekistan agreed to increase water releases from the Syr Darya river to 
the Chardara reservoir (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2004). Overall, around forty 
AOAs were signed in the period 1991-2011. 
In addition to these barter agreements, the Central Asian governments repeatedly 
reaffirmed their friendship, issuing joint communiqués and holding talks (mostly at the 
bilateral and trilateral level) to increase cooperation in the management and sharing of 
natural resources. It is however clear that an unfriendly approach prevails in the relations 
between the basin riparians and that these cooperative events are fundamentally ineffective, 
as they only solve the most pressing matters while leaving the underlying conflict 
unresolved. Frequently the AOAs were signed following situations of extreme tension, with 
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 A city located in Southern Kazakhstan, not far from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. 
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Uzbekistan – the country with the largest military apparatus of Central Asia – that often 
threatened to use force, and the upstream countries that used water as a bargaining tool.  
While over the last two decades cuts in water and gas supplies have been common, in 
1997 regional relations reached one of their lowest points. In January, Kyrgyzstan reduced 
the amount of flow leaving the Toktogul reservoir and entering into Uzbekistan (Hanks, 
2010: 88; Muzalevsky, 2010). As a response, Uzbekistan cut off 70 % of the water flowing 
in downstream Kazakhstan
63
, threatening 100,000 hectares of irrigated corn and cotton 
crops and prompting a riot by Kazakh farmers. Moreover, in an attempt to intimidate the 
Kyrgyz government, Uzbekistan deployed 130,000 troops near its border with Kyrgyzstan 
in the Ferghana Valley (Hogan, 2000). The crisis was eventually averted following 
negotiations among the countries, although later in 1997 Kyrgyzstan threatened to cut off 
electricity and water supplies to Kazakhstan, which failed to honour agreed energy transfers 
and pay for previous deliveries (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1998). These events 
are emblematic of the profound intertwining of the water and energy sectors in Central 
Asia, where a coordinated approach to the management of shared natural resources is 
essential. 
Similar tensions are also common in the Ferghana valley (see Figure 14), a region shared 
by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan that includes myriad enclaves and exclaves, and 
that has the highest population density of Central Asia
64
. Border negotiations in the 
Ferghana Valley are extremely complicated, and so is the allocation of water resources. In 
2008, 150 Tajik residents of Isfara (in Tajikistan’s Soghd province) crossed the border into 
Kyrgyz Batken Region to try to destroy a dam erected by the Kyrgyz authorities that cut 
them off from water sources. While the Tajiks complained that the dam was situated in an 
area where the border was still unsettled, Kyrgyz authorities countered that the structure 
was inside Kyrgyzstan, and they mobilised their border guards to prevent the demolition 
attempt (Rosario, 2009). The potential bloodshed was eventually avoided thanks to a 
provisional agreement to open the dam and replenish the Tajik canals (Khamidov, 2008). 
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 For what concerns the Toktogul reservoir, Kyrgyzstan is the furthest upstream country, Uzbekistan the 
midstream and Kazakhstan the furthest downstream. 
64
 Population density in the Ferghana Valley on average is 360 persons per square kilometer and reaches 
550 in some areas, while the average density for the whole Central Asia is of 14 persons per square kilometer. 
More than ten million people live in the Valley, a sixth of the entire population of Central Asia. For more 
information on the Ferghana Valley see Starr et al. (2011). 
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Figure 14: Water issues in the Ferghana Valley. Source: Philippe Rekacewicz, UNEP/GRID-Arendal 
(http://www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/water-issues-in-the-ferghana-valley_108d). 
 
3.6.2. Three stages of regional relations 
What emerges from the data in the timeline is that, overall, regional relations in Central 
Asia have had three different and evolving phases: i) the period 1991-1996, marked by the 
signing of numerous multilateral agreements on water sharing; ii) the period 1997-2006, in 
which the Central Asian countries have started to negotiate bilateral and trilateral AOAs 
and adopted a more individualist attitude towards the management of shared water 
resources; iii) the period 2007-2011, in which the revitalization of large-scale hydroelectric 
projects in the upstream countries led to the gradual deterioration of interstate relations, 
thus becoming the main source of regional tensions.  
Though the evolution (and degradation) of regional water relations has mostly political 
motivations, it is important to note that the high seasonal and yearly variability in the water 
flow of both the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya seems related to this trend. While the water 
flow was abundant in the period 1991-1997 (Rahimov, 2009), it started to diminish in the 
following years, and for instance in 2000 and 2001 Central Asia was hit by the worst 
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drought over the last 95 years (Wegerich, 2002). However, the water flow is only a 
fluctuating variable that can at most exacerbate existing problems, which have their roots in 
ineffective regional agreements and with an unsatisfying water allocation scheme, as 
demonstrated by the proliferation of AOAs. 
Therefore, starting in 1997 the Central Asian republics changed their approach to the 
management of shared water resources, opting for an individualistic rather than 
collectivistic tactic. All Central Asian states have adopted internal laws that recognize 
water as national asset and as a crucial resource to sustain social and economic 
development. As Bektur Sakiev effectively sums it up:  
 
According to clause 4 of Kazakhstan’s Water Code, “the State owns the water in 
Kazakhstan”; clause 4 of Tajikistan’s Water Code states that “the State owns all water 
in the Republic of Tajikistan in accordance with its Constitution”; as clause 3 of Uzbek 
Law “On Water and Water Use” states “water is the state property – national treasure of 
Uzbekistan. The water must be used rationally and is protected by the State”. Clause 5 
of Kyrgyzstan’s water law declares that “the State owns the State water fund of 
Kyrgyzstan”. (Sakiev, 2009: 85)  
 
The 1997 Kyrgyz edict
65
, in particular, was the first to demand compensation for 
revenues lost from releasing water downstream to Uzbek farms instead of using it to 
generate hydroelectricity (Hogan, 2000). This is significant, because the edict set a new 
attitude towards water among the two upstream countries, which started to view the 
resource as a commodity that can be traded and from which they can profit, also because 
they are not well-endowed with other natural resources. Bishkek reiterated its intentions in 
2001, through the adoption of the “Law of the Kyrgyz Republic On Inter-State Use of 
Water Objects, Water Resources and Water Economy Constructions”. For what concerns 
Kyrgyz rivers that flow to other countries, Article 3 states that the following principles 
apply:  
 
Recognition of state property rights for water objects, water resources and water 
economy constructions within its territory; Recognition of water as a type of natural 
resources that has its economic value within all competitive types of use and it’s a 
commodity; Chargeable water use within international water relations. (Legislative 
Assembly of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2001) 
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 Adopted by the then President of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akaev in October 1997. 
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The Kyrgyz water law is inspired by Principle 4 of the 1992 Dublin Statement on Water 
and Sustainable Development, which is titled “Water has an economic value in all its 
competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good” (The Dublin Statement on 
Water and Sustainable Development, 1992). As Heltzer (2003) observed, the 
accompanying language of the law is such that rather than setting a water price, this legal 
instrument seems intended to force cash payment for maintenance of infrastructures and the 
loss of hydropower generation during the winter months. As the then Kyrgyz Prime 
Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev commented, the 2001 water law has to be considered a 
compensation for Kyrgyzstan’s losses, as the country uses less than 25 % of the water in its 
reservoirs while its “neighbors don't pay anything for the water they get” (RFE/RL, 2001).  
The law caused the prompt opposition of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, that argued that 
international water law
66
 does not allow profiting from water nor charging for shared water 
(Dinar, 2005: 152), which also goes against some of the basic tenets of Islam. Another 
consequence of the water law was that a few months after its adoption, in October 2001, the 
Uzbek government shut off natural gas deliveries to Kyrgyzstan (Cagnat, 2001; Khamidov, 
2001; Hanks, 2010), resulting in serious energy shortages for the remaining winter months. 
Perhaps more importantly, the law lacked an implementation mechanism and became 
contested also within Kyrgyzstan itself
67
, thus resulting in no real efforts from the Kyrgyz 
government to put it into action
68
 (Sehring, 2009). Thus, the Kyrgyz government stepped 
back from its original position, asking the downstream countries to only share maintenance 
costs for Kyrgyz reservoirs and canals (similar to the mechanism set out by the Chu and 
Talas Agreements).  
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 And indeed, while on the one hand Principle 4 of the 1992 Dublin Statement inspired the Kyrgyz water law, 
on the other hand it also acknowledged that “Within this principle, it is vital to recognize first the basic right 
of all human beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable price. Past failure to 
recognize the economic value of water has led to wasteful and environmentally damaging uses of the 
resource. Managing water as an economic good is an important way of achieving efficient and equitable use, 
and of encouraging conservation and protection of water resources.” (The Dublin Statement on Water and 
Sustainable Development, 1992). 
67
 As Jennifer Sehring (2009, 119-120) observed, within Kyrgyzstan the law was highly debated, and was 
sometimes referred to as zakon gaspodina Usubalieva, the law of Mr. Usubaliev. This is because the law was 
commonly associated with Turdakun Usubaliev, the former First Secretary of the Kyrgyz Communist Party 
that actively lobbied for water pricing in independent Kyrgyzstan.  
68
 However, even if the Kyrgyz law did not enter into force, the legitimacy of compensation mechanisms has 
been already acknowledged by the Kazakh government, that in 2000 agreed to share maintenance costs for 
Kyrgyz reservoirs with the above mentioned Chu and Talas Agreement.  
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As the International Crisis Group observed (2002: 17), on this issue Kyrgyzstan has 
more bargaining power than Tajikistan. This is because the flow of the Syr Darya being 
more regulated by reservoirs than that of the Amu Darya, Kyrgyzstan is potentially in a 
position to cut water supplies to the downstream countries for a considerably longer period 
of time than Tajikistan. If Tajikistan wants to use water as a bargaining tool (and charge 
downstream countries for the water it releases), it needs to complete the Rogun 
hydroelectric plant (see Chapter 4), that with its massive reservoir would give the Tajik 
government full control of the Amu Darya water flow.  
On the other hand, the construction of large reservoirs can have significance also for the 
downstream countries, and especially for those that are midstream: Turkmenistan on the 
Amu Darya river basin, where the furthest downstream country is Uzbekistan and 
Uzbekistan on the Syr Darya river basin, where the furthest downstream country is 
Kazakhstan. Through the construction of large reservoirs, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
can use water as a strategic tool increasing their bargaining power towards the furthest 
downstream states, and more importantly, they can decrease their dependence from the 
upstream republics, since they can use the water stored in their reservoirs as a buffer 
whenever the water flow arriving from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan diminishes. Hence, both 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan went along with resource capture strategies, which are 
unilateral actions that occur “whereby a riparian, in the absence of formal understandings, 
moves ahead with projects that affect the flow or quality of the resource” (Waterbury, 
1997: 279).  
While the Uzbek resource capture strategies will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 
6 (where they will be analysed as hegemonic strategies), it is worth focusing on those 
carried out by Turkmenistan, as they have generated controversies and debates all over the 
region. It must be first noted that Turkmenistan has traditionally had an isolationist 
approach towards the management of transboundary waters and regional issues in general. 
Its foreign policy is based on the status of permanent positive neutrality, that was 
recognized by the UNGA Resolution on Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan on 12 
December 1995 (United Nations General Assembly, 1995), and that has been used by the 
Turkmen government as a tool to strengthen its authority and to establish a “domestic-
oriented” foreign policy (Anceschi, 2009). As outlined in the timeline, Turkmenistan has 
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not taken part in most of the regional meetings on the management of regional water 
resources, and only recently, following the establishment of the UN Regional Centre for 
Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia
69
 (UNRCCA) in its capital Ashgabat, the country 
has become more involved – although this involvement seems mostly cosmetic – in the 
regional water dialogue.  
The Turkmen isolationist approach is well embodied by the decision to realise the 
Golden Age (Altyn Asyr) Lake, a giant reservoir in the middle of the Karakum desert whose 
construction was launched in the year 2000 by the then President of Turkmenistan 
Saparmurat Niyazov. This huge artificial lake
70
, that is very likely to increase 
Turkmenistan’s water intake from the Amu Darya, has been planned without consulting 
with the other riparian countries. The Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, 
defined the Turkmen lake as “truly priceless, not only for Turkmenistan but for the entire 
Central Asia region”, because the lake will give birth to “New green oasis, towns, villages, 
districts”, while allowing the “development of irrigated agriculture, livestock and fisheries” 
(Turmenistan.ru, 2009). This notwithstanding, the project has been harshly criticised by 
environmental experts, that contend that the runoff will be insufficient to fill the lake, and 
that due to the high evaporation rate the result will be a massive dead lake in the middle of 
the desert (Stone, 2008). The Uzbek government has also raised concerns, as it is worried 
that the Lake will cause a reduction in the Amu Darya flow to Uzbekistan (International 
Crisis Group, 2002: 25-26). However, the Turkmen government has continued with the 
construction of the Lake, although delays have postponed its launch – initially expected in 
2010 – to an undefined date. 
Unilateral actions such as the construction of the Golden Century Lake, which is being 
imposed by Turkmenistan on its neighbours without their consent, are emblematic of the 
individualist approach to regional water issues that has been gradually adopted by the 
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 The UNRCCA – a special political mission of the United Nations – was inaugurated in 2008, following a 
request presented by the five Central Asian governments to the UN Security Council. Its mission is to prevent 
the main threats to Central Asian security, including international terrorism and extremism, drug trafficking, 
organized crime and environmental degradation/water issues. The Turkmen government insisted on having 
the Centre in Ashgabat, that among the Central Asian capitals is the one that hosts the fewer regional and 
international organizations. 
70
 Once completed, the lake is expected to hold more than 130 billion m³ of water, covering an area of 2,000 
square kilometers (Turkmenistan.ru, 2009; Menga, 2013). 
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Central Asian republics
71
. In the same way, the construction of major dams in the upstream 
countries without the consent of the downstream riparians is an extremely controversial 
unilateral action that will impact heavily (and at different levels) on all countries in the 
region. For this reason, the almost simultaneous revitalisation of the Rogun and Kambarata 
dams in 2007 acted as a game changer in regional politics. For the first time, the poorer and 
politically weaker upstream countries have attempted to drastically change the status-quo, 
thus marking the beginning of a new phase in regional water relations. The two major dams 
quickly gained prominence in regional politics, monopolizing the attention of the Central 
Asian governments and strongly influencing (and straining) their relations.  
Before moving to the two case studies, however, it is important to outline the evolution 
of bilateral relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
using the TWINS matrix. As it was mentioned in Chapter 2, the analysis has been limited to 
these two bilateral relations as they are the ones that best mirror the conflict on Rogun and 
Kambarata, since Uzbekistan has been the most vocal dam opponent among the three 
downstream countries of the Aral Sea basin.  
 
3.6.3. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
The Central Asian people can be differentiated among nomadic/semi-nomadic, the 
Kazakhs, the Kyrgyz and the Turkmens, and sedentary, the Tajiks and the Uzbeks, that 
settled around the main oasis in the vicinity of the Amu Darya river (Adle and Palat, 2005). 
Although the Soviets have attempted to stamp out expressions of traditional identity and 
carefully fabricate new nationalities, their effort had no particular significance. The Tajiks 
and the Uzbeks have strong bonds, and for instance, at the moment of independence they 
had difficulties indicating their nationality for their identity cards, since they were often a 
mixture of both identities (Phillips and James, 2001: 29). Although they speak different 
languages
72
, the peoples of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan share a common culture and 
traditions, and being the two main contemporary sedentary civilizations of Central Asia, 
they also developed a fierce rivalry, that was further exacerbated after the collapse of the 
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 Further confirming this attitude, in June 2000 Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan rejected the multilateral 
approach to regional water issues proposed by the then head of the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) Benita Ferrero-Waldner (O’Hara, 2004), advocating instead for a bilateral 
approach to solve such issues. 
72
 Uzbek is a Turkic language, while Tajik is a variety of modern Persian.  
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Soviet Union due to the assignment of the predominantly ethnic Tajik cities of Samarkand 
and Bukhara to Uzbekistan (see Chapter 4). As Paul Bergne historical analysis exhaustively 
illustrated (2007), the birth of Tajikistan
73
 in the 1920s caused a profound shift in the way 
the Tajiks saw themselves, creating a Tajik national identity where there was none. “The 
founding of Tajikistan was not the result of Tajik nationalism but the hour of its birth” 
(Lutz Rzehak, quoted in Bergne, 2007: 103), and this new national identity almost 
immediately clashed with the Uzbek one. 
While, on the one hand, the Soviets did not manage to eradicate expressions of 
traditional identity in Central Asia, on the other hand, they were more successful in creating 
inter-national divisions through borders, distribution of political power and an intertwined 
resource distribution system whose rationale was essentially driven by the divide et impera 
rule (Capisani, 2000). And thus, due to the void left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
two rival civilizations turned into strenuous competitors for the management and control of 
the region’s natural resources. Significantly, the competition between the two countries 
seems to go beyond the mere exchange of natural resources, as its roots lie in the assertion 
of power and national interests, in a context where former Communist leaders took a 
nationalist turn to enhance the perceived legitimacy of their authority (Mellon 2010, 138-
139). 
For these reasons, and also given the geographical configuration of the basin, where 
Tajikistan is upstream of the water but Uzbekistan is “upstream” of the gas, bilateral 
relations between the two new-born republics have been immediately tense. The 
circumstances triggered by the water/energy nexus, soon had Tajikistan – unable to pay for 
the gas supplied by Uzbekistan – releasing water from the Nurek reservoir (its main source 
of electricity) to generate hydroelectricity in winter. Further complicating matters, a harsh 
civil war hit Tajikistan from 1992 until 1997, with devastating effects: between 60,000 to 
100,000 victims, some 600,000 (a tenth of the population) were internally displaced, 80,000 
left the country, for an estimated economic cost of US$ 7 billion (International Crisis 
Group, 2001: i).  
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 Tajikistan did not exist as an ethnically defined political unit before the Bolshevik revolution. In 1924, the 
USSR created the Tajik ASSR, that was part of the larger Uzbek SSR. In 1929, the Tajik ASSR achieved the 
status of union republic, becoming the Tajik SSR. 
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The first of many energy crises
74
 to come hit Tajikistan in winter 1993 (Barber, 1993), 
and in 1996, due to dropping temperatures and rising consumptions, the Tajik government 
was forced to cut electric power for an average of 12 hours a day (United Press 
International, 1996). Nevertheless, perhaps due to Uzbekistan’s involvement in the Tajik 
civil war
75
 (Horsman, 1999), and to the unstable internal situation in Tajikistan, the 
relationship between the two countries was not as tense as it turned out to be after 1997. 
During the civil war, Tajikistan actively participated to all major regional water 
negotiations and agreements (thus showing the high priority given to water issues in 
Tajikistan’s political agenda), and Uzbekistan successfully managed to leave Soviet water 
allocation unchanged and out of regional discussions. Yet, in what seems a forerunner of 
future tensions, in May 1995 Uzbekistan unilaterally (and suddenly) decided to stop buying 
electricity from Tajikistan, violating an agreement between the two republics and causing 
discontent amid the Tajik side (the head of the Tajik power grid described the Uzbek move 
as “impolite, to say the very least”) (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1995a).  
 
                                                     
74
 Further tensions arose when, in September 1992, supporters of the deposed Tajik President Nabiyev (a 
political rival of Rahmon), took control of the town of Nurek and attempted to seize the Nurek dam (that was 
at the moment controlled by troops from the Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS), which if destroyed 
could flood the entire region (Agence France Presse, 1992). The attempt failed, as Nabiyev supporters were 
eventually overwhelmed (Olcott, 2012), but this aspect seems interesting because it underlines the highly 
strategic value of large dams. For instance more recently (February 2012), during the civil war in Syria rebels 
captured the al-Furat dam, the nation's largest dam and a symbol of the Assad family's four-decade rule 
(Mroue, 2013). 
75
 Uzbek military forces fought alongside the Tajik and Russian armies against the front formed by the 
Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRP) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).  
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Figure 15: Trajectory of Tajikistan-Uzbekistan relations (1991-2011) 
 
After the end of the civil war, and with the beginning of what was previously defined the 
second phase of water relations in Central Asia (the one marked by a unilateral approach to 
shared problems), relations between the two countries came to be tenser. The signing of 
AOAs became the norm, and Tajikistan’s plans to revamp the Soviet hydroelectric projects 
abandoned after the collapse of the Soviet Union and put in standby during the civil war – 
most notably the Rogun and Sangtuda dams – contributed to increase strains, as Uzbekistan 
strongly opposes their construction
76
. And indeed, starting in 2007, when a Russian 
involvement in Rogun seemed to materialize, skirmishes intensified, and besides the 
frequent resource cuts (form both sides), the two countries got engaged in a harsh dispute 
aimed at imposing their view on the management of shared water resources as the dominant 
one, through the use of ideational and bargaining power (as it will be illustrated in detail in 
Chapter 4).  
What emerges from the TWINS matrix (see Figure 15), is that while the two countries 
continued to cooperate through ad-hoc actions over the course of the years (although such 
cooperation never moved to a higher level), the overall relationship gradually deteriorated. 
What was an already politicized issue became constantly securitized and presented as an 
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 When asked what he thought about the construction of large hydroelectric stations upstream, Karimov 
replied “How will we look into the eyes of our children and grandchildren if Uzbekistan is without water? 
This is our land, we are not going to leave it” (Eurasianet.org, 2009). His words illustrate well his tendency to 
view water – and the revision of water allocation – as a non-negotiable matter. 
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existential threat. Water issues in the two countries are indeed managed by the Ministries of 
Foreign affairs rather than by water officials, as they are perceived as a potential threat to 
the interests of the nation and not anymore as a recurrent seasonal problem. It is in 
particular the revitalization of the Rogun dam that seems to have triggered this mechanism, 
as it has moved the relation between the two countries on the brink of a violent interstate 
conflict, although, as Dinar (2009) points out, countries tend to find the use of violence to 
solve water problems too costly and unattractive. This third and next phase of interstate 
relations, the one that basically orbits around the Rogun dam, will be examined in Chapter 
4, through the outline of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic tactics. 
 
3.6.4. Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan 
While Tajikistan’s history is interconnected with that of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan shares 
historic and cultural roots with Kazakhstan, to the extent that the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz 
can be defined “ethnic cousins”77 (Cummings, 2012: 104). The Kyrgyz have a 
predominantly nomadic-pastoral culture, although the Soviet regulations forced them to 
undergo a sedentarization process and to practice irrigated agriculture in the Ferghana 
Valley (Adle and Palat, 2005). Also in this case, following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan found themselves as being part of an extremely inter-dependent 
system, in which Kyrgyzstan was upstream of the water (of the Syr Darya river), and 
Uzbekistan was upstream of the fuel and gas. Two important differences, however, seem to 
subsist: i) the flow of the Syr Darya is much more regulated than that of the Amu Darya 
(thanks to the hydraulic infrastructures built by the Soviets), and Kyrgyzstan has a stronger 
position than Tajikistan towards Uzbekistan, as it can use the mode of operation of its water 
infrastructure as a bargaining tool (Wegerich et al., 2007); ii) the internal political situation 
of the new-born Kyrgyz republic has been considerably more stable than that of Tajikistan 
– at least until 2005 when the Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev was ousted by the Tulip 
Revolution – and therefore Kyrgyzstan could almost immediately start challenging the 
1992 Almaty Agreement and attempt to exploit its hydroelectric potential in winter. 
                                                     
77
 Under the Soviet Union, initially the Kazakh SSR was called the Kirghiz Autonomous Socialist Soviet 
Republic (ASSR) (1920-1925), and was renamed Kazak ASSR in 1926, and only in 1936 was elevated to the 
status of a Union-level republic, becoming the Kazakh SSR. 
 93 
 
Thus, in the period 1993-1996 Kyrgyzstan released water from its Toktogul reservoir to 
generate hydroelectricity, and Uzbekistan threatened to break the AOAs that the two 
countries had already started to sign (Weinthal, 2001; Shalpykova, 2002). The year 1996 
marked a breakthrough, as Kyrgyzstan started considering water a commodity, demanding 
compensation for its unexploited hydroelectric potential and for the maintenance of its 
dams. Significantly, in April 1996, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan reached an 
Agreement in which Kyrgyzstan agreed to supply water to the downstream countries that, 
in return, agreed to help pay for the upkeep of the Kyrgyz water infrastructures and to 
purchase the hydroelectricity generated in Kyrgyzstan. This Agreement (that can be viewed 
as a forerunner of the abovementioned 1998 Syr Darya Agreement) gave rise to an 
animated debate on those who viewed water as a commodity and those who did not. 
Kyrgyzstan's minister for water resources Zhenishbek Bekbolotov was quoted as saying 
“Water is a commodity […] Any natural resource that is used should be paid for” (Thoenes, 
1996), while Uzbekistan's acting minister for water resources, Abdurahim Zhalalov, 
rejected this notion, pointing out that the commodity was hydroelectricity, and not water
78
. 
And indeed, as it was brought up in paragraph 3.6.2, in 1997 (a very tense year for water 
relations in Central Asia), Kyrgyzstan initiated the legislative process aimed at declaring 
water as a commodity. Among increasing tensions, and as a reaction to Kyrgyzstan’s 
flooding of Uzbek farm fields to produce additional hydroelectricity in winter, in the year 
2000 Uzbekistan carried out military exercises at the border with Kyrgyzstan, with the 
seeming objective of practicing for capturing the Toktogul Reservoir (Hashimova, 2009; 
Muzalevsky, 2010).  
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 In addition, Koposyn Kudaibergenov, the deputy chairman of the Kazakh Water Committee, made 
reference to the Qur'an adding that “In the Koran [sic] it is written that water should not be sold. We should 
solve the problems for each other as partners” (Thoenes, 1996).  
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Figure 16: Trajectory of Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan relations (1991-2011) 
 
The situation remained to a status of nearly-violized all over 2001, as the Uzbek troops 
maintained position near the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, and they were accused by the chairman 
of the Kyrgyz Parliamentary Committee for International Relations, Alisher 
Abdimomunov, of unilaterally occupying disputed Kyrgyz territories (Khamidov, 2001). 
Tensions continued also in the following years – although without the involvement of the 
Uzbek army – with regular flooding of Uzbek farmland due to excessive winter releases 
from the Toktogul reservoir (in 2004, the worst flood since 1969 occurred) (RFE/RL, 
2004), triggering harsh criticisms from the Uzbek President Karimov. Nevertheless, the two 
countries kept signing AOAs and holding regular talks on how to improve the management 
and sharing of natural resources.  
Also in this case, as it is effectively illustrated by the TWINS matrix (see Figure 16), 
conflict coexisted with cooperation, although the former was only limited to short-term 
solutions under the form of ad-hoc agreements to solve the most pressing matters. The 
relationship between the two countries gradually deteriorated, especially after the Kyrgyz 
government disclosed its plan to give a price to water. Perhaps because of the almost total 
control that Kyrgyzstan can exert on the flow of the Syr Darya river – from which the 
country can wield a larger bargaining power than for instance Tajikistan – the Kyrgyz 
administration has attempted to challenge the status-quo and getting compensation for the 
water it releases to the downstream countries. And these efforts were to some extent 
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successful, as both the 1998 Syr Darya agreement and the 2000 Chu and Talas agreement 
recognize Kyrgyzstan’s right to get some sort of reimbursement for its water. However, 
implementation of the 1998 Syr Darya agreement proved difficult due to high water 
variability in dry years, and the Chu and Talas agreement takes into consideration only two 
minor river basins shared by Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.  
Alike the Rogun dam, the revamp of the Kambarata dam in 2007 further strained 
relations with Uzbekistan, although in this case the event did not exactly marked the 
beginning of a new phase in water relations. This is because Kyrgyzstan already attempted 
to challenge the status-quo, and the Kambarata dam would have a different impact than the 
Rogun dam on the overall water flow, as it will be illustrated in greater detail in Chapter 5, 
that will examine the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic tactics put in place to favour and 
obstruct the construction of the dam. 
 
3.7. Conclusions 
This chapter has given an account of water relations in Central Asia for the period 1991-
2011, outlining the interdependency issues at play in the region and the criticalities that 
they have generated. While on the one hand it is clear that the Soviet resource distribution 
system left a legacy that has still not disappeared, on the other hand, the Central Asian 
republics have not shown a genuine will to cooperate and to put an end to the recurring 
seasonal disputes concerning the exchange of water and energy.  
A weak institutional framework and the inability to negotiate long-term solutions to 
regional problems gradually strained interstate relations, and soon after independence the 
first conflicts emerged. The key incompatibility between water demands of irrigation and 
hydropower is at the origin of a growing frustration among the upstream and the 
downstream countries. The latter want to maintain the status-quo unchanged, while the 
former have an interest in changing it to be able to exploit their significant hydroelectric 
potential.  
This fundamental conflict has driven the evolution of interstate relations over the last 
twenty years. Following a first buffer period, in which countries attempted to have a 
multilateral approach to regional water issues, an individualist attitude prevailed, and with 
it the first recriminations from both sides of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. 
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Subsequently, the almost simultaneous revitalisation of the Rogun and Kambarata dams in 
Tajikistan and in Kyrgyzstan, has marked the beginning of a third (and on-going) phase of 
water relations, in which the upstream countries are more peremptorily attempting to 
change the status-quo. These two large dams gained a pivotal role in the regional water 
debate, strongly influencing interstate relations and giving rise to a harsh confrontation 
between Uzbekistan – the leading dam-opponent among the downstream states – and the 
two upstream republics. This political arm-wrestling will be analysed in detail in the 
following chapters, that will delve on how power has been wielded and on the key 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic strategies that these three countries have put in place to 
favour and obstruct the construction of the Rogun and Kambarata dams. 
 97 
 
Chapter 4. The Rogun Dam 
 
Rogun is our national idea. 
 Emomali Rahmon, 2010 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the first of the two case studies of this research, 
the construction of the Rogun dam in Tajikistan. The dam will be used to examine how 
state power is wielded in international transboundary water relations, and to identify which 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic measures have been put in place to favour and obstruct 
its construction. The focus is placed on the acrimonious regional debate that emerged after 
the revitalisation of the project in the year 2000s, after which its realisation became a matter 
of foreign policy, and, as it will be shown, also a matter of national pride. The chapter first 
gives an overview of the project, its history and its expected impact. Subsequently, it 
outlines and categorizes the various counter-hegemonic tactics that were put in place by 
Tajikistan to promote the dam. Finally, the chapter concludes assessing the main effects of 
Tajik counter-hegemonic tactics. 
 
4.1. Overview of the Rogun dam 
Originally conceived as a dual-purpose structure for irrigation water management and 
for hydroelectricity, the Rogun dam was designed in the Uzbek SSR by the Soviet 
Hydroproject Institute based in Tashkent during the 1960s, the golden years of the Soviet 
hydraulic mission. While realising the design, the Institute also carried out a first feasibility 
study. The original project – which is still the one proposed by Tajikistan – consists of a 
335 meter high structure, a 70 km long reservoir with a volume of 13.3 km3 and six 600 
megawatts (MW) turbines, resulting in a total installed capacity of 3,600 MW (Schmidt, 
2007). If compared with other dams, Rogun would be the tallest in the world – the fourth 
one being Nurek in Tajikistan (300 m.) – and the twentieth for installed capacity 
(International Commission on Large Dams).  
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Preparatory construction works began in 1976, and intense construction started in 1982, 
involving five to ten thousand people (UNEP, 2011: 48). In 1991, due to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the worsening political situation in Tajikistan that would eventually lead 
to a five year civil war (1992-1997), works at the Rogun site were stopped. Furthermore, in 
1993 – which was originally the year set for its first unit to start producing electricity 
(Yerofeyeva, 2002) – the upper coffer-dam was washed away by a powerful flash-flood. 
Combined with inadequate management caused by the civil war, the flood destroyed most 
of the accomplished structure (Fradchuk, 2010), frustrating two decades of efforts and an 
investment of 802 million dollars, leaving the “Queen of the Tajik mountains without a 
crown” (Djuzhev, 2002). Nevertheless, the idea of building Rogun was already too well-
established in the minds of Tajik bureaucrats to be washed away with the flood. 
 
Table 4: Concise timeline of the Rogun project. Source: Annex 3; Schmidt, 2007; Sodiqov, 2009. 
1960s The Soviet Hydroproject Institute in Tashkent designs the dam and carries 
out a first feasibility study 
1976 Beginning of preparatory construction works 
1982 Start of intense construction involving five to ten thousand people 
1991 Interruption of works, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
worsening political situation in Tajikistan 
1993 A flash-flood destroys most of the accomplished structure 
2004 The Russian Aluminium Company (RusAl) agrees to invest US$ 560 million 
to complete the construction of the first stage of the project 
2005 Tajik and Russian workers begin construction at the Rogun site 
2006 The German engineering firm Lahmeyer, which was awarded a contract from 
RusAl to carry out a first feasibility study of Rogun, recommends 285 meters 
as the ideal height of the dam, instead of 335, on which the GoT insisted. The 
GoT will not accept the findings of the report 
August Tajik President Rahmon cancels the deal with RusAl and resumes his search 
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2007 for investors  
2008 The GoT allocates resources from the state budget to restart the construction 
of Rogun 
January 
2009 
The GoT adopts a resolution on the Rogun resettlement scheme, which 
envisages the moving of about 30,000 people, from the districts of Rogun, 
Nurobod, Dangara, Tursunzade, and Darband  
January 
2010 
The GoT launches an Initial Public Offering (IPO) to sell to its citizens 
shares of the “Open Joint Stock Company Rogun” 
March 
2010 
The World Bank announces that it will realize an 18 month feasibility study 
and environmental assessment of the dam 
2011-2012 In view of the results of the World Bank studies, the GoT interrupts the 
resettlement scheme and, in 2012, construction works 
 
 
4.1.1. Independent Tajikistan and the Rogun dam 
Indeed, with independence, the newly-born Tajik government and its President Emomali 
Rahmon repeatedly attempted to restart the project, encountering however numerous 
obstacles, both financial and political. The project is, in fact, extremely expensive. With a 
total cost of US$ 2.9 billion, it cannot be financed by Tajik national resources alone. 
Although the GoT has calculated that US$ 800 million of work has already been executed, 
the project still requires US$ 2.1 billion of funds (EDB, 2008: 20), equivalent to roughly a 
third of the country’s 2011 GDP (The World Bank n.d.a). In order to meet this necessity of 
external funding, the GoT has carried out an interrupted effort over the last twenty years 
aimed at the mobilisation of financial resources (recounted in full in paragraph 4.3.2). 
The turning point in the quest for investments is 2004, when Tajikistan signs an 
agreement with the Russian Aluminium Company (RusAl), that decided to invest US$ 560 
million to complete the construction of the first stage of the project (Interfax, 2004). 
Nonetheless, three years later, the Government of Tajikistan (GoT) cancelled the deal, for a 
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disagreement on the height of the dam and on its ownership
79
 (Eurasianet, 2007a). 
Disappointed with the Russians, but still determined to pursue its plan, in 2008 the GoT 
allocated resources from its national budget, finally restarting construction works (Avesta, 
2011a), while at the same time continuing to look for foreign investors (BBC Monitoring 
Central Asia Unit, 2009a). Subsequently, following an internal campaign aimed at creating 
a “Rogun ideology” (see paragraph 4.3.1) the GoT invited its citizens to buy shares of the 
“Open Joint Stock Company Rogun”, through an Initial Public Offering (IPO) launched in 
January 2010.  
In the meanwhile, downstream countries – and in particular Uzbekistan – started to 
actively advocate against Rogun, worried, among the other things, that the dam would 
reduce water availability for irrigated agriculture. As a consequence of this political 
diatribe, and particularly after Uzbek reiterated requests of having an external examination 
of the project, the World Bank (WB) got involved in the dispute. In 2010, after a round of 
consultations with riparian countries that went on from October 2008 until April 2009, 
Motoo Konishi, the WB regional director for Central Asia, announced that the bank will 
carry on an 18 month feasibility study and environmental assessment of the dam (The 
World Bank, n.d.b). More precisely, a Techno-Economic Assessment Study (TEAS) and an 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) were contracted respectively to a 
consortium led by Coyne & Bellier and to the company Poyry of Switzerland. As of 2013, 
the feasibility study is yet to be released
80
, and the Tajik government agreed that “no new 
construction would commence until the Assessment Studies have been prepared, reviewed 
by the Panels of Experts, then shared and discussed with riparian nations” (The World 
Bank, n.d. b).  
 
4.2. Expected impact of the Rogun dam 
The Rogun dam has drawn the attention of both Tajikistan and its neighbours. But what 
are the reasons of this interest? What effects might the dam have at the national and 
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 According to a UN official, the Russians apparently wanted to have a 70 % ownership of Rogun, and this 
was the main reason behind the cancelation of the agreement, since Tajikistan wanted to retain the ownership 
of Rogun (U.S. Embassy Astana, 2009). 
80
 Originally, the results of the study were to be released in Summer 2012. 
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regional level? This section aims to shed light on these questions, reviewing the potential 
impact that Rogun might have on Tajikistan and on the other Central Asian countries. 
 
4.2.1. A step towards energy independence 
Paradoxically, even though Rogun used to be a Soviet project, its significance increased 
when the Soviet Union ceased to exist. With independence – and with the vanishing of the 
centralised Soviet management system responsible for the allocation of resources to the 
Soviet republics – energy-poor Tajikistan had to start paying for the imports of gas, oil and 
coal necessary to fulfil its energy needs. However, the country’s failure to pay for 
outstanding debts combined with a tense relationship with Uzbekistan, its sole supplier of 
natural gas, had the latter cutting gas supplies to Tajikistan in several occasions. To recall 
only the more recent examples, at the end of 2011 Uzbekistan raised the price of the natural 
gas that sells to Tajikistan to US$ 311 per thousand cubic meter, and, a few weeks later, gas 
supplies were cut and Tajikistan, which that year should have received 180 million cubic 
meters, and instead received only 160 million (Ria Novosti, 2012). Again, on 31 December 
2012, Uzbekistan suspended gas deliveries to Tajikistan
81
 after both sides failed to agree on 
a price for gas, following the expiration of their annual resource supply contract.  
Unreliable gas supplies, combined with insufficient winter hydropower output, are at the 
cause of frequent electricity shortages, as demand exceeds by far supply, as shown in 
Figure 17, which refers to 2009, a year marked by a major energy crisis in Tajikistan. 
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 Two days later, Uzbekistan announced a ban on road transportation of liquefied natural gas through its 
territory, explaining that the measure was aimed at protecting public safety and the environment. 
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Figure 17: Tajikistan’s monthly electricity generation vs. demand in 2009. Source: The World Bank 
n.d. c. 
 
Around 70 % of the Tajik population experiences extensive electricity shortages in 
winter, which, alongside their social costs, cause economic losses estimated at over US$ 
200 million per year (The World Bank, 2012: i). For instance, TALCO (the Tajik 
Aluminium Company located close to the border with Uzbekistan), a key industrial asset of 
Tajikistan and the largest aluminium processor in Central Asia, particularly suffers from 
this situation, as it is powered with Uzbek gas and with the electricity generated by the 
large Nurek hydropower plant (HPP) located on the Vakhsh river, around 70 kilometres 
downstream of the Rogun site. 
Under such circumstances, the potential impact of a HPP of the size of Rogun is 
remarkable. Namely, as Tajikistan’s electricity production from hydroelectric sources 
accounts for around 97 % of total
82
 (The World Bank n.d.b), the country’s total installed 
capacity of 4,500 MW (see Figure 18) could almost double with the additional 3,600 MW 
that the Rogun dam will generate, allowing Tajikistan not only to become energy secure, 
but also to sell electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan through the proposed CASA (Central 
Asia South Asia) transmission line, strongly promoted by the United States (see Figure 19).  
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 Most of which is generated by the 3000 MW Nurek HPP. 
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Figure 18: Hydroelectric system of the Vakhsh river. As of 2013, the Sangtuda 1 and 2 HPPs are 
operational, as they were inaugurated respectively in 2009 and 2011. Source: Tajik Hydro-
Meteorological Service. 
 
 
Even though it is probably too optimistic to predict that “with Rogun, Tajikistan will live 
like Kuwait”, as a representative of Barki Tojik – the energy holding company of Tajikistan 
– declared in 2009 (Marat, 2010), potentially many of the country’s energy problems could 
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be resolved by the dam. This is even more relevant after the two exceptionally cold winters 
that hit Central Asia in 2007-2008 and in 2008-2009, and that engendered a widespread 
energy crisis in Tajikistan and in Kyrgyzstan, which was further aggravated by the Kazak 
and Uzbek withdrawal from the Central Asia Power System (CAPS), officially because of 
fear on instability in the transmission lines. Although the two countries later re-joined 
CAPS, in that occasion Tajikistan remained fully isolated, as it also lost the possibility to 
import gas from Turkmenistan passing through Uzbekistan (The World Bank, 2012: 56).  
 
Figure 19: The Central Asian Electric Grid. Source: USAID Regional Energy Security, Efficiency and 
Trade Program (RESET). Available from: http://www.ca-
reset.org/images/pdf/CentralAsiaElectricGrid.pdf [Accessed 3 May 2013]. 
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Therefore, for a country where the population has electricity only for two-three hours a 
day from October to May (Trend News Agency, 2012), and where winter temperatures can 
be particularly rigid, the achievement of energy self-sufficiency and of reliable electricity 
supplies is a quite enticing prospect. Whereas for the Soviet Union water reservoirs were 
primarily conceived to provide a reliable water supply to downstream irrigated agriculture 
(Libert et al., 2008: 10), for independent Tajikistan their main use appear to be the 
generation of hydro-electricity. It is in this new setting that Rogun became the centrepiece 
of Tajikistan’s energy plans, and the government presents the project as a fundamental leap 
forward in national development. 
 
4.2.2. A strong political symbol and a unifying element 
At the political level, Rogun can have an equally important impact. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union implied that Communism was no longer providing a basis for legitimacy to 
national governments, and this led former Communist leaders to take a nationalist turn to 
enhance the perceived legitimacy of their authority (Mellon, 2010: 138-139). As Matveeva 
points out, Central Asian states created a legitimisation framework through the invention of 
national symbols, in the form of “landslide electoral victories, Independence Day parades 
with displays of military might, historical writings, leaders’ addresses to the nation, 
national holidays, flags and anthems, the currency, the capital and major national 
monuments” (Matveeva, 2010: 18). This perspective allows to appreciate the symbolism 
and prestige that can be attached to the world’s tallest dam, and to understand how a project 
like Rogun can become the centre of a certain rhetoric put in place by the government to 
legitimate itself, gain consensus and divert attention from more pressing matters. Even 
more so, considering that not long ago Tajikistan – the least prepared of the Central Asian 
countries to undergo policies of national consolidation (Gleason, 1997: 100) – was ravaged 
by a harsh civil war that enfeebled the authority of the national government and accentuated 
regional and clan divisions (Akiner, 2001). The unifying effect of an iconic project like 
Rogun can contribute to the creation of a national identity, while helping keep in power 
President Emomali Rahmon and his close network from the Kulob region. 
And if Rogun is seen as a symbol of patriotism and success, it is understandable why the 
GoT wants Rogun to be the tallest dam in the world. Having recently inaugurated the 
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world’s tallest flagpole and Central Asia’s largest library (Parshin, 2012), the GoT seems to 
pay particular attention on world and regional records. While the original Soviet project, on 
which Rahmon insists, envisages a final height of 335 meters, a few alternatives for a lower 
dam were proposed over the years (Eschanov, 2011: 1582). Notably, the 285 meters 
suggested by RusAl following the impact assessment realized by Lahmeyer
83
, were one of 
the causes behind the cancelation of the deal in 2007 (RFE/RL, 2007). Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that the huge reservoir envisaged by the 335 meters project, would 
irreversibly alter the landscape, as it will flood an area that stretches for over 70 km in 
length. Although the Tajik government sees this as a necessary cost, the foreseen forced 
resettlement of the 30,000 people living in the Rogun, Nurobod and Rasht areas where the 
reservoir will materialise (Bureau of Human Rights and Rule of Law, 2012: 6), has raised 
complaints and discontent within the country. 
On a foreign policy level, the political value of Rogun can also be directly connected 
with the historical rivalry between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which has its more recent 
origin in the dispute for the control of the predominantly ethnic Tajik cities of Samarkand 
and Bukhara
84
. As a matter of fact, the Uzbek opposition to the project is having the 
unintentional effect of further convincing the GoT that the dam can be held up as a symbol 
of self-determination and success, one that can be used to unite the people of Tajikistan 
around a national idea and against a common antagonist. As an example, in 2010, during an 
epistolary dispute between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Tajik Prime Minister Akil Akilov 
sent a letter to his Uzbek counterpart, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, in which he stressed how Uzbek 
criticisms have no other effect than uniting the “people of Tajikistan in the idea of building 
this vitally important hydropower plant” (Ferghana, 2010). The unifying effect of the 
                                                     
83
 Lahmeyer proposed three different stages of construction. In Stage I, Rogun would have a height of 225 
meters, in Stage II 285 meters, and in Stage III 335 meters. Only at Stage III Rogun would be the tallest dam 
in the world. Overall, Lahmeyer advised the GoT to re-start the project from the beginning (Schmidt, 2007). 
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 As mentioned in Chapter 3, in 1924, when the Soviet Union started to create the Central Asian SSRs, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan corresponded respectively to the Uzbek SSR and the Tajik ASSR (the Autonomous 
SSRs were administrative units of a lower status then the SSRs), the latter being part of the larger Uzbek SSR. 
In 1929, the Tajik ASSR was transformed to a full-fledged SSR, and its territory was administratively 
separated from that of the Uzbek SSR. However, the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara remained in the Uzbek 
SSR, thus originating the dispute on whether the cities should belong to Uzbekistan or to Tajikistan. On this 
regard, in 2009, during a particularly animated press conference, Emomali Rahmon alluded to his difficult 
personal relationship with Islam Karimov, recalling a fight he had with the Uzbek President. In that occasion, 
before Leonid Kuchma (the former President of Ukraine) managed to physically separate them, Rahmon 
shouted to Karimov: “We will take Samarkand and Bukhara!” (Dubnov, 2009). 
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Rogun dam seems particularly relevant, considering that the drawing of the Soviet borders 
left 60 % of the Tajik population outside their home country (Bergne, 2007: 100). 
 
4.2.3. Potential threats to the reliability of water supplies and to the environment  
In addition to producing large quantities of electricity and providing a mean to promote 
patriotism, Rogun might also influence the water flow of the Amu Darya and, if used with 
bad intents, threaten the agricultural interests of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. For 
instance, the Uzbeks are concerned that if the water stored in the Rogun reservoir is 
released in large quantities in winter to generate electricity, the summer flow would be 
insufficient to sustain agriculture and the needs of the population downstream. Conversely, 
the GoT notes that Rogun would not only improve water supply to currently irrigated lands, 
but it will also allow to irrigate 480 thousand additional hectares of land, including 140 
thousand in Turkmenistan and 240 thousand in Uzbekistan (Yuldoshev, 2008).  
For what concerns the water flow, Wegerich et al. (2007: 3822) observe that only one out 
of the three construction stages proposed by Lahmeyer in 2006, Stage III, could give 
Tajikistan full control of the Vakhsh river, and consequently, of the Amu Darya. 
Nevertheless, Stage III, or in other words having a Rogun with a height of 335 meters and a 
reservoir volume of 13.3 km3, is the one on which the GoT insists. Therefore, the dam 
would certainly increase the dependence of the downstream countries on Tajikistan (Libert 
et al., 2008: 15), and, as a result, the current situation, in which most of the water is 
allocated to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, could possibly be reversed. Tajikistan could use 
water as a strategic tool, for example by pressing downstream riparian states to pay for 
water releases, thus establishing a form of hydro-hegemony (Wegerich, 2008: 72).  
Moreover, as the dam is being built on what is notoriously a seismic area, Uzbekistan is 
worried that the weight of the dam and of its reservoir could provoke an earthquake that 
would have terrible consequences, both for Tajikistan and for the downstream countries 
(Mission of Uzbekistan to the E.U., 2010). The anti-Rogun discourse is well summarised 
by the declarations of Uzbek President Islam Karimov. For instance, when asked why 
Uzbekistan is opposing the construction of Rogun, the Uzbek President replied “How can 
we let the residents of Uzbekistan live without water for eight years, while the Rogun water 
reservoir is being filled up? What will farmers be doing all this time?” (Interfax, 2010). 
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4.2.4. The ensuing debate 
Rogun would have an impact at different levels, as it is often the case with structures of 
this size. At the domestic level, the dam could allow Tajikistan to become energy 
independent, serving as a symbol of success that could reinforce – in the ideas of the Tajik 
leadership – national identity. Moreover, Afghanistan and Pakistan could take advantage 
from the electricity surplus generated by the dam, through the proposed CASA transmission 
line. Nevertheless, Rogun could also impact on the water flow of the Amu Darya, and have 
negative consequences on irrigated agriculture in downstream countries. Perhaps even more 
importantly, Rogun could provide Tajikistan a strategic advantage in regional water issues, 
as the country would be able to control the water flow and, for instance, charge downstream 
countries for the water that it releases. 
The dam could indeed change the status-quo, and allow Tajikistan to become the hydro-
hegemon in the Amu Darya basin. In the current status of things, although it is difficult to 
identify a clear hegemon in the basin (Wegerich, 2008: 78), Uzbekistan is nonetheless 
exerting a form of hydro-hegemony, as it has managed to keep its advantageous water 
allocation unchanged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As it was mentioned in 
Chapter 3, the country contributes 6 % to the flow generated in the basin (Micklin, 2000: 
7), but thanks to the Soviet Protocol 566 signed in Moscow in 1987 (Protocol 566, 1987), it 
withdraws 36 %
85
. Such hydro-hegemony is discernible especially in relation with 
Tajikistan, a country which depends from Uzbekistan for its natural gas supplies, and which 
has a considerably smaller population, inferior military and political might and a less 
developed economy.  
Thus, while the project is yet to be realised, and the impacts discussed above are only 
potential, the Rogun dam has crystallised the upstream-downstream tensions over the 
differing preference of water use. Both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have shown little 
disposition to discuss solutions that would be acceptable to both countries, leaving little 
room for compromise (Jalilova et al., 2013: 4). If, on the one side, Tajikistan advocates in 
favour of the dam, on the other side, Uzbekistan attempts to hamper its construction.  
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 While Tajikistan, which contributes 80 % of flow generated, can withdraw only 15.4 %. 
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Based on these assumptions, the strategies carried out by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to 
attain their goal, can be respectively defined as counter-hegemonic and hegemonic, with the 
former aiming at altering a disadvantageous status-quo, and the latter aiming at maintaining 
it unchanged. Therefore, as this is the key to answer the research questions that drive this 
study, the remaining of this chapter analyses in detail the counter-hegemonic tactics put in 
place by the Tajik government.  
 
4.3. Tajik counter-hegemonic tactics 
In her study of counter-hegemonic strategies in the Nile river basin, Ana Cascao (2008: 
17) observed that the main goals of the hegemonised are to challenge, contest, change and 
create alternatives to the status-quo. This applies also to Tajikistan, which is contesting and 
trying to change a status-quo in which it cannot exploit its hydroelectric potential. The key 
goal of Tajik counter-hegemonic strategies is to get the conditions necessary to build the 
Rogun dam, a fundamental step in the achievement of the Tajik hydraulic mission.  
The carrier of the Tajik hydraulic mission is the Tajik hydrocracy. The Tajik hydrocracy 
is tasked with implementing existing Soviet projects rather than planning or designing new 
ones. Therefore, its key members are high-level decision-makers, such as the Tajik 
President Rahmon and officials from his close network of power, most notably the Foreign 
Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi, the Prime Minister Akil Akilov and the Tajik Permanent 
Representative to the UN, Sirodjidin Aslov
86
. All of them have managed to keep an 
unvaried position towards the Rogun dam over the last decade, one that can be summarized 
into the motto “Rogun shall be built at all costs”.  
The strategy adopted by the Tajik hydrocracy to further the construction of the Rogun 
dam is shaped by three main drivers: getting visibility and international acceptance for the 
project, mobilizing international funds and creating a Rogun ideology at the internal level. 
Consequently, these three factors led the hydrocracy to adopt two distinct discourses, one 
for the domestic and one for the foreign dimension. While the former presents the dam as a 
vital achievement for the country, as a symbol of national pride, honour, progress and 
prosperity, the latter focuses on presenting Tajikistan to the international community as a 
responsible water user that should be allowed – and possibly, financially supported – to 
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 In December 2013 Aslov was appointed Foreign Minister, thus replacing Zarifi as head of the Tajik MFA. 
 110 
 
exercise its right of building a dam, that will be operated for the mutual benefit of all the 
countries in the region to produce clean energy. The Tajik discourse seems then to include 
the two main justifications held by dam proponents during the twentieth century: the “big-
dams-are-development” argument, is indeed sided by the cause of hydropower as a clean 
and renewable energy that contributes to reduce climate change (Khagram, 2004: 209). The 
project is framed in such a way that legitimises Tajikistan’s right to build it, portraying it as 
a key for the prosperity of the country and as a symbolic, cooperative regional project.  
Overall, the Tajik counter-hegemonic strategy is formed by four main tactics, which all 
challenge the status-quo ideally leading to the construction of the Rogun dam: i) internal 
support; ii) mobilization of financial resources; iii) international support and iv) knowledge 
construction (see Figure 20). The tactics represent the ways in which ideational and 
bargaining power are wielded.  
 
 
Figure 20: Building the Rogun dam: the four tactics forming the Tajik counter-hegemonic strategy 
 
Through these tactics, the Tajik government is attempting to impose its discourse and 
ideology. Only when Tajikistan will get consent, it will be able to exploit the geographical 
advantage that comes from being the furthest upstream country in the Amu Darya basin. 
Challenging 
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Soft power here can set the conditions to use structural power, or, to interpret it through a 
Gramscian lens, consent is a necessary condition to use force. To reconnect with the 
analysis of power and hegemony presented in Chapter 2, while hegemony can be 
maintained through the use of connective forms of power, in the same way it can also be 
challenged, through a continuous and evolving process aimed at changing the status-quo. 
The following, analyses these tactics in detail, outlining the main aspects of the Rogun 
discourse and the ways in which it has been disseminated, starting with its domestic 
dimension and gradually moving to its international one. 
 
4.3.1. Internal support: creation of a Rogun ideology 
Targeting both Tajik citizens living in Tajikistan and those working abroad, the GoT has 
carried out a significant effort to create a Rogun identity. This process has a performative 
relevance to Rogun, since an ideology bound to the dam can facilitate its physical 
construction, notably when the citizens are called to financially support the project. The 
strategy gained momentum with the energy crisis of 2007-2008, that left many people 
without electricity and heating in many areas of the country including the capital Dushanbe 
(Eurasianet, 2008a). After this event, the fact that Tajik citizens should fully appreciate the 
benefits of Rogun became a priority for Tajik President Emomali Rahmon (Idiev, 2009), 
that started to disseminate his message on national TV, radio channels and websites as well 
as on ubiquitous banners and poster. As Molle et al. noted (2009), the creation of certain 
meta-discourses and meta-justifications – which usually tend to stress matters such as the 
achievement of national goals and priorities or the absence of real alternatives – are among 
the classical means of furthering large-scale projects at the internal level, and this is the 
case also for Rogun.  
In line with Susan Strange (1994) idea of the “knowledge structure”, and with the 
Foucauldian view of discourse as an essential element in the operation of power, “as it is 
the vehicle through which knowledge and subjects are constituted” (Gaventa, 2003: 4), the 
GoT is using ideational discursive means to shape the minds of its citizens and persuade 
them of the benefits of the dam. The recurring elements of the internal Rogun rhetoric, 
include the portrayal of the dam as a source of light, heat and progress, as a vital and 
existential issue and as a solution to most of the problems faced by the country.  
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Tajik media, such as the Khovar and Avesta news agencies, and the Tajik state-run TV 
and Radio, work together in both ensuring visibility to the project and in channelling 
official statements that report the government’s vision on Rogun. For instance, the internet 
portal of the Avesta news agency
87
 features Rogun on top of the list of topics addressed in 
the website (placing it before the “Government”, “Security” and “Business” sections), 
while the Khovar news agency duly reports Rahmon’s speeches on Rogun and mirrors the 
government’s position on the matter. When in 2008 Rahmon called “on all patriots and 
honoured sons of the motherland to take an active part in the soonest completion of the 
construction of the first unit of the hydroelectric power station”, all the country’s TV and 
radio channels quoted him as saying this (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2010i). In 
2010, strained relations among the Tajikistan and Uzbekistan led to a harsh epistolary 
dispute concerning the Rogun dam between the Tajik Prime Minister, Akil Akilov, and his 
Uzbek counterpart, Shavkat Mirziyoyev. The letters were also simultaneously published in 
the Tajik and Uzbek state-owned news agencies, thus informing the citizens of both 
countries about the quarrel. While Akilov’s letter discarded the Uzbek view as 
unreasonable, and stressed how the Rogun dam is based on the “vital necessity of normal 
electricity provision for population and national economy” (Akilov, 2010), the Tajik state-
owned press noted that Uzbek criticisms have no other effect than uniting the “people of 
Tajikistan in the idea of building this vitally important hydropower plant” (Ferghana, 
2010).  
A month before, Khovar – along with the Tajik state TV and Radio which broadcasted it 
integrally – reported the yearly Presidential address to the people of Tajikistan, which in 
this occasion was almost entirely centred on Rogun. In his message to the nation, Rahmon 
provides a comprehensive synthesis of the Rogun rhetoric: 
Rogun is our national idea. […] I shall reiterate to all citizens of this sovereign state, 
regardless of nationality, language and religion, that Rogun is a real battleground for 
honour and dignity, is a popular arena of selfless work for a better future and prosperity of 
sovereign Tajikistan! […] I appeal to the children of Tajikistan, living and working in other 
countries, and always thinking about the welfare of their ancestral land and the prosperity 
of their houses: you can actively participate in this nation-wide initiative and contribute to 
the construction of Rogun, a source of light and heat in your homes! […] Rogun is a 
symbol of the accomplishment and prosperity of the present and future Tajikistan, of an 
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 See http://www.avesta.tj/, top-left sidebar, viewed 1 March 2013.  
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unprecedented development of industry and agriculture, and most importantly, a daily 
symbol of warmth and light for every citizen of our country! […] Rogun is a source of 
national pride for every citizen of Tajikistan and a symbol of pride for our present and 
future life! Rogun is a symbol of the life of our nation, a symbol of life and death of the 
Tajik state! (Rahmon, 2010a; translated by the author from the original Russian) 
 
All the key elements of the Rogun discourse are contained in this address: Rogun is 
portrayed as a symbol of national pride and honour, of progress and prosperity, and 
ultimately, as a matter of life and death for Tajikistan
88. In addition, the “appeal to the 
children of Tajikistan living abroad”, seems of particular interest, both because this can be 
linked directly to the representation of Rogun as a unifying element, and also because the 
amount of remittances sent home by Tajik migrants is estimated to account for half of the 
GDP
89
 (International Labour Organization, 2010).  
This aspect acquires more relevance if connected with the sale of Rogun shares to Tajik 
citizens. Indeed, Rahmon has extensively used (Dubnov, 2009; Interfax, 2009) certain 
aspects of the Rogun discourse – namely the representation of the dam as a vital facility and 
as a matter of life and death – to convince his citizens to buy shares of the “Open Joint 
Stock Company Rogun” (Ministry of Finance of Tajikistan, 2009), that launched an initial 
public offering (IPO) on 6 January 2010 (Rasul-zade, 2010), a day which was also declared 
the “Day of Solidarity for the Construction of Rogun” (Eurasianet, 2010a), and that was 
marked by the birth of a baby named by his family Roghunshoh, King Rogun, in honour of 
the power station (Ria Novosti, 2010).  
During the IPO, Tajik citizens were forced to sacrifice part of their salaries to purchase 
shares of Rogun, while the main streets of Dushanbe had been adorned with banners and 
posters advertising the dam, and the Tajik state TV devoted substantial amounts of prime 
time broadcast to updates on the progress of the share sale (Leonard 2010). One year later, 
some two million shares of Rogun had been sold, earning the GoT US$ 170 million 
(Ergasheva 2011), corresponding to less than 10 % of the total amount required to build the 
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 Also, and in line with Arundaty Roy’s analysis of the Sardar Sarovar Dam in India, this implies that if you 
support the dam you are a patriot, but if you don’t, you are an enemy of the nation (Aradhana, 2002). Indeed, 
Suhrob Sharipov, the head of the Strategic Research Centre (SRC) of Tajikistan, was quoted as saying that “if 
somebody in the country opposes construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power station, he will automatically 
turn into a traitor” (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009a). 
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 As reported by the International Labour Organization (2010), the total labour migration out of Tajikistan is 
estimated to include between 500,000 to 800,000 people, which represent about 10 % of its total population of 
6.9 million. 
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dam
90
. Although this is a significant amount in absolute terms for the Tajik economy
91
, it is 
insufficient to make a difference in the overall dam construction process, as it corresponds 
to less than 10 % of the total amount required.  
But has Rogun really become the people’s dam? In spite of the government’s tight grip 
on the media and Tajikistan’s rubber-stamp Parliament designed to maximize Rahmon’s 
power (Olcott 2012, 16), Tajik citizens have yet to be persuaded that Rogun is a panacea 
(Eschanov 2011, 1579-80). Discontent has risen after the launch of the IPO, as government 
employees who refused to buy shares were reportedly being fired, and university students 
were forced to show share certificates to their professors before sitting for exams (Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2011). Mukhiddin Kabiri, the Head of the Islamic 
Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and a political rival of Rahmon, accused the government 
of diverting the people’s money to unspecified uses not related to the dam (Panvilova 
2009). The project has also raised complaints among residents of the Rogun, Nurobod and 
Rasht areas, where 30,000 people will be forcibly resettled to make room to the Rogun 
reservoir. However, this has not changed Rahmon’s strategy, and the Tajik government has 
continued to disseminate its Rogun discourse both at the domestic and at the international 
level, where the dam has become one of the cornerstones of Tajikistan’s foreign policy. 
 
4.3.2. Mobilization of financial resources 
The IPO represents only a part of the efforts carried out by the GoT to raise funds for the 
construction of Rogun. In effect, over the last twenty years the Tajik administration 
uninterruptedly looked for the US$ 2.1 billion necessary to build the dam, trying to involve 
in the project a great variety of foreign partners. While none of these attempts would 
eventually lead to any substantial foreign involvement, it is nevertheless useful to illustrate 
them, as pulling together international financial resources is an essential requirement to 
fulfil Tajikistan’s hydropower ambitions. To this extent, the case of Tajikistan and Rogun 
seems similar to that of Ethiopia and its dam projects in the Ethiopian highlands in which – 
as Cascao observes – the mobilisation of international funding constitutes a crucial element 
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 Later in 2011, the GoT interrupted the sale of Rogun shares following criticism of the IPO by the 
International Monetary Fund (International Monetary Fund 2010). 
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 In 2011, the Tajik budget allocated roughly US$ 1.8 billion in expenditures, of which 210 US$ million to 
the energy sector. Available from: http://minfin.tj/downloads/files/MTEFfinalTajikenglish.pdf [Accessed 7 
September 2012]. 
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in Ethiopia’s counter-hegemonic strategy against Egypt in the Blue Nile Basin (Cascao, 
2008: 24).  
Worldwide, only a few countries have the necessary funding to realize on their own 
structures of the size of Rogun. International players such as China (and to a lesser extent 
India), are currently leading the way in the dam building sector, financing several large 
projects both within their territory and in other countries and regions (Gleick, 2011: 128-
129), taking the role that in the 1960s belonged to the Soviet Union. Over the last century, 
the Soviets contributed to the construction of numerous large dams around the world, 
including the Aswan High Dam in Egypt (Mitchell, 2002) the Hoa Binh Dam in Vietnam 
(Vietnam Online, n.d.) and the Tabqa dam in Syria (Kolars and Mitchell, 1991). Tajikistan, 
notwithstanding the IPO (2010) and the direct allocation of budget money (starting in 
2008), is not able to realize the project on its own (and had it been, the whole story would 
perhaps have been different). Therefore, the following will outline how Tajikistan has been 
targeting large individual donors (particularly Russia) and international financial 
institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), to get financial 
support for the project. 
 
4.3.2.1. Involving countries… 
Already in May 1993, in the middle of the Tajik Civil War, the newly elected President 
Emomali Rahmon released an interview to Ostankino Channel 1
92
 in which he declared that 
despite financial constraints, “the construction of the Rogun hydro-electric station is 
continuing” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1993a), adding that Russian President 
Eltsin visited the site and that there was a general interest from international investors to 
participate in the project. Thence, a few weeks later, Tajik Premier Abdullojonov 
announced the drafting of an agreement between Russia and Tajikistan concerning the 
construction of Rogun (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1993b), that was eventually 
signed in April 1994 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1994a). A month later, rumours 
started to circulate about the establishment of a Tajik-Russian joint-stock company set to 
complete the construction of Rogun, but then again no concrete actions followed (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 1994b). Rahmon’s interest on Rogun was reiterated in his 
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 Ostankino Channel 1 (currently named Pervyy Kanal, First Channel), was and remains the main Russian 
TV channel. 
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election manifesto in November 1994, which stressed the importance of attracting workers 
to the construction sites of the Rogun and Sangtuda I
93
 hydro-power stations (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 1994c). Such goal was also included as a priority area in 
the Tajik government's economic reform programme for the period 1995-2000 (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 1995b). 
Tajik-Russian talks on Rogun continued also after the end of the civil war. In 1998, 
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Valery Serov mentioned the preparation of feasibility 
studies for the “construction of several hydroelectric plants” in Tajikistan (BBC Monitoring 
Central Asia Unit, 1998). One year later, the two countries signed an agreement in which it 
was decided that part of Tajikistan's debts to Russia
94
 was to be paid through shares in a 
number of Tajik enterprises and industrial projects, including Rogun (Moscow News, 
1999). Again, in 2002, Barki Tojik, signed a contract with the Russian financial group 
Baltic Construction Company to build Rogun (Ria Novosti, 2002b). Nevertheless, despite 
an undeniable interest showed over the years, Russian involvement on the project did not 
materialise into tangible actions, and the construction site remained inactive. This probably 
explains why during the following years the GoT tried to involve – with poor results – new 
potential investors, including Japan (Ria Novosti, 2002), Pakistan (Interfax, 2002) and the 
Czech Republic (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2004d). After more than a decade of 
negotiations and a handful of unsuccessful agreements, a more effective treaty was signed 
in October 2004 by Rahmon and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. One of its effects 
was that the Russian aluminium giant RusAl agreed to invest $560 million to resume work 
and complete the construction of the first stage of the project (Interfax, 2004). The German 
engineering firm Lahmeyer, which was awarded a contract from RusAl to carry out a first 
feasibility study of Rogun (Interfax, 2005), recommended that the optimal height of the 
dam should be 285 meters, instead of the 335 on which the GoT insisted (Associated Press, 
2006), and, as it was noted earlier, such was the disagreement on the height of the dam and 
on its ownership that in August 2007 Tajik officials eventually announced the cancelation 
of the deal with RusAl (Eurasianet, 2007).  
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Sangtuda I is a 670 MW hydroelectric power plant on the Vakhsh River. The project – realized thanks to a 
Russian investment of roughly US$ 720 million – represents the largest foreign direct investment project in 
Tajikistan to date (Olcott, 2012: 242 
94 
US$ 170 million out of an estimated total of US$ 300 million.  
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At this point, it is worth noting that the mobilization of international funding appears to 
be subordinated to the resolution of the regional conflict with Uzbekistan. Significantly, 
after his visit to Uzbekistan in 2009, the then-President of the Russian Federation Dmitry 
Medvedev has clarified that "Hydroelectric power stations in the Central Asian region must 
be built with consideration of the interests of all neighbouring [sic] states," adding that, "if 
there is no common accord of all parties, Russia will refrain from participation in such 
projects" (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009b). Although the MFA of Tajikistan 
reacted to this sending a note of protest to the Russian Government (Eurasianet, 2010b) – 
and a week later, Emomali Rahmon unusually cancelled a long-planned visit to Moscow 
(Russia & CIS Presidential Bulletin, 2009) – Russia did not change its position. There seem 
to be here a condition comparable to what Barry Buzan called “overlay”, although water 
takes the place of security in the original definition. Overlay “occurs when the direct 
presence of outside powers in a region is strong enough to suppress the normal operation of 
security dynamics among the local states” (Buzan et al., 1998: 12). In the case of 
Uzbekistan, the country managed to influence Russia to such an extent (using its bargaining 
power, as outlined in Chapter 6) that the former eventually decided to withdraw its support 
to Tajik hydroelectric plans. 
Once more, when the Russian involvement in Rogun faded, the GoT turned its attention 
elsewhere, this time towards Ukraine. In March 2008, Ukrainian President Yushchenko 
announced its country’s participation in an international consortium to finish the project 
(Interfax, 2008). The two sides held talks again a few months later, discussing a deal worth 
several hundred million US dollars (Water Power & Dam Construction, 2009) and ending 
up signing a memorandum of intent on cooperation in the construction of the dam, which 
was not ensued by tangible measures. Surprisingly enough, before the outburst of the 
Rogun controversy, even downstream Kazakhstan showed interest in investing in Tajik 
hydropower projects. In 2008, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev announced that "If 
a consortium will work on the Rogun hydroelectric power station, then Kazakhstan will 
take part, providing materials, helping with shares, and as investor" (RFE/RL, 2008). Two 
years later, and again as a result of Uzbek lobbying (IWPR, 2009), Nazarbayev seemed to 
have changed his opinion about Tajik plans, and while visiting Uzbekistan he declared that 
"there ought to be no hydroelectric power plants in the region without results of the 
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expertise obtained and studied" (Dubnov, 2010), referring to Uzbek demands of having an 
independent examination of Rogun.  
Also Iran, a country that shares with Tajikistan a common language and culture, has 
been involved in the Rogun project. In 2009, Ali Asghar Sherdust, the Iranian ambassador 
to Tajikistan, uttered his country’s intentions to participate in completing the construction 
of Rogun (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009c). Two years later, Iranian support 
became “harder”, as outlined by Tajik Defence Minister General Sherali Khairulloyev, that 
during increasing tensions with Uzbekistan reminded its neighbours – on what sounded as a 
warning – that “Today, if necessary, the Islamic Republic of Iran's Armed Forces can reach 
Tajikistan in two hours” (FARS News Agency, 2011). Yet, while Iranian financial support 
on Rogun did not materialize, the country has participated in another hydroelectric project, 
investing US$ 180 million (82 % of the total cost) in the construction of the less contested 
220 MW Sangtuda II hydroelectric plant on the Vakhsh river (Daly, 2011), whose first unit 
was inaugurated in September 2011 (ITAR-TASS, 2011).  
 
4.3.2.1. …and financial institutions 
Unsurprisingly, the WB – the largest single source of funding for dams around the world 
(McCully, 2001: 19) – has also been involved in the Rogun project. As it was mentioned, 
the WB is currently preparing a feasibility study and an environmental assessment of the 
dam, whose much awaited results – as of 2013 – are yet to be released. Nevertheless, the 
Bank’s engagement on this particular issue is due to Uzbek pressures on having an external 
evaluation of the project. Despite the fact that in 1994 the financial institution 
recommended to drop the project on both financial and ecological grounds (FT Energy 
Newsletters, 1995) the GoT attempted to have the WB participate in Rogun in several 
occasions, both as a dispute settler and as a provider of international funds. For instance, in 
2006 Tajikistan requested the assistance of the WB to resolve the above-mentioned dispute 
between RusAl and the GoT (Associated Press, 2006). As it was observed, the dispute with 
RusAl would not be solved, and shortly after the cancelation of the contract Tajikistan 
sought a loan from the WB, through its energy company Barki Tojik (Global Insight, 
2007a).  
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Towards the end of 2007, Rahmon mentioned for the first time the creation of an 
international consortium to complete Rogun led by the WB (Central Asia & Caucasus 
Business Weekly, 2007). Indeed, a few weeks later, WB Vice-President Shigeo Katsu had a 
meeting with the Tajik prime minister Oqil Oqilov, in which he confirmed that the 
Bank will take part with a new investment programme aimed at building the dam (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 2007). Then, in May 2008, during one of his regular visits 
to the construction site
95
, Rahmon announced that the consortium had been established 
thanks to the help of the WB and of other unspecified international financial institutions, 
adding that this would lead to the completion and operation of two of the six envisioned 
turbines within 4 and half years, at the end of 2012 (Parshin, 2008a). For the time being, the 
turbines have not been built, and the international consortium seemed to have ceased to 
exist, perhaps also because of the WB involvement in the preparation of the two impact 
assessments. 
As for the ADB, in 2009 the Bank's president Haruhiko Kuroda supported Rogun and 
other hydroelectric projects in Tajikistan (Water Power & Dam Construction, 2009), and 
subsequently Juan Miranda, ADB director general for Central and Western Asia, expressed 
the Bank’s readiness in helping with the assessments. Although Miranda declared that the 
Bank “will make it a priority to support projects in this field [hydroelectric] within its 
cooperation with Tajikistan” (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2010h), it appears that 
the involvement of the ADB – as it is the case for the other potential donors mentioned so 
far – is subordinated to the resolution of the dispute with Uzbekistan, or at least, to the 
release of the studies carried out by the WB. 
 
4.3.3. Internationalising Rogun 
An important part of Tajik counter-hegemonic strategies consists of getting international 
acceptance and support for Rogun. This is because without international acceptance, no 
country or financial institution is likely to invest in a project that is considered too 
controversial. Therefore, Tajikistan needs to persuade key regional and international 
players that the dam is necessary for its development and wellbeing, and moreover, that it 
has every right to build it. In other words, Tajikistan needs to impose its discourse as the 
                                                     
95
 Rahmon regularly visits the site, both to verify the advancement of the works and to propose Rogun to 
potential investors.  
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dominant one. If a discourse is constructed and disseminated successfully, it becomes a 
“sanctioned discourse”, that, according to the definition provided by Anthony Turton, “is 
the prevailing or dominant discourse that has been legitimised by the discursive élite within 
the water sector at any one moment in time. It represents what may be said, who may say it 
and how it may be interpreted, thereby leading to the creation of a dominant belief system 
or paradigm” (Turton, 2002: 39). Allan (2001: 183-183) usefully draws from Foucault to 
explain how a discourse can be understood as a “network of consensus” in politics. In water 
politics, the main role of politicians is often to legitimise their inputs in a way that they 
become the dominant discourse. Accordingly, the process through which the 
sanctioned/dominant discourse is contested, and, at its best result, reversed, can be defined 
alternative discourse construction. This is the domain where ideational power is delved and 
possibly best observed, as it is through this form of power that discourses, narratives and 
ideologies are imposed. It was noted that through ideational power the hegemon convinces 
the hegemonised that the current situation is right and proper. Conversely, through 
ideational power the hegemonised can reverse the existing perception of the current 
situation, and impose a new discourse.  
The following analyses how the GoT has delved ideational power, outlining the ways in 
which it has fervently sought international support for Rogun, proactively bringing the 
matter at the most important international forums worldwide and organising international 
conferences and seminars on water management issues. 
 
4.3.3.1. Rogun meets the UN (and a few more) 
For what concerns the United Nations, beginning in 1999 during the 54
th
 United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA), and carrying on uninterruptedly until the 67
th
 UNGA in 2012, 
the GoT gradually introduced in its annual address water issues and, subsequently, the 
development of its hydroelectric potential and the construction of Rogun (see Table 5). 
Through a well-planned communication strategy aimed at portraying itself as a responsible 
water user and as a global leader in encouraging cooperation in the field of water (Rahmon, 
2008), the Tajik discourse at the UN is a water-energy crescendo that eventually leads to 
Rogun. Considering that the desiccation of the Aral Sea was caused by the series of dams 
and river diversion projects (which also included Rogun) realized by the Soviet Union, this 
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strategy can be interpreted as an attempt of changing the perception of Central Asia as an 
environmentally degraded region, and bestowing to Tajikistan the role of regional leader in 
promoting environmental responsibility
96
. Hence, in the period 1999-2004, the GoT called 
for the attention of the world community on fresh water problems and on greater 
cooperation between countries, successfully putting forward two initiatives to declare 2003 
the “International Year of Freshwater”, and 2005-2015 the “International Decade for 
Action Water for life
97” (Rahmon, 1999 and 2003; Alimov, 2000 and 2001; Nazarov, 2002 
and 2004). Then, in 2005, the Tajik Foreign Minister Talbak Nazarov raised for the first 
time at the UN the issue of Tajikistan and of its unexploited hydroelectric potential: “water 
resources possessed by Tajikistan provide us with considerable potential advantages in 
terms of the Millennium Development Goals [MDGs] implementation, since they represent 
a huge hydro potential that, unfortunately, is currently used by less than 5 %” (Nazarov, 
2005). During the subsequent years, the connection between Rogun and the achievement of 
the MDGs, which implies the representation of the dam as a fundamental element to attain 
national goals and priorities, became the central message delivered by Tajikistan at the UN 
(Aslov, 2007; Rahmon 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2010; Zarifi 2011a; 2012a). Part of the efforts 
carried out by the GoT were also aimed at underlining the regional benefits that would stem 
from Rogun. For instance, Sirodjidin Aslov, the Tajik Permanent Representative to the UN, 
in 2007 stressed how with “the completion of the construction of the Ragun [sic] 
hydropower station in Tajikistan alone will make it possible to supply with water extra 3 
mln. hectares of land in the neighboring Central Asian states, and ensure water supply in 
the years of droughts” (Aslov, 2007).  
 
                                                     
96 
Supporting this interpretation, and shifting the blame to the Soviet Union, the Tajik delegation to the OSCE 
declared in 2008 that “any allegation on insalubrities of constructing hydropower plants in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan is something as systematic mislead of the world community and concealment of ecological crimes 
committed in a second half of the 20th century in the Central Asia” (Yuldoshev, 2008). 
97
 A third initiative of this kind, proclaiming 2013 the “International Year of Water Cooperation (IYWC)”, 
was launched by Tajikistan in 2010 (Rahmon, 2010). 
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Table 5: Content of the addresses delivered at the UNGA by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 1999-2012. 
“Water”, “Hydroelectric” and “Rogun” respectively mean that issues related to the management of 
shared waters, the development of hydroelectric infrastructures and the Rogun dam were discussed in 
the address. Table constructed by author based on data from the United Nations Bibliographic 
Information System (http://unbisnet.un.org/).  
 Content of the Tajik Address Content of the Uzbek address 
UNGA session 
no. and year 
Water Hydroelectric Rogun Water Hydroelectric Rogun 
54th, 1999       
55th, 2000       
56th, 2001       
57th, 2002       
58th, 2003       
59th, 2004       
60th, 2005 
        
61st, 2006       
62nd, 2007       
63rd, 2008       
64th, 2009       
65th, 2010       
66th, 2011       
67th, 2012       
 
The address delivered by Hamrokhon Zarifi, the Tajik Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the 
66
th
 UNGA in 2011, summarizes well the essence of the Tajik discourse at the international 
level, and the evolution of the message delivered by the GoT over the years: 
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Energy resources are of paramount importance for sustainable development. Access to 
energy is an imperative for ensuring social and economic development, eradication of 
poverty and hunger. […] Complex development of hydropower, combined with other 
renewables, will not only allow to increase the capacity of energy systems, but also to 
promote their stability and increased efficiency, and to considerably decrease detrimental 
emissions into the atmosphere. For over ten years, in the winter season, the Republic of 
Tajikistan has experienced a severe shortage of electrical energy supply. Since Tajikistan 
lacks other sources of energy it is of vital importance for the country, which possesses huge 
hydropower potential, to develop a hydro energy economic sector in a consistent and 
complex manner. Tajikistan is prepared to closely cooperate on issues of rational use of 
water and energy resources with all the countries of the region, with due consideration to 
the common regional interests. (Zarifi, 2011a: 2) 
 
Sustainable development, huge hydropower potential, clean energy, absence of 
alternatives, winter energy crises, will to cooperate, distancing from the disastrous Soviet 
water administration and, finally, the presentation of Tajikistan as a leader in water 
cooperation under the auspices of the UN.  
A similar message has been delivered at the OSCE Ministerial Council meetings, in 
which the emphasis is placed on matters such as the necessity for Tajikistan to exploit its 
hydroelectric potential, the regional benefits originating from Rogun and Tajikistan’s will 
to cooperate with its neighbours. Consequently, also in this assembly Hamrokhon Zarifi, 
underlined his country’s “necessity of constructing hydropower plants”, as this will be not 
only extremely profitable for Tajikistan, but it will also “contribute to sustainable 
development of other countries of the region”, considerably increasing their irrigated land98 
(Zarifi, 2007). The achievement of energy independence is presented as “a matter of vital 
importance […] which will have impact on further social and economic development of the 
country (Zarifi, 2011b). Moreover, thanks to Rogun Tajikistan’s energy production will 
exceed the “real needs of the region three and more times” – allowing “to satisfy the 
growing demands of neighboring [sic] countries” (Zarifi, 2009). In addition, based on the 
assumption that the politicisation of hydropower issues is hampering the development of 
regional cooperation, the GoT reiterated its effort in promoting regional dialogue, 
proposing the creation of an international hydropower consortium to construct Rogun 
(Zarifi, 2012b).  
                                                     
98 
One year later, the GoT increased the expected hectares of land that Rogun would allow to irrigate to 4.6 
million, including 140 thousand additional hectares in Turkmenistan and 240 thousand additional hectares in 
Uzbekistan (Yuldoshev, 2008). 
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In line with a Rogun-centred foreign policy, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon raised the 
issue of the dam also during his visits to the European Parliament (EP). In 2009, in a speech 
to the Foreign Policy Committee of the EP, he defined the completion of Rogun of 
“vital importance” for his country (RFE/RL, 2009), while in 2011 he ensured the EP that 
Rogun will benefit not only Tajikistan but all the countries in the region, and therefore the 
country should be allowed to build the dam (Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 2011). In 
another occasion, Zarifi, through his “Message from the roof of the world”, asked the EU to 
help Central Asian countries find a solution on regional disputes, nevertheless reminding 
that “Tajikistan has abundant unexhausted sources of hydro-energy ranking the 8th in the 
world on total amount and the 2
nd
 on specific volumes” (Zarifi, 2011c). 
Finally, above and beyond the UN, OSCE and the EU, the Rogun campaign at 
international organizations is complemented by bringing the issue of Tajikistan and the 
development of “its enormous hydropower resources” (Rahmon, 2009a) at key 
international conferences, such as the World Water Forum (in 2009 and 2012)
99
 and the 
2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. 
 
4.3.3.2. Water conferences 
Another significant tactic supplementing the Rogun internationalization process, consists 
in the organization of international water conferences and seminars. Over the last ten years, 
the GoT has organized in its capital Dushanbe several large events in which the Tajik view 
on water management issues and on regional cooperation was presented to the participants. 
These events – often organised under the auspices or with the financial support of the 
United Nations – have been usually conceived within the framework of larger initiatives 
successfully presented by the GoT at the UNGA, such as the abovementioned “2003 
International Year of Freshwater” and “2005-2015 International Decade for Action Water 
for life”. 
Not long after the first conferences had been organized, Kai Wegerich noted that 
Tajikistan “started to challenge the hegemony of Uzbekistan, which has so far dominated 
the international arena with its own sponsored favoured discourses, such as at ICID, the 
                                                     
99
 Emblematically, and in line with the process aimed at presenting the country as a responsible water user 
and at binding the idea of Tajikistan with that of water, the GoT disseminated at the 2012 World Water Forum 
in Marseille brochures and pens uttering the message “Tajikistan is a water country”. 
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World Water Week in Stockholm, Green Cross International and the World Water Forum” 
(Wegerich, 2008: 83). Indeed, the main goal of these events is to strengthen the image of 
the country as a world leader in promoting cooperation in the field of water, to show an 
aptitude to cooperate with Uzbekistan
100
 and the other Central Asian countries, and 
eventually to promote the development of Tajik hydroelectric potential
101
. 
Following the organization of the “International Water Forum” in 2003, the GoT 
convened the large and costly “International conference on regional cooperation in 
transboundary river basins” in 2005. In 2008, the International Conference on Water 
Related Disaster Reduction took place in Dushanbe. In his opening remarks, Tajik 
President Rahmon reiterated his desire to expand Tajikistan's hydro-power potential and 
urged the creation of an international consortium to develop Lake Sarez (Parshin, 2008b). 
These events were followed in 2010 by the “Water for Life” conference and in 2011 by the 
conference “Towards the conference on sustainable development (RIO+20): water 
cooperation issues”. In addition, and under the umbrella of the UN initiative (which was 
proposed by Tajikistan) “2013 International Year of Water Cooperation”, the GoT is 
organized a large “High-level International Conference on Water Cooperation” in 
Dushanbe in late August 2013, during which Tajikistan will present its analysis and ideas 
on water supply and use, as underlined by Rahmat Bobokalonov, Tajikistan’s Minister of 
land reclamation and water resources (Bloomberg, 2013).  
Overall, the organisation of water conferences serves to portray Tajikistan as a leader in 
fostering water cooperation, but also to propagate through authoritative channels Tajik 
views on water management and to give a positive image of the Rogun dam. This process, 
closely related with the creation and dissemination of a specific knowledge that backs Tajik 
assumptions, is delineated in the following section.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
100
 For example, at the Water for Life conference Tajik Minister of Energy and Industry Sherali Gul, declared 
that “Tajikistan will meet Uzbekistan's all demands so as to complete the construction of the Roghun 
hydroelectric power plant”, also adding that “Tajikistan is not going to block water to Uzbekistan […] We 
will never leave our neighbours without water” (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2010g). 
101
 Often the conferences end with a guided visit at the Rogun site or at the existing Nurek hydropower 
station, as it was the case in 2010 for the Water for Life conference (Interfax, 2010a). 
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4.3.4. Knowledge construction 
Knowledge construction can be considered a hegemonic (Warner and Zeitoun, 2006) but 
also a counter-hegemonic strategy, since the construction of expertise-based knowledge 
serves to contest the scientific assumptions contained in the Uzbek discourse, namely that 
the dam will lead to environmental calamities and water shortages. Additionally, most of 
the strategies outlined previously could also fit in this category, as in all its endeavours the 
Tajik government is attempting to impose its discourse and ideology, propagating a specific 
scientific postulation: the seismicity of the area where the project is located is not strong 
enough to pose a threat neither to Tajikistan nor to its neighbours. Moreover – and similarly 
to what is maintained by most upstream countries when it comes to building a large dam 
(Molle et al., 2009) – the Rogun dam will lead to a better regulation of the water flow while 
also allowing an increase in the irrigated land in the downstream countries. Science-based 
knowledge that presents the Rogun dam as a win-win situation, can provide an authoritative 
support that help legitimise the way the issue is framed by the Tajik hydrocracy. This 
knowledge has been disseminated by means of newspaper articles, open letters, and the 
active engagement of western politicians.  
Interestingly, while the Soviet legacy on the environment is strongly condemned by 
Tajik Ministers (see note 96), Tajik scientists glorify the Soviet engineering expertise 
behind Rogun, that rather than making the project outdated (as the Uzbek government 
sustains) (Mirziyoyev, 2007), is presented as the state of the art of dam design and 
construction. The benefits of the dam are widely diffused by the Tajik press and by the 
websites of the Tajik Embassies, that are also used to counter negative assumptions about 
the Rogun dam. For instance, when a Moscow-based scientist with a wide experience in 
Tajikistan, Leonid Papyrin, warned about the seismicity of the area and recommended 
further engineering investigations (Papyrin, 2011), the Tajik government entrusted the reply 
to Professor Dzhonon Ikrami, a Tajik scientist, that objected that: 
 
The current broad scale attack of our neighbors’ environmentalists towards construction of 
Rogun HPP reminds me of an incompetent report of a number of major writers led by 
Marietta Shaginyan featured in the “Pravda” newspaper in 1962 against the construction of 
the Nurek HPP high rock-fill dam. […] After reading a number of statements of our 
opponents asserting that for the last 100 years in the Rogun construction area there had been 
20 earthquakes with a magnitude of 9 points, we turned to the well-known seismologist, 
Academician S. Kh. Negmatullaev and asked to give us the background on seismic 
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condition of the Nurek and Rogun HPPs construction area. […] A thorough data review has 
showed that the earthquakes with an intensity of more than 6 points on the MSK scale have 
never been recorded in the construction area of these high-altitude dams. (Ikrami, 2012) 
 
 
The article proceeds with a series of counter-arguments to the “myths about Rogun’s 
dangers”, in which Ikrami backs up his statements with those of other experts in favour of 
Rogun. Similarly, when the Uzbek newspaper Pravda Vostoka published an alarmed article 
that defined Rogun a tsunami for Central Asia (Pravda Vostoka, 2011), the criticisms were 
dismissed reminding that Rogun was designed by some of the finest Soviet scientists, and 
that the project successfully passed the inspections carried out by the WB and the German 
company Lahmeyer (Ikrami, 2011). A few months later Pravda Vostoka published another 
worried article on Rogun, that was punctually contested in the Tajik government-owned 
website Avesta, noting that the seismicity of the area is not strong enough to pose a threat 
to the Rogun dam (Avesta, 2011b). 
Rahmon and his ministers have also tried to legitimise their views through the 
apparently spontaneous endorsement of western politicians and newspapers, and especially 
of those that engage with the EU. For instance, Struan Stevenson, a Member of the 
European Parliament (MEP) which in 2010 was appointed by the Kazakh Presidency of the 
OSCE as Personal Representative of the Chairman in Office responsible for the ecology 
and environment of Central Asia, has been actively lobbying for Rogun over the last years, 
spreading the Tajik message around the European Institutions and British universities
102
. 
The declarations and articles released by Stevenson are regularly reposted by the main 
Tajik information agencies and disseminated by Tajik Embassies worldwide, as for 
example when the MEP called on the West to widely support Emomali Rahmon and his 
projects (Stevenson, 2011). In his book “Stalin’s Legacy”, Stevenson describes his first 
meeting with Emomali Rahmon: 
 
The president began to thank me for my ‘excellent’ newspaper article about Rogun. He 
explained the importance of the project for Tajikistan and said that it was incomprehensible 
to him why Uzbekistan’s president was so opposed to it. […] President Rahmon suddenly 
lent forward and grabbed me tightly by the wrist. His face was only a few inches from 
mine. ‘As you know I am coming to Strasbourg next week for meetings with the President 
                                                     
102 
In Fall 2012 and Spring 2013, Stevenson toured several British universities to present his book Stalin’s 
Legacy: The Soviet War on Nature. 
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of the European Parliament and for a debate with members of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee. I hope that I can meet you there, and I hope that you will repeat your support 
for our Rogun hydro project’. (Stevenson, 2012: 169-170)  
 
Rahmon here gets to the point very clearly, asking in a direct way for Stevenson’s 
support inside the European Parliament. And indeed, after this meeting Stevenson wrote an 
article in which he explained that his goal is “to get necessary information about the Rogun 
project, and communicate it to the European Parliament, as not all of them understand the 
importance of Rogun to Tajikistan and Central Asia
103” (Avesta, 2011c).  
Thus, with the involvement of academics, politicians and the media, the Tajik 
government has disseminated its own expertise-based knowledge, emphasising the absence 
of seismic risks and therefore countering the scientific assumptions held by the Uzbeks. 
This seems to complement and strengthen the Tajik strategy on the Rogun dam, in an 
attempt of providing legitimacy and authority to the overarching Tajik discourse. 
 
4.4. Conclusions 
As it was anticipated in Chapter 3, the revamp of the Rogun dam has been a source of 
regional tensions, leading to the gradual deterioration of bilateral relations between 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The status-quo originally set by the USSR and later maintained 
by Uzbekistan, has been challenged by the Tajik hydrocracy through the revitalization of a 
Soviet project. This last aspect is relevant, as it underlines how the legacy of the Soviet 
Union still plays a central role in regional water management issues. 
The Tajik government has used its bargaining and ideational power to frame the Rogun 
dam as a cooperative regional project to influence international backers to support – both 
diplomatically and financially – its construction. In a process aimed at raising Tajikistan’s 
international profile as a water country and at attracting foreign investments, the Tajik 
hydrocracy has attempted to impose its discourse as the dominant through different tactics 
and strategies, challenging the hegemonic order set by Uzbekistan in which the upstream 
country in the Amu Darya basin is not able to exploit its hydroelectric potential.  
                                                     
103
 As a reaction to Stevenson’s declarations, the Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan, an Uzbek political 
party and environmental movement, sent a letter of protest to the President of the European Parliament Jerzy 
Buzek, in which Stevensons’s declarations were severely criticised (The Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan, 
2011).  
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While the mobilisation of financial resources has proven difficult for the Tajik 
government, the efforts aimed at raising its profile as a regional and global leader in the 
promotion of water cooperation have been more successful, and currently Tajikistan 
emerges as the key player – at least among the Central Asian countries – when it comes to 
launching global water initiatives and organising international water conferences. While the 
Tajik government has indeed challenged the status-quo, at present its actions do not seem 
effective enough to successfully change it. Tajikistan’s counter-hegemonic actions in the 
Amu Darya basin are an on-going process rather than an accomplished one, whose effects 
will be assessed only when the destiny of the Rogun dam is set. 
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Chapter 5. The Kambarata Dam 
 
God gave us the River Naryn and Kyrgyz people should make full use of it. 
Kurmanbek Bakiev, 2009 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the second of the two case studies of this 
research, the construction of the Kambarata dam in Kyrgyzstan. The dam will be used to 
analyse how state power is wielded in international transboundary water relations, and to 
identify which counter-hegemonic measures have been put in place to favour its 
construction. Similarly to Rogun, also the revitalisation of the Kambarata project in the 
2000s triggered an animated regional debate on whether the dam should be built or not, 
quickly becoming a matter of foreign policy in regional politics. Also in this case, the 
Uzbek leadership appears to be the main antagonist to the project, and the two sides have 
been engaged in a diplomatic arm wrestling that has seen the two countries sponsoring and 
demeaning the dam. 
Following the same structure adopted for the Rogun dam, this chapter first gives an 
overview of the project, its history and its expected impact. Subsequently, it outlines and 
categorizes the various counter-hegemonic tactics that were put in place by Kyrgyzstan to 
favour its construction. Finally, the chapter assesses the main effects of Kyrgyz counter-
hegemonic tactics. 
 
5.1. Overview of the Kambarata Dam 
The history of Kambarata is not dissimilar to that of Rogun. Both projects were 
conceived during the Soviet hydraulic mission towards the 1970s, partially built in the 
1980s, and then finally abandoned in 1991 with the demise of the Soviet Union. Kambarata 
was part of the National Plan of the USSR in the Kyrgyz SSR, that from 1960 to 1970 led 
to the construction of numerous reservoirs and hydroelectric plants in the country. During 
these years the Soviets tamed the Syr Darya and its tributaries all along its course. These 
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facilities were intended to favour irrigated agriculture of rice and cotton in Kazakhstan and 
in Uzbekistan, rather than for the generation of hydroelectricity in Kyrgyzstan (Shalpykova, 
2002). The upper stream section of this development scheme consisted in the Upper Naryn 
Cascade on the Naryn river (a tributary of the Syr Darya), in which the Kambarata complex 
– formed by the Kambarata I and the smaller Kambarata II hydroelectric plants – is the 
furthest upstream hydraulic structure (see Figure 21).  
 
 
Figure 21: Overview of existing and projected power stations in the Naryn river. Image taken from a 
presentation delivered in Bishkek in September 2010 by Avtandil Kalmambetov, Deputy Minister of 
Energy of Kyrgyzstan. Available from: http://www.carecinstitute.org/uploads/events/2010/ESCC-
Sep/Day1-KGZ-Energy-Sector.pdf [Accessed 2 March 2012]. 
 
 
At this point, it is worth noting that the focus of this study is placed on Kambarata I and 
not on the smaller (360 MW) Kambarata II HPP. This is due mainly to two reasons. First 
and foremost, during these last years the regional debate and controversy have been centred 
on Kambarata I, and not on its smaller counterpart, which will have only a minor impact on 
the Syr Darya water flow and therefore has not been heavily contested by downstream 
countries; the construction of Kambarata II cannot change the existing hegemonic order. 
 132 
 
Second, since Kambarata II became operational in 2010
104
 (Dzyubenko, 2010), it cannot be 
used as a case study and compared with Rogun, as the focus of this research is on counter-
hegemonic and hegemonic measures put in place to favour and obstruct dams which are 
still under construction. Henceforth, to avoid misunderstandings, in this research the term 
“Kambarata” will refer only to the Kambarata I HPP.  
When completed, Kambarata would stand 275 meters high, with a 4.65 km
3 
reservoir, a 
generating capacity of 1,900 MW (four turbines with a capacity of 475 MW each), and a 
performance of 5.1 billion kilowatt hours of electricity per year (Tetra Tech, 2011). The 
project was originally designed in the 1980s and construction started in 1986 
(Hydroworld.com, 2009). Then, in 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the project 
was abandoned because of lack of funds. Nevertheless, as it was the case with Rogun, 
Kambarata did not die with the Soviet Union, and after a latency period that lasted 
approximately a decade, in 2003 the Kyrgyz government started to seriously discuss the 
revitalization of the project (Water Power & Dam Construction, 2003). 
 
 
Table 6: Concise timeline of the Kambarata project. Source: Annex 4; Tetra Tech, 2011. 
1970s Planning and design of the Upper Naryn Cascade on the Naryn river 
1980s Design of the Kambarata dam  
1986 Start of construction works 
1991 Interruption of works, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent 
lack of funds 
2007 Talks about the establishment of a joint-venture with Kazakhstan and Russia 
to build Kambarata I and II 
January 
2009 
Russia pledges a US$ 1.7 billion loan to finish construction of Kambarata  
                                                     
104
 The dam, which is the first hydroelectric power station launched in Kyrgyzstan since the collapse of the  
Soviet Union, was inaugurated in August 2010 by Acting Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva. Kambarata II  
was built thanks to a US$ 300 million loan from Russia (The Times of Central Asia, 2010) 
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April 2009 Interruption of the credit line from Moscow  
March 
2013 
SNC-Lavalin wins a tender to undertake a feasibility study of Kambarata 
 
 
5.1.1. Independent Kyrgyzstan and Kambarata 
The Government of Kyrgyzstan (GoK) has repeatedly attempted to revamp the 
construction of Kambarata since independence announcing its revitalization in several 
occasions, but, at the time of writing, the project is yet to be restarted. Given its high cost, 
which was recently estimated to vary from 2 to almost US$ 5 billion
105
 (Tetra Tech, 2011: 
64), Kyrgyzstan needs to mobilise foreign investments to be able to build the dam. 
Although a US$ 1.7 billion deal was struck with Russia in 2009 (Ministry of Economy of 
the Kyrgyz Republic, 2011) to proceed with the construction of Kambarata, the agreement 
was cancelled a year later (as it was also the case of the RusAl agreement concerning the 
Rogun dam). Moreover, the rather turbulent history of the Kyrgyz Republic – arguably the 
most unsettled of all the five Central Asian countries – did not facilitate the realisation of 
the hydraulic infrastructure.  
Following independence in 1991, the newly elected President Askar Akaev made a 
genuine effort towards a democratic and pluralist form of governance, distinguishing the 
country from its more authoritarian neighbours, leading some commentators to refer to 
Kyrgyzstan as an “island of democracy” (Anderson, 1999). However, a change in Akaev’s 
leadership tactics and a turn towards a more authoritarian rule (Spector, 2004) undermined 
this democratic experiment. In 2005, protests over flawed parliamentary elections forced 
Akaev to flee from his office, leading to a regime change that was chiefly rooted in 
domestic politics (Lewis, 2008) and that analysts termed the “Tulip Revolution”’106, to 
match previous events such as the “Rose” and “Orange” revolutions in Georgia and 
Ukraine
107
. As Scott Radnitz (2006) has noted, technically the term “revolution” is not 
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 In 2011 the GDP of Kyrgyzstan was US$ 6.2 billion (The World Bank). 
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 For a comprehensive overview of the ‘Tulip Revolution’ and of its wider implications, refer to the edited 
volume Domestic and international perspectives on Kyrgyzstan's 'Tulip Revolution' (Cummings, 2009).  
107
 For more information on the so-called “colour revolutions” in the former Soviet republics, refer to Ó 
Beacháin and Polese (2010). 
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accurate to define the 2005 events in Kyrgyzstan, as rather than a major social and political 
transformation, what happened resembles to a change in government, “with old patters 
reproducing themselves and hindering efforts at real reform on major issues such as 
corruption and equitable distribution of resources” (Radnitz, 2006: 133). 
In July 2005 the opposition leader Kurmanbek Bakiev succeeded Akaev as President of 
Kyrgyzstan. After an initial optimism for what appeared as a shift towards democratization, 
Bakiev increasingly consolidated his power, dismissing his political opponents and 
strengthening his family’s power base in the country (Juraev, 2010). In April 2010, five 
years after the ‘Tulip Revolution’, a swift and violent rebellion sparked by anger at high 
energy prices and widespread corruption and nepotism, led to the ousting of Bakiev 
(International Crisis Group, 2010). At this point, Roza Otunbayeva, a former Member of 
Parliament (MP), became the interim president of Kyrgyzstan and remained in office until 
December 2011, when Almazbek Atambayev was elected the fourth President of 
Kyrgyzstan.  
While this stormy past has caused changes in the GoK’s attitude towards Kambarata 
over the years, the dam remained an appealing project to each Kyrgyz regime, as its 
successful completion would probably boost the popularity of the ruling government 
(Kraak, 2012: 193). Yet, whereas the Tajik hydrocracy has managed to keep an unvaried 
position towards the Rogun dam over the last decade, in Kyrgyzstan the situation lacked 
such continuity, and for instance neither Akaev nor Bakiev was able to form lasting 
transmission belt parties (Cummings, 2012; 73). As Holsti noted, every decision-maker is 
in part a prisoner of beliefs and expectations that inevitably shape his definitions of reality, 
and make him different from anyone else (Holsti, 1967: 39). Accordingly, each Kyrgyz 
leader supported the construction of the dam, but with varying levels of enthusiasm. If for 
instance Akaev sustained Kambarata, especially during the last years of his presidency, it 
was under Bakiev that the dam became a national priority, and some observers saw the dam 
as his political pet project (The Times of Central Asia, 2011). Conversely, Bakiev’s 
successor, Roza Otunbayeva, has been more cautious on the necessity of building the dam 
at all costs.  
Different internal situations in Tajikistan and in Kyrgyzstan resulted in different dam 
discourses and rhetoric. While in Tajikistan there is a rubber-stamp Parliament and Rahmon 
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tightly controls the opposition (Olcott, 2012), in Kyrgyzstan the opposition has the 
possibility of expressing its dissent inside the Parliament, and the Kyrgyz Republic remains 
the most liberal of all the five Central Asians, with the most vibrant contestational politics 
(Cummings, 2012: 64). Therefore, unlike the Rogun dam, the ownership of the Kambarata 
dam and the way the project money was being administered has been contested by Kyrgyz 
members of the Parliament, and predominantly by Roza Otunbayeva when she was a 
parliamentarian for the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan during the Bakiev rule.  
 
5.1.2. Between corruption and internal criticism 
The hydropower sector is frequently linked with corruption (Wiehen, 1999; McCully, 
2001; Pearce, 2007). Transparency International, an NGO which monitors corporate and 
political corruption, dedicated its 2008 Global Corruption Report to “Corruption in the 
Water Sector”: 
 
The hydropower sector’s massive investment volumes (estimated at US$50–60 billion 
annually over the coming decades) and highly complex, customised engineering 
projects can be a breeding ground for corruption in the design, tendering and execution 
of large-scale dam projects around the world. […] Of the US$11.1 trillion the world is 
predicted to spend on energy infrastructure between 2005 and 2030, US$1.9 trillion 
may be expected to go toward hydropower. These large numbers create multiple 
opportunities for bribery, fraud and other forms of corrupt behaviour. […] Combined 
with a lack of transparency, this provides fertile ground for manipulation and abuse. 
(Transparency International, 2008: xxv, 86-87) 
 
Corruption and nepotism were also among the main reasons behind the ousting of both 
Akaev and Bakiev. Although in the aftermath of the ‘Tulip Revolution’, Bakiev declared 
that the new Kyrgyz government would make of the fight of corruption one of its priorities 
(Mayak Radio, 2005), Kubanychbek Idinov, a former parliamentarian, later observed that 
the scope of corruption became even wider in the period 2005-10. Maxim Bakiev, the son 
of Kurmanbek, has been involved in a corruption scandal concerning Kambarata II, and 
was accused of diverting into his private bank accounts US$ 200 million from the 300 lent 
by Russia (Karabayev, 2010). It is not surprising, then, that the financial management's 
transparency of the Kambarata project has often been questioned, particularly for what 
concerns the US$ 1.7 billion Russian loan secured in 2009 (see paragraph 5.3.2.2). And 
besides corruption, even the necessity of constructing Kambarata (with or without Russian 
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money) has been subject to considerable criticism inside Kyrgyzstan itself. For instance, in 
December 2008, Roza Otunbaeva, interrogated the Kyrgyz Parliament on the matter: 
 
Will the Russian $1US.7 billion loan for construction of Kambarata-1 water power 
station bring benefit for Kyrgyzstan and does it meet interests of Kyrgyzstan? Frankly 
speaking, this is a commercial loan. With this loan the public external debt of 
Kyrgyzstan will double. Why do we drive ourselves into the grave? […] We will 
benefit nothing. Prior to any agreements we should think about interests of the state. 
(AKIpress, 2008c) 
 
Otunbayeva saw the Russian involvement as particularly harmful
108
, both economically 
and in terms of water ownership. Just before the deal with Russia was signed, she noted 
how “A foreign state is taking advantage of a difficult economic situation to become owner 
of water. Kyrgyzstan itself has paved the way for Russia to own our water. Will Kyrgyzstan 
retain its independence or not?” (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009d). 
Subsequently, the day after Tursun Turdumambetov, the head of the State Committee for 
the Management of State Property, submitted a bill to nullify the law on constructing and 
running the Kambarata I and II HPPs (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009e), 
Otunbayeva took again a stance against her government: 
 
The Kyrgyz authorities must admit that their measures to carry 
out Kambarata hydroelectric power station projects are not based on any economic 
calculations. […] Television advertisements about the construction have already pulled 
the wool over our eyes. It should be pointed out that the incumbent president's election 
programme was based exactly on this project. However, we see today that they are 
talking nonsense to people. It turns out that Kyrgyzstan is unable to complete this 
project on its own, without bringing investment. […] What kind of organization [the 
state-run Development Fund charged to manage the Russian money] is it? Why is the 
government's guarantee insufficient for this organization to allocate 100m dollars? This 
is the people's money. It turns out today that the government is forced to kneel and beg 
its own money from this fund. (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009f) 
 
 
Then, in the wake of the 2010 coup, Otunbayeva emerged as the leader of the Kyrgyz 
interim government, and maintained this position until the end of 2011. The transition from 
being at the opposition to leading the government, also changed Otunbayeva’s position 
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towards Kambarata, and the new President became less critical of the project. On the 
contrary, at the launch of the first unit of Kambarata II in August 2010, Otunbayeva seemed 
to have become quite supportive of hydroelectric projects:  
 
In such a difficult time as Kyrgyzstan is going through, the launch of the first 
generating unit at Kambarata-2 HPP is a historic event for the country. […] The 
construction and launch of this HPP shows the power of our country and we do not 
intend to turn away from projects for further building of Kambarata-2 and Kambarata-1 
HPPs. […] The building of Kambarata strengthens the country’s energy security, en-
sures the uninterrupted work of the hydropower system, and will completely cover all 
the republic’s demand, and make it possible to develop its export potential, carrying out 
the export of electrical energy to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the future. […] We will 
be able to live well in both winter and summer, and are increasing our export potential. 
(The Times of Central Asia, 2010) 
 
Nevertheless, despite this new attitude, in November 2010 Otunbayeva decided that the 
construction of Kambarata would begin only after a review of the dam is completed, in line 
with Uzbek reiterated requests and following a path similar to that of Rogun. Thus, it can 
be argued that by treating Kambarata as an open issue, Roza Otunbayeva successfully 
managed to freeze a project that she previously criticised, passing on the responsibility of 
its construction to her successors, that, in March 2013 hired the Canadian Company SNC-
Lavalin to undertake a feasibility study of the project (Eurasianet, 2013), that should be 
released in Fall 2013 (Sytenkova, 2013). 
 
5.2. Expected impact of Kambarata 
If competed, a structure of the size of Kambarata will have an impact at both the national 
and regional level. The production of hydroelectricity will benefit the crisis-prone Kyrgyz 
energy sector, and the dam could also provide popularity to the government. Yet, the dam 
will impact the water flow of the Syr Darya and will have also other environmental 
consequences that have originated an animated regional debate. This section outlines the 
various ways in which the dam could impact on Kyrgyzstan and on its neighbours. 
 
5.2.1. Boosting Kyrgyzstan’s energy production 
In line with the Soviet hydraulic mission, Kambarata was originally projected to 
facilitate irrigation in the downstream republics rather than to produce hydroelectricity. 
However, this order of priority changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and today 
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the importance of the dam lies in its hydroelectricity generation capacity. This is because 
the vanishing of the centralised Soviet resource management system made the achievement 
of energy self-sufficiency one of the key goals of post-soviet Kyrgyzstan (Wegerich, 2009: 
29), that given the lack of other natural energy resources decided to expand its hydropower 
production.  
90 % of the energy produced in Kyrgyzstan is hydroelectric, and yet, the country has 
developed only 10 % of its potential. The country has 17 operating hydroelectric plants
109
, 
that form the Toktogul cascade. All of them (besides Kambarata II) were built during the 
Soviet period and are today in need of repair, because of protracted lack of maintenance 
during the last decades (Zozulinsky, 2010). The total hydroelectric capacity installed is 
2,950 MW, and the largest operating plant is Toktogul, that with its 1,200 MW of installed 
capacity is considered the flagship hydropower station of Kyrgyzstan (Elektricheskiye 
Stantsii, 2006).  
Since 2007-2008, the country’s dependence from hydroelectricity, along with a string of 
dry summers and extremely cold winters, has engendered a series of harsh energy crises 
that left a substantial part of the population without access to reliable supplies of gas, 
electricity and heat. Besides leaving Kyrgyzstan without the ability to produce 
hydroelectricity, low water levels at the Toktogul reservoir negatively impacted on irrigated 
agriculture in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in summer. During the winter of 2008-2009, 
rural areas in northern Kyrgyzstan and even in the capital Bishkek had electricity only for a 
few hours a day, and increasing anger and frustration among the population started to 
seriously challenge Bakiev’s leadership (Ferghana, 2008), which was being blamed for his 
incapacity of managing the crisis (Eurasianet, 2008b). 
 Another energy crisis hit the country in 2009-2010, and overall, household energy 
prices during 2007-2010 rose by 81 %, due to inefficiencies in the energy system 
(UNDP Bureau for Europe and CIS, 2011). After three years of recurrent energy crisis and 
increases in energy prices, discontent and frustration among the people of Kyrgyzstan led to 
the ousting of Kurmanbek Bakiev in 2010. However, instead of addressing this energy 
emergency by repairing the losses and inefficiencies in the energy system, the solution 
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proposed by successive Kyrgyz regimes has been the construction of new dams (Kraak, 
2012; Kalmambetov, 2010), and of one in particular, Kambarata.  
Thanks to the 1,900 MW generated by Kambarata, Kyrgyzstan would have a 65 % 
increase in its total hydroelectric installed capacity, sufficient to meet the country’s demand 
for power in the winter period (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2009: 
180). Moreover, alike Rogun, thanks to the CASA transmission line (see Figure 19) 
Kambarata would allow Kyrgyzstan not only to become energy self-sufficient, but also to 
sell electricity to neighbouring countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and China. 
Therefore, although the project is extremely costly (according to some analyst, it can be 
even considered as anti-economic; Tetra Tech, 2011: 74), and would make Kyrgyzstan 
even more reliant on hydroelectricity, the GoK portrays it as the best solution to solve the 
country’s energy crisis. This is because, besides its undeniable contribution to the country’s 
energy sector, Kambarata could also help the government gain popularity and legitimacy. 
 
5.2.2. Kambarata is good for Kyrgyzstan! 
Symbols play an important role in Central Asian politics. Chapter 4 outlined that 
Matveeva’s (2009) analysis effectively underlines how symbols are used by Central Asian 
leaders to create a legitimisation framework that can help them maintain power. 
Murzakulova and Schoeberlein have also acknowledged the importance of symbols and 
ideology in the efforts carried out by Kyrgyz leaders to “invent” legitimacy in Kyrgyzstan, 
stressing how the Gramscian concept of persuasion is useful to understand the country’s 
nation-building process (Murzakulova and Schoeberlein, 2009). And indeed, the symbolism 
that can be attached to a mega-structure like Kambarata is significant. Feaux de la Croix 
observes that the construction of the Toktogul dam in the 1960s-70s, epitomised the 
classical Soviet slogans on human’s mastery over nature and on forceful domination of 
rivers, with Lenin’s insight “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the 
whole country” adorning the dam’s turbine hall (Feaux de la Croix, 2011: 495). Similarly, 
in her study of moral geographies in Kyrgyzstan, she notes that the Kambarata dam can be 
interpreted as “a novel effort of the Kyrgyz government to boost its legitimacy and regional 
power” (Feaux de la Croix: 2010: 27). 
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To the same extent, Kraak explains how directing attention to a large-scale state-
sponsored project like Kambarata could surely benefit the elites: “a new dam the size of the 
Kambarata-I would contribute to both national pride and Kyrgyzstan’s regional power. 
[Bakiev] presents the dam as a national project, notwithstanding the financial aid from 
Russia and elsewhere that would be required” (Kraak, 2012: 188). Kraak also notes how, 
over the period 2005-2010, the increasing tension between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan has 
been blended into a discourse of nationalism, with Kambarata being used as a tool to 
conduct foreign policy and assert (or at least attempt to) regional power. It appears that, 
similarly to Rogun, the tension with Uzbekistan – which strongly opposes the construction 
of large-scale dams in Central Asia – has had the effect of further reinforcing the 
nationalistic sentiment attached to Kambarata, whose construction comes to symbolise the 
right of self-determination of the Kyrgyz people, which independently decide what to do 
with their own natural resources.  
The GoK has attempted to persuade its people (see paragraph 5.3.1) that Kambarata is a 
source of progress and success, of heat and light, in a way that resembles the Tajik rhetoric 
on Rogun. If the people of Kyrgyzstan accept the government’s representation of 
Kambarata as right and proper, then the dam, if completed, can unmistakably play a role in 
the legitimation of the Kyrgyz leadership. This is even more relevant considering that so far 
the history of the Kyrgyz Republic has been marked by a declining economy, social unrests 
and dissatisfaction for the government’s inability to offer basic services such as electricity 
or heating. 
 
5.2.3. Environmental problems and the setting of a precedent  
Not only Kambarata could generate large amounts of energy – the equivalent of two 
nuclear reactors – and help legitimise the Kyrgyz government, but it could also provide 
Kyrgyzstan with a tool to further control the flow of the Syr Darya, with potential negative 
consequences for Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Although the Syr Darya is much more 
regulated than the Amu Darya, and thanks to Toktogul Kyrgyzstan can already control the 
Naryn river, downstream riparians – and particularly Uzbekistan – contest the construction 
of Kambarata. The reasons of such opposition are both technical and political.  
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From a technical point of view, this is probably because if Kambarata is operated at the 
same time as Toktogul, there could be even more spills in the Arnasai depression in 
Uzbekistan, where the Chardara reservoir is located (Wegerich and Warner, 2010: 327). 
And indeed, since 1992, when Kyrgyzstan began to increase winter water releases from 
Toktogul to generate hydroelectricity, billions cubic meters of water have been spilled into 
the Depression, damaging land and infrastructure and depriving the Syr Darya Delta and 
the northern Aral Sea of much-needed water (PA Consortium Group, 2004). Although an 
EBRD study contends that “the release of water from Kambarata-I to generate electricity 
during the winter will reduce the need for the Kyrgyz authorities to release water from the 
Toktogul reservoir” (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2009: 180), 
there is still the risk that the reservoirs are operated simultaneously, thus causing more 
spills in the Depression, and consequently, the opposition of downstream countries. During 
a speech delivered in 2009, Kurmanbek Bakiev effectively summarized Kazakh and Uzbek 
concerns: “I want to straightforwardly quote [what] the president of Kazakhstan and the 
president of Uzbekistan told me: Kurmanbek Saliyevich, you simply flood us in winter” 
(BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009g). Besides flooding downstream areas, 
Uzbekistan is concerned that Kambarata might cause a lack of water in the Fergana Valley, 
the most densely populated territory of Central Asia. In addition, the project is located in an 
active seismic zone. Since it was designed in the 1970s, when international design criteria 
for dam hydrological and seismic safety were less stringent, Kambarata might increase the 
geological hazard of rockfalls and landslides (Asian Development Bank, 2013).  
From a political angle, downstream countries’ opposition can be directly linked to the 
other major Central Asian hydroelectric project, Rogun. Although Rogun is more contested 
than Kambarata, as it would have a stronger impact on the less regulated Amu Darya water 
flow (even though also Kambarata could give Kyrgyzstan more control to the water flow of 
the Syr Darya), the two projects have similar characteristics. Consequently, allowing the 
construction of Kambarata could facilitate the construction of Rogun, and vice versa, as this 
would set a precedent that implies the admission from downstream countries that large 
dams in Central Asia can be built, even if there is no consent from all the parties concerned 
by the project. In other words, by allowing the construction of Kambarata, Uzbekistan 
would give up on its own weltanschauung concerning the management of shared waters, 
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which is based on the principle of absolute integrity of the river rather than on that of 
absolute territorial sovereignty claimed by upstream countries (Dellapenna, 2001).  
 
5.2.4. The ensuing debate 
Alike Rogun, Kambarata would have a significance at different levels. Domestically, the 
dam would allow Kyrgyzstan to meet its energy winter peak demands, while legitimising 
the ruling elite and boosting its popularity. At the foreign level, the dam would provide 
Kyrgyzstan with an important tool to conduct foreign policy and use water as a strategic 
tool. Perhaps more importantly, the construction of Kambarata would set a precedent, 
opening the way to the construction of other large-scale hydroelectric plants upstream, thus 
implying a change in the status-quo. Until now, downstream countries have managed to 
maintain their advantageous water allocation quotas set in the 1980s by the Soviet Union, 
and upstream countries have not been successful in exploiting their hydroelectric potential. 
The construction of Kambarata would be a regional historical landmark, which would 
change the way water resources in Central Asia have been controlled so far.  
For these reasons, the revamp of the project in the 2000s has triggered an animated 
regional debate between Kyrgyzstan, which obviously advocates in favour of the dam, and 
the downstream countries – whose concerns are voiced predominantly by Uzbekistan – 
which, coherently with their attitude towards Rogun, strongly oppose the project. On the 
one hand, the Kyrgyz discourse tends to present the dam as an existential matter, claiming 
the right of exploiting the waters of the Naryn river for the benefit of the Kyrgyz people, 
underlining the absence of alternatives and reassuring the downstream countries that the 
dam will be operated paying attention to the interests of all basin riparians. On the other 
hand, the Uzbek discourse is analogous to that adopted for Rogun, and the two dams are 
often treated as a single entity by the Uzbeks, which insist on having an external 
examination of a project considered outdated and dangerous.  
Both sides have carried out a considerable effort to convince each other and the broader 
international community of the validity of their reasons. To this extent, the strategies 
carried out by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan can be correspondingly defined as counter-
hegemonic and hegemonic, with the former contesting a disadvantageous status-quo, and 
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the latter aiming at maintaining it unchanged. The following analyses in detail the counter-
hegemonic tactics carried out by Kyrgyzstan. 
 
5.3. Kyrgyz counter-hegemonic tactics 
In its attempt to build the Kambarata dam, Kyrgyzstan is challenging, contesting and 
proposing an alternative to the existing status-quo. As Dinar noted (2006: 150), the Kyrgyz 
Republic has already questioned the status-quo since it got independence, making a number 
of unilateral decisions (see also chapter 3) that stem from one strategic advantage: its 
upstream location in the Syr Darya river. Kyrgyzstan contests the old Soviet inter-
republican quotas which allocated most of the Syr Darya’s water to Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan (Valentini et al., 2004: 62), and the country also seeks compensation from the 
downstream countries for the annual cost of maintaining the Toktogul reservoir and its 
related infrastructure. This has led Kyrgyzstan’s policymakers to re-evaluate the value of 
water as a resource with a price (Bichsel, 2011: 26). In 1997, Akaev signed an edict 
codifying his country’s right to profit from water resources within its territories, threatening 
to sell water to China if Uzbekistan refuses to pay (Eurasianet, 2000). Similarly, in 2001, 
with the adoption of the “Law of the Kyrgyz Republic On Inter-State Use of Water Objects, 
Water Resources and Water Economy Constructions”, Kyrgyzstan categorized water as a 
commodity, placing it at the same level of oil or gas (Legislative Assembly of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, 2001). However, as it was explained in paragraph 3.6.2, the Kyrgyz water law 
was never enforced, and the issue of the rights of the upstream and downstream states 
remained unresolved (Hodgson, 2010: 3).  
Besides the water payment issue, Kyrgyzstan has also not been able to take advantage of 
its upstream position and tap its significant hydroelectric potential. The completion of 
Kambarata (that along with Rogun, would be the first major dam ever finalized in Central 
Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union) would imply the fulfilment, at least in part, of 
Kyrgyzstan’s hydropower ambitions, as well as the assertion of the country’s God-given 
right to make full use of the waters of the Naryn river. While laws can be unilaterally 
adopted (as the “water price” laws), the same cannot be said for dams of the size of 
Kambarata, for which a small country like Kyrgyzstan needs to get international support 
and funding before being able to proceed with its construction. Therefore, and similarly to 
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what was observed with Rogun, the GoK is using its ideational and bargaining power to 
persuade its neighbours and other relevant international partners of the necessity and 
rightfulness of the Kambarata project. This effort aimed at getting consent is solely based 
on the use of soft power which, in this case, can create the preconditions to increase 
Kyrgyzstan’s hard (or in this case perhaps more appropriately “structural”) power, once and 
if the dam is completed. 
Overall, the Kyrgyz strategy to facilitate the construction of Kambarata is based on three 
main goals: achieve regional, and to a minor extent, international acceptance for the project, 
mobilize foreign funds, and get internal support. As a result, the GoK has adopted two, 
often converging, discourses, one for the domestic and one for the foreign level. The 
Kyrgyz discourse presents Kambarata as a key achievement, as a symbol of success and 
perseverance, as a key structure conceived to bring well-being to both Kyrgyzstan and the 
downstream countries. And indeed, underlining the beneficial effects of Kambarata on 
regional water management, seems to be as important as stressing the positive impact that 
the dam will have on the Kyrgyz energy and water sectors. Also in this case, Kyrgyz 
counter-hegemonic strategies are formed by four main tactics, as shown in Figure 22. 
 
 
Figure 22: Building the Kambarata dam: the four tactics forming the Kyrgyz counter-hegemonic 
strategy 
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Although the tactics adopted by the GoK for Kambarata seem similar to those adopted 
by the GoT for Rogun, and in fact to many extents they are, there are some significant 
differences between the two, possibly because of the power shifts in the Kyrgyz republic 
that have not allowed the same policy continuity as in Tajikistan. These differences will be 
partly outlined in the remaining of this chapter and in Chapter 7. The following analyses 
Kyrgyz counter-hegemonic tactics in detail, delineating the main aspects of the Kambarata 
discourse and the ways in which it has been propagated. 
 
5.3.1. Promoting Kambarata at the domestic level 
As Frey noted, images and perceptions play a significant role in politics, and the 
emotional salience of large hydraulic infrastructures can be used by leaders to gain 
sacrifices and support that would otherwise be missing (Frey, 1993). This support, for 
instance, could take the form of financial contributions from the citizens (as in the case of 
the Rogun dam) or in the ability to freely allocate public funds to a project (as in the case of 
Turkey’s Ataturk dam). The Kyrgyz leadership has sought the support of its people in the 
realisation of Kambarata, framing the dam as a symbol of progress and modernization and 
as a solution to most of the problems faced by the country, and, above all, as a key to stop 
the energy crises that are at the origin of widespread discontent and public unrest. This 
move can be considered a counter-hegemonic strategy, since a popular perception of the 
dam as a vital national asset might facilitate its construction, providing the Kyrgyz 
leadership with legitimacy and a freehand in the management of the financial resources of 
Kambarata.  
While the effects of such major ventures are best observed in the long term, the latest 
Kyrgyz governments operated more in the short run. The Bakiev Presidency, that was the 
most involved with the project and with the management of the large Russian loan, held 
power only for a lustrum, while Otunbayeva’s ad interim mandate lasted less than two 
years. This sharply contrasts with the Tajik political setting in which Emomali Rahmon has 
maintained power for the last two decades, and where the President and his key men are the 
ones most likely to benefit from Rogun in terms of popularity and visibility. This 
notwithstanding, both under Bakiev and (to a lesser extent) Otunbayeva, the Kyrgyz 
government has used ideational discursive means to disseminate the Kambarata discourse 
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that, alike the Tajik one, portrays the dam as a vital achievement for the country. This 
seems indeed to confirm Feaux de la Croix’s (2010) assumption about a continuity between 
the construction of Toktogul – that symbolised the Soviet’s slogans on human’s mastery 
over nature – and that of Kambarata, that renews the patriotic feeling historically attached 
to large dams. And significantly, this quest for patriotism has been in a way 
institutionalised in 2008, when some members of the Kyrgyz Parliament announced that 
they were planning to ask the President to formerly label Kambarata an all-nation project, 
“so that people would have spirit and pride” in the dam”110 (AKIpress, 2008a).  
Kyrgyz state-owned radio, TV and the Kabar news agency have functioned as the 
mouthpiece of the government, duly reporting speeches and declarations on the importance 
of building Kambarata. The key aspects of this dam rhetoric are well summarized by a 
speech delivered by Bakiev at a meeting dedicated to a planned explosion aimed at 
blocking the River Naryn. The event was planned in coincidence with the “National holiday 
of energy industry workers” on 22 December 2009, and was integrally broadcasted by 
state-owned Kyrgyz Television 1:  
 
The explosion aimed at blocking the River Naryn was carried out successfully. I want to 
repeat this again that this is a great event in the history of Kyrgyzstan's development 
[…] and Kyrgyzstan can be proud of the fact that not only this kind of technology was 
used but also that it is a rare technology in the world. Its construction [of the Kambarata 
complex] started in 1986. However, even such a power as the USSR was forced to 
suspend the construction because of limited funds. But after the Union collapsed, we 
became an independent sovereign state. Frankly speaking, this was already a dream, and 
many top officials forgot and did not dream that we together with you would not only 
construct but complete its construction. Today I think nobody doubts that Kyrgyzstan 
will complete [the construction of] the Kambarata 2 and Kambarata 1 and this way we 
will go upstream along the River Naryn. (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009g) 
 
Bakiev presents the dam as the most viable and only option to achieve energy security, 
underlining the absence of alternatives. He emphasizes the beneficial effects that the dam 
will have on Kyrgyzstan and on irrigated agriculture downstream, and at the same time he 
remarks the right of the Kyrgyz people to use the water of the Naryn river for their greater 
good, thus connecting with the conception of water as a national commodity. Bakiev also 
underlines how the project deploys some state-of-the-art technology, and exalts the 
                                                     
110
 In that occasion, the MPs also declared that they were going to contribute to the project with a one-off 
payment from their salary. 
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significance for independent Kyrgyzstan of finishing something that not even the Soviet 
Union was able to complete.  
Kyrgyzstan’s right to build Kambarata and the representation of the dam as a symbol of 
national pride was extensively used by Bakiev also during his re-election campaign in 
2009:  
 
With the completion of the construction of Kambarata No.2 and No.1, the volume of 
water [in the Toktogul reservoir] will not decrease, but on the contrary it will increase. 
[…] To be frank, our neighbours - Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan - should only welcome 
our decision because we are increasing the volume of water. This means, we will give 
them water when they need it. Kyrgyzstan must not be considered a small nation when 
the Kyrgyz nation's national interests are considered. Therefore, the Kambarata No.1 
and No.2 projects will have no damage on the neighbouring states. […] Therefore, we 
are building Kambarata No.2 and we will also build Kambarata No.1. We need them. 
(BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009h) 
 
Kyrgyzstan is portrayed as a benevolent country, that thanks to Kambarata will be able 
to take care of its national interests while sharing with its neighbours the benefits stemming 
from an increased control of the Toktogul reservoir. The representation of Kambarata as a 
cooperative regional element that will help solving the country’s energy crisis while 
regulating the water flow of the Syr Darya, was also adopted by Roza Otunbayeva during 
her ad-interim Presidency, even though when she was a MP she appeared less enthusiastic 
towards the realisation of the project and she often criticised the management of the 
financial resources generated by the Russian loan (see paragraph 5.1). Thus, it appears that 
although Kyrgyz citizens have not been called to financially contribute to the construction 
of the dam
111
, the GoK has nevertheless created a patriotic dam rhetoric with the intent of 
persuading its people about the necessity and importance of building the Kambarata dam.  
A similar discourse, although more focused on the regional dimension of the dam, was 
also disseminated at the international level, with the goal of mobilising international 
financial resources and getting international acceptance for the project. These two 
correlated elements of the Kyrgyz counter-hegemonic strategy are analysed in the 
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 It is worth noting that for what concerns the smaller Kambarata II, in 2008 the residents of the Suzak rayon 
collected 1 million Kyrgyz Som (roughly US$ 20,000) to facilitate the construction of the dam (AKIpress 
News Agency, 2008b). Also, in January 2008 Bakiev suggested the emission of long-term bonds and the 
launch of IPOs for large national projects such as Kambarata I and II, but however these proposals were not 
followed by concrete actions (Russia & CIS Business & Financial Daily, 2008).  
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following sections, beginning with the tactics aimed at mobilising financial resources and 
continuing with those aimed at raising international awareness on the necessity of building 
the Kambarata dam. 
 
5.3.2. Mobilization of financial resources 
As outlined in paragraph 5.1, the high cost of Kambarata does not allow the Kyrgyz 
government to unilaterally proceed with its construction. Recent cost estimates vary from 2 
to almost 5 US$ billion
112
, an enormous amount for the Kyrgyz economy, that in 2011 
generated a GDP of US$ 6.2 billion and whose expenditures in the national budget 
amounted to less than US$ 2 billion. The situation is thus similar to that of the Rogun dam, 
since a co-financing scheme is essential to proceed with the construction of the dam. This 
aspect is also connected with the necessity of getting international support and consent for 
the construction of the dam, since the more a project is controversial, the more this deters 
potential investors to participate in its realisation, as for instance it has been the case for 
Russian participation in the Rogun dam.  
As Erika Marat noted (Marat, 2008b: 12), Kyrgyzstan’s lack of expertise in the hydro-
energy sector and the country’s rampant corruption, have made of Kambarata an 
economically unattractive project to foreign investors. Moreover, and this applies to most 
large dams worldwide, projects of this scale are often anti-economical and their 
construction always takes longer than originally planned (McCully, 2001; Mitchell, 2002). 
The investment appears to be a political rather than an economic one, both for the Kyrgyz 
government, which would have a payback in terms of legitimization and popularity, and for 
the potential financial partner, which could sit on the board of the plant and have political 
influence while at the same time projecting a positive international image in the region. 
Although the World Bank could have been an ideal, neutral partner and contributor to the 
Kambarata complex, the financial institution argues that the economic cost of 0.0717 
US$/kwh is too high and is therefore not interested in a participation (Moller, 2009: 25). 
For this reason, the Kyrgyz government has focused its attention on individual donors, 
targeting, among the others, neighbouring Russia and Kazakhstan. 
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 Although the Kyrgyz Ministry of Industry, Energy and Fuel Resources estimated in 2008 that the 
construction of the Kambarata dam will require US$ 1.5 billion (AKIpress News Agency, 2008a). 
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5.3.2.1. The international consortium and the involvement of Kazakhstan 
In 1992, the newly-born Kyrgyz government held talks with the American company 
General Electric concerning the construction of a dam complex in the Naryn River (Europe 
Information Service, 1992). Nevertheless, after this first, early attempt of attracting a 
foreign investor, the Kyrgyz administration put the project aside for the next ten years, and 
seriously decided to revamp it only in 2003. Overall, besides the signing of a few, 
ineffective, agreements with China (Central Asia & Caucasus Business Weekly, 2008), the 
American aluminium company Alcoa (Central Asia General Newswire, 2007a), and the 
South-Korean electric power corporation KEPCO (Central Asia General Newswire, 
2007b), it appears that the efforts put through by the Kyrgyz government had two main 
objectives: at the multilateral level, to set-up a joint venture to build the Kambarata 
complex; at the bilateral level, to secure a more direct, individual involvement of Russia. 
While the former did not produce any substantial result, the latter materialized into a 
substantial loan.  
The initial structure of the consortium proposed by Akaev in 2003 included Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia and even the World Bank (Water Power & 
Dam Construction, 2003). Thus, besides Turkmenistan, which traditionally has had a rather 
isolationist approach to regional issues, all the Central Asian republics were interested in 
building the Kambarata dam, which was at the time perceived as a regionally beneficial 
water project. The idea was reiterated one year later by the then Kyrgyz Foreign Minister 
Askar Aytmatov, that expressed his country’s willingness to create an 
international water and energy consortium within the framework of the Central Asian 
Cooperation Organization (CACO), with the involvement of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2004b). The consortium 
was apparently put aside until 2007, when the Kyrgyz First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar 
Usenov, announced that since power engineering is considered Kyrgyzstan's second wealth 
after gold, the Kambarata project had been included in the state economic development 
programme. The partners of this new, reconsidered joint-venture were reduced to three, 
with Kyrgyzstan, that would have owned 34 % of the shares, and Russia and Kazakhstan 33 
% each (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2007b). And a month later, as an outcome of 
Nazarbayev's visit to Kyrgyzstan, a joint venture involving state-owned companies from 
 150 
 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Russia was established, with the intent of finishing 
construction of the Kambarata complex (Eurasianet, 2007b). However, the projected joint 
venture never became operational, as Kazakh investors eventually decided to abandon the 
scheme.  
Indeed, the Kazakh government’s fluctuating attitude towards the Kambarata dam, has 
influenced the country’s willingness to invest in the project. In 2000, Kazakh Prime 
Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev expressed serious concern about the dam and proposed 
that the project should be “blocked in every way”, since it could lead to water being drawn 
away from the Toktogul hydroelectric station thus reducing water supplies in Kazakhstan 
(BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2000). Subsequently, in the period 2003-2007 Astana 
showed interest in investing into the Kambarata dam, as revealed by the abovementioned 
creation of a consortium and by the Kazakh announcement to bid in the tender for the 
Kambarata stations (Global Insight, 2007b). Then again, when Uzbek lobbying against 
large dams intensified in 2008, the Kazakh government became more cautious about the 
project and decided to leave the consortium, and eventually Kazakh President Nazarbayev 
released a statement in which he was extremely critical about the construction of 
hydroelectric power plants in the region (Defense and Security, 2010). Hence, the attitude 
of Kazakhstan towards the realisation of the Kambarata dam has followed a parallel path as 
that towards the Rogun dam, and the interest displayed formerly gradually vanished as the 
projects became more controversial. Thus, only one out of the six partners of the initial 
consortium remained actively engaged in the negotiations, Russia. 
 
5.3.2.2. The Russian loan and the Manas affair 
It was mentioned that the Soviet Union contributed to the construction of numerous 
large HPPs within its Republics and around the world. Similarly, the Russian Federation 
has also been very interested in investments in hydropower, and during the last two decades 
Russian firms (among the others, RusAl, RusHydro and Zarubezhstroy
113
) have participated 
to several hydropower projects worldwide. It is not surprising then, that an unfinished 
Soviet project like the Kambarata dam has later attracted investments from Russia, in the 
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 For instance, Zarubezhstroy, that controls power plants in African countries such as Uganda and Libya, in 
2011 has agreed to invest US$ 700 million in the 464 MW Rumakali hydropower project in Tanzania 
(Bloomberg, 2011). 
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same way as the Rogun dam has done in Tajikistan. This is also due to the fact that, besides 
attempting to create an international consortium, the Kyrgyz government has repeatedly 
tried to involve Russia as the sole investor of the Kambarata project, with overall mixed 
results. 
Already in 2004, Askar Akaev reached an agreement in which RusAl confirmed its 
intention to invest US$ 1.5 billion in the Kambarata power station (BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 2004c). A year later, in the aftermath of the Tulip Revolution, Kyrgyz 
acting Foreign Minister Roza Otunbayeva declared that the agreement with RusAl was still 
in force, since “projects for the construction of the Kambaratin [sic] hydropower plant are 
of great significance for our country” (Interfax, 2005). Nevertheless, the situation remained 
fuzzy and the project was at a standstill. The newly elected President Bakiev had meetings 
with representatives of the Russian government trying to get them interested in the dam 
(Ria Novosti, 2006), and in 2007 Russia partially wrote off Kyrgyzstan's debt, showing 
again interest in the project. Then, at the end of 2008, the Kyrgyz Prime Minister Igor 
Chudinov announced that Russia finally agreed to lend US$ 2 billion to the Kyrgyz 
government, including US$ 1.7 billion for the construction of Kambarata I and II 
(AKIpress, 2008b). And indeed, during a visit to Moscow in February 2009 Bakiev 
announced that the loan was secured. Interestingly, this event coincided with Kyrgyzstan’s 
announcement that the United States should leave the Manas airbase (Emerson et al., 2009: 
58), a strategic military airport near Bishkek that the US Air Force had rented to support the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and whose military presence in Russia’s backyard had long 
vexed the Kremlin.  
Using Manas as a bargaining tool, Bakiev struck a quid pro quo deal that was, 
predictably, received with dissatisfaction by Uzbek President Karimov, that was possibly 
also taken by surprise by this new development. Only a few weeks earlier, in fact, Dmitry 
Medvedev had clarified during his visit to Uzbekistan that new HPPs in Central Asia shall 
be built only with the consent of all parties involved, thus causing a little diplomatic crisis 
with Tajikistan (see Chapter 4). Now, on the contrary, Russia was endorsing and facilitating 
the realisation of the Kambarata project, since the offset was worth the cost. Therefore, 
during the important IFAS meeting of the five Central Asian Presidents in April 2009, 
Karimov criticised Moscow’s influence on regional issues, declaring that “third countries 
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which would very much like to take part in this discussion are also pursuing their own 
aims” (Eurasianet, 2009). 
However, the Uzbek President could stop worrying shortly afterwards, since Bakiev did 
not manage to close the American air base at Manas. On the contrary, in July 2009 the US 
signed a new lease for Manas that was much more profitable for the Kyrgyz government. 
This new development infuriated the Russian leadership, that suddenly interrupted the 
credit line, de facto cancelling the deal. The Kyrgyz government did not return the money 
already received, and shortly before the overthrow of the Bakiyev regime in April 2010, 
Kyrgyz representatives were still complaining that Russia had failed to deliver the loan 
promised for Kambarata (International Crisis Group, 2010). One of the first initiatives of 
the new Otunbayeva government was to send the then ad-interim Prime Minister 
Atambayev to Moscow, to discuss several issues including the Kambarata credit (Kraak, 
2012: 192). But after the disappointment provoked by the Manas lease, the possibility of 
having Russia investing in the Kambarata project seems unlikely, unless until trust is 
restored. 
 
5.3.3. International support 
It appears then, that despite the attempts that the GoK has carried out to attract investors 
to the project, regional controversies and geopolitical manoeuvrings have so far made these 
efforts ineffective. This has increased the necessity of giving visibility to the project, 
getting international support and consent to its construction, and projecting a positive 
international image of the Kambarata dam, since this could make the dam less contentious 
and facilitate its realisation. In a similar way to the Rogun dam, persuading regional and 
international partners of the necessity of building the Kambarata dam for the wellbeing of 
all Central Asian countries constitutes a key element of Kyrgyz counter-hegemonic 
strategies.  
The Kyrgyz government has used ideational means to disseminate and attempt to impose 
its discourse as the dominant one. What is being questioned here is the prevailing belief that 
no new HPPs can be built in the Aral Sea basin, and implicitly, that water cannot be used as 
a commodity. While the latter point had been already challenged by unilaterally adopting 
(and later cancelling) a national law that declared water a commodity, the former cannot be 
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contested in a similar manner. Besides the fact that, as reminded by Karimov, the 
construction of the Kambarata dam without the agreement of all the parties involved could 
lead to serious confrontations and even wars (Reuters, 2012), the GoK does not have the 
means to unilaterally proceed with the realisation of the project. This calls for more subtle, 
diplomatic tactics that could change the perception of large dams as potentially harmful and 
deleterious. The following analyses how the Kyrgyz government has framed the Kambarata 
dam at the international level, illustrating the various tactics adopted to portray it as a 
positive and cooperative regional project.  
 
5.3.3.1. Proactive diplomacy 
The basic tenet of the Kyrgyz discourse on Kambarata is that the dam will enable 
Kyrgyzstan to solve its frequent energy crises while better regulating the water flow of the 
Syr Darya. Downstream Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will be able to increase their irrigated 
land, and will no longer suffer from winter flooding thanks to the combined operation of 
the Kambarata and Toktogul reservoirs. Such discourse is almost identical to the Tajik one 
on Rogun, which also underscores the positive effects that the dam will have on the energy 
sector of Tajikistan and on downstream irrigation thanks to the combined operation with 
the Nurek reservoir. What differs, though, is the emphasis with which this discourse has 
been disseminated by the governments of the two upstream Central Asian republics. If, on 
the one hand, the Tajik leadership has made of the Rogun dam one of the key priority areas 
of its foreign policy, on the other hand, the Kyrgyz government has been more moderate in 
executing its international Kambarata campaign. Arguably, other more pressing matters 
such as the 2005 and 2010 changes of government, made it difficult for the Kyrgyz 
government to engage in an all-round Kambarata campaign.  
Therefore, the process aimed at getting international support for the Kambarata dam is 
formed by a series of distinct events, rather than by a long-term awareness-raising strategy. 
For instance, if we examine the content of the addresses delivered by Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan at the UNGA (see Table 7), what emerges is that the Kyrgyz government has 
never referred neither to the Kambarata dam nor to the development of its hydroelectric 
potential, while on the contrary, the Uzbek government – the key antagonist of the project – 
has done this several times. 
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Table 7: Content of the addresses delivered at the UNGA by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, 1999-2012. 
“Water”, “Hydroelectric” and “Kambarata” respectively mean that issues related to the management 
of shared waters, the development of hydroelectric infrastructures and the Kambarata dam were 
discussed in the address. Table constructed by author based on data from the United Nations 
Bibliographic Information System (http://unbisnet.un.org/). 
 Content of the Kyrgyz Address Content of the Uzbek address 
UNGA 
session no. 
and year 
Water Hydroelectric Kambarata Water Hydroelectric Kambarata 
54th, 1999 
      
55th, 2000 
      
56th, 2001 
      
57th, 2002 
      
58th, 2003 
      
59th, 2004 
      
60th, 2005 
        
61st, 2006 
      
62nd, 2007 
      
63rd, 2008       
64th, 2009       
65th, 2010 
      
66th, 2011 
      
67th, 2012 
      
 
 
Only in three occasions (Bakiev, 2005; Dosbol, 2008; Chudinov, 2009), the 
representatives of the Kyrgyz government have outlined the necessity to manage regional 
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transboundary water resources in a cooperative and a mutually beneficial manner
114
. This 
has also been the case for the OSCE Ministerial Council meetings, where only once, in 
2007, Kyrgyzstan stressed the need to cooperate in the management of natural resources, 
which “should not become enemies of the state which possesses them” (Karabaev, 2007).  
Yet, regional water issues in Central Asia were extensively debated at the 2009 World 
Water Forum in Istanbul. During his address, the Kyrgyz Prime Minister Igor Chudinov 
offered a comprehensive overview of the Kyrgyz framing of the Kambarata project, 
highlighting how the dam could be the best possible solution to solve water and energy 
problems in Central Asia: 
 
At present time, the Kyrgyz Republic explored only 10% of existing hydro potential. 
For the last years our state has been using 8,0-9,0 km³ of water resources per year for 
own needs. The rest of water course – more than 30, 0 km³ of water resources goes to 
the territory of neighboring countries. […] Kyrgyzstan believes necessary to consider 
water problem in direct connection with energetic, as supply of population with 
electricity and heating at the cost of functioning of hydropower plant is vitally 
important condition for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well as water supply for 
agricultural needs of downstream countries. […] By putting these [Kambarata I and II] 
water reservoir into operation, needs in electric energy of the republic will be fully 
satisfied and it will let work Toktogul hydro juncture in optimal regime, in which 
downstream countries are concerned. (Chudinov, 2009)  
  
Chudinov’s declaration essentially retraced the concepts outlined by Kurmanbek Bakiev 
at the tense IFAS meeting held in Almaty a few months earlier. Also in that occasion, the 
Kyrgyz President remarked how the Kambarata project could satisfy his country’s energy 
needs while better regulating the water flow for downstream countries (Bakiev, 2009). 
What is striking in this case is that in spite of the fact that the Almaty gathering had been 
organised to exclusively discuss issues related to the Aral Sea, Bakiev centred his statement 
on the Kambarata dam, an issue that should have remained off-limits. Such unexpected 
development distressed Uzbek President Karimov, and led Nursultan Nazarbayev to rebuke 
his Kyrgyz counterpart for his undisciplined behaviour
115
 (BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
                                                     
114
 Interestingly, while Tajikistan portrayed itself as a “water country” promoting several UN initiatives such 
as the “Year of Fresh Water” or the decade “Water for Life”, Kyrgyzstan has put forward a somewhat similar  
effort to create the image of a “mountain country”. For instance, in 2000 the country supported the FAO 
initiative “International Year of the Mountains” (Ibraimova, 2000), and in 2007, the then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Ednan Karabaev put forward an initiative to organise in Kyrgyzstan the “Second Mountain Global 
Summit” (Karabaev, 2007). 
115
 A month later, Bakiyev challenged once more the downstream countries declaring that both phases of the 
Kambarata project will be built, regardless of those who do not agree with this (Eurasianet.org, 2009a). 
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Unit, 2009i). Bakiev’s move is significant, because it challenges the non-written rule that 
has kept topics such as the revision of water allocation and the construction of large HPPs 
out of multilateral discussions between the Central Asian Presidents. This is mostly due to 
Uzbekistan’s emblematic use of bargaining power, that has allowed Tashkent to keep water 
allocation unchanged after the collapse of the Soviet Union by preventively leaving the 
issue of their revision out of the regional political agenda.  
Underlining the beneficial effects that the project will have in regulating the water flow 
of the Syr Darya appears to be a recurring element in the Kyrgyz framing of the Kambarata 
dam. This is relevant, because if downstream countries are persuaded of the veracity of this 
assertion, they could possibly change their attitude towards the project. One of the keys to 
make this discourse convincing and get consent, is to back such assumption with 
authoritative scientific opinions. This dimension of Kyrgyz counter-hegemonic tactics, the 
construction of knowledge, is analysed in the following paragraph.  
 
5.3.4. Knowledge construction 
As outlined in Chapter 4, knowledge construction can be considered both a hegemonic 
and a counter-hegemonic strategy. This is because expertise-based knowledge may serve to 
establish a dominant belief, but also to challenge it. For what concerns the Kambarata dam, 
the Kyrgyz government contests the Uzbek belief that the dam will lead to a decrease in the 
volume of water flowing downstream. To this extent, the scientific knowledge held up and 
disseminated by the Kyrgyz government is almost identical to that maintained by the Tajik 
government and, overall, by most upstream countries when it comes to building a large dam 
(Molle et al., 2009): the dam will lead to a better regulation of the water flow while also 
allowing an increase in the irrigated land. Such assumption is at the base of each of the 
counter-hegemonic tactics carried out by the Kyrgyz government, because it constitutes the 
central message embedded in each of them. A convincing and respected expertise-based 
knowledge is a primary prerequisite to successfully persuade regional and international 
actors of the credibility of Kyrgyz assertions. Besides being a counter-hegemonic strategy 
in itself, knowledge construction can be arguably considered a broader underlying 
fundamental for the deployment of ideational power.  
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However, Kyrgyzstan’s lack of expertise in the hydro-energy sector116 (Marat, 2008b; 
UNDP Bureau for Europe and CIS, 2011) did not facilitate the creation and dissemination 
of expertise-based knowledge in support of the Kambarata dam, leading the Kyrgyz 
government to back its statements with external expertise. For instance, the 2004 World 
Bank report “Water Energy Nexus in Central Asia: improving regional cooperation in the 
Syr Darya Basin”, has been frequently used by representatives of the Kyrgyz government 
as a source of authoritative knowledge, although the report only dedicated a few and far 
from enthusiastic lines to the Kambarata complex: 
 
Long-term structural options like the construction of new storage hydroelectric projects 
Kambarata I (1900 MW) and Kambarata II (360 MW) at an estimated cost of $1.5 
billion upstream of the Toktogul HPP in the Kyrgyz Republic could increase winter 
power generation without increasing winter discharges. These projects, however, would 
also substantially increase summer power output and markets for the surplus power 
have to be found. The projects have to be shown to be the least cost solution to the 
Kyrgyz power needs and may have to be jointly owned by all relevant riparian countries 
as well as by other potential buyers of power to enable water sharing and power 
purchase agreements and to raise funds by spreading the external debt burden among 
the many owners. (The World Bank, 2004: vi) 
 
Yet, at the abovementioned IFAS meeting Bakiev remarked how the report released by 
the “authoritative financial institution” wholeheartedly supported the Kambarata project, 
since the dam would allow Kyrgyzstan to increase winter power generation without 
increasing winter discharges of water (Bakiev, 2009). In other occasions, the Kyrgyz 
leadership and state-owned press have disseminated the opinions of Ibrahim Aliyev, a 
former director general of the company “Naryngidrostroy”. A Kyrgyz veteran of the sector, 
Aliyev presents the realisation of the project as a pressing need for Kyrgyzstan, that will 
allow the production of precious hydroelectricity while better regulating the operation of 
the Toktogul reservoir. The opinions of Uzbek scientists are considered unfounded, since 
they do not have a sufficient amount of knowledge to discuss the issue (Kabar Analitika, 
2011). On a more conciliatory tone, this thesis was sustained by the Kyrgyz Minister of 
Energy and Industry Avtandil Kalmambetov (Kabar, 2011; The European Times, 2011), 
                                                     
116
 Driven by the necessity of increasing his country’s know-how, in 2007 Bakiev put forward an initiative to 
set up in Bishkek an international water management academy (in some documents also referred to as the 
“Water University of Central Asia”), with the declared aim of training highly skilled specialists in the field 
(BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2007a). At the time of writing, however, the Academy is yet to be 
established. 
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and by the then Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 
2010f), that also proposed to Uzbekistan the realisation of a feasibility study of Kambarata 
led by a team of experts from Kyrgyzstan.  
 
5.4. Conclusions 
Just like regional relations in Central Asia have had three different and evolving phases 
in the period 1991-2011, also the recent history of the Kambarata project has been marked 
by three succeeding periods, that correspond to the leadership changes in Kyrgyzstan. 
Although Akaev supported the project, it was certainly under Bakiev that the Kambarata 
dam gained more prominence and its realisation became a national priority. After that, the 
ad-interim Presidency of Roza Otunbayeva has been too brief and transitory to really 
delineate a strategy towards the project, although also in this period the dam was presented 
as a cooperative regional project that could help solving the country’s frequent energy 
crises while regulating the water flow of the Syr Darya. 
But to what extent were the Kyrgyz counter-hegemonic tactics successful? Despite 
frequent negotiations with potential investors, regional controversies and geopolitical 
manoeuvrings have so far made these efforts ineffective. Moreover, the Kambarata dam did 
not gain an international visibility comparable with other similar projects such as the Rogun 
dam. Overall, the Kyrgyz strategy lacked the continuity that seems necessary to 
successfully contest the status-quo and impose a new dominant discourse. The possibility 
of expressing dissent inside the Parliament and abrupt government changes in 2005 and 
2010, did not allow the Kyrgyz leadership to engage in an all-round Kambarata campaign. 
The same does not apply to the Uzbek government, that placed its anti-dam campaign 
among the priority areas of its foreign policy. The following chapter illustrates in detail 
how Uzbekistan used its power to maintain the status-quo unchanged and hamper the 
constructions of large dams in Central Asia. 
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Chapter 6. Uzbek hegemonic tactics 
 
Water resources could become a problem in the future that could escalate 
tensions not only in our region, but on every continent. I won't name specific 
countries, but all of this could deteriorate to the point where not just serious 
confrontation, but even wars could be the result.  
Islam Karimov, 2012 
 
 
 
Following the analysis of the counter-hegemonic tactics utilised by Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, this chapter outlines and categorizes the hegemonic tactics put in place by the 
Uzbek government to impede the construction of the Rogun and Kambarata dams. This 
concludes the analysis of how state power has been wielded in Central Asia to favour and 
obstruct the revitalisation of these two large hydroelectric projects, and outlines the full 
picture of the regional debate that they have generated. 
This chapter first briefly recapitulates on why Uzbek measures can be considered 
hegemonic, and later analyses them in greater detail. Since the Uzbek government tends to 
consider the Rogun and Kambarata dams as a nearly unique entity, such approach is also 
adopted in this analysis, that will thus merge the hegemonic tactics aimed at hampering the 
construction of both dams in a single chapter. Unlike Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the actions 
carried out by Uzbekistan are not limited by spatial boundaries, as rather than being about a 
dam, they are more related to the notion of power and how to maintain it.  
 
6.1. Perceiving a threat 
The Aral Sea basin denotes a competitive hydro-hegemonic setting, marked by a 
contested control of water resources and a dominative form of hydro hegemony exerted by 
Uzbekistan that, as outlined in the previous chapters, can be considered the hydro-hegemon 
in both the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya basins. In a competitive hydro-hegemonic 
setting, disputants consider the resources under negotiations as limited, and parties take a 
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position and seek power and control (Jarvis and Wolf, 2010: 129). While this hydro-
hegemony might be not particularly clear in absolute terms (Wegerich, 2008; Bernauer and 
Siegfried, 2012), or in comparison with other river basins where the hydro-hegemon 
appears stronger (e.g. Turkey in the Tigris-Euphrates basin), it is nevertheless rather 
evident in relation to the two upstream countries, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, that also 
happen to be the poorer and less developed among the five Central Asian countries. At the 
regional level, Uzbekistan has been by far the most vocal opponent of the construction of 
large hydroelectric plants upstream, and has so far managed to impede or slow down their 
realisation. Uzbekistan has also maintained the consolidated control it has over water 
resources, keeping unchanged its advantageous water allocation after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, thus continuing to practice the water-intensive cotton monoculture, whose 
income is needed by the Uzbek political elites to support the existing system of social, 
political, and economic control (Weinthal, 2006). Additionally, since both Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan depend from Uzbekistan for their imports of natural gas, Tashkent uses the 
situation to gain leverage on the countries, imposing high purchase prices and 
uncompromising payment deadlines, and frequently cutting gas supplies, causing several 
serious energy crises (Fumagalli, 2008).  
It was also outlined that, over the last two decades, the incompatibility between water 
demands of irrigation and hydropower gave rise to a tense confrontation between the 
upstream and downstream republics on the use and control of the region’s water resources 
(Bohr, 2004). Central Asian leaders tend to portray water as an almost non-negotiable 
matter, using Islam and its precepts on water (see paragraph 3.2.1) to justify and legitimise 
their views on how the resource should be used and shared. The Uzbek President Islam 
Karimov perceives the development of hydraulic infrastructures upstream as an existential 
threat to the well-being of his country, and opposes these projects vehemently. In this 
context, Tajikistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s flagship water resources development projects, the 
Rogun and Kambarata dams, have crystallised the upstream-downstream tensions over the 
differing preference of water use. Their construction could entail an irreversible change in 
the status-quo that the Uzbek government wants to maintain unchanged.  
Although the two projects are not identical, their many points in common and the nature 
of the threat perceived, led the Government of Uzbekistan (GoU) to treat them as a single 
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entity. The Uzbek counter-arguments concerning their realisation are essentially three. 
First, due to the seismicity of the area where they are located, the likely event of a major 
earthquake could lead to one of the worst man-made catastrophes in history. Second, during 
the time necessary to fill the two water reservoirs there will be a reduction in the amount of 
water flowing to Uzbekistan. Third, the impact of these two outdated Soviet projects should 
be assessed by a UN-backed impartial study carried out by a team of international experts. 
These are the three contentions forming the Uzbek discourse, that is projected both at the 
international and domestic level and is disseminated through speeches at international 
forums, the active criticism of the dams in various settings and the engagement of regional 
heavyweights such as Russia or Kazakhstan. Uzbek hegemonic strategies – which are based 
on ideational, bargaining and also hard power – are formed by five main tactics, as shown 
in Figure 23.  
Although these tactics may appear similar to those used by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
there are two important differences. The first is that the Uzbek government, unlike its 
antagonists, has also used its hard power (see paragraph 6.5) to defend its interests. This 
can perhaps be explained considering the dominant position (and the stronger military 
capabilities) that Uzbekistan has in respect to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, that can serve as a 
deterrent for unilateral and harmful actions that the upstream countries might want to take. 
The second and more important difference lies in the basic goal pursued by Uzbekistan, 
that is to maintain hegemony and not to counter it. The dominant position broadens the 
scope and range of opportunities available to the hegemon, that can reassert and consolidate 
its interests while eroding those of the hegemonised. 
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Figure 23: Wielding power: the five tactics forming the Uzbek hegemonic strategy 
 
These five areas of action represent the domains in which the Uzbek government is 
wielding its power. The basic goal that is being pursued is to maintain the status-quo 
unchanged. This implies the avoidance of changes in water allocation or in the way water is 
used and shared. While the Uzbek government can do little to control events such as 
population growth and climate change that might sooner or later impact the Central Asia’s 
rivers and consequently change the status-quo (Hodgson, 2010), some other events such as 
the construction of large dams can be more easily controlled or contested. The following 
analyses the five elements of the Uzbek hegemonic strategy in detail, outlining the main 
aspects of the Uzbek anti-dam discourse and the ways in which it has been propagated. 
 
6.2. Seeking international support  
International support
117
 is of paramount importance to effectively impede the realisation 
of Rogun and Kambarata, since having powerful friends can be a very efficient source of 
                                                     
117
 It is worth mentioning that also at the domestic level the Uzbek government has extensively used its 
official newspapers and TV channels to discredit the two dams, and especially Rogun and the Tajik 
government, possibly because of the particularly tense relationship between the Tajik and the Uzbek 
governments and their two presidents. For instance, the widely diffused newspaper Narodnoe Slovo has 
repeatedly reiterated the need for an external expert examination of Rogun (BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
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power (Warner and Zeitoun, 2006). This aspect seems of particular relevance, because it 
allows observing how the Uzbek government is using ideational and discursive means to 
persuade the international community of the validity of its ideas concerning the 
construction of hydroelectric plants, with the final goal of getting consent and imposing its 
views as the hegemonic also at the international level. Before it was challenged by 
Tajikistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s alternative discourses, the Uzbek sanctioned discourse – as it 
is the discourse endorsed by the more powerful side – was also the one heard more often at 
the international level. The new setting led the Uzbek government to intensify its efforts 
and to act mostly in reaction to Tajik and Kyrgyz plans. Overall, the three countries have 
shown little disposition to discuss solutions that would be acceptable to all, and the already 
acrimonious debate has been further harshened by the GoU’s unaccommodating attitude 
and harsh tones. 
 
6.2.1. Reactive diplomacy  
The nearly contemporary revitalisation of the Rogun and Kambarata projects in the 
2000s caused the almost immediate reaction of the Uzbek government, which based its 
international support strategy on what was being said and done by the Kyrgyz and the Tajik 
government. Table 8 – that compares the content of the addresses delivered by the three 
countries at the UNGA in the period 1999-2012 – clearly shows how, starting in 2005, the 
Uzbek government introduced water and hydroelectric issues in its speeches. This coincides 
with the moment in which Tajikistan started to raise awareness on the necessity to develop 
its hydroelectric potential, and more in general, with the disclosure of the upstream 
countries’ hydroelectric ambitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
Unit, 2010d), warning on the potential catastrophic effects of the dam and defining it – along with the 
Kambarata dam – a “source of misery and poverty” (Narodnoe Slovo, 2012) . Also, in a report broadcasted by 
Uzbek TV, the Tajik government was accused of spreading lies on Rogun to damage the friendship between 
the Uzbek and Tajik peoples (Eurasianet.org, 2010b). 
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Table 8: Content of the addresses delivered at the UNGA by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
1999-2012. “Water”, “Hydroelectric” and “Kambarata” and “Rogun” respectively mean that issues 
related to the management of shared waters, the development of hydroelectric infrastructures and the 
Kambarata and the Rogun dams were discussed in the address. Table constructed by author based on 
data from the United Nations Bibliographic Information System (http://unbisnet.un.org/). 
 UZBEKISTAN TAJIKISTAN KYRGYZSTAN 
UNGA session 
no. and year 
Water Hydro K*/R** Water Hydro R Water Hydro K 
54th, 1999 
      
   
55th, 2000 
      
   
56th, 2001 
      
   
57th, 2002 
      
   
58th, 2003 
      
   
59th, 2004 
      
   
60th, 2005          
  
61st, 2006        
  
62nd, 2007        
  
63rd, 2008        
  
64th, 2009        
  
65th, 2010       
   
66th, 2011       
   
67th, 2012       
   
* Kambarata dam; ** Rogun dam. 
 
However, the Uzbek anti-dam international campaign took off in 2007, mostly as a 
result of tensions with Tajikistan. As a forerunner of the upcoming conflict, in February 
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2007, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the Uzbek Prime Minister, wrote an open letter
118
 to his Tajik 
counterpart, Akil Akilov, in which he asked to submit Rogun to “a detailed and 
independent examination, since it was designed about 40 years ago on the basis of outdated 
designing, engineering and technological decisions”, and accused the GoT of “full 
ignorance” for not having thought about the possible consequences of the project 
(Mirziyoyev, 2007). Playing the card of international support, Mirziyoyev also informs 
Akilov that the Uzbek view on the dam is supported by organizations such as “the United 
Nations, European Union, World, Asian and Islamic development banks
119
, as well as the 
Russian Federation and its public circles, as well as other countries”, warning the GoT that 
Uzbekistan will not hesitate to ask support to these organizations in case its request for an 
external examination is ignored
120
. 
A few months later, at the 62
nd
 UNGA, the Uzbek Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov 
introduced what would be a recurring element in the Uzbek anti-dam rhetoric, the recourse 
to international law. Quoting the 1991 UN Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection 
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and the 1997 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Norov 
notes that “States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, 
mutual benefit and good faith”, reminding to Tajikistan and to the countries interested in 
investing in Rogun, that according to these legal instruments the impact of any 
hydroelectric project should be assessed by a team of international experts (Norov, 2007). 
Uzbek tones harshened at the 64
th
 UNGA, when Norov accused the Tajik and the Kyrgyz 
governments of carrying on an active manipulation of the public opinion to attract 
investments for Rogun and Kambarata, ignoring the shrinking of Central Asian glaciers and 
the seismicity of the area. In addition, Norov made reference to the recent [August 2009] 
                                                     
118
 The letter was originally published in Russian in the Uzbek national newspaper Pravda Vostoka, and 
subsequently translated into English by the Uzbek information agency Jahon and published in all Uzbek 
embassies’ websites. 
119 
Uzbekistan evidenced the World Bank support also before the important IFAS (International Fund for 
Saving the Aral Sea) meeting of the Central Asian Presidents in 2009. In that occasion, the Uzbek newspaper 
Pravda Vostoka published a letter in which Robert Zoellick, the President of the World Bank, shared Uzbek 
“concern regarding the delicate ecological balance of the region, and absolute necessity to ensure that the 
hydropower potential will not lead to a reduction of runoff water volume in states of the lower reaches, as 
well as the need to consider design of new buildings in seismic zones” (Akipress News Agency, 2009). 
120
 The epistolary dispute on Rogun continued also in 2010, with yet another exchange of bitter letters 
between Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Akil Akilov.  
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accident at the Russian hydroelectric power station Sayano–Shushenskaya, to express 
concern that a similar event could happen at the Rogun and Kambarata sites, thus leaving 
the people of Uzbekistan without water (Norov, 2009a). A similar warning was also given 
by Uzbek President Islam Karimov during his address at the Plenary Session of the UN 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Summit in 2010
121
:  
 
It is necessary to take into consideration that the area around the Aral Sea is supplied 
with water at the expense of the watercourses of the two main rivers - Arnudarya and 
Syrdarya, and any decrease of the watercourse of these rivers means a radical 
disturbance of the existing fragile environmental balance in the entire vast region. And 
in these conditions any attempts to implement projects drafted 30-40 years ago, yet in 
the Soviet period, to construct in the upper stream of these rivers the large scale 
hydropower facilities with gigantic dams, and moreover, if to take into account that the 
seismicity of the area of forthcoming construction makes up 8-9 points, - all of these 
may inflict an irreparable damage to environment and will be a reason for the most 
dangerous man-caused catastrophes which we have been witnessing for over the last 
years. (Karimov, 2010) 
 
These three points – the request for an external evaluation of the project, the necessity to 
take into account the interests of all countries in the basin according to the 1992 and 1997 
UN conventions and the fact that the construction of giant hydro facilities in Central Asia is 
counterproductive and dangerous – were also the core of the address delivered by the GoU 
at the 66
th
 (Ganiev, 2011) and 67
th
 (Kamilov 2012) UNGAs, confirming the high priority 
that the country has been giving to impeding the construction of the Rogun and Kambarata 
dams. In addition, and mirroring the strategy of the Tajik government, the GoU delivered 
these messages also at the OSCE Ministerial Council meetings in 2007 (Nematov, 2007), 
2008 (Norov, 2008) and 2009 (Norov, 2009b), and, more vehemently, by Islam Karimov at 
the opening of the Asian Development Bank's board of governors meeting in the Uzbek 
capital, Tashkent (Agence France Press, 2010). Furthermore, the Uzbek leadership 
disseminated its criticisms to large HPPs also through the organization of the international 
conference “Transboundary environmental problems in Central Asia: application of 
international legal mechanisms to solve them”, that took place in Tashkent in 2010. The 
event, that was attended by representatives from several UN agencies, international 
                                                     
121
 On this subject, when asked a few weeks later why Uzbekistan is opposing the construction of Rogun, 
Karimov replied “How can we let the residents of Uzbekistan live without water for eight years, while the 
Rogun water reservoir is being filled up? What will farmers be doing all this time?” (Interfax News Agency, 
2010). 
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organizations and financial institutions, noted the negative impact that Rogun and 
Kambarata will have on the environmental situation of Central Asia and, once again, 
underlined the importance of acceding to the UN conventions on transboundary 
watercourses (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2010b). 
 
6.2.2. Incentives to get allies 
Besides working to disseminate its anti-dam rhetoric worldwide, the GoU has been using 
its bargaining power, mostly under the form of financial incentives, to get support from 
regional heavyweights and dissuade them from supporting Rogun and Kambarata, creating 
a condition similar to what Buzan defined overlay. Overlay occurs when the direct presence 
of outside powers in a region is strong enough to suppress the normal operation of security 
dynamics among the local states” (Buzan et al., 1998: 12). In the case of Uzbekistan, the 
country managed to influence Russia and Kazakhstan to such an extent that they eventually 
decided to withdraw their support to Tajik hydroelectric plans. 
For what concerns the Rogun dam, as it was briefly mentioned in Chapter 4 in 2009 the 
GoU successfully managed to bring on its side of the dispute the Russian government, thus 
provoking a little diplomatic incident between Tajikistan and Russia. Until then, in fact, the 
two countries had been involved in protracted negotiations and signed several agreements 
on a possible Russian participation on Rogun. However, as a result of bilateral talks 
between Russia and Uzbekistan – that resulted in an agreement in which Uzbekistan 
decided to supply its natural gas solely to Russia (BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, 
2009) – Moscow changed its position, as it was also reaffirmed by Russian Deputy Prime 
Minister Sergey Ivanov during his visit to Tashkent in 2010. Also in that circumstance, 
Ivanov noted that “construction of major hydroelectric facilities in Central Asia should be 
carried out in full agreement with the neighboring countries” (BBC Monitoring Central 
Asia Unit, 2010a), implying that without Uzbek agreement Russia will not support the 
construction of Rogun. Thus, by granting Russia exclusivity on its gas, Uzbekistan found 
an ally in its anti-Rogun campaign.  
Furthermore, the Uzbek government paid particular attention to the creation of a 
common downstream threat perception, remarking how the two dams might have 
potentially catastrophic consequences not only for Uzbekistan but also for Kazakhstan and 
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Turkmenistan. And indeed, the Kazakh government, which was initially interested in 
investing in both the Rogun and Kambarata dams, later decided to withdraw its financial 
and diplomatic support to both projects, joining Uzbek requests for an external examination 
of the two power plants
122
. This change of views seems to be related to Nazarbayev's 
initiative to convene the yearly OSCE summit in Kazakhstan, taking advantage of the 
country’s OSCE chairmanship in 2010. Following a visit to Tashkent in which Nazarbayev 
secured Karimov’s support on the matter (Eurasianet.org, 2010b), Nazarbayev fully 
endorsed the Uzbek position, declaring that no hydroelectric power plant shall be built in 
Central Asia without the realisation of a neutral impact assessment (Defense and Security, 
2010). 
Akin bilateral diplomatic activities were carried out with the other downstream country 
of the Amu Darya basin, Turkmenistan (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009l), and in 
2011 the two countries signed a Joint Statement, in which they noted that water and energy 
issues in Central Asia should be solved in accordance with international legal instruments 
such as the to the 1992 and 1997 UN conventions (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 
2011).  
Beyond the creation of a common front against Rogun, Uzbekistan has also been 
promptly criticizing any initiative conflicting with its goal, in an attempt of deterring 
potential supporters of the project. For instance, when in 2011 Pakistan announced a plan to 
import 1,000 MW of Rogun-generated electricity from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan`s 
Ambassador in Islamabad Arif Karimov handed a letter of disapproval to senior officials of 
the Pakistan Ministry of Water and Power, noting that all downstream riparians opposed 
the project in absence of an Environmental Impact Assessment. Moreover, as an incentive 
to refrain Pakistan from supporting Rogun, the Uzbek government offered financial support 
for the realization of three hydropower plants on the Swat river in Pakistan, that would 
represent an alternative source of electricity with their total generation capacity of 1,315 
MW (AKIpress, 2011).  
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 It is nevertheless worth mentioning that Kazakhstan is now attempting to play a mediation role to resolve 
the conflict between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2013). 
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6.3. Knowledge construction 
Mirroring (and responding to) Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the GoU has constructed and 
disseminated its own expertise-based knowledge about Rogun and Kambarata. In the case 
of Uzbekistan, knowledge construction can be considered a hegemonic strategy and not a 
counter-hegemonic one. This is because, in a similar way than a sanctioned discourse, the 
science-based knowledge constructed by Uzbekistan is also the one endorsed by the more 
powerful side. Nevertheless, the confrontation between the two diverging schools of 
thought is so acrimonious, that it would be appropriate to describe this strategy also as 
“knowledge destruction” or “discrediting knowledge”, since its main objective seems the 
portrayal of the “other” as incompetent and fundamentally biased.  
These hostilities have been particularly evident between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. If, in 
the case of Tajikistan, Professor Dzhonon Ikrami acted as the scientific voice of the 
government, in the case of Uzbekistan an analogous role is covered by the Ecological 
Movement of Uzbekistan (EMU), an Uzbek political party and environmental movement 
which has been very vocal on the Rogun dam, and has often served as the communication 
arm of the Uzbek government. 
For instance, when the MEP Struan Stevenson took position in favour of Rogun (see 
chapter 4), the EMU sent a letter of protest to the President of the European Parliament 
Jerzy Buzek, severely criticising Stevensons’s declarations and questioning his 
environmental expertise:  
Is Mr. Stevenson, the member of the Committee of European Parliament on Environment, 
Public Health and Food Safety, not aware about possible negative consequences of 
construction of enormous dams? Probably, during his two or three visits to the countries of 
Central Asia he has not managed to learn environmental problems of all five countries of 
the region properly. Did he take into consideration the opinion of millions inhabitants, 
whose conditions of life have worsened, first of all, because of building of the large hydro-
power constructions that have created an intense environmental situation in downstream 
areas of the rivers? It is also word [sic] to recall the address of Mr. Stevenson at the 
hearings in the European Parliament on “Ecocatastrophe of Aral Sea. Can we rescue the 
drying Sea?” held in October 12, 2010 in Brussels, where he has been a moderator 
Stevenson has called EU and the world community for assistance in solving of the Aral Sea 
catastrophe, naming it a “global problem”. Does Mr. Stevenson not really understand that 
building of Rogun HPS will become the serious factor that will aggravate the present 
situation in the Aral Sea area? So, where are logic, intelligence and integrity? (The 
Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan, 2011) 
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The letter also warned of the catastrophic impacts of an earthquake in the Rogun area, 
supporting this statement with an example coming from Europe, the Vajont disaster in Italy 
(The Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan, 2011). Again, a few months after the decision of 
the WB to finance a feasibility study and an impact assessment for Rogun, the EMU sent a 
worried letter to the WB, in which it requested an inspection of the Rogun site. The letter 
outlined the usual points of concerns for Uzbekistan, and accuses the WB of partiality, as it 
is “making a one-sided evaluation of the tender procedures for environmental assessment of 
construction of hydroelectric power station, and do not take into account the interests of all 
parties, including those countries which are located in the downstream of Amudarya [sic] 
river” (The Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan, 2010: 3)123.  
In addition, Pravda Vostoka, the official newspaper of the Cabinet of Ministers of 
Uzbekistan, has also been active in disseminating scientific evidence against Rogun. The 
article “Rogun, a tsunami for Central Asia”, published in the aftermaths of the Japan’s 
earthquake, caused resentful replies from Tajikistan. The piece accuses the GoT of 
brainwashing its population, and reminds that a Tajik scientist, Sabit Negmatullaev, 
released an interview to Itar-Tass declaring that an earthquake of similar strength than that 
occurred in Japan already happened in Tajikistan, and could happen again during the next 
ten years. This, according to Pravda Vostoka, proves wrong Tajik Prime Minister Akil 
Akilov and the other Tajik authorities, which have been betrayed by the “euphoria of their 
own obsessive fantasies about Rogun” (Pravda Vostoka, 2011). 
Kyrgyz scientific assumptions on the Kambarata dam have been criticised and contested 
in a similar way. In 2009, the Uzbek Minister of Foreign Affairs published an article 
written by Sergei Zhigarev, the Director of the Institute “Gidroproject”, that bitterly 
criticized Igor Chudinov’s speech at the fifth World Water Forum, reminding the readers 
that “It goes without saying, and it is clear to any sober-minded person that the 30-years-old 
projects must be subjected to an independent objective examination (Zhigarev, 2009). 
Likewise, Natalia Koroleva’s (an official of Uzbekistan's State Nature Committee) article 
on Pravda Vostoka, called for an independent feasibility study for a project that will have 
                                                     
123
 In its response, the WB specified that the Uzbek request for inspection is ineligible, as “the issues raised by  
the Requesters focus on potential harm that could derive from the construction, operation and/or failure of the 
proposed Rogun HPP, but not from the Assessment Studies that the Bank intends to finance” (The Inspection 
Panel, 2010: 5). 
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significant transboundary effects (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009m), while 
Mahira Usmanova, a researcher of the Seismology Institute of the National Academy of 
Sciences of Uzbekistan, reminded that hydroelectric facilities such as Kambarata should not 
be constructed without consideration of seismic issues and geological risks, as this will put 
in danger all Central Asian countries (Akipress, 2009). 
 
6.4. Recourse to international law  
A recurring element in the Uzbek strategy against Rogun and Kambarata has been the 
recourse to international law. The GoU often buttresses its criticisms to the two dams with a 
reference to the key principles of international water law: equitable and reasonable 
utilization, prior notification, causing no significant harm and consultation between basin 
riparians. This is not surprising, especially considering Uzbekistan’s geographical position. 
Downstream states, in fact, often claim a right to the “absolute integrity of the 
watercourse”, which basically states that upper riparian states can do nothing that affects 
the quantity or quality of water that flows down the watercourse (Dellapenna, 2001: 269).  
 Nevertheless, Uzbek interest on international water law seems to have been triggered 
directly by Rogun and Kambarata, rather than by a genuine commitment to the 
aforementioned principles. As a matter of fact, Uzbekistan ratified both conventions – the 
1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes and the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses – in September 2007 (United Nations, 2013a and 2013b), a date 
which corresponds in particular with the concretization of Tajik plans on Rogun. As Bo 
Libert – a UNECE regional advisor that works on water issues in Central Asia and that has 
closely followed the ratification process of the UNECE Convention – observes (Libert et 
al., 2008: 15), Uzbek ratification was rapid and, perhaps more importantly, unexpected. 
However, international water law has still a moral value rather than a binding one, and the 
legal architecture for international watercourses remains weak (Rieu Clarke, 2012). 
Instruments such as the 1997 Watercourse Convention have not entered into force, and it is 
possible that they never will (Hodgson, 2010: 3). 
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6.5. Beyond diplomacy: active stalling  
In September 2012, amid rising tensions, Islam Karimov released a widely-cited 
declaration in which he warned that “Water resources could become a problem in the future 
that could escalate tensions not only in our region, but on every continent […] I won't name 
specific countries, but all of this could deteriorate to the point where not just serious 
confrontation, but even wars could be the result” (Reuters, 2012). Even if implicitly, this 
was the first time that the Uzbek President mentioned the possibility of recurring to the use 
of force to solve the hydropower row in Central Asia. And in effect, in spite of a very active 
and varied international strategy aimed at discrediting the two dams through the imposition 
of a specific discourse, in a few occasions the GoU used its hard power to more directly 
state its case. 
For what concerns the Rogun dam, one of the tactics adopted has been to actively stall 
the provision of construction material to the Rogun site. Since all of Tajikistan’s rail 
imports has to pass through Uzbekistan, starting in 2010 Uzbek authorities have delayed 
thousands of rail carriages bound to Tajikistan that were crossing its border (Eurasianet, 
2010b). Moreover, Tashkent has also significantly raised the customs duty for trucks and 
unilaterally closed the border several times in 2010 (Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2010; BBC 
Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2010c). Border problems escalated towards the end of 2011, 
when a mysterious explosion damaged a bridge in Uzbekistan, causing the interruption of 
one of the three major rail links to Tajikistan, the one between the Uzbek city of Termez 
and the Tajik city of Qurgonteppa (Radio Free Europe, 2011). Although the Uzbek 
newspaper Pravda Vostoka described the incident as a terrorist act, Tajikistan asked, in 
vain, for additional investigation. In addition, instead of fixing the track, Uzbekistan 
dismantled it, making the movement of trains to Tajikistan impossible (BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 2012). It seems then, that the GoU is using time as a source of power. 
However, this is done in a less subtle way than the one outlined for instance by Marwa 
Daoudy in the Euphrates and Tigris basin, in which time was used as a form of bargaining 
power to influence negotiations (Daoudy, 2009). In this case, Uzbekistan is physically 
impeding the delivery of building materials, to actively stall and extend over time the 
construction process at the Rogun site.  
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6.5.1. Issue linkage 
While Warner and Zeitoun (2006: 454) listed issue linkage as a counter-hegemonic 
strategy that can increase a country’s bargaining power (as in the case of Syria gaining an 
advantage from the Kurdish human rights movement that were contesting the Ilisu dam in 
Turkey), it appears that in the case of Uzbekistan a point can be made for issue linkage as 
an hegemonic strategy and for the use of hard power as a source of bargaining power. 
German scholar Ines Dombrowsky (2010) has analysed how issue linkage – which she 
defined as an exchange of concessions in fields of relative strength (Dombowsky, 2010: 
133) – can play a role in the resolution of transboundary water conflicts. However, matters 
related to the exchange of concessions in the use of natural resources in Central Asia, have 
been marked by a rather conflictual approach, and in the specific cases of the Rogun and 
Kambarata dams, issue linkage has been used for uncooperative ends. More specifically, 
the GoU has used its gas resources to gain leverage on both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Figure 24: Natural gas pipelines in Central Asia. Source: Richard Jones, “The Politics of Central Asian 
and Caspian Energy” (presentation at Chatham House, London, February 23–24, 2010). 
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Since Uzbekistan is Tajikistan’s sole supplier of natural gas (see Figure 24), the country 
has used this strategical advantage as a form of retaliation against Tajik plans. Although gas 
cuts had happened before as a consequence of Dushanbe’s failure to pay for outstanding 
debts (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 2009n), other analogous episodes can be 
connected directly to the Rogun dispute. In 2010, in a new chapter of the epistolary dispute 
between the Uzbek Prime Minister Mirziyoyev and his Tajik counterpart Akilov, the latter 
sent an open letter to Mirziyoyev, which was promptly posted by the Tajik news agency 
Khovar. The message emphasized the country’s sovereign right to build the dam to 
overcome its energy deficits, which could not be addressed by energy imports because of 
the artificial barriers created by Uzbekistan (Akilov, 2010). As a response, the GoU did not 
send another letter. Instead, a few hours after the reception of the communication, 
Uzbekistan unexpectedly halved gas supplies to Tajikistan, without specifying the reasons 
behind such decision (Agence France Press, 2010). Two years later another exchange of 
letters took place, touching on issues such as Rogun, the interruption of rail traffic between 
the two countries and Uzbekistan's decision to withdraw from the Central Asian power grid 
(Avesta, 2012). Also in this occasion, Uzbekistan interrupted all gas supplies to Tajikistan, 
explaining that there was a supply contract with China that needed to be fulfilled. 
Moreover, the Uzbek side did not concede the use of its territory to allow the transit of 
Turkmen gas to Tajikistan (The Times of Central Asia, 2012). 
This is noteworthy, because by using hard (structural) power in the form of a gas cut, the 
Uzbek government has increased its bargaining power, placing the Tajik government in a 
testing situation. Besides the implications that this move might have on gas supplies to the 
Tajik population, this considerably impacts on the Tajik industrial sector. The Tajik 
Aluminium Company (TALCO) is powered with Uzbek gas, and so is the Tajikcement 
plant, the largest cement producer of Tajikistan that is of central importance for cement 
provisions to the Rogun site. 
Likewise, the Uzbek government has used hard power to gain leverage on Kyrgyzstan 
and show its disapproval. Beyond the frequent gas cuts caused by behind-time payments 
from Bishkek, in 2009 Uzbek authorities decided to strengthen security on the Kyrgyz-
Uzbek border by digging ditches in the Suzak, Aksy and No’okat regions of Kyrgyzstan 
and erecting walls in the Rishtan rayon of Uzbekistan, some analysts interpreted this 
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measure as a sign of dissatisfaction towards Kyrgyz hydropower ambitions (Akhmadov, 
2009). Once more, when in 2010 Uzbekistan unilaterally closed the Kara-Suu-
Avtodorozhnyy customs checkpoint, some Kyrgyz human rights activists connected this 
move with the construction of the Kambarata dam (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 
2010e).  
 
6.6. Resource capture 
According to Thomas Homer-Dixon, resource capture occurs when “the degradation and 
depletion of a renewable resource interacts with population growth to encourage powerful 
groups within a society to shift resource distribution in their favour. These groups tighten 
their grip on the increasingly scarce resource and use this control to boost their wealth and 
power” (Homer-Dixon, 1999: 177). This seems to connect with Wittfogel’s seminal study 
Oriental Despotism (1957), that first introduced the concepts of hydraulic society and 
hydraulic despotism. Wittfogel argued that those who control water in arid or semi-arid 
regions also control political power. The so-called “hydraulic regimes” might increase their 
grip on power by building and managing hydraulic infrastructures such as dams and 
network of canals, which would allow bureaucrats to exert control over people and rivers. 
More recently, other scholars (Worster, 1985; Reisner, 1993; Swyngedouw, 1999) have 
investigated how ruling political elites can increase their influence and preserve social 
control through large hydraulic projects, in the so-called “hydraulic mission” to control 
nature and conquer the desert. 
Resource capture can be the end in itself, but it can also be the means to an end, with the 
end being consolidated control of water resources. The construction of large hydraulic 
infrastructures such as Rogun and Kambarata (whose realization if often so symbolic that it 
becomes the end in itself), offers a good example of how resource capture is associated to 
the water/power nexus. Nevertheless, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are not the only basin 
riparians occupied in capturing water resources, since also Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
have adopted a similar strategy. The latter, in particular, has built a number of reservoirs 
using winter releases of water from the Toktogul Reservoir with the plan of using it for 
irrigation in summer, becoming less dependent on Kyrgyzstan’s water (Wegerich, 2008). 
Among them, there are the Rezak Reservoir in Namangan Region, and the Karaman 
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Reservoir in Jizak Region. While these infrastructures alleviate Uzbekistan’s problems in 
low-water years, they are not sufficiently large to achieve Uzbek self-sufficiency in 
irrigation water (Abbink et al., 2010). Moreover, as Kemelova and Zhalkubaev noted, 
Uzbekistan built these reservoirs without notifying or consulting with Kyrgyzstan, the 
country whose interests could be potentially harmed by such initiative, thus violating 
international water law (Kemelova and Zhalkubaev, 2003). It appears then that the Uzbek 
government – that extensively recurs to international water law when its interests have to be 
safeguarded – has a one-way (if not contradictory) understanding of the matter, since it 
does not respect the same principles for which it advocates. 
 
6.7. Conclusions 
While Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan resorted to the sole use of bargaining and ideational 
power to accomplish their hydraulic mission, Uzbekistan acted similarly but with the 
opposite objective, and in addition did not disdain the use of hard power. Dinar (2009) 
noted how the use of violence in hydropolitics is too costly and often counter-productive. 
Nevertheless, hard power does not refer to the mere use of violence, but more in general to 
the structural capacity of influencing the other’s behaviours in less subtle (and more easily 
observable) ways than by using ideational or discursive means. And this appears to be the 
tactic sometimes used by the Uzbek government, which instead of recurring to the use of 
violence, preferred to take advantage from its upstream position in the gas distribution 
system.  
Besides causing the gradual deterioration of relations between the upstream block and 
Uzbekistan, the ways in which Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have challenged and contested 
the status-quo have caused the direct and peremptory reaction of the Uzbek leadership, 
which employed a wide array of tactics to discredit both projects. The key to understand the 
nature of this conflict seems to be symbolic value that has been attached to the two dams 
and to their construction. If, on the one hand, Tajik Prime Minister Akil Akilov underlined 
how Uzbek criticisms to Rogun have no other effect than uniting the people of Tajikistan in 
the idea that the dam should be built, on the other hand, impeding the construction of both 
dams has become a matter of principles for the Uzbek government. The dams come to 
symbolize the right of self-determination of the upstream countries but also the right of 
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self-defence of Uzbekistan, at least according to how the three countries have portrayed the 
matter. Perceptions and images play a crucial role in international politics, in the same way 
that symbolism is of central importance in Central Asian politics, both at the internal and at 
the regional level. Avoiding a threat (whether a real or a presumed one) assumes a value 
since what is visible is equally important as what is invisible, or what is real has the same 
value of what is only presented as real. And thus, impeding the construction of the two 
dams becomes as important as their construction, since both actions are not anymore the 
means to an end, but the end in itself.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusions 
 
The most hateful grief of all human grieves is this, to have knowledge of the 
truth but no power over the event.  
Herodotus, The History - Book IX, 440 B.C. 
 
 
 
This thesis was set out to understand and explore how state power is wielded in 
transboundary water relations in Central Asia, and what hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
tactics Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have put in place to favour and obstruct the 
construction of two large hydroelectric dams, Rogun and Kambarata. This final chapter 
assesses and compares the two case studies and their impact on regional water relations. 
Subsequently, the findings of this study are presented, along with its contributions to 
knowledge and its limitations. Finally, areas for future research are identified and outlined. 
 
7.1. The two case studies compared 
As it was explained in the introduction, the two case studies are in many ways similar. 
Yet, as it emerged from the analysis carried out in the previous chapters, there are also 
some significant differences that can now be illustrated.  
At the technical level, the flow of the Syr Darya river is at present more regulated than 
that of the Amu Darya river, and therefore the Kambarata dam would have, in absolute 
terms, a less significant impact than the Rogun dam on the water flow. The Kyrgyz 
government is already in the position to use water as a bargaining tool (and it already did, 
as discussed in Chapter 3), while the Tajik government expressly needs a large dam like 
Rogun before being able to do so. This notwithstanding, the impact of the Kambarata dam 
should not be underestimated, as its construction would set a precedent on regional water 
issues, implying that Uzbekistan and the principle of absolute integrity of the river for 
which the country advocates were overpowered by the principle of absolute territorial 
sovereignty claimed by upstream countries. 
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The two dams have also had a different political significance for the governments of 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, one that appears to be greater for the former than for the latter. 
Indeed, the Tajik government has placed the Rogun dam at the centre of a specific 
ideological production aimed at portraying the dam as a symbol of patriotism, national 
unity and progress, to the point that Tajikistan presents itself to the international community 
as a “water country”. While a similar dam-rhetoric was also propagated within Kyrgyzstan, 
the intensity with which the Kyrgyz government carried out its Kambarata campaign is 
considerably lesser than that observed in Tajikistan. For instance, considering the IPO 
launched in Tajikistan in 2010 in which the Tajik citizens were forced by the government to 
buy Rogun shares, it seems difficult to imagine a similar development in Kyrgyzstan. This 
is both because of the more vibrant contestational politics that characterise the Kyrgyz 
setting if compared with the Tajik one, and also because of the political instability that 
marked Kyrgyzstan over the last decade. Furthermore, the long-standing rivalry between 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan led the Tajik government to interpret and portray the 
construction of the Rogun dam against the will of Tashkent as a symbol of internal 
cohesion, that serves to assert the country’s sovereignty over its natural resources. While 
also the Kyrgyz leadership, and particularly Bakiev, represented the dam as an expression 
of the God-given right of the Kyrgyz people to use their water as they wish, the tones (and 
the nature of the conflict with Uzbekistan) were never as exasperated as in the case of the 
Rogun dam. 
Likewise, the Uzbek attitude towards the two dams was similar and different at the same 
time. It was similar in the sense that the Uzbek government treated the Rogun and 
Kambarata dams as a virtually unique entity, linking them together at regional and 
international roundtables, presenting and perceiving them both as a direct threat to its 
wellbeing. It was different in the sense that the Rogun dam seems to be the one that worried 
the most Karimov and his entourage. Specific and more peremptory actions were taken to 
oppose its construction, and the Uzbek government constantly retorted each and every point 
made by the Tajik government. 
Overall, the three countries have been (and still are) engaged in a tense conflict, in which 
each of them used its power to assert its interests and get the desired outcome to maintain 
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or contest hegemony. The following paragraph returns to the research questions and 
answers them presenting the findings of this study. 
 
7.2. The research questions unwrapped 
This thesis has taken a critical hydropolitical approach (i.e. one that studies water 
relations taking into consideration aspects such as overt and covert forms of power, 
discursive processes and social constructions) to analyse interstate relations in the Aral Sea 
basin in Central Asia, and to examine how state power is wielded in transboundary water 
relations. Two sub-questions have helped addressing this main research question. The first 
one, investigating how water relations evolved in the period 1991-2011, was addressed in 
Chapter 3.  
This has outlined how the resource distribution system set by the USSR left a heavy 
legacy on the Central Asian republics. The incompatibility between water demands of 
irrigation and hydropower is at the origin of a growing frustration among the upstream and 
the downstream countries. Over the last two decades, this fundamental conflict has strongly 
influenced water relations, that have taken a downward trend marked by three different and 
evolving phases. During the first “buffer period” (1991-1996), the new-born (and 
disoriented) republics decided to preserve the Soviet water allocation, and unconvincingly 
attempted to have a multilateral approach to regional water issues signing several 
multilateral agreements on water sharing. A more individualist and cautious attitude 
towards the management of shared water resources emerged in the period 1997-2006, that 
was marked by the first severe regional energy crisis (1997) and by the adoption of 
numerous bilateral and trilateral short-term agreements (AOAs) that were often signed as a 
response to an on-going crisis and not to prevent its occurrence. Subsequently, the 
revitalisation of the Rogun and Kambarata dams corresponded to the beginning of the third 
phase of water relations (2007-2011), characterised by the open and manifest conflict 
between Uzbekistan – the leading dam-opponent among the downstream states – and the 
two upstream republics, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The two dam projects led to the gradual 
deterioration of bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan, as it was illustrated by the TWINS matrix. 
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This served as a link to Chapter 4, 5, and 6, that helped answering the second sub-
question, identifying and categorising which counter-hegemonic and hegemonic measures 
have been put in place to favour and obstruct the construction of the Rogun and Kambarata 
dams. With the due differences (outlined in paragraph 7.1), the analysis showed that the 
Tajik and the Kyrgyz governments adopted similar tactics to contest the Uzbek hegemony 
and change a disadvantageous status-quo. They both resorted to i) internal support; ii) 
mobilization of financial resources; iii) international support; and iv) knowledge 
construction, to impose a particular discourse and ideology and wield their soft (ideational 
and bargaining) power. Counter-hegemony appeared as a constant and evolving process – 
with varying intensities and dimensions – aimed at changing the status-quo. Since the 
concept of “half-hegemony” does not seem to be theoretically plausible, counter-hegemony 
can exist and be observed even when it is not (yet) successful, as in the case of Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan.  
Conversely, the Uzbek government adopted a series of hegemonic tactics – i) 
international support; ii) knowledge construction; iii) recourse to international law; iv) 
active stalling/issue linkage; and v) resource capture – to maintain hegemony, rather than 
countering it. The dominant position in which the hegemon finds itself broadens the scope 
and range of opportunities that it can use to reassert and consolidate its interests while 
wearing down those of the hegemonised. Thus, Uzbekistan used its hard and soft power to 
respectively coerce and persuade other actors and get the desired outcome. Yet, hard power 
never implied the use of violence (although this was sometimes used as a threat), even 
when tension was at a peak, but rather the recourse to other “structural” measures such as 
the construction of water reservoirs or actively stalling the provision of construction 
materials. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan only resorted to the use of soft 
power, although in their case this can be interpreted as a prerequisite to use hard power: the 
moment in which they will get consent and persuade the other actors of the validity of their 
reasons, they will be able to build the Kambarata and Rogun dams and capitalize on their 
upstream position. Soft power in this case sets the conditions to use structural power, 
confirming the reciprocal relationship between material capabilities and ideas, and 
emphasizing the intimate connection between material and soft power at the basis of the 
concept of hegemony. 
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And indeed, over the course of this research the concept of hegemony and its two related 
facets – that refer to how hegemony can be maintained and contested – emerged as central 
to the study of power. Social and discursive constructions and the constant attempt to 
impose a certain worldview appeared to be a recurring element in the analysis of water 
politics in Central Asia, where water has both symbolic value and material worth. 
Moreover, the absence of a binding legal framework and the ambiguity that this might 
entail, seems to have further strengthened the confrontational attitude aimed at imposing its 
own view of things rather than adapting to that of the others.  
Among the three forms of power, the ideational one seems to be the most significant to 
both maintain and contest hegemony. Going back to Gramsci’s (1975 and 1975a) idea of an 
“intellectual” hegemony, and more in general to the power theory review carried out in 
Chapter 2, the ability to impose ideas and influence those of the others is considered an 
efficacious instrument to affirm hegemony and create expectations and behaviours. 
However, while on the one hand the political setting described by Gramsci presented the 
figure of a lay Pope, Benedetto Croce, that acted as a key instrument of hegemony, on the 
other hand, Central Asian water politics do not seem to be influenced by a singular actor 
but rather by a multiplicity of fragmented realities, or as Chantal Mouffe would have 
defined them, nodal points of power (Mouffe, 2008). This is perhaps the reason behind the 
strong influence that the Soviet Union and its policies still have on water management 
issues in Central Asia. Uzbekistan’s water hegemony is primarily a result of the decisions 
taken in the Soviet period, and of the succeeding ability of the Uzbek government to 
maintain the status-quo unchanged. This does not diminish, however, the intensity of the 
counter-hegemonic struggle that has taken place to disarticulate the current hegemonic 
order.  
 
7.3. Main contributions, limitations of the study and areas for future research 
This thesis contributes to existing knowledge at several levels. It does so by being the 
first study to carry out a comprehensive analysis of power dynamics in transboundary water 
relations in Central Asia placing the focus on the issue of large dams. Thus, this research 
provides an original contribution to the literature on hydropolitics in Central Asia, offering 
fresh theoretical interpretations to the subjects of power and counter-hegemony in the Aral 
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Sea basin. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary approach used in this dissertation – that takes 
and connects insights from critical IR theory, conventional political geography and Central 
Asian studies – has been rarely used to analyse water politics in the Aral Sea basin. 
The categorisation and detailed illustration of the counter-hegemonic tactics deployed by 
the Tajik and the Kyrgyz governments adds a contribution to the critical hydropolitics 
literature focusing on power dynamics in Central Asia but also at a more general level. 
Similarly, the categorisation of the hegemonic tactics adopted by the Uzbek government 
provides an additional contribution to the study of how power is used to maintain 
hegemony in an international river basin. Also, as it emerged in the previous paragraph, the 
present study confirms previous findings and contributes additional evidence that suggests 
that states tend to avoid the use of violence to solve transboundary water conflicts. Indeed, 
while conflict and cooperation coexisted in the Aral Sea basin in the period under analysis 
– and cooperation proved to be fundamentally ineffective – the use of violence and the 
possibility for a “water-war” to erupt remained a remote option.  
Conceptually, this study developed an analytical model that connected the concepts of 
power and hegemony and revisited the analytical framework of hydro-hegemony, 
proposing a redesign of its structure named the “circle of hydro-hegemony”. Hegemony is 
placed at the centre of this analytical structure, while the various forms of power are taken 
as an interconnected entity that is connective in the function of hydro-hegemony. Such 
analytical contribution can prompt constructive discussion about the relationship and 
interconnections between the notions of power and hegemony in hydropolitics.  
In addition, the empirical material collected during this research led to the creation of 
three timelines (Annex 2, 3, and 4), that represent the largest recollection of events of this 
kind available at the time of writing, and the possible uses for these data are vast. The 
timeline of water relations in the period 1991-2011 could for instance be used by 
researchers comparing water interactions in a number of international river basins, or by 
those specifically studying water politics in Central Asia. Likewise, the timelines of the 
Rogun and Kambarata dams could offer useful information for those studying the politics 
and rhetoric of large dams and, more specifically, to those interested in these two projects.  
Concerning the data collection, a number of important limitations need to be considered. 
First, although the data collection was carried out as scrupulously and thoroughly as 
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possible (see Annex 1), it may occur that some events are not included in the timelines. 
This is because the timelines are based on news reports, official declaration and official 
documents. Rumours and unsubstantiated events, and more in general, matters that were 
not reported by the “official” information channels, were not included in the timelines.  
A second limitation is due to the fact that events happening after the year 2011 were 
deliberately left out of the timelines. While this was done to keep the scope of the research 
within a controllable time span, this time limit does not allow to study recent and relevant 
developments concerning water relations in Central Asia and the construction of the Rogun 
and Kambarata dams.  
Thirdly, this research did not entail any fieldwork. This is due to two connected reasons. 
The first, is that prior to this study the author spent one year (2009) working on high-level 
water politics in Central Asia for the UNRCCA based in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. While 
none of the confidential information accessed during this experience was disclosed nor used 
in any way in this thesis, this privileged position allowed the researcher to gain a first-hand 
understanding of water politics in Central Asia and of how much certain issues can be 
politicised and kept in the inaccessible cabinet rooms of the government
124
. Secondly and 
consequently, since this research analysed social constructions and official government 
representations of water issues, the prospect of doing fieldwork in Central Asia (and for 
instance interviewing government representatives) did not seem to add any value to the data 
collection, as the outcome would have most likely been very similar to the official stance 
that the Central Asian governments take through official declarations, statements and 
national state-owned media channels that tend to function as the mouthpiece of the 
government.  
Finally, it is suggested that further research be undertaken in the following areas. First, 
and this comes from one of the limitations of this study, further research might explore 
recent developments concerning the construction of the Rogun and the Kambarata dams, 
(such as the release of the long delayed WB assessment report on the Rogun dam).  
Second, although this is not yet feasible, when a regime change (or a succession) takes 
place in Uzbekistan and in Tajikistan it would be interesting to see what position the new 
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 As Allan and Mirumachi have noted (2010: 14), “[p]oliticized and securitized relations over transboundary 
water disappear first into ministries of foreign affairs and then into what has become known as the shadow 
state”. 
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leaderships will take towards regional water management, also considering how much the 
2010 government change has impacted on the Kambarata dam in Kyrgyzstan. For instance, 
will the new Uzbek President attempt to harshen the tones of the conflict to assert his power 
and get legitimation? Or will he/she be more accommodating than his/her predecessor? And 
also, will the Rogun dam be the pet project of the next Tajik President or will he/she instead 
attempt to gain energy self-sufficiency for his country with other, less symbolic projects? 
Third, considering that both the Tajik and the Kyrgyz governments have framed their 
dam projects as symbols of patriotism, and also considering that little has been written on 
the correlation between the control of water resources and the nation-building process, 
further research could explore how ruling political elites use iconic projects such as large 
dams to create a sense of national identity, gain legitimacy and boost their popularity. The 
necessity of expanding on this area, and to link it with the study transboundary water 
relations seems even more relevant, it is argued, considering that after a decline in the 
number of dams being erected worldwide from the 1970s onwards, dams are now back on 
the global agenda, and hundreds of new, controversial projects have been launched in the 
last few years.  
Fourth, it would be interesting to compare counter-hegemonic tactics in a number of 
international river basins, to explore which forms of power are used by different riparians 
and why. This might apply to the issue of large dams but also to any other activity aimed at 
countering an existing hegemonic order. For what concerns Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
both countries adopted, in different ways, the same four counter-hegemonic tactics. Will 
these be the same in another international river basin? 
Fifth, although this goes beyond the field of hydropolitics and enters that of political 
science, a comparative study could investigate the rhetoric of justification used by various 
governments when it comes to the construction of architectural “white elephants”. 
Countries that have apparently no much in common, might indeed use very similar 
discourses aimed at portraying a certain infrastructure as the panacea. For instance, this 
could be the case of Italy and Tajikistan for what concerns the Strait of Messina bridge 
project and the Rogun dam. The results of such a study could be, depending on the point of 
view, surprising or predictable. After all, although more than two millennia have passed 
since Plato wrote the Republic, the distinction between reality and appearance in politics 
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and the way realities are constructed by politicians appear to be a topical issue also in the 
contemporary world. 
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Annex 1. Methodology 
 
1. Research process 
This research started in February 2011 and lasted for three years. Overall, the research 
process can be divided into five major steps: i) problem definition; ii) research design; iii) 
literature review; iv) data collection; v) analysis and writing. While some of them 
overlapped, the different stages of the research generally followed one another, as 
illustrated in Figure 25.  
 
 
Figure 25: Timeframe of the research 
 
Discussions with numerous scholars have helped in gradually narrowing the scope of the 
research, eventually leading to the choice of the two case studies. The attendance of two 
summers schools
125
 and numerous conferences and workshops allowed me to present my 
research and to receive precious feedback. In addition, the two terms that I have spent at the 
Department of Geography of King’s College London (Sept.-Dec. 2012) and at the School 
of International Relations of the University of St Andrews (Jan.-Mar. 2013), gave me the 
opportunity to receive advices from leading scholars and to access relevant bibliographic 
resources. 
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 In July 2011 I participated to the 14
th
 Erasmus IP European Seminar on Geography of Water in Cagliari, 
while in July 2012 I attended the EAERE-FEEM-VIU European Summer School on Management of 
International Water hosted by Prof. Ariel Dinar in Venice. 
Month
Activity
YEAR 3YEAR 1 YEAR 2
Literature review
Data collection
Analysis and writing
Problem definition
Research design
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2. Creation of three chronologies 
A central element in the operationalization of this study was the creation of three 
detailed chronologies (one for general interstate relations and one each for Rogun and 
Kambarata) of relevant speech acts representative of cooperative and conflictive 
interactions. The collection of chronological events emphasizes one of the major strengths 
of case studies, namely that case studies allow to trace events over time, to subsequently 
analyse them (Yin, 2009: 148). The initial analysis of existing databases on water conflicts 
and agreements, such as the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD) of the 
Oregon State University, the IRCC of the ETH-Zurich and the Water Conflict Chronology 
of the Pacific Institute, revealed lack of consistency, both when they were compared to each 
other or when crossed with other chronologies and reports of events found in published 
academic articles. For this reason, it became necessary to compile a new, detailed 
chronology, integrating the above mentioned sources with a systematic screening of 
relevant media reports operating in and on the region, both using their websites and the 
LexisNexis Research software.  
Initially, I made a selection of relevant news sources from the region. The main sources 
that I used are: BBC Monitoring International Reports from Central and South Asia Units 
(that provides also transcription and translations of national TV and radio programs), 
Interfax News Agency, Agence France Press, RFE/RL, Interfax and the state-owned 
Central Asian media, that act as the mouthpiece of the government. Subsequently, these 
selected sources were the object of a systematic screening based on certain keywords that 
was done both taking the five countries (LexisNexis allows to isolate the countries of 
interest), both isolating country couples (as Tajikistan-Uzbekistan). In addition, and to get 
more results, I limited the timespan of each research to a period of 12 months. This was 
done because LexisNexis automatically filter the results when they are more than 1000 
(which is often the case for period longer than a year), and thus this was the only way to 
avoid a possible loss of information. The process of data collection has taken around 14 
months.  
The events collected include press reports and interviews, official documents and 
declarations, letters and memoirs of key individuals. All these documents have the function 
of manifesting actions, such as promising or threatening (Klotz and Lynch, 2007: 19). 
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These primary sources are supplemented and contextualised through secondary sources, 
such as academic articles and reports from international organizations, and also by 
conducting semi-structured interviews with representatives of key international 
organizations working in the region and with prominent experts on Central Asian interstate 
relations
126
.  
Subsequently, all the information collected and retained was ordered into three 
chronologies (see the annexes for the full chronologies): a general one, and a specific 
timeline for Rogun and Kambarata. The general timeline consists of a total of 197 speech 
acts, which provide a detailed account of regional inter-state relations in the field of water. 
The two specific timelines are similar to the general one, the difference being that they 
focus only on Rogun and on Kambarata. Certain events are part of two or oven three 
timelines, as they were relevant both the specific and in the general context (i.e., a 
conference where the five Presidents openly argued over Rogun and Kambarata and 
threatened to take certain actions is something that goes in the three timelines). 
As mentioned, thanks to BBC Monitoring and its transcription and translation of 
national TV and radio programs, I had access to indigenous language sources overcoming 
my unfamiliarity with them. On the other hand, I do understand written Russian language 
sources
127
, and I have therefore accessed them in their original form. 
 
3. Speech acts 
The three chronologies are made of speech acts. Speech act theory was originally 
developed by a philosopher of language, Austin (1975), in his seminal book How to do 
things with words. The main assumption behind speech act theory is that different uses of 
language, by their utterance, perform an action. If I say to a friend that “I will buy a house”, 
or “I do” during a marriage ceremony, I am promising that I will do something by just 
saying it. This is a performative utterance, one through which I am performing an act. 
                                                     
126 
It has to be noted that the objective of these interviews was mostly to further understand and assess the 
main challenges and tendencies for regional relations and to enrich the research with further details and 
elements. Interviews are normally being realized at the margins of international conferences on water 
management (such as the 2012 World Water Forum in Marseille, France) or during dedicated trips to IOs 
headquarters. 
127
 When it comes to regional meetings and conferences, Russian is still the lingua franca in Central Asia. 
Furthermore, the Central Asian presidents and ministers generally use Russian to address international forums 
such as the UNGA or the OSCE Ministerial Council meetings. 
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Austin identified five categories of performative acts (1975: 151-2): verdictives (giving a 
verdict or an appraisal), exercitives (the exercising of powers, rights and influence), 
commissives (committing to do something by declaring or announcing it), behabitives 
(relating with social behaviours, e.g. apologizing, congratulating or cursing), and expositive 
(they put an utterance in a context, as in “I reply”, “I assume” or ”I argue”). Further 
elaborating on this, Searle (1975) introduced the following categories of speech acts: 
assertive, directive, commissive, expressive and declarations.  
Subsequently, Nicholas Onuf (1998) analysed speech acts from a constructivist point of 
view, considering them as acts that perform an action and establish a relationship when 
they encounter a response or a reaction from the audience towards which they were 
directed. Onuf (1998: 66) reduced the categories of speech acts to the following three: 1) 
assertive, through which something is asserted, as in “our country is experiencing a 
difficult situation”; 2) directive, through which something is demanded, as in “we need 
more water”; and 3) commissive, through which something is promised, as in “I will pay 
my debts”.  
In this research, speech acts are studied within Onuf’s three categories, assertive, 
directive and committive, with the clarification that speech acts can be both verbal and 
nonverbal facts, as stated by Duffy and Frederking (2009) in their speech acts analysis of 
the end of the Cold War. A nonverbal speech act is a physical, concrete action that conveys 
a meaning, such as mobilizing troops at the border, which is an example of a directive 
speech act. In water relations, an assertive speech act can be for instance a public speech or 
an official statement through which sovereignty on water resources is stated. A directive 
speech act can be a cut in water resources to obtain, as in the case of relations between 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, a resumption of gas supplies. Finally, a commissive speech act 
can be the signing of a treaty or a joint declaration, through which two countries express a 
commitment to engage in future actions.  
 
4. Discourse analysis 
The concept of discourse analysis does not refer to a specific method but rather to a 
research perspective (Keller, 2012: 3). More than a method, discourse analysis is a 
methodology that contains methods of data collection and analysis, combining them with a 
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set of assumptions on how language and social interactions construct realities (Muller, 
2011). The focus of discourse analysis is on how specific identities, practices, meanings 
and knowledge are created by an actor in describing something in a way or in another 
(Rapley, 2008: 132). Being this a study on power and hegemony, it is important to focus on 
the capacity of one actor to impose or control a certain discourse, as the management of 
social representations can be associated with the control over the minds and perceptions of 
other people and thus to hegemony (Van Dijk, 1993: 257). Discourse analysis in this study 
is used in the analysis of speech acts, to ascertain whether they are assertive, directive or 
committive, connecting them with particular periods of water relations in the Aral Sea 
basin, and analysing the audience towards which they were addressed and the meaning that 
wanted to be conveyed. 
The way discourse analysis is carried out is inspired by techniques developed in 
grounded theory. Grounded theory is a methodology for developing theory that is grounded 
in data gathered and analysed systematically (Strauss and Corbin, 1994: 273). In this 
methodology originally conceived by Glaser and Strauss (1967), theory may be generated 
directly from the data or, if other theories on the area of investigation already exist, theory 
may be further elaborated and modified using the data gathered. The former approach, 
applies to the study of counter-hegemonic strategies, which have not been theorised in 
detail and therefore theory will be generated directly from the data. The latter approach, on 
the other hand, will be used for hegemonic strategies. In this case, the data gathered will be 
confronted with the existing theorisation from Warner and Zeitoun (2006), confirming or 
further expanding the categorisation of hegemonic strategies. The data collected in the three 
timelines, is coded and categorised (and sub-categorised) looking for relationships, patterns 
of action and interaction (Strauss and Corbin, 1994: 278) between the various basin 
riparians. As Birks and Mills note, grounded theory is usually derived from data sources of 
a qualitative and interpretive nature (Birks and Mills, 2011: 6), as it is also the case for this 
research. 
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Annex 2. Water relations in Central Asia 1991-2011 
Key 
 
KG Kyrgyzstan KZ Kazakhstan TJ Tajikistan  TK Turkmenistan UZ Uzbekistan  
 
EXT Non-Central Asian actor  Y Involved in the event 
 
 
 KG KZ TJ TK UZ EXT DATE DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT 
TYPE OF 
EVENT 
SOURCE 
1 Y Y Y Y Y 
 
12/10/1991 
Statement of heads of water economy organizations 
of Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan adopted 
on 10-12 October 1991 meeting in Tashkent in 
which the countries recognized water as a limited 
resource that should be equally distributed among 
the republics. 
Joint 
statement/de
claration 
Statement of heads of water 
economy organizations of 
Central Asian Republics and 
Kazakhstan adopted on 10-12 
October 1991 meeting in 
Tashkent, 1991. Available 
from: http://www.icwc-
aral.uz/statute2.htm [Accessed 
10 Feb 2012] 
2 Y Y Y Y Y 
 
18/02/1992 
Agreement on Cooperation in the Area of Joint 
Management, Utilization and Protection of Interstate 
Water Resources (also known as the “Almaty 
Agreement). 
Agreement 
Agreement between the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic 
of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and the Republic of Uzbekistan 
on co-operation in interstate 
sources' water resources use 
and protection common 
management, 1992. Available 
from: http://www.icwc-
aral.uz/statute1.htm [Accessed 
10 Feb 2012] 
3 Y Y Y Y Y 
 
26/03/1993 
Agreement between Republic of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Republic of Uzbekistan on joint 
activities in addressing the Aral Sea and the zone 
around the Sea crisis, improving the environment, 
and enduring the social and economic development 
of the Aral Sea region (Kzil Orda Agreement). 
Agreement 
Agreement between Republic 
of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Republic of 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Republic of Uzbekistan on 
joint activities in addressing the 
Aral Sea and the zone around 
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the Sea crisis, improving the 
environment, and enduring the 
social and economic 
development of the Aral Sea 
region, 1993. Available from: 
http://www.icwc-
aral.uz/statute13.htm [Accessed 
10 Feb 2012] 
4 Y Y Y Y Y 
 
15/01/1994 
Adoption of "The Program of Specific Measures to 
Improve the Ecological, Social and Economic 
Situation in the Aral Sea Basin for 3-5 Years" and of 
the "The Basic Provisions of the Concept " (now 
known as the Aral Sea Basin Program). 
Adoption of 
a joint 
program 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1994. Central 
Asian summit agrees measures 
to save Aral Sea. 15 Jan. 
5 Y 
   
Y 
 
01/01/1994 
Informal barter agreement under which Uzbekistan 
agreed to provide Kyrgyzstan with winter heat and 
electricity in exchange for water during the summer 
growing season. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
RFE/RL, 1997. 
Kyrgyzstan/Uzbekistan: The 
Politics Of Water. RFE/RL 
[online], 9 Oct. Available from: 
http://www.rferl.org/content/art
icle/1086795.html [Accessed 3 
Feb. 2012]. 
6 Y Y Y Y Y 
 
03/03/1995 
Establishment of the Aral-Ekobank to raise funds to 
deal with the ecological disaster of the Aral Sea. 
This was established dutring a meetin in Ashgabat 
that established the Resolution of the Heads of States 
of the Central Asia on work of the EC of ICAS on 
implementation of Action Plan on improvement of 
ecological situation in the Aral Sea Basin for the 3-5 
years to come with consideration of social and 
economic development of the region Parties: 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan. 
Establishme
nt of a joint 
body 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1995. Central 
Asian summit agrees measures 
to save Aral Sea. 7 Mar. 
7 
  
Y 
 
Y 
 
31/05/1995 
Uzbekistan is to stop taking electricity from 
Tajikistan in a step which the Tajik energy 
authorities see as a violation of an agreement 
between the two republics, the Moscow daily 
'Pravda'reported on 31st May. The head of the Tajik 
power grid was quoted as describing the Uzbek 
move as "impolite, to say the very least" . He said 
that changes to the annual electricity transfer 
contract between the republics require the consent of 
both of them, "yet Tashkent did not even inform the 
Agreement 
violation 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1995. Uzbekistan 
reinterprets power supply deal 
with Tajikistan ('Pravda', 
Moscow, in Russian) 2 Jun. 
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Tajik side of its decision" , 'Pravda' reported. 
8 Y Y Y Y Y 
 
20/09/1995 
Signing of the Nukus Declaration, that focuses on 
sustainable development of the Aral Sea Basin and 
on financial obligations of the states to ICAS and 
IFAS. 
Joint 
statement/de
claration 
Ryabtsev, 2003. 10 Years of 
Regional Collaboration in 
Shared Water Resources 
Management of Central Asia. 
3rd World Water Forum, 
Kyoto. 
9 
   
Y Y 
 
16/01/1996 
Agreement between Turkmenistan and the republic 
of Uzbekistan on cooperation on questions of water 
management. This agreement stipulates that the Amu 
Darya’s water be divided equally between 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan agreed to 
pay to Turkmenistan US $11.4m. annually as land 
rent for the Buxoro and Qashqadaryo pump stations, 
as well as for the water storage area of the 
Tuyamuyun reservoir. In addition, Uzbekistan 
supplies water from the Qashqadaryo pump station 
to a 25,000-ha irrigated area of Turkmenistan free of 
charge. This was the first meeting between Karimov 
and Niyazov. 
Agreement 
Uzbek television, 1996. 
UzTVl, 16 Jan. 
10 Y Y 
  
Y 
 
01/04/1996 
Agreement between the Government of Kazakhstan, 
the Government of Kyrgyzstan and the Government 
of Uzbekistan on management of water resources in 
Central Asia. It stipulated compensation for 
Kyrgyzstan for not fully utilizing its hydro-power 
potential during winter and allowed increased water 
releases during summer. 
Agreement 
The World Bank, 1997. 
Kazakhstan-Syrdarya Control 
and Northern Aral Sea Project. 
The World Bank Public 
Information Center. 
11 Y Y 
  
Y 
 
12/04/1996 
"Water is a commodity," Kyrgyzstan's minister 
for water resources, Zhenishbek Bekbolotov, said. 
"Any natural resource that is used should be paid 
for." Despite the deal announced this week, 
Uzbekistan's acting minister for water resources, 
Abdurahim Zhalalov, rejected the notion 
that water had become a commodity in Central Asia. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
The Moscow Times, 1996. 
Kyrgyzstan Gets to Play 
Its Water Card. 12 Apr. 
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"Nobody is trading water," he said. "The commodity 
is hydroelectricity." Koposyn Kudaibergenov, 
deputy chairman of the Kazakh Water Committee, 
added that "In the Koran it is written 
that water should not be sold. We should solve the 
problems for each other as partners." 
 
12 Y 
   
Y 
 
25/12/1996 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of Uzbekistan and the Government of the Republic 
of Kyrgyzstan on the question of use water energy 
resources of Naryn Syr Darya's hydropower stations 
cascade in 1997. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
UNECE, 2003. Transboundary 
water cooperation in the newly 
independent states. Moscow-
Geneva. 
13 Y Y Y Y Y 
 
28/02/1997 
Almaty Declaration, adopted by the leaders of 
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan. It declared 1998 as Environmental 
Protection Year in the central 
Asia region, acknowledged the need to develop a 
comprehensive programme of environmental 
security including the Aral problem and called on the 
UN to pay particular attention to the Aral sea crisis. 
Joint 
statement/de
claration 
United Nations, 1997. 
A/52/112, 18 Mar. Available 
from: 
http://www.un.org/documents/
ga/docs/52/plenary/a52-
112.htm [Accessed 16 Feb. 
2012]. 
14 Y Y 
  
Y 
 
01/06/1997 
Kyrgyzstan stated that it was planning to charge 
Kazakhstanand Uzbekistan for water. 
Declaration/
Speech 
RFE/RL Newsline, 1997. Vol. 
1, No. 53, 97-06-16. 
15 Y Y 
  
Y 
 
01/07/1997 
Uzbekistan cut off 70 % of flow downstream, 
threatening 100,000 hectares and prompting a riot by 
Kazakh farmers. Moreover, it has deployed 130,000 
troops on the Kyrgyz border to guard the reservoirs 
straddling the two countries. 
Resource 
cut/Mobilisa
tion of 
troops 
Eurasianet.org, 2000. Central 
Asian states wrangle over 
water. Available from: 
http://www.eurasianet.org/depa
rtments/environment/articles/ea
v040500.shtml [Accessed 6 
Mar. 2012]. 
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16 Y Y Y 
 
Y 
 
19/07/1997 
Local Representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met in the northern Tajik 
city of Khujand on 19-20 July to discuss water 
distribution. he Kazakhs and Uzbeks requested an 
increase in the volume of water flowing from the 
Kairakum reservoir in Tajikistan into the Syr River. 
Tajik representative Kosim Kosimov said such a 
decision can be made only by the Tajik central 
government. Kyrgyzstan has already announced it 
will begin charging its neighbors for water from the 
Naryn River; it has not yet decided on a price, 
however. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 1, No. 
78, 97-07-22. 
17 
 
Y 
  
Y 
 
24/07/1997 
Residents of Southern Kazakhstan Oblast staged a 
demonstration to protest a decision by the Uzbek 
government to cut the amount of water flowing from 
that country into Kazakhstan. The demonstrators 
said the Uzbek decision threatened the corn and 
cotton crops on some 100,000 hectares of land in the 
oblast. 
Resource 
cut/Protests 
RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 1, No. 
82, 97-07-28. 
18 Y Y Y Y Y 
 
26/09/1997 
All five Central Asian republics agreed on the need 
for a common strategy in using the region's water for 
power generation, irrigation and other purposes. 
They decided to create a special consortium for this 
purpose. The meeting also agreed to install special 
equipment in the main rivers of the region in order to 
monitor the flow of water into the Aral Sea. The 
Central Asian states merged ICAS and IFAS into a 
new IFAS under rotating chairmanship of the 
Presidents of Central Asian states. 
Agreement 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1997. Central 
Asian states seek common 
strategy for water resources 
(Interfax news agency) 3 Oct. 
19 Y 
   
Y 
 
01/10/1997 
President Askar Akaev signed an edict codifying 
Kyrgyzstan's right to profit from water resources 
within its territories. Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated a 
clear intent to follow through on its plans. It has 
threatened to sell water to China if Uzbekistan 
refuses to pay. It has also demanded compensation 
for revenues lost from releasing water downstream 
to Uzbek farms instead of using it to generate 
hydroelectric power. 
Adoption of 
legal 
instruments 
Eurasianet.org, 2000. Central 
Asian states wrangle over 
water. Available from: 
http://www.eurasianet.org/depa
rtments/environment/articles/ea
v040500.shtml [Accessed 6 
Mar. 2012]. 
20 Y Y 
 
Y Y 
 
16/10/1997 Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Imanaliyev's 2-day official Talks on BBC Summary of World 
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visit to Tajikistan ended by an exchange of 
ratification instruments for a treaty on the basic 
principles of mutual relations between the countries. 
Speaking at press conference Thursday, he said 
Kyrgyz leadership was extremely interested that 
Tajikistan should become participant in 
implementation of projects within framework of 
Central Asian Union. Specifically, this concerned the 
decision of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan 
to establish transnational consortiums in 7 directions, 
Imanaliyev explained, noting that Tajikistan was 
interested in such spheres as water resources and 
power engineering. 
water/energy Broadcasts, 1997. President 
Rahmonov discusses 
cooperation with Kyrgyz 
foreign minister (Tajik Radio 
first programme, Dushanbe, in 
Tajik) 18 Oct. 
21 Y Y 
    
27/12/1997 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan friday reached a "coal 
for water" agreement, ending their three-year-long 
row over the issue, the itar-tass news agency 
reported saturday. Under this accord, Kyrgyzstan 
will provide irrigation water to Kazakhstan in the 
spring of 1998. Kazakhstan will pay back with 
600,000 tons of coal and partially pay for the 
utilization of irrigation works in Kyrgyzstan. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1997. Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan sign water for 
coal deal ( ITAR-TASS news 
agency (World Service), 
Moscow, in Russian) 30 Dec. 
22 Y Y 
    
01/01/1998 
Kyrgyzstan has threatened to cut off water and 
electricity supplies to Kazakhstan unless previous 
deliveries are paid for. 
Threatening/
Warning 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1998. Kyrgyzstan 
unhappy with 
Kazakh water and electricity 
debts ( ITAR-TASS news 
agency (World Service), 
Moscow, in Russian) 2 Jan. 
23 Y Y Y Y Y 
 
05/01/1998 
The presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met 
behind closed doors in Ashgabat on 5-6 January. On 
the agenda were regional cooperation, gas and oil 
pipelines, and the situation of the Aral Sea. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 1, No. 
189, 98-01-06. 
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24 
  
Y 
 
Y 
 
04/02/1998 
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic 
of Tajikistan and the Government of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan on Cooperation in the Area of Rational 
Water and Energy Uses. The documents included an 
intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the 
use of water and energy resources, agreements on 
legal aid, cooperation and mutual assistance between 
the two countries' security services and interior 
ministries, cooperation to combat crime, transport 
and on cooperation in the struggle against drug 
trafficking. An intergovernmental agreement on 
restructuring Tajikistan's debt to Uzbekistan was 
also among the documents signed. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
Agreement Between the 
Government of the Republic of 
Tajikistan and the Government 
of the Republic of Uzbekistan 
on Cooperation in the Area of 
Rational Water and 
Energy Uses. Available from: 
http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/
mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme
nts/Kayrakum-98.pdf 
[Accessed 7 Mar. 2012] 
25 Y Y 
  
Y 
 
17/03/1998 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan, the Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic and the Government of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan on Joint and Complex Use Water and 
Energy Resources of the Naryn Syr Darya Cascade 
Reservoirs in 1998. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
Agreement Between the 
Government of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, the Government of 
the Kyrgyz Republic and the 
Government of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan on Joint and 
Complex Use Water and 
Energy Resources of the Naryn 
Syr Darya Cascade Reservoirs 
in 1998. Available from: 
http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/
mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme
nts/Annual-Operation-98.pdf 
[Accessed 7 Mar. 2012]. 
26 Y 
   
Y 
 
01/08/1998 
Uzbekistan cut off supplies to Kyrgyzsatn on 1 
August because of unpaid bills. 
Resource cut 
RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 2, No. 
148, 98-08-05. 
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27 Y 
   
Y 
 
04/08/1998 
Gas supplies from neighboring Uzbekistan have 
been restored. The Kyrgyz government has paid 
$900,000 of the debt and sent a letter to the Uzbek 
authorities guaranteeing future payments. 
Resumption 
of resource 
supply 
RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 2, No. 
148, 98-08-05 
28 
   
Y Y 
 
16/10/1998 
Talks between Turkmen and Uzebk presidents 
concerning regional security, including the use of the 
Amu Darya. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
Associated Press Worldstream, 
1998. Turkmen, Uzbek 
presidents discuss Afghanistan. 
16 Oct. 
29 
  
Y Y 
  
03/03/1999 
Turkmenistan Foreign Minister Shikhmuradov 
pointed out that attention during his meetings with 
Tajikistan President Rakhmanov and Foreign 
Minister Nazarov was devoted mainly to the 
development of substanative dialogue on all matters 
concerning bilateral relations, including the 
problems of the Aral Sea. Upon having pointed out 
that Tajikistan, as a country with huge water 
resources, plays an important role in the resolution 
of the problem. Shikhmuradov said message from 
the President of Turkmenistan to Rakhmanov have 
been delivered, inviting him to attend the Ashgabat 
summit on the Aral Sea. Shikhmuradov declared in 
favor of intensifying cooperation between the 
countries in power development, specifically under 
comprehensive programs of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1998. Tajik 
Turkmen leader concur on 
regional security issues. 
(ITAR-TASS news agency) 3 
Mar. 
30 Y Y Y Y Y 
 
09/04/1999 
Agreement between the government of Republic of 
Kazakhstan, the Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, the Government of Republic of Tajikistan, 
the Government of Turkmenistan and the 
Agreement 
Interstate Commission for 
Water Coordination of Central 
Asia. Available from: 
http://www.icwc-
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Government of Republic of Uzbekistan about the 
status of the international fund for saving the Aral 
sea (IFAS) and its organizations. 
aral.uz/statute3.htm [Accessed 
6 May 2012] 
31 Y Y Y Y Y 
 
09/04/1999 
Adoption of the April 1999 Ashgabat Declaration, 
that calls for joint actions to address shared 
environmental problems in the Aral Sea basin. 
Joint 
statement/de
claration 
Interstate Commission for 
Water Coordination of Central 
Asia. 
32 
  
Y 
 
Y 
 
13/04/1999 
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic 
of Uzbekistan and the Government of the Republic 
of Tajikistan on Cooperation in the Area of Rational 
Water and Energy Uses in 1999 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
Agreement Between the 
Government of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan and the 
Government of the Republic of 
Tajikistan on Cooperation in 
the Area of Rational Water and 
Energy Uses in 1999. Available 
from: 
http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/
mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme
nts/Kayrakum-99.pdf 
[Accessed 8 Jun. 2012]. 
33 Y Y Y 
 
Y 
 
07/05/1999 
Protocol on Inserting Amendments and Addenda in 
the Agreement Between the Governments of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and 
the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Use of Water and 
Energy Resources of the Syr Darya Basin, of 17 
March 1998. Id adds Tajikistan to the 17/03/1998 
agreement. 
Agreement 
Protocol on Inserting 
Amendments and Addenda in 
the Agreement Between the 
Governments of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, and the Republic of 
Uzbekistan on the Use of 
Water and Energy Resources of 
the Syr Darya Basin, of 17 
March 1998Available from: 
http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/
mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme
nts/SyrDaryaAmm-Jun-99.pdf 
[Accessed 15 May 2012]. 
34 Y Y 
    
17/05/1999 
Water supply to the Jambyl and Chimkent regions of 
neighboring Kazakhstan from the Kara-Bura 
reservoir in Kyrgyzstan was halted. According to 
Silaev, the governments of Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan agreed last year that Kazakhstan would 
supply Kyrgyzstan with 560,00 metric tons of coal in 
1999 in return for water from the Kara-Bura 
reservoir, but Kazakhstan has not sent any coal to 
Kyrgyzstan so far this year. Nor has the Kazakh 
Resource cut 
RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 
101, 99-05-25. 
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leadership informed Kyrgyzstan when those 
deliveries will be made. According to Pannier, in this 
case Kyrgyzstan for the first time used water as a 
political tool. It demanded compensation for 
maintaining the reservoirs on the Syr-Darya. 
Kazakhstan, for example, was asked for shipments 
of coal to keep northern Kyrgyzstan warm and 
productive in the winter. When Kazakhstan did not 
ship the coal, Kyrgyzstan closed off the reservoirs 
that release water to Kazazkhstan. The pressure 
worked; the bill was paid. (Pannier 2000) 
35 Y Y 
    
18/05/1998 
Kazakhstan's Intergaz company on 18 May cut gas 
supplies to northern Kyrgyzstan. Toktosun 
Abduvaliev said his company owes Intergaz some 
$2.2 million for supplies received in 1997-1998. 
Resource cut 
RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 
97, 99-05-19. 
36 Y Y 
    
22/05/1999 
Northern regions of Kyrgyzstan began receiving gas 
from Kazakhstan on 22 May after the Kyrgyz 
government paid the first installment, worth $25, 
000, of its $2.2 million back debt to Kazakhstan's 
Intergaz company, RFE/RL's Bishkek bureau 
reported. 
Resumption 
of resource 
supply 
RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 
99, 99-05-24. 
37 Y Y 
    
22/05/1999 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic on Comprehensive Use of Water and 
Energy Resources of the Naryn Syr Darya Cascade 
Reservoirs in 1999. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
Agreement Between the 
Government of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and the 
Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic on Comprehensive 
Use of Water and Energy 
Resources of the Naryn Syr 
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Darya Cascade Reservoirs in 
1999. Available from: 
http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/
mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme
nts/Annual-KzKg-99.pdf 
[Accessed 8 Jun. 2012]. 
38 Y Y Y 
 
Y 
 
17/06/1999 
Agreement between the Governments of the 
Republics of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the 
Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of 
Uzbekistan on the Parallel Operation of the Energy 
Systems of Central Asia. 
Agreement 
Interstate Commission for 
Water Coordination of Central 
Asia. 
39 Y 
   
Y 
 
01/01/2000 
Uzbekistan carried out military exercises at the 
border with Kyrgyzstan, with the seeming objective 
of practicing for capturing the Toktogul Reservoir, 
located on Kyrgyz territory but used by Uzbekistan 
to irrigate fields in Fergana valley. This action was a 
response by Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan’s flooding of 
farm fields, while opening the dam to produce 
additional electricity for its population. 
Resource 
cut/Mobilisa
tion of 
troops 
CACI Analyst, 2009. Fire over 
water in Central Asia. 
Available from: 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=
node/5079 [Accessed 7 Jun. 
2012]. 
40 
  
Y 
 
Y 
 
14/01/2000 
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic 
of Uzbekistan and the Government of the Republic 
of Tajikistan on Cooperation in the Area of Rational 
Water and Energy Uses in 2000. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
Agreement Between the 
Government of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan and the 
Government of the Republic of 
Tajikistan on Cooperation in 
the Area of Rational Water and 
Energy Uses in 2000. Available 
from: 
http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/
mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme
nts/Kayrakum-00.pdf 
[Accessed 2 May 2012]. 
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15/01/2000 
Uzbekistan reduced gas supplies to neighboring 
Kyrgyzstan to a minimum in retaliation for Bishkek's 
failure to pay its outstanding $400,000 debt for 
earlier supplies, ITAR-TASS and AP reported. Most 
private homes in Bishkek and other areas of northern 
Kyrgyzstan were without gas or heating as most of 
Kyrgyzstan's thermal plants are gas fired. 
Resource cut 
RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 
11, 00-01-17. 
42 Y Y 
    
21/01/2000 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic on the utilisation of the water facilities of 
interstate use on the Chu and Talas Rivers . In this 
agreement, Kazakhstan agreed to pay Kyrgyzstan 
maintenance costs for the use of their shared water 
facilities on the Chu and Talas Rivers. 
Agreement CA Water Info portal 
43 Y 
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16/03/2000 
Intergovernmental Protocol between the Government 
of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Government of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan on Use of the Naryn-Syr 
Darya Water and Energy Resources in 2000. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
Intergovernmental Protocol 
Between the Government of 
the Kyrgyz Republic and the 
Government of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan on Use of the 
Naryn-Syr Darya Water and 
Energy Resources in 2000 16 
March 2000, Osh, Kyrgyzstan. 
Available from: 
http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/
mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme
nts/Annual-UzKg-00.pdf 
[Accessed 7 Apr. 2012] 
44 
   
Y 
 
Y 31/03/2000 
Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov has 
rejected British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook's 
proposal on the republic's participation in an 
international conference on saving the Aral 
Sea. Niyazov believes the politicization of this issue 
may cause serious difficulties in relations between 
the five CIS countries regarding the distribution 
of water resources, the presidential press service has 
Declaration/
Speech 
Interfax Russian News, 2000. 
Turkmen president against 
politicization of Aral Sea issue. 
31 Mar. 
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told Interfax. 
45 
   
Y Y 
 
31/03/2000 
Niyazov and Karimov had a telephone conversation 
today. As a most pressing topic of the current time 
they recalled the rational distribution and purposeful 
use of water resources, an issue which concerns the 
daily life of their two peoples and also of the other 
peoples of the region. The two sides stated that 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan enjoy complete 
consensus on this issue.The leaders of Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan came to the conclusion that these 
water-related issues should be regulated on the basis 
of bilateral relations and that any international 
assistance should not be accompanied by undesirable 
politicization. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 2000. 
Turkmen, Uzbek heads oppose 
"politicization" of regional 
water issues. (Turkmen 
Television first channel, 
Ashkhabad, in Turkmen) 1 
Apr. 
46 Y Y 
    
23/05/2000 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic on the use of water and energy resources of 
the Naryn – Syr Darya cascade of reservoirs in 2000. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
Agreement Between The 
Government of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan And The 
Government of the Kyrgyz 
Republic On the Use of Water 
and Energy Resources of the 
Naryn – Syr Darya Cascade of 
Reservoirs in 2000. Available 
from: 
http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/
mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme
nts/Annual-KzKg-00.pdf 
[Accessed 4 May 2012]. 
47 Y Y Y Y Y Y 07/06/2000 
OSCE head Ferrero Waldner visited Central Asia 
and proposed a multilateral approach to water 
management. The presidents of Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan said they prefer to handle the problem on 
a bilateral basis and rejected the multilateral 
approach proposed by the OSCE. Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, however, favor it. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
Eurasianet.org, 2000. OSCE 
seeks agreement on Central 
Asian water. Available 
from:http://www.eurasianet.org
/departments/environment/artic
les/eav060600.shtml [Accessed 
7 Mar. 2012]. 
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01/07/2000 
Dispute between KG, KZ and UZ during July 2000. 
Southern Kazakhstan faced a serious water shortage 
after Bishkek cut supplies because of Kazakhstan’s 
failure to meet agreed energy supplies and 
Uzbekistan reportedly extracted more water than it 
was entitled to. Uzbekistan began appropriating 
some of Kazakhstan’s water share from the Fergana 
Valley. Kazakhstan lobbied Uzbekistan for more 
water in meetings and Kazakh TeleCom stopped 
relaying international telephone calls from 
Uzbekistan. 
Resource 
cut/capture 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 2000. Kazakh-
Uzbek talks on water issues 
stalling, Kazakh cotton crop in 
balance. (Khabar TV, Almaty, 
in Russian) 15 Jul. 
49 
   
Y 
  
20/10/2000 
Turkmen President Saparmyrat Niyazov attended a 
ceremony to launch a project to build 
a huge artificial lake in the Karakum desert in central 
Turkmenistan. Speaking at the ceremony, a report on 
which was broadcast on Turkmen TV later the same 
day, Niyazov said that the lake was designed to 
collect saline waters from all over Turkmenistan and 
to provide the Turkmen people with water over the 
next 50 years. He said the project would not harm 
the environment of other Central Asian states since it 
was merely restoring the facilities which had existed 
before Genghis Khan destroyed the area's water 
economy in the 14th century. 
Resource 
capture 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 2000. Turkmen 
president launches project to 
build artificial lake. (Turkmen 
Television first channel, 
Ashgabat, in Turkmen) 21 Oct. 
50 Y Y 
    
21/11/2000 
Kazakh Prime Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev 
expressed serious concern about the plans to build 
the Kambarata hydroelectric station in Kyrgyzstan 
with Kazakh funds and proposed that the project 
should be "blocked in every way". He thinks that it 
will lead to water being drawn away from the 
Toktogul hydroelectric station, which would have an 
adverse affect on water supplies in Kazakhstan. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 2000. Kazakh 
government discusses water 
supplies to southern Regions. 
(Interfax-Kazakhstan news 
agency, Almaty, in Russian) 22 
Nov. 
51 Y Y 
    
24/11/2000 
The Kyrgyz parliament has refused to pass the law 
ratifying an agreement with Kazakhstan on use of 
the water control facilities on two rivers [the Naryn 
and Syrdarya]. Deputies took the view that the 
republic's water resources are not simply a national 
wealth but a commodity. 
Other 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 2000. Parliament 
rejects water accord with 
Kazakhstan. 29 Nov. 
52 Y Y 
    
01/12/2000 
KG and UZ announced with great fanfare a 
rescheduling agreement that was designed to solve 
the payment problems of natural gas sold to KG. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
Eurasianet.org, 2000. 
Upstream-Downstream: The 
Difficulties of Central Asia’s 
Water and Energy Swaps. 
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Available from: 
http://www.eurasianet.org/depa
rtments/business/articles/eav02
0601.shtml [Accessed 5 Jul . 
2012]. 
53 Y 
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20/01/2001 
UZ cut off natural gas supplies to KG for lack of 
timely payment, leaving residents in the Northern 
regions of KG without natural gas for part of the 
winter. 
Resource cut 
Wines, 2002. Grand Soviet 
Scheme for Sharing Water in 
Central Asia Is Foundering. 
The New York Times, 9 Dec. 
54 
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03/02/2001 
An intergovernmental agreements was signed 
between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on cooperation in 
the efficient use of water resources in 2001. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 2001. Water and 
energy deals signed. (Tajik 
Radio first programme, 
Dushanbe, in Tajik) 16 Feb. 
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05/02/2001 
Gas supplies are flowing again from Uzbekistan to 
Kyrgyzstan following a more than week-long cutoff 
that created heating and electricity shortages in many 
Kyrgyz cities. Uzbekistan stopped supplying gas to 
exert pressure on Kyrgyzstan to pay off $1.35 
million in debts for earlier deliveries. 
Resumption 
of resource 
supply 
Eurasianet.org, 2000. 
Upstream-Downstream: The 
Difficulties of Central Asia’s 
Water and Energy Swaps. 
Available from: 
http://www.eurasianet.org/depa
rtments/business/articles/eav02
0601.shtml [Accessed 5 Jul . 
2012]. 
56 Y 
   
Y 
 
26/02/2001 
Talks between Kyrgyz officials and Uzbek Prime 
Minister Otkir Sultonov have started in Bishkek. The 
main subject of the talks between the two 
government delegations will be resumption of Uzbek 
gas supplies to northern Kyrgyzstan and 
accumulation of water in Kyrgyz reservoirs for 
Uzbekistan's irrigation needs," it added. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 2001. Uzbek-
Kyrgyz gas, water talks begin 
in Bishkek. (Kabar news 
agency, Bishkek, in Russian) 
27 Feb. 
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01/03/2001 
An Uzbex expert declared that"Because of 
Kyrgyzstan's extensive water discharge during the 
last five years, the total loss for Uzbekistan reached 
almost $1 billion,". 
Declaration/
Speech 
Eurasianet.org, 2001. Available 
from: 
http://www.eurasianet.org/depa
rtments/environment/articles/ea
v031901.shtml [Accessed 5 
Aug . 2012]. 
58 Y Y 
    
06/03/2001 
Kazakhstani and Kyrgyz authorities signed a 
protocol under which Kazakhstan agreed to settle a 
$21.5 million debt in order to facilitate negotiations 
on water supplies. Kazakhstan also promised to 
supply Kyrgyzstan with fuel and coal. Astana is 
seeking up to 750 million cubic meters of water for 
irrigation. A formal agreement could be in place by 
the end of March. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
Eurasianet.org, 2001. Available 
from: 
http://www.eurasianet.org/depa
rtments/environment/articles/ea
v031901.shtml [Accessed 6 
Aug . 2012]. 
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16/03/2001 
Protocol of Experts’ Joint Working Meeting to 
Develop a Draft Agreement between the 
Governments of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Republic of 
Tajikistan and Republic of Uzbekistan on Use of 
Naryn-Syr Darya Cascade’s Water and Energy 
Resources in 2001. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
Protocol of Experts’ Joint 
Working Meeting to Develop a 
Draft Agreement between the 
Governments of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Republic of 
Tajikistan and Republic of 
Uzbekistan on Use of Naryn-
Syr Darya Cascade’s Water 
and Energy Resources in 2001. 
Available from: 
http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/
mckinney/papers/aral/agreeme
nts/Annual-Protocol-01.pdf 
[Accessed 5 Mar. 2012]. 
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01/06/2001 
The Kyrgyzstan legislature passed a law identifying 
water as a legal commodity, opening the way for the 
imposition of a pricing structure, and within a few 
months the government declared that it would soon 
develop a fee scale by which it would charge the 
downstream recipients for water usage. (ICG notes 
that Kyrgyzstan has backed down from its original 
position. Whereas initially it demanded that 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan pay for all water they 
receive, it now insists that they pay only for the 
water passing through Kyrgyz reservoirs and canals 
– in other words, share maintenance costs.) 
Adoption of 
legal 
instruments 
Eurasianet.org, 2001. Water 
continues to be source of 
tension in Central Asia. 
Available from: 
http://www.eurasianet.org/depa
rtments/environment/articles/ea
v102301.shtml [Accessed 30 
Apr . 2012]. 
61 Y Y 
    
24/07/2001 
The presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, Askar 
Akayev and Nursultan Nazarbayev, signed 
an agreement on economic cooperation for the 
period between 2001 and 2005. The two countries 
are to set up a consortium for the joint utilization 
of water and energy resources. The prime ministers 
have been instructed to draw up a plan for 
establishing this consortium, the presidents 
announced. The Kyrgyz parliament's decision to 
demand a charge for the utilization of 
Kyrgyz water resources was unacceptable for 
Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev said. 
Joint 
statement/de
claration 
Interfax News Agency, 2001. 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan sign 
agreement on economic 
cooperation. 24 Jul. 
62 Y Y 
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01/08/2001 
Following up on the June law, The Kyrgyz 
government announced that it was preparing 
regulations to charge neighboring states, including 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, for the water they use. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Eurasianet.org, 2001. Available 
from: 
http://www.eurasianet.org/depa
rtments/environment/articles/ea
v102301.shtml [Accessed 27 
Sept. 2012]. 
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15/10/2001 
Kyrgyz First Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai 
Panayev told that Uzbekistan may stop supplying 
gas to Kyrgyzstan in the near future, at a press 
conference in Bishkek. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Interfax News Agency, 2001. 
Bishkek fears Tashkent may 
stop gas supplies. 15 Oct. 
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16/10/2001 
Uzbek Prime Minister Utkir Sultanov told journalists 
in Tashkent on October 16 that Kyrgyzstan's move 
to charge for water would add friction to already 
tense relations. "The 
introduction of the law contradicts the international 
norms," Sultanov said. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Eurasianet.org, 2001. Available 
from: 
http://www.eurasianet.org/depa
rtments/environment/articles/ea
v102301.shtml [Accessed 27 
Sept. 2012]. 
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29/10/2001 
Protocol on the joint use of water and energy 
resources has been signed, obliging Uzbekistan to 
ship 300 million cubic meters of gas, oil, fuel and 
lubricants to Kyrgyzstan's Bishkek and Osh heat and 
electricity stations. Kyrgyzstan also agreed to accept 
532 million-kilowatt hours of electricity in 
wintertime from Uzbekistan as disbursement for 
Uzbekistan's energy debt. Kyrgyzstan, in its turn, 
guarantees the accumulation of water in the 
Toktogul water reservoir, Central Asia's largest, so 
that irrigation water will last for Uzbekistan through 
2002. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
Central Asia & Caucasus 
Business Report, 2001. 
Kyrgyzstan to be fully supplied 
with gas from Uzbekistan. 29 
Oct. 
66 
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Y 29/10/2001 
Chairman of the Barki Tochik open joint stock 
holding company (Tajikistan) Dzhurabek 
Nurmakhmatov and director general of one of the 
units of the Russian financial-industrial group Baltic 
Construction Company Oleg Toni on Tuesday will 
sign a contract in Dushanbe to build the Rogun 
hydroelectric station. 
Agreement 
Ria Novosti, 2002. Russians to 
complete construction of 
Rogun HPP in Tajikistan. 29 
Oct. 
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23/01/2002 
Report from Uzbek TV "A number of residential 
areas in Namangan Region [eastern Uzbekistan] and 
agricultural farms are under threat of being flooded 
because 650-700 cu.m. of water are being released 
from the Toktogul reservoir at present. For example, 
since a great deal of water flows in the River 
Arnasay in winter, its water level has risen to 7.5 m 
during the past 5-6 years. (...) As a result, about 
350,000 ha of land in Navoi and Dzhizak Regions 
have been flooded, we have had to move hundreds of 
sheep farms, and many roads and power 
Floods 
BBC Monitoring International 
Reports, 2002. Kyrgyz fail to 
stick to water-energy deal - 
Uzbek TV. 23 Jan. 
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transmission lines have been hit by floods. 
68 Y Y Y 
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01/02/2002 
The foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan and the deputy foreign minister of 
Uzbekistan, have met in Almaty, Kazakhstan. They 
discussed regional security, drug trafficking, the 
threat posed by the Chardara reservoir in southern 
Kazakhstan and the creation of a regional water-
energy consortium. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Sumary of World 
Broadcasts, 2004. Uzbekistan 
agrees to act to avert overflow 
of Kazakh reservoir. (Khabar 
Television, Almaty, in Russian) 
20 Feb. 
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15/02/2002 
Uzbekistan shows concern about possible 
emergencies that may arise due to the increased 
release of water from the Toktogul reservoir in 
Kyrgyzstan. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Interfax News Bulletin, 2002. 
Uzbekistan faces flood threat. 
15 Feb. 
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05/10/2002 
Joint Communiqué of the Heads of State of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the 
Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of 
Uzbekistan, where it was reiterated the need for 
coordinated measures in the water sector based on 
generally recognized norms and principles of 
international law. 
Joint 
statement/de
claration 
Official Documents System of 
the United Nations. 
71 Y Y Y Y Y 
 
06/10/2002 
Dushanbe Declaration, signed during the summit of 
the States members of the Organization of Central 
Asian Cooperation. It concentrates on improving 
information exchange on water and other natural 
resources 
Joint 
statement/de
claration 
Official Documents System of 
the United Nations. 
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01/04/2003 
The four central Asian states of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are to 
collaborate for the construction of the Kambarata 
hydroelectric power plant in Kyrgyzstan. According 
to preliminary estimates, the construction of the first 
Kambarat hydroelectric power plant is expected to 
cost US$1.7B, and the second is estimated at 
approximately US$230M. It is expected that Central 
Asian states, Russia and the World Bank will 
provide funding for the projects. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
Water Power & Dam 
Construction, 2003. Central 
Asian states to participate in 
hydro. 30 Apr. 
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28/08/2003 
Authorization of the "Programme of concrete actions 
on improvement of environmental and socio-
economic situation in the Aral Sea Basin for the 
period of 2003-2010" (ASBP-2) 
Agreement 
Interstate Commission for 
Water Coordination of Central 
Asia. 
74 
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Y 01/09/2003 
TJ organizes the UN supported Interantional Water 
Forum. Countries adopt the Dushanbe Water Appeal, 
that reiterates the importance of freshwater resources 
and calls on the United Nations, governments, 
organizations and stakeholders to commit 
themselves more fully to achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals and the targets agreed upon in 
the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. The 
Appeal also invites the United Nations to declare 
2005-2015 the International Decade of 'Water for 
Life. 
Water 
conference 
UN Documents. Dushanbe 
Water Appeal, Included as an 
Annex to A/58/362. 
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04/12/2003 
A contract for supplying natural gas from 
Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan in 2004 still has not been 
signed. Two-month Kyrgyz-Uzbek talks have ended 
fruitlessly. A decision is expected to be made in 
early January 2004 . A contract for 2003 was also 
signed with a one-month delay, and only after 
Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev's personal 
intervention. Anyway, the 2003 contract for 
supplying natural gas to Kyrgyzstan is valid until the 
end of the year. No one can guarantee that natural 
gas will be supplied to Kyrgyzstan without 
interruption after its expiration. Currently 
Kyrgyzstan owes almost 11m dollars to Uzbekistan 
for natural gas. Of this amount, Kyrgyz people owe 
4m dollars to the Kyrgyzgaz for the supplied natural 
gas. 
 
No 
agreement 
reached 
BBC Sumary of World 
Broadcasts, 2003. Kyrgyz-
Uzbek talks on natural gas 
supplies reopen. (Public 
Educational Radio and TV, 
Bishkek, in Russian) 4 Dec. 
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12/12/2003 
The Kyrgyz prime minister, Nikolay Tanayev, has 
told parliament that a deal has been reached with 
Uzbekistan on gas supplies and that Kyrgyzstan will 
be paying for Uzbek gas in foreign currency - it had 
been paying 45 per cent in kind. He also defended 
Kyrgyzstan's record in paying for gas (Kyrgyzstan 
has a debt of 11m dollars for Uzbek gas). 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
BBC Sumary of World 
Broadcasts, 2003. Deal reached 
on Uzbek gas, Kyrgyz premier 
tells parliament. (Kyrgyz Radio 
first programme, Bishkek, in 
Russian) 13 Dec. 
77 Y Y 
    
25/12/2003 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan agreed to jointly operate 
a pipeline that supplies the Central Asian neighbors 
with gas, one several deals aimed at expanding 
economic ties. 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan agreed to jointly operate 
the Bukhara-Almaty pipeline that supplies the two 
countries with Uzbek gas, ending a dispute between 
Kazakh and Kyrgyz gas companies over sharing the 
gas flowing through it, officials said. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
Associated Press Worldstream, 
2003. Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan sign deals to 
improve economic ties. 25 Dec. 
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29/12/2003 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan signed water and energy 
supply deals and discussed other long-standing 
problems as they attempt to improve strained 
relations. Uzbek Foreign Ministry spokesman 
Ilkhom Zakirov said the visit by Akil and other 
senior ministers visit signaled "the mutual desire to 
finally sit down and discuss a wide range of 
Cooperation issues." 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
Associated Press Worldstream, 
2003. Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan sign 
energy, water deals, discuss 
long-standing issues. 29 Dec. 
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03/01/2004 
Tajik and Kyrgyz natural-gas firms have succeeded 
in signing contracts with Uzbekistan's gas supplier 
Uztransgaz for deliveries of gas in 2004. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
RFE/RL Newsline, 04-01-06. 
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04/01/2004 
High-level delegations from Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan met in Shymkent in 
South Kazakhstan Oblast on 4 January to discuss 
measures to prevent flooding from a major reservoir 
on the Syr Darya River. The discussion ended with 
the signing of a protocol under which Kazakhstan 
will supply coal and fuel oil to Kyrgyzstan in 
January and Kyrgyzstan will reduce its hydroelectric 
output and increase power generation in its thermal 
plants, while Uzbekistan will raise the flow of water 
from the Chardara Reservoir into its nearby Arnasai 
Reservoir. The three delegations also agreed to set 
up a working group to regulate the flow of the Syr 
Darya. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
RFE/RL Newsline, 04-01-06. 
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13/01/2004 
Some Kazakh media have complained that 
Uzbekistan has not taken the measures promised at 
the 4 January meeting to control the flow from the 
Chardara Reservoir on the Uzbek-Kazakh border. 
Declaration/
Speech 
RFE/RL Newsline, 04-01-14. 
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01/02/2004 
The Syr Darya River has burst its banks, submerging 
fields and settlements near the Uzbek-Kazakh border 
in the region's worst floods since 1969. The rising 
waters are partly due to unseasonably heavy rain 
over the winter, but the major reason lies in the 
Central Asian states' longstanding inability to 
manage their shared water resources in a coordinated 
and rational manner. The root of the problem is 
Kyrgyzstan's Toktogul Reservoir. 
Floods 
RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 
2004. Volume 4, Number 7, 16 
Feb. 
83 Y Y Y 
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11/02/2004 
TJ agreed to immediately reduce its own discharges 
from its Qayroqqum Reservoir to stop the floods. 
The Syr Darya actually passes through this body of 
water. In the first week of February the Tajiks, far 
from helping to defuse the crisis, were contributing 
to it by discharging large additional amounts of 
water for their own hydroelectric purposes. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
RFE/RL Central Asia Report, 
2004. Volume 4, Number 7, 16 
Feb. 
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12/02/2004 
Kazakh Agriculture Minister and Deputy Prime 
Minister Akhmetzhan Yesimov traveled to Tashkent 
for bilateral follow-up talks with Uzbek Prime 
Minister Shavkat Mirzayoev. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
RFE/RL Newsline, 04-02-13. 
85 Y Y 
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14/02/2004 
Karimov sent a letter to Nazarbaev blaming the 
current excess of water in the basin of the Syr Darya 
River on Kyrgyzstan's carelessness in releasing 
water from the Toktogul reservoir. 
Open Letter RFE/RL Newsline, 04-02-17. 
86 Y Y Y 
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13/05/2004 
Foreign Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic Askar 
Aytmatov in an interview with the Kyrgyz AKIpress 
on 13 May 2004 commented on the country's 
position regarding some issues relating to Kyrgyz-
Kazakh economic cooperation. "Moreover, currently 
an issue of the creation of an international water and 
energy consortium is being considered within the 
framework of CACO Central Asian Cooperation 
Organization. It is expected that an investment 
policy will be conducted within the framework of 
this consortium, which is aimed at the construction 
of new hydroelectric power stations - Kambar-Ata-1 
and Kambar-Ata-2 southwestern Kyrgyzstan 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Sumary of World 
Broadcasts, 2004. (Corr) 
Kyrgyzstan to develop 
cooperation with "fraternal" 
Kazakhstan - minister. 
(AKIpress, Bishkek, in 
Russian) 13 May. 
87 Y Y Y 
 
Y 
 
28/05/2004 
The presidents of the four Central Asian countries, 
Nursultan Nazarbayev Kazakhstan, Askar Akayev 
Kyrgyzstan , Emomali Rahmonov Tajikistan and 
Islam Karimov Uzbekistan , signed a joint 
communique, an agreement between the member 
states on mutually broadcasting TV and radio 
programmes and a decision on setting up an 
international water and energy consortium within the 
framework of CACO. 
Joint 
statement/de
claration 
BBC Sumary of World 
Broadcasts, 2004. Central 
Asian leaders set up water-
energy consortium. (Interfax-
Kazakhstan news agency, 
Almaty, in Russian) 28 May. 
88 Y Y 
    
12/07/2004 
An agreement to this effect was signed during a 
session of the Kyrgyz-Kazakh joint 
intergovernmental commission for bilateral 
cooperation yesterday 12 July . Kazakhstan intends 
to buy over 1bn kWh from the country. This is the 
highest figure in recent years. For its part, 
Kyrgyzstan is ready to comply with Kazakhstan's 
wishes and to increase water discharges from the 
Toktogul reservoir. Southern Kazakh regions badly 
need irrigation water during the vegetation period. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
BBC Sumary of World 
Broadcasts, 2004. (Corrected) 
Kazakhstan to increase imports 
of Kyrgyz electricity. (Pyramid 
TV, Bishkek, in Russian) 13 
Jul. 
 215 
 
89 Y Y 
  
Y 
 
15/07/2004 
Delegations from three Central Asian countries - 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan - are 
considering the issues of water discharge from the 
Toktogul hydroelectric power station [in 
northeastern Kyrgyzstan] during the vegetation 
period. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Sumary of World 
Broadcasts, 2004. Kyrgyz, 
Kazakh, Uzbek officials 
discuss water issues in 
Tashkent. (Kyrgyz Radio first 
programme, Bishkek, in 
Russian) 16 Jul. 
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16/07/2004 
Uzbekistan has pledged to increase 
the water released from the Syr Darya river to the 
Shardara reservoir in South Kazakhstan Region by 
80 cu.m. per second to irrigate the cotton 
fields.This agreement was reached during a meeting 
between Kazakh Agriculture Minister Serik 
Umbetov and Uzbek Deputy Agriculture Minister 
Mahmud Jalolov held in the region's Makhtaaral 
District on 16 July, the regional agriculture 
department has told the Interfax-Kazakhstan news 
agency. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
BBC Sumary of World 
Broadcasts, 2004. Uzbekistan 
pledges more water for Kazakh 
cotton fields. (Interfax-
Kazakhstan news agency, 
Almaty, in Russian) 20 Jul. 
91 
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19/11/2004 
Uzbek President Islam Karimov and his Turkmen 
counterpart Saparmurat Niyazov toasted champagne 
and signed agreements that signalled an end to 
tensions over an alleged assassination attempt on 
Niyazov in 2002 and over the Amu-Darya River that 
criss-crosses the countries' border. "We have solved 
the water dispute for future generations," Niyazov 
said. 
Agreement 
Agence France Presse, 2004. 
Turkmen, Uzbek leaders vow 
end to tension 
over water, assassination bid. 
19 Nov. 
92 
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Y 16/10/2004 
Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov said after a 
meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin 
in Dushanbe, that in all, the Russian aluminum giant 
RUSAL will participate in projects worth more than 
$1 billion in Tajikistan. Rusal will, for example, 
receive an as yet unspecified stake in the Rogun 
hydroelectric project for $560 million of investment 
in the Rogun dam's completion. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
Interfax Mining & Metals 
Report, 2004. RUSAL to hep 
build aluminum smelter in 
Tajikistan. 21 Oct. 
93 Y Y 
    
08/02/2005 
The Kazakh-Kyrgyz intergovernmental commission 
has reached an agreement on the use of the 
Toktogul water reservoir in Bishkek. Kyrgyzstan 
will reduce the amount of water released by the 
Toktogul reservoir into the Kazakh Shardara 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2005. Kyrgyzs agree to 
cut water discharge to prevent 
floods in Kazakhstan. (Kazakh 
Television first channel, 
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reservoir from 740 cu.m. per second to 650 cu.m. per 
second. In return, Kazakhstan will consider 
supplying natural gas to the neighbouring state. 
Pressure was put on the Toktogul hydroelectric 
power station due to the shortage of electricity in 
winter months. 
Astana, in Kazakh) 8 Feb. 
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10/02/2005 
A Tajik government delegation headed by Prime 
Minister Oqil Oqilov arrived in Tashkent today. Two 
documents were signed on the results of the talks. 
They are intergovernmental agreements on the 
mutual settlement of accounts for cargo 
transportation and the payment of Tajikistan's state 
debt in 2005, and on cooperation in the rational use 
of water and energy resources in the period from 
February 2005 to April 2006. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2005. Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan sign energy, debt 
accords. (Uzbek Television 
first channel, Tashkent, in 
Russian) 10 Feb. 
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06/05/2005 
Incident between the border communities of Charbak 
and Sogment [both Kyrgyz] and Khushyor [Uzbek]. 
Farmers from Khushyor demand that a schedule for 
supplying irrigation water be changed. 
Other 
BBC Monitoring International 
Reports, 2005. NGOs said 
playing "key role" in settling 
Uzbek-Kyrgyz water row. 6 
May. 
96 Y 
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19/05/2005 
TJ and KG presidents met and agreed to boost the 
development of their relationd at all levels. They 
said Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan could become the 
countries who could export power not only to the 
region but to the world as well 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2005. Tajik, Kyrgyz 
leaders hail prospects for 
energy ties. (Asia-Plus news 
agency, Dushanbe, in Russian) 
19 May. 
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31/05/2005 
The heads of the Central Asian states have taken a 
decision to set up a water and energy consortium 
(WES). This will be a significant step towards the 
integrated management of water resources in the 
region, the Tajik minister of land reclamation 
and water resources, Abduqohir Nazirov, told a 
conference in Dushanbe today. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2005. Central Asia agrees 
consortium for rational use 
of water at Tajik forum. 
(Avesta website, Dushanbe, in 
Russian) 31 May. 
98 
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Y 01/06/2005 
A session of the Tajik Assembly of Representatives 
has cancelled an old agreement (1994) between the 
Russian and Tajik governments to complete the 
construction of the Rogun hydro-electric power 
station on the River Vakhsh. Another reason for the 
cancellation of the agreement was the signing of a 
new agreement "On long-term cooperation between 
the Tajik government and RusAl. 
Cancelation 
of an 
agreement 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2005. Tajik-Russian 
power plant deal cancelled. 
(Avesta website, Dushanbe, in 
Russian) 1 Jun. 
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Y 19/09/2005 
Rahmon announced that construction of Rogun will 
begin with the involvement of Russian capital in late 
September. Rahmon stressed again the strategic 
importance of the unique hydroelectric power station 
not only for Tajikistan and Russia, but also for the 
neighbouring countries, specifically Afghanistan. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2005. Russia to start 
construction of Tajik power 
plant late September. (ITAR-
TASS news agency, Moscow, 
in Russian) 19 Sep. 
100 Y 
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13/02/2006 
The current state and prospects for cooperation 
between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were discussed 
by the head of the Tajik state and the Kyrgyz 
diplomat during a meeting which was held after the 
presentation of credentials.The construction of the 
Batken-Konibodom power transmission line [linking 
Tajik north with southwestern Kyrgyzstan] and the 
Dushanbe-Saritosh [on the border with Kyrgyzstan] 
as an important factor for expanding Tajik-Kyrgyz 
relations was also discussed. This was said to be one 
of the most important directions of the development 
of relations between the two neighbouring countries, 
as well as the expansion of mutually beneficial 
bilateral cooperation in the hydroelectric power 
sector and mining industry and rational use 
of water resources. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2006. Tajik president 
receives Kyrgyz envoy, 
relations discussed. (Tajik 
television) 14 Feb. 
 218 
 
101 Y Y 
    
26/07/2006 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan Inaugurate the Chu-
Talas Rivers Commission 
Establishme
nt of a joint 
body 
UNECE, 2006. Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan Inaugurate the 
Chu-Talas Rivers Commission. 
24 Jul. 
102 Y Y Y 
 
Y 
 
07/09/2006 
Leaders of KZ, KG, TJ and UZ -- who discussed 
economic, security and cultural cooperation -- 
concluded two pacts covering water resources -- one 
that seeks to save the shrinking Aral Sea and another 
that strives to improve the regional water 
management system. Summit participants envisioned 
the creation of a consortium to tackle long-running 
disputes over the distribution of scarce water 
resources. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
Eurasianet.org, 2006. Central 
Asian leaders seek to improve 
regional cooperation. 8 Sep. 
103 Y 
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01/10/2006 
During his visit to Kyrgyzstan in October 2006 the 
president of Uzbekistan made yet another statement 
about ‘further strengthening collaboration in fighting 
international 
terrorism, religious extremism, and transnational 
organised crime’ (cited in Asrorov 2006). What 
Islam Karimov didn’t mention in his communique´ 
was the fact that at that moment the two countries 
were perilously close to an open confrontation over 
water in the Toktogul Reservoir, the illegal presence 
of Uzbek troops in the Sokh enclave, disputes over 
natural gas prices and Uzbek refugees from Andijan. 
Other 
Gazeta Kz., 2006. Pogovorim 
ob uzbeksko-kirgizskikh 
otnosheniiakh. 15 Nov. 
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14/12/2006 
Kyrgyzstan has agreed to buy gas from Uzbekistan 
at 100 dollars per 1,000 cu.m. At Uzbekistan's 
request, Kyrgyzstan agreed to discharge additional 
1.56bn cu. m. of water [from the Toktogul reservoir] 
for Uzbekistan's irrigation needs. The neighbouring 
country agreed to buy 1.3bn electricity from 
Kyrgyzstan at 0.011 [figure as heard] per kWh 
during the vegetation period. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2006. Kyrgyzstan agrees 
to buy Uzbek natural gas at 
new price. (Kyrgyz Television 
1) 15 Dec. 
105 Y 
    
Y 15/12/2006 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia are launching a major 
energy-generating project to build the Kambarata-1 
and Kambarata-2 hydroelectric cascades in the 
Central Asian state, to be operated by Russian 
electricity monopoly Unified Energy System (UES), 
and designed to produce electricity for domestic 
needs and exports to Pakistan, Afghanistan and 
northern China. 
Joint 
statement/de
claration 
Ria Novosti, 2006. Russia, 
Kyrgyzstan embark on multi-
billion dollar energy project. 15 
Dec. 
 219 
 
106 
  
Y 
 
Y 
 
01/02/2007 
Uzbek Prime Minister Writes to his Tajik Colleague 
on Rogun Hydrolelectric Power Station, requiring a 
detailed examination of the project , accusing TJ of 
"full ignorance on the part of the Government of the 
Republic of Tajikistan, which has not viewed 
possible after-effects and the proper planning and 
technical support, but yet continues to speedily 
undertake construction of this facility." 
Open Letter 
Mirziyoyev, 2007. Uzbek 
Prime Minister Writes to his 
Tajik Colleague on Rogun 
Hydrolelectric Power Station. 3 
Feb. 
107 Y Y 
   
Y 15/03/2007 
The Kyrgyz government intends to set up a joint 
venture with Kazakhstan and Russia to build 
two Kambarata hydroelectric power stations. 
Kyrgyzstan will own 34 per cent of the shares in the 
joint venture, and Russia and Kazakhstan 33 per cent 
each, First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov 
said that according to preliminary estimates, about 
2bn dollars were needed to build the two 
hydroelectric power stations, of which 1.7bn dollars 
would be spent on Kambarata 1 and 300m dollars 
on Kambarata 2. 
Kyrgyzstan has already invested a little more than 
150m dollars into building the Kambarata 2 
hydroelectric power station. In principle, Kazakhstan 
and Russia also must invest 150m dollars each. 
"The Kambarata projects have been included in a 
state economic development programme. The work 
on setting up the joint venture must be completed 
this year," Usenov said. 
Talks on 
commercial 
cooperation 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2007. Kazakhstan, Russia 
to build hydroelectric power 
stations in Kyrgyzstan. 
(Kyrgyz AKIpress) 15 Mar. 
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28/04/2007 
Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov and Uzbek 
President Islam Karimov have discussed prospects 
for bilateral cooperation, as well as hydroelectricity 
problems, in a telephone conversation, the Tajik 
presidential press service said on Saturday. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
Russia & CIS Presidential 
Bulletin, 2007. Tajik Uzbek 
leader discuss prospects for 
cooperation. 28 Apr. 
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30/04/2007 
As an outcome of Nazarbayev's visit to Kyrgyzstan, 
a joint venture involving state-owned companies 
from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia is 
established. The new venture is expected to finish 
construction on two hydroelectric power stations 
located on the Naryn River -- Kambarata 1 and 
Kambarata 2 –. 
Establishme
nt of a joint-
venture 
Eurasianet.org, 2007. 
Nazarbayev Flexes Diplomatic 
Muscle During Visit to 
Kyrgyzstan. 30 Apr. 
110 Y Y 
    
09/07/2007 
Kazakhstan annulled Kyrgyzstan's debt for the usage 
of railways and spread the national tariffs onto the 
country, and contributed US$100 million to a 
US$120 million joint investment fund to be created. 
Kazakh delegation also announced its intention to 
bid in the tender for the Kambarata stations. 
Talks on 
commercial 
cooperation 
Global Insight, 2007. 
Kazakhstan Outmanoeuvres 
Russia Over Investment in 
Kyrgyzstan. 13 Jul. 
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29/08/2007 
Another round of talks on the use of water and 
energy resources of the River Syr Darya by the 
Central Asian states has ended unsuccessfully 
No 
agreement 
reached 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2007. Central Asian talks 
on joint water use break down 
in Uzbekistan. (Tajik news 
agency Asia-Plus website) 29 
Aug. 
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Y 29/08/2007 
Rahmon announced that Tajikistan has cancelled a 
deal with the giant Russian aluminium 
company, RusAl, to build Rogun, after the two sides 
failed to come to agreement over the height and type 
of dam to be built. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2007. Backgrounder: 
Tajikistan cancels giant 
Russian dam project. 11 Sep. 
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18/09/2007 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan sign several accords, among 
which an agreement between the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Water Resources and Processing 
Industry of Kyrgyzstan and the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Environmental Protection of 
Tajikistan "On cooperation in the agricultural 
sector". 
General 
cooperation 
agreement 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2007. Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan sign several accords. 
(Kyrgyz AKIpress website) 18 
Sep. 
114 Y 
    
Y 18/09/2007 
Bakiyev expressed his wish to hold in Bishkek an 
international water and energy summit under the 
aegis of the European Union, and to set up in 
Kyrgyzstan an international water management 
academy, which could train highly skilled specialists 
in this field. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2007. Kyrgyz paper says 
sides agreed on disputed areas 
at talks with Tajik leader. 21 
Sep. 
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07/01/2008 
As a result of temperature fall in the Central Asian 
countries, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan Cut 
Electricity Supply to Tajikistan. 
Resource cut 
Regunm news agency, 2008. 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan Cut 
Electricity Supply to 
Tajikistan. 7 Jan. 
116 Y 
     
10/01/2008 
Bakiyev said that "The government should start with 
the possible emission of long- term bonds for large 
national projects, including Kambarata 1 and 2 and 
an international highway." 
Declaration/
Speech 
Russia & CIS Business & 
Financial Daily, 2008. Bakiyev 
suggests issuing bonds for 
national projects. 10 Jan. 
117 Y 
     
23/01/2008 
The Kyrgyz government has endorsed the draft 
budget and its own programme of action for 2008, in 
which a total of 1.2bn soms are planned to be 
channelled into the construction of 
the Kambarata hydroelectric power station. 
Adoption of 
legal 
instruments 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2008. Kyrgyz 
government endorses draft 
budget for 2008. 28 Jan. 
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24/01/2008 
A report published on an UZB newspaper criticized 
Tajik hydroelectric power production projects, and 
said they might cause environmental problems in the 
region. 
Newspaper 
article 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2008. Uzbek expert raps 
Tajik hydroelectric power 
station projects. 25 Jan. 
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25/01/2008 
Tajik Prime Minister Oqil Oqilov expressed the 
opinion that it is necessary to boost the construction 
of the [Kyrgyz] Kambarata power stations. "This 
winter demonstrated that we should speed up the 
construction of the Kambarata-1 and Kambarata-2 
hydroelectric power stations, whether we want it or 
not," Oqilov said. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2008. Kyrgyz, Tajik 
premiers discuss electricity 
supply, transport. 25 Jan. 
120 Y Y 
    
18/02/2008 
Kazakh, Kyrgyz foreign ministers discuss 
cooperation. Tazhin also said that efficient use 
of water and energy resources was also discussed. 
"We reached an agreement to take all the necessary 
measures to prevent consequences that could be 
caused by unregulated water discharges in the River 
Syrdarya," he said. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2008. Kazakh, Kyrgyz 
foreign ministers discuss 
cooperation. 18 Feb. 
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01/03/2008 
150 Tajik residents of Isfara crossed the border into 
Kyrgyz territory to try to destroy a dam that cut them 
off from water sources. The dam was reopened later, 
after the Tajik side had to retreat due to armed 
threats by Kyrgyz border guards. 
Resource 
capture/Prot
ests 
Eurasianet.org, 2008. Ferghana 
Valley: Harsh Winter's Legacy 
Stokes Ethnic Tension. 1 Jun. 
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13/05/2008 
Kazakhs President Nursultan Nazarbayev indicated 
that Astana was very interested in investing in Tajik 
hydro-power projects. "If a consortium will work on 
the Rogun hydroelectric power station, then 
Kazakhstan will take part, providing materials, 
helping with shares, and as investors," Nazarbayev 
said during a May 13 joint news conference. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Radio Free Europe, 2008. 
Central Asia: Kazakh, Tajik 
Presidents Show Oil And 
Water Do Mix. 14 May. 
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16/05/2008 
The presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have 
signed an agreement on setting up an inter-
governmental coordinating council. Tasks and ways 
of resolving problems in the water and energy, 
transport and communications sectors were defined 
as priority 
Establishme
nt of a joint 
body 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2008. Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan sign cooperation 
accords. 16 May. 
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10/06/2008 
Kyrgyzstan will supply 1bn kWh of electricity and 
additionally discharge 1.2bn cubic metres 
of water, that is in excess of its own needs, to 
neighbouring countries. An agreement to this effect 
has been reached at a regional conference of the 
heads of the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik and 
Uzbek water resources, fuel and energy sectors. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2008. Kyrgyzstan reaches 
electricity, water accords with 
neighbours. 10 Jun. 
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08/07/2008 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan agree on free access to 
water of river. We have reached an agreement with 
Uzbekistan on free access to water of the River Syr 
Darya, Kazakh Deputy Prime Minister Umurzak 
Shukeyev said in Tashkent today. "We reached 
agreements with the Kyrgyz government last week 
on purchasing electricity amounting to 500m kW [as 
published]. In return for this, Kyrgyzstan is to 
discharge approximately 600m cu.m. of water from 
the Toktogul [reservoir]," Shukeyev said. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2008. Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan agree on free 
access to water of river. 8 Jul. 
126 Y Y 
    
18/07/2008 
Kazakhstan threatens to stop buying Kyrgyz 
electricity if water not supplied. Kazakhstan should 
not beg for the water which it is entitled to. We gave 
our partners in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan until 
Monday [21 July]. Kazakhstan will stop buying 
electricity from Kyrgyzstan if water is not supplied 
to the Dostyk channel by that time," the chairman of 
the committee for water resources of the Kazakh 
Ministry of Agriculture, Anatoliy Ryabtsev, said at a 
news conference in Shymkent today. 
Threatening/
Warning 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2008. Kazakhstan 
threatens to stop buying 
Kyrgyz electricity if water not 
supplied. 18 Jul. 
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19/07/2008 
Astana has warned Tashkent that if Uzbekistan 
hinders water supply from Kyrgyzstan into the 
Dostyk canal (in South Kazakhstan Region, SKR) 
then not only Kazakhstan but also other countries in 
the region will suffer from this. "Otherwise, the 
purchase of expensive electricity from Kyrgyzstan 
will be stopped. Not only Kazakhstan but also fields 
Threatening/
Warning 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2008. Kazakhs warn 
Uzbeks of consequences if 
Kyrgyz water not supplied. 19 
Jul. 
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in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan will suffer from this," 
says the government's telegram, the text of which is 
available to the Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency. 
128 Y Y Y Y Y 
 
11/09/2008 
The Syr Darya basin countries have failed to agree 
on the most topical issue - rational use of 
river water. The heads of water and energy facilities 
in the Central Asian states admitted that they 
practically reached deadlock in Astana yesterday 
evening. 
No 
agreement 
reached 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2008. Kyrgyz paper urges 
compromise on 
energy, water issues in Central 
Asia. 12 Sep. 
129 Y 
    
Y 09/10/2008 
The Russian and Kyrgyz presidents have ordered to 
accelerate the construction of the first and 
second Kambarata hydropower plants in Kyrgyzstan. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Central Asia General 
Newswire, 2008. Russian, 
Kyrgyz presidents want faster 
building of Kambarata HPP. 9 
Oct. 
130 Y Y Y Y Y 
 
20/10/2008 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan have agreed to coordinate the use of 
common water and energy resources of the region 
during the 2008-09 winter and crop seasons. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2008. Central Asian 
states to coordinate use of 
common water, energy 
resources. 20 Oct. 
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03/12/2008 
Uzbekistan against construction of Tajik power plant 
on transborder river. "We think that all decisions on 
using a watercourse of transborder rivers, including 
on building hydro-technical facilities, should not, 
under no circumstances, damage the environment 
and infringe the interests of people, who live in the 
contiguous countries," the paper quoted the acting 
head of the State Committee for Environment 
Protection, Boriy Alixonov, as saying at an 
international environmental forum held in Asgabat 
on 3 December. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2008. Uzbekistan against 
construction of Tajik power 
plant on transborder river. 16 
Dec. 
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01/01/2009 
As of Jan. 1 Uzbekistan halted the transmission of 
power supplied by Turkmenistan to Tajikistan, 
which heightened the severity of the country’s power 
shortage into an even more severe crisis. 
Resource cut 
Central Asia Online, 2009. In 
the resolution of the energy 
crisis in Tajikistan, a word for 
Uzbekistan. 30 Jan. 
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Y Y 23/01/2009 
While visiting Uzbekistan, Medvedev stated that 
"Hydroelectric power stations in the Central Asian 
region must be built with consideration of the 
interests of all neighbouring states," adding that, "if 
there is no common accord of all parties, Russia will 
refrain from participation in such projects." As a 
reaction to this, the MFA of Tajikistan had sent a 
note of protest to the Russian Federation embassy. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Tajikistan offended 
by Russian leader's remarks on 
water use in region - paper. 11 
Feb. 
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27/01/2009 
"We will build the Roghun hydroelectric power 
station although somebody will be against it," the 
deputy Tajik minister of energy and industry Pulod 
Muhiddinov said. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Tajikistan to go 
ahead with construction of 
power plant - official. 27 Jan. 
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Y 01/02/2009 
Russia has gone ahead bilaterally with Kyrgyzstan 
with a pledge of a loan of $1.7 billion to invest in the 
Kambarata hydro project. 
Joint 
statement/de
claration 
Ministry of Economy of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, 2012. 
Regulation of specific 
industries. 21 Sep. 
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Y 02/02/2009 
Rahmon has cancelled his visit to Moscow. "There is 
a big suspicion that the refusal is a response to a 
speech by Medvedev, who just over a week ago in 
Tashkent agreed with Uzbekistani President 
Islom Karimov that issues of constructing 
hydroelectric power stations should be decided 
collectively, taking account of the interests of all 
countries in the region," Daniil Kislov, founder and 
chief editor of the Fergana.ru news agency, told 
Gazeta.ru. 
Dipl. rel. 
Cooling 
BBC Monitoring Former 
Soviet Union - Political, 2009. 
Tajik leader's Moscow visit 
cancellation shows cooling of 
relations with Russia. 6 Feb. 
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10/02/2009 
As of 10 February, Tajikistan is again on the brink of 
energy collapse as last winter.Tajikistan says the 
electricity crisis has been caused by a dry summer, 
as well as the unresolved issue of Turkmen 
electricity transit via Uzbekistan. 
Newspaper 
article 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Uzbek leader 
against politicizing Central 
Asian water. 26 Feb. 
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13/02/2009 
At a session of the Cabinet of Ministers on 13 
February, Uzbek President Islom Karimov said 
Uzbekistan did not mind Tajik and Kyrgyz energy 
projects if independent experts guarantee that the 
projects would not damage the environment, Uzbek 
TV reported the same day. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Uzbeks not against 
Tajik, Kyrgyz energy projects 
if ecology not harmed - leader. 
13 Feb. 
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18/02/2009 
UZ and TJ s signed an agreement on cooperation in 
the fields of water, energy and gas. The sides agreed 
a schedule of water discharge from the Qayroqqum 
reservoir, in line with which the Tajik side will fill 
the reservoir of the Qayroqqum hydroelectric power 
station by 30 May. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan agree steps to ease 
water dispute. 19 Feb. 
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19/02/2009 
As a consequence of the 18 Feb. Agreement, and at 
the culmination point of Tajik-Uzbek energy 
disputes, the Uzbek side resumed the supply of 
electricity to Tajikistan. 
Resumption 
of resource 
supply 
CACI Analyst, 2009. Fire over 
water in Central Asia. 
Available from: 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=
node/5079 [Accessed 7 Jun. 
2012]. 
141 
   
Y Y 
 
25/02/2009 
Uzbek President Islom Karimov has said water 
problems in the Central Asian region should not be 
politicized, and shows good relationship with 
Turkmen president. Karimov said that projects on 
the construction of power plants on transborder 
rivers in the region must undergo an international 
examination. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Uzbek leader 
against politicizing Central 
Asian water. 26 Feb. 
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14/04/2009 
The Uzbek foreign ministry issued a formal 
statement warning that Rogun and Kambarata 
projects “pursue commercial interests and far-
reaching political objectives, but disregard the 
possible consequences and ignore the concerns of 
the neighbouring states”. 
Declaration/
Speech 
IWPR, 2009. Tashkent Sees 
Astana as Possible Ally on 
Water. 18 Apr. 
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15/04/2009 
In an annual address to parliament, Rahmon 
dismissed as “groundless” claims that hydroelectric 
schemes will reduce water flows and harm the 
environment. Two days later, Kyrgyzstan’s 
Kurmanbek Bakiev accused unspecified “other 
countries” of trying to “gain control over our 
Declaration/
Speech 
IWPR, 2009. Uzbek Overtures 
to Kazakstan on Water Dispute. 
30 Apr. 
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strategic resources”. Meanwhile, UZ has been busy 
enlisting the other downstream states, Turkmenistan 
and Kazakstan, to support its cause. 
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28/04/2009 
IFAS Summit in Almaty: the five Central Asian 
leaders met to discuss water issues related to the 
Aral Sea. The discussion on the interstate regulation 
of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers (both 
flowing into the Aral Sea) between upstream and 
downstream countries dominated the summit's 
agenda. It exposed some of the deepest divisions 
among the region's leaders. Uzbekistan's President 
Islam Karimov bullied upstream Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan for their plans to implement more 
assertive water management policies. Kazakhstan's 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev, in turn, 
demonstrated his upper hand by seeking to moderate 
the discussion, while Turkmenistan's Gurbanguly 
Berdimuhamedov called on others to seek a regional 
balance without clarifying how this might be 
achieved. The summit ended with the signing of an 
agreement without any specific detail on 
transnational water management. 
Joint 
statement/de
claration 
Agence France Presse, 2009. 
Central Asian water talks boil 
over into bickering. 28 Apr. ; 
AKIpress, 2009. President 
Bakiev hints neighboring 
countries that Kyrgyzstan 
needs compensation 
for water accumulation. 28 
Apr. 
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30/04/2009 
ALMATY follow-up: TJ paper "Tajikistan" accuses 
UZ of having created a "Plot hatched to mislead 
world community". "In fact, Mr Karimov's covert 
goal of intensifying a dispute over water and 
electricity in the region, which has been continuing 
for 17 years, is to attract the attention of the world 
community to investment projects for 
the construction of hydroelectric power stations in 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Islom Karimov knows 
well that every time he plays this card in a specific 
manner, the issue of foreign investment in the 
hydroelectric power stations in the region will be 
postponed for a certain time. This is because 
Tashkent's hue and cry has made international donor 
organizations to act cautiously. Seeing and knowing 
this, Karimov is skilfully using this card. 
Newspaper 
article 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Tajik paper claims 
Uzbekistan to blame for demise 
of Aral Sea. 18 May. 
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05/05/2009 
ALMATY follow-up: President Bakiyev of 
Kyrgyzstan stated in May of 2009 that both phases 
of the Kambarata power project will be built, 
regardless of “who likes it or not,” a clear challenge 
to the objections of Tashkent and Ashgabat. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Eurasianet.org, 2009. 
Kyrgyzstan: Bakiyev Stands 
Up to Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan on Hydropower 
Projects. 6 May. 
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Y Y 30/05/2009 
Tajik President Rahmon speaks about Rogun with 
participants in a session of the regional political 
dialogue between the EU troika and the Central 
Asian countries at the level of foreign ministers. "We 
adhere to the principled line which is based on the 
need to maintain balance of both national and 
regional interests. In this connection I would like to 
stress two important points. First, the hydroenergy 
sector is not water consuming and it does not 
consume water without return. It just 
lets water through turbines of the hydroelectric 
power station. Unlike the hydroenergy sector, 
irrigated farming takes the river flow without return, 
and even if returns, it returns part of water as a 
drained water of very bad quality. I have repeatedly 
said from various rostrums that none of Tajikistan's 
projects in this sector [energy sector] will not be 
aimed against our neighbours," Emomali Rahmon 
said. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. None of Tajik 
energy projects aimed against 
neighbours - leader. 1 Jun. 
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13/06/2009 
Uzbek authorities decided to strengthen security on 
the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. Specifically, they dug 
ditches in the Suzak, Aksy and No’okat borderline 
regions of 
Kyrgyzstan and erected walls in the Rishtan rayon of 
Uzbekistan’s Ferghana region. One explanation for 
Uzbekistan’s decision relates to Kyrgyzstan’s 
intention to build the Kambarata hydro-electric 
station. Bishkek-based political scientist Mars 
Saryev views the current Uzbek policy as yet another 
sign of disapproval of such plans, and another way 
of raising difficulties for the Kyrgyz in realizing 
their energy potential. 
Issue linkage 
CACI Analyst, 2009. 
Uzbekistan- Kyrgyzstan 
building a wall. 7 Jan. 
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15/06/2009 
If the construction of hydroelectric power stations 
has turned into a national idea for Tajikistan, then for 
Uzbekistan such idea is the issue of water usage 
because over 60 per cent of the Uzbek population 
live in rural areas, the assistant of the Uzbek 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan should seek 
compromise on water row - 
Uzbek diplomat. 16 Jun. 
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ambassador to Tajikistan, Yuriy Nagay, told Asia-
Plus. We need to listen to each other attentively and 
come toagreement," the assistant of the Uzbek 
diplomat convinced. 
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16/07/2009 
Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow 
launched the first stage of the Grand Turkmen Lake, 
a huge artificial lake in the desert. Berdimuhamedow 
stressed the significance of the Turkmen lake and 
added: "As is known, our initiatives to provide water 
and environmental security, as well as safe use of 
transboundary water resources in Central Asia and to 
deal with the aftermath of the Aral tragedy 
demonstrate that Turkmenistan is 
making huge efforts to contribute to common work 
on preserving the nature and improving 
environment". The project will be implemented in 
three stages. 
Resource 
capture 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Turkmenistan 
contributes to "saving" 
transborder water resources - 
leader. 16 Jul. 
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19/09/2009 
Tajikistan suspends exporting electricity to 
Uzbekistan. "Tajikistan would benefit more from 
selling energy to the neighbouring country, rather 
than releasing water for nothing," Yodgori said. 
Resource cut 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Tajikistan suspends 
exporting electricity to 
Uzbekistan. 19 Sep. 
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23/09/2009 
Uzbekistan suspends gas supplies to southern and 
northern Kyrgyzstan due $19US million gas debt 
owed. 
Resource cut 
AKIpress, 2009. Gas supplies 
resume in Osh. 14 Oct. 
153 Y Y 
    
28/09/2009 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are holding talks on 
mutual exchange of electricity. "The 
fundamental agreement is that we help Kyrgyzstan 
with electricity in winter and in return they 
supply water to our south during the irrigation 
period," Mynbayev said. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan discuss mutual 
energy issues. 28 Sep. 
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30/09/2009 
Uzbekistan has completely cut off gas supplies to 
Tajikistan over a debt that exceeds 18m dollars, a 
report circulated by the open joint-stock company 
Tojiktransgaz [Tajikgas transportation] today says. 
Resource cut 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Uzbekistan cuts 
off gas supplies to Tajikistan 
over debt. 30 Sep. 
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30/09/2009 
Uzbekistan resumes gas supply to Tajikistan after 
the latter has paid the most part of its $18US million 
debt for gas. 
Resumption 
of resource 
supply 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Uzbekistan 
resumes gas supplies to 
Tajikistan. 30 Sep. 
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14/10/2009 
Uzbekistan resumes gas supply to Osh (gas was cut 
on september 23) 
Resumption 
of resource 
supply 
AKIpress, 2009. Gas supplies 
resume in Osh. 14 Oct. 
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21/10/2009 
The former head of the Tajik Barq-i Tojik power 
supply company, Sharifkhon Samiyev, blames 
Uzbekistan for energy problems. "I think that energy 
issues between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have long 
acquired a political and not economic 
nature."[Reporter Ramziddin Najmiddinov:] 
Everybody in Tajikistan believes that after 
construction of the Roghun hydroelectric power 
station and commissioning of the South-North and 
Tajikistan-Afghanistan power transmission lines, 
many energy problems in the country will be 
resolved. [Sharifkhon Samiyev:] I also believe in 
this. But one should look at things realistically. The 
issue of constructing Roghun is not resolved in one 
or two years. At the same time, Tajikistan's demand 
in electricity is growing every day." 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Tajik official 
blames Uzbekistan for energy 
problems. 7 Nov. 
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24/11/2009 
Uzbek Ambassador to Tajikistan Shoqosim 
Shoislomov said in Dushanbe that Uzbekistan will 
end its participation in the Soviet-era electric power 
grid as of December 1. He said Uzbekistan has built 
a new power distribution system that can provide all 
of its regions with electricity and does not need the 
outdated electricity grid. Homidjon Orifov, the head 
of Tajikistan's National Committee for Dams, said 
Uzbekistan's move is most likely connected to the 
Tajik-Uzbek standoff regarding the construction of a 
new hydropower station near the Tajik city of 
Roghun. 
Withdrawal 
from a 
regional org. 
Radio Free Europe, 2009. 
Tajikistan Reacts To Uzbek 
Decision To Quit Power Grid. 
27 Nov. 
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25/11/2009 
Husrav Goibov, deputy head of the CIS department 
at the Tajik Foreign Ministry, says that "The 
unilateral decision made by Uzbekistan to leave the 
Central Asian Unified Energy System runs counter 
to the principles of neighborliness and is politically 
motivated," 
Declaration/
Speech 
Interfax News Agency, 2009. 
Uzbekistan's withdrawal from 
Central Asian power grid. 25 
Nov. 
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01/12/2009 
UZ withdraws from Central Asian power grid. 
Uzbek officials say Tashkent's participation in the 
regional system endangers the flow of electricity to 
its domestic consumers. If UZ does not quickly 
reverse its decision, some Tajiks suggest Dushanbe 
will retaliate by restricting water supplies that 
Tashkent desperately needs to keep the country's 
cotton sector afloat during the spring and summer. 
Withdrawal 
from a 
regional org. 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Uzbekistan 
withdraws from Central 
Asian power grid from 1 
December. 1 Dec. 
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13/12/2009 
Uzbek President meet with Turkmen President. In a 
speech Karimov said that "I would like to 
specifically note the commonality of interests and 
stances regarding the rational and fair use 
of water and energy resources in the Central Asian 
region". 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Uzbek, Turkmen 
leaders upbeat on bilateral ties. 
13 Dec. 
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23/12/2009 
Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev has said that 
downstream countries such as Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan will benefit from the construction of 
the Kambarata 2 hydroelectric power station. He said 
by constructing the power plant Kyrgyzstan would 
ensure uninterrupted power supply for local 
population and accumulate water for irrigation needs 
of downstream countries in the region. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Kyrgyz leader says 
neighbours to benefit from new 
power plant. 23 Dec. 
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28/12/2009 
Uzbek President Islom Karimov held a meeting with 
Kyrgyz Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov to discuss 
prospects for developing bilateral cooperation. 
Following the talks, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Daniyar 
Usenov said his country would possibly carry out an 
international expert examination of the project of 
the Kambarata-1 hydroelectric power station. "The 
Uzbek side has informed the Kyrgyz one of its 
concern over plans to construct the Kambarata-1 
power plant in view of possible damage to the 
environment and the water and energy balance, as 
well as possible technological threats. For this 
reason, Uzbekistan has requested to carry out an 
international expert examination of the project under 
the aegis of the World Bank. The reservoir of the 
planned Kambarata-2 hydroelectric power station 
will contain 5bn cu.m. of water. This volume is large 
enough. Kyrgyzstan will benefit from the conduct of 
an expert examination of Kambarata-1. According to 
him, a delegation of the World Bank's Board of 
Directors visited the place allocated for the 
construction several weeks earlier. "I asked them to 
help and allocate a grant to carry out a thorough 
expert examination of Kabarata-1. All the major 
facilities should undergo an international 
examination. We see nothing bad in it," the Kyrgyz 
prime minister noted. 
Talks on 
dam 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Kyrgyzstan may 
agree to probe into major water 
facilities - premier. 30 Dec. 
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01/01/2010 
Since January, Tashkent has delayed thousands of 
rail carriages, citing “technical and logistical” issues. 
Dushanbe says Tashkent is trying to sabotage 
construction of a giant hydroelectric power plant, 
Rogun. 
Border 
tensions 
Eurasianet.org, 2010. Boxcar 
Diplomacy Puts Tajik 
Businesses At Tashkent’s 
Mercy. 6 Aug. 
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01/01/2010 
In his official address to Tajik citizens, President 
Rakhmon announced that 2010 will be the year 
“when great resources will be mobilized” to 
construct the 3,600 mw Rogun dam. “The 
construction of this site, important for our country, 
has turned into the arena of labor, bravery and 
generosity, trials of heroism, and, more so, our 
national idea,” said Rakhmon. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2010. 
Will Tajikistan Successfully 
Construct Rogun? Volume: 7 
Issue: 17. 
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08/01/2010 
Uzbektransgaz, the gas transport arm of Uzbekistan's 
state-run Uzbekneftegaz, cut gas supplies to 
Tajikistan in half, from 480,000 cm/d to 240,000 
cm/d, due to Tajikistan's failure to pre-pay for gas 
supplies. 
Resource cut 
Agence France Presse, 2010. 
Uzbekistan halves energy to 
Tajikistan: company. 8 Jan. 
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14/01/2010 
Water resource ministers of the 5 Central Asian 
countries wrapped up two days of discussions on 
water pumping limits and operation of hydroelectric 
dams on transborder rivers. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
Central Asia Online, 2010. 
Ministers discuss water use and 
allocation for 2010. 15 Jan. 
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03/02/2010 
In a letter to his Tajik counterpart Akil Akilov,which 
appeared in the media before reaching the addressee, 
Uzbek Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoev called on 
Tajikistan to reconsider the construction of Rogun in 
order to prevent environmental dangers, maintain 
water balance, and provide continuing access to 
water for millions of people. He also stated "it is 
necessary to make an independent evaluation of the 
project before resuming the construction of the 
Rogun hydropower plant. The project was elaborated 
about 40 years ago and based on obsolete 
technologies". 
Open Letter 
Global Insight, 2010. 
Uzbekistan Calls for 
Independent Assessment of 
Hydropower Project in 
Tajikistan. 4 Feb. 
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07/02/2010 
Akilov sent an open letter to Mirziyoyev posted by 
the Khovar news agency. He emphasized the 
country’s sovereign right to build the dam to rectify 
energy deficits, which have plagued the country for 
years now but “have been impossible to cover by 
energy imports because of ongoing man-made 
obstacles.” He also referred to the project’s 
compliance with international law and the 2006 
assessment by the German Lahmeyer corporation. 
The latter allegedly confirmed that the project takes 
ecological issues into consideration, something 
Uzbekistan seriously questions. 
Open Letter 
Central Asia General 
Newswire, 2010. Tajik premier 
again affirms absence of Rogun 
HPP threat to Uzbekistan. 8 
Feb. 
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08/02/2010 
The reaction of Uzbek side on Akilov’s letter has 
been to cut gas supplies to TJ. "Since Sunday, 
Uzbekistan has cut in half -- from 28,000 cubic 
metres of natural gas per hour to 15,000 cubic metres 
-- gas to Tajikistan," a company spokesman told 
AFP. 
Resource cut 
Agence France Presse, 2010. 
Uzbekistan cuts energy to 
Tajikistan amid tensions: 
company. 8 Feb. 
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Y 10/03/2010 
The World Bank announced that they will 
underwrite an environmental feasibility study for the 
proposed Rogun hydropower project. "If the Rogun 
project proves its financial and environmental 
sustainability, the World Bank will provide the 
financial aid and support to the government of 
Tajikistan for the establishment of a consortium that 
will build this plant. The Tajik government and the 
World Bank will sign an appropriate memorandum 
on this issue," Konishi said. 
ESIA 
Eurasianet.org, 2010. 
Tajikistan: World Bank Offer 
Energizes Rogun Hydropower 
Project. 15 Mar. 
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16/03/2010 
Nazarbayev visits Uzbekistan. A tendency for KZ-
UZ rapprochement is evident from 
Karimov's backing to Nazarbayev's initiative to 
convene the OSCE summit under the aegis of 
Kazakhstan chairmanship in this Organisation. 
According to Nursultan Nazarbayev, the 
environmental and anthropogenic security of and 
regulation of water flows at Rogun HPP in Tajikistan 
and Kambarata facilities in Kyrgyzstan need be 
appraised by international experts. "There ought to 
be no hydroelectric power plants in the region 
without results of the expertise obtained and 
studied," he said. The Kazakh leader underlined that 
ahead of his visit to Uzbekistan he had been in talks 
with Emomali Rahmon and Kurmanbek Bakiyev. "In 
principle they are ready for expert evaluation. 
Islam Karimovand I have come to an agreement we 
are now announcing - after the expert opinion is 
ready we are getting down to construction of new 
facilities". 
Talks on 
water/energy 
Vremya Novostei, 2010. 
Summits, Maneuvres, Jubilees. 
26 Mar. 
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19/02/2010 
Uzbek newspaper Narodnoye Slovo reiterates need 
for expert examination of Rogun, stating that "the 
documentation of the project has become obsolete 
and the construction needs international 
examination". 
Newspaper 
article 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Uzbek paper 
reiterates need for expert 
examination of major Tajik 
power plant. 19 Feb. 
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23/02/2010 
Tajik dam expert says no one has right to stop 
construction of RogHun plant. "The implementation 
of the project, which was launched back in Soviet 
era and which underwent all possible examinations 
in the Soviet era, is under way. The examination of 
the project was carried out by best specialists of 
leading institutes of the [former] Soviet Union," 
Homidjon Arifov said. "Tajikistan does not 
need agreement of any country or international 
organization for the project of the Roghun 
hydroelectric power station. Nobody has the right to 
veto this project. The fact that the World Bank is 
currently conducting an ecological examination of 
the Roghun project is the goodwill of Tajikistan in 
case if in future the bank makes a decision to take 
part in financing the project," the expert said. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Tajik dam expert 
says no one has right to stop 
construction of Roghun plant. 
24 Feb. 
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01/03/2010 
Uzbekistan has unilaterally closed the Qorasuv-
Avtodorozhnyy checkpoint [on the border with 
Kyrgyzstan]. Qorasuv-Avtodorozhnyy is the second 
biggest and busiest customs checkpoint between 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan after the Dostlik 
checkpoint in the east of Uzbekistan. Human rights 
activists in Kyrgyzstan connect the closing of the 
checkpoint with the construction of 
the Kambarata hydroelectric power station, which 
the Uzbeks think can lead to a decrease in the 
volume of water flowing to Uzbekistan. 
Border 
closure 
BBC Monitoring Former 
Soviet Union - Political, 2010. 
Uzbekistan reportedly closes 
checkpoint on border with 
Kyrgyzstan. 4 Mar. 
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18/03/2010 
Tajik leader assures Turkmen counterpart energy 
projects not against neighbours. They signed 7 
agreements on cooperation. Speaking about the 
consumption of water resources in Turkmenistan, the 
Turkmen leader said the construction of lakes and 
reservoirs in Turkmenistan would help to protect the 
environment and use water rationally. 
General 
cooperation 
agreement 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Tajik leader assures 
Turkmen counterpart energy 
projects not against neighbours. 
18 Mar. 
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Y Y 31/03/2010 
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov who 
is on a visit to Tashkent, has confirmed Russia's 
unchangeable position towards projects on the 
construction of major hydroelectric facilities in 
Central Asia. "Construction of major hydroelectric 
facilities in Central Asia should be carried out in 
full agreement with the neighbouring countries," 
Ivanov said answering questions of journalists about 
Russia's position towards the construction of the 
Roghun hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan and 
Kambar-Ata [hydroelectric power station] in 
Kyrgyzstan, and about water balance between 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Russian official in 
Uzbekistan says power plants 
should be built in agreement. 
31 Mar. 
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Karimov, addressing the opening of the Asian 
Development Bank's (ADB) board of governors 
meeting in Tashkent, slammed his neighbours for 
what he said was a lack of foresight about the 
environmental impact of their policies. "In Uzbek we 
say 'where this is no water there is no life'. That's 
why, indeed, we treat this problem 
seriously," Karimov said. "Unfortunately, some of 
our neighbours do not treat this issue like-mindedly, 
especially the countries on the upstream of the 
rivers. They do not think about what kind of 
consequences it may lead to," he added. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Agence France Presse, 2010. 
Uzbek leader blasts neighbours 
in water row. 3 May. 
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18/05/2010 
Kyrgyzstan unexpectedly shut off supplies of 
irrigation water from the Kirov reservoir to 
Kazakhstan's Zhambyl region. 
Resource cut 
Russia & CIS Food and 
Agriculture Weekly, 2010. 
Kyrgyzstan shuts off irrigation 
water flow to Kazakhstan. 19 
May. 
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19/05/2010 
Kazakhstan will reopen its border with Kyrgyzstan 
on May 20, that it had closed after the April 7-8 
developments that resulted in the change of power in 
Bishkek and the flight that took President 
Kurmanbek Bakiyev out of Kyrgyzstan. (note: this is 
most likely linked with KG shutting off water 
supplies to KZ) 
Border 
opening 
Central Asia General 
Newswire, 2010. Nazarbayev 
has given instructions to open 
Kazakhstan's border with 
Kyrgyzstan on May 20. 19 
May. 
 238 
 
181 Y Y 
    
19/05/2010 
Kyrgyzstan revived agricultural water supply on 
Talas River to the south Kazakhstan. 
Resumption 
of resource 
supply 
Trend Daily Economic News, 
2010. Kyrgyzstan revive water 
supply to Kazakhstan. 20 May. 
182 Y Y Y Y Y Y 08/06/2010 
At the Water for life conference in dushanbe Tajik 
President Emomali Rakhmon’s proposed to declare 
2012 the International Year of Water Diplomacy. 
The proposal will be presented to the 65th session of 
the UN General Assembly in September. He also 
declared "Wise water management in the basins of 
trans-border rivers should be organized with respect 
to just and mutually beneficial use of not only water 
but also other natural resources." The conference 
was marked by tensions between Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan over the Rogun hydropower project. 
Water 
conference 
Central Asia Online, 2010. 
Rogun dam dominates water 
conference. 9 Jun. 
183 
  
Y Y 
  
08/06/2010 
A meeting between Tajik President Emomali 
Rahmon and Turkmen deputy chairman of cabinet of 
ministers in charge of agrarian sector, Myratgeldi 
Akmammedow, discussed issues of multifaceted 
cooperation between Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. 
The meeting also discussed topics of today's 
conference as well as rational and economical use of 
regional water and energy resources. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Tajik leader, 
Turkmen official discuss 
cooperation. 8 Jun. 
184 Y 
     
30/08/2010 
KG launched Kambarata-2 $200 million 
hydroelectric power station on Monday, its first 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Acting 
President Roza Otunbayeva pressed a symbolic red 
button to start the first unit of the Kambarata-2 hydro 
project. The project, funded partly by Russia, will 
allow Kyrgyzstan to generate more power but could 
divert water from its neighbours. 
Dam launch 
Reuters, 2010. Kyrgyzstan 
launches new hydroelectric 
power plant. 30 Aug. 
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185 
  
Y 
 
Y 
 
09/06/2010 
Tajikistan will meet Uzbekistan's all demands so as 
to complete the construction of the Roghun 
hydroelectric power plant, [Tajik] Minister of 
Energy and Industry Sherali Gul has said at the high-
level international conference on medium term 
review of the progress of the implementation of the 
International Decade for Action "Water for Life" 
2005-2015, which is under way in Dushanbe. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Tajikistan to meet 
Uzbekistan's demands 
regarding power plant - 
minister. 10 Jun. 
186 
 
Y Y 
   
11/10/2010 
Tajik Prime Minister Oqil Oqilov held a meeting 
with the Kazakh ambassador to Tajikistan, Abutalip 
Akhmetov to discuss prospects for further 
development of multilateral and bilateral mutually 
beneficial relations. The meeting also discussed 
issues in such fields as energy and use 
of water resources, including preparing a 
draft agreement "On the construction of the 500-
kWh Khujand-Datka-Almaty electricity transmission 
line". 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Tajik premier, 
Kazakh envoy 
discuss water, energy issues. 12 
Oct. 
187 
  
Y 
 
Y 
 
12/10/2010 
UZ President Karimov said that the Rogun project 
undermines Uzbekistan's water supplies. "How can 
we let the residents of Uzbekistan live without water 
for eight years, while the Rogun water reservoir is 
being filled up. What will farmers be doing all this 
time?" Karimov said, when asked why Uzbekistan is 
opposing the construction of the Rogun HPP in 
neighboring Tajikistan. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Interfax Central Asia & 
Caucasus Business Weekly, 
2010. Rogun project 
undermines Uzbekistan's water 
supplies - Karimov. 12 Oct. 
188 
  
Y 
 
Y 
 
21/10/2010 
Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi and 
experts have dismissed Uzbek President Islom 
Karimov's concerns that the construction of a major 
hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan will lead to 
a shortage of irrigation and drinking water in 
Uzbekistan. "The accusations being levelled at 
Tajikistan in connection with the construction of the 
Roghun hydroelectric power station, and the 
allegations that the water will take eight years to 
accumulate - during which Uzbekistan will not 
get water - do not have any scientific or economic 
basis,". 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Tajik minister, 
experts flay Uzbek president's 
statement on hydropower 
project. 19 Nov. 
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189 
  
Y 
 
Y 
 
01/11/2010 
UZ has unilaterally closed a post on its border with 
TJ without any explanation, a source in the Tajik 
Foreign Ministry has told Interfax today. 
Border 
tensions 
Ecological movement of 
Uzbekistan, 2010. International 
conference «Transboundary 
ecological problems of Middle 
Asia: Application of 
international legislative 
mechanisms for their solution». 
17 Nov. 
190 
  
Y 
 
Y 
 
16/11/2010 
Uzbekistan organised in Tashkent an international 
conference under the topic of "Transborder 
environmental problems of Central Asia: use of 
international legal mechanisms to resolve them", 
attended by Over 60 representatives of international 
organizations and financial institutions from over 30 
countries attended the conference. Particularly, it 
was attended by specialists from the UN, OSCE, 
World Bank, World Health Organization, and others. 
The conference noted Rogun negative impact on 
regional environment. 
Water 
conference 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Uzbek conference 
notes Tajik plant's negative 
impact on regional 
environment. 1 Dec. 
191 Y  Y    25/11/2010 
Kyrgyz Interim President Roza Otunbayeva said that 
for Kyrgyzstan as well as for Tajikistan it is a 
"topical" task to reach an agreement in mutually 
beneficial cooperation in efficient use of water and 
energy resources in Central Asia and said that 
Kyrgyzstan is ready for a "constructive" dialogue to 
resolve this issue for the benefit of peoples in the 
region. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Kyrgyz president 
urges closer cooperation in 
resolving water, energy issues. 
25 Nov. 
192   Y  Y  01/12/2010 
The Uzbek gas distribution company Uztransgaz 
(Uzbek gas transportation) has warned Tajikistan 
that it may cut off gas supplies to this country if its 
debt is not paid. "Tough measures will be taken, 
right up to a complete cut-off of gas supplies to 
Tajikistan if the debt is not paid," the letter reads. 
Threatening/
Warning 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Uzbekistan warns 
Tajikistan of gas cut-off over 
arrears. 1 Dec. 
193   Y  Y  02/12/2010 
State-run Uzbek TV carried a report December 2 that 
accused Tajik government officials of spreading lies 
to damage “the friendship between the Uzbek and 
Tajik peoples.” The Tajik people are suffering from 
the “arbitrariness” of their leaders, the report 
asserted, though “their gradually escalating tricks 
cannot damage stability in the Republic of 
Uzbekistan, or our good relations with the friendly 
[Tajik] people.” Regarding the delays at the border, 
Dipl. rel. 
Cooling 
Eurasianet.org, 2010. 
Uzbekistan vs. Tajikistan: 
Competition over Water 
Resources Intensifying. 8 Dec. 
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the report added somewhat ominously, “our state 
borders have always been open to people with good 
intentions." 
194 Y Y   Y  07/12/2010 
Kyrgyzstan has signed an agreement on the parallel 
operation of [electric] energy systems with 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan," the press service of the 
Kyrgyz Energy Ministry has said. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan sign 
electricity cooperation accord. 
7 Dec. 
195    Y Y  05/05/2011 
Uzbek-Turkmen cooperation accords signed. The 
signed documents included an agreement signed 
between the governments of the two countries on 
cooperation in science and technology aimed at 
"expanding cooperation in spheres such as power 
engineering, agriculture, water management, health 
care, environment protection and other spheres of 
mutual interest". 
General 
cooperation 
agreement 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2011. Uzbek-Turkmen 
cooperation accords signed. 5 
May. 
196 Y Y   Y  16/09/2011 
KyrgyzGaz Chairman Turgunbek Kulmurzaev told 
RFE/RL that the agreement -- under which 
Kyrgyzstan will supply water to southern 
Kazakhstan in exchange for gas -- was reached on 
September 16 in Bishkek between Kyrgyz officials 
and visiting Kazakh Prime Minister Karim 
Masimov. Bishkek started looking for alternative gas 
supplies after Uzbekistan raised the price for natural 
gas deliveries to $278 per 1,000 cubic meters. 
Annual 
operation 
agreement 
RFE/RL, 2010. Kazakhs To 
Sell Gas To Kyrgyz After 
Uzbekistan Raises Price. 20 
Sep. 
197   Y  Y  16/11/2011 
Misterious explosion damaged a bridge in Uzbek 
territory that caused key rail traffic between Termez 
in Uzbekistan and the Tajik city of Qurgonteppa to 
be shut down. The UZ described the incident as a 
terrorist act. Also: Rather than fix the track, the 
Uzbeks dismantled it. Tajikistan calls the actions a 
blockade. 
Flow of 
goods 
disruption 
Radio Free Europe, 2011. Tajik 
Railways Wants Probe With 
Uzbeks Of Alleged Terrorist 
Blast. 21 Nov. 
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Annex 3. Timeline of the Rogun dam 
Key 
 
KG Kyrgyzstan KZ Kazakhstan TJ Tajikistan  TK Turkmenistan UZ Uzbekistan  
 
EXT Non-Central Asian actor  Y Involved in the event 
 
 
 KG KZ TJ TK UZ EXT DATE DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT 
TYPE OF 
EVENT 
SOURCE 
1   Y    30/05/1993 
The newly elected President of Tajikistan Emomali 
Rahmon released an interview to Ostankino Channel 
1, in which he declared that despite financial 
constraints, “the construction of the Rogun hydro-
electric station is continuing”. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1993. Tajikistan; 
Interview with President 
Rahmonov. 1 Jun. 
 
 
 
 
 
2   Y   Y 18/07/1993 
Tajik Premier Abdullojonov says that a draft has 
been elaborated of an agreement between Russia and 
Tajikistan concerning the completion of the 
construction of Rogun hydroelectric power station. 
Draft 
Agreement 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1993. Tajik 
premier: under CIS treaty 
everyone should help us defend 
our borders. 20 Jul. 
3   Y   Y 13/04/1994 
The Russian-Tajik intergovernmental talks ended on 
Wednesday [13th April] with [the] signing [of] two 
agreements: on Russia's participation in completing 
the construction of the Rogun hydropower station 
and on granting an R80bn credit by Russia to 
Tajikistan in 1994. 
Agreement 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1994. Russia grants 
R80bn in credit to Tajikistan. 
14 Apr. 
4   Y   Y 26/05/1994 
According to an official of the Russian Ministry 
for Cooperation With CIS Member States, a Tajik-
Russian joint-stock company is being set up to 
complete the construction of Tajikistan's Rogun 
hydroelectric power station. 
Establishme
nt of a joint-
stock 
company 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1994. Tajik-
Russian joint venture to 
complete Tajik power plant. 3 
Jun. 
5   Y   Y 01/07/1994 
The World Bank recommends to drop the project on 
both financial and ecological grounds. 
Declaration/
Speech 
FT Energy Newsletters, 1995. 
News: Russia to take half share 
in Tajik hydro project. 27 Jan. 
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6   Y    19/10/1994 
In his election manifesto, Rahmonov mentions how 
important it is to attract workers to the construction 
of Rogun and Sangtudin hydro-power stations. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1994. Election 
manifesto of presidential 
candidate Imamali Rahmonov. 
2 Nov. 
7   Y   Y 09/06/1995 
Tajikistan and Russia signed an agreement to 
strengthen economic ties between the two countries. 
The agreements envisage wide-ranging economic 
integration in industry, fuel and power, the creation 
of a customs union and Russian assistance in 
completing the construction of the Rogun and 
Sangtuda hydroelectric power stations. 
Agreement 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1995. Uzbekistan 
reinterprets power supply deal 
with Tajikistan. 2 Jun. 
8   Y    19/08/1995 
In the Tajik government's economic reform 
programme for the period 1995-2000, one of the 
priority tasks of the fuel and power complex is to 
take measures to complete the construction of the 
Rogun and Sangtudinskaya hydroelectric power 
stations and one cascade of the Pamir hydroelectric 
power stations. 
Multiannual 
planning 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1995. Tajik 
economic reform programme 
1995-2000. 27 Sep. 
9   Y   Y 14/01/1998 
ITAR-TASS quoted Russian Deputy Prime Minister 
Valeriy Serov as saying that the two sides (Russia 
and Tajikistan) had decided to instruct their relevant 
ministries to start preparing the necessary document 
and to conduct feasibility studies for energy projects 
as a whole and particularly for Russia's participation 
in completing the construction of several 
hydroelectric plants in the country. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia, 
1998. Russian premier satisfied 
with Tajik visit. 14 Jan. 
10   Y   Y 16/04/1999 
On April 16, day two of Tajik President Emomali 
Rakhmonov's visit to Moscow, the parties signed an 
agreement on the restructuring of Tajikistan's debts 
to Russia, estimated at $ 300 million. According to 
Vremya's information, Moscow and Dushanbe have 
agreed that $ 170 million will be written off in return 
for Tajikistan's stock of 67 billion old Russian rubles 
Agreement 
Moscow News, 1999. RF 
troops stay on in Tajikistan. 21 
Apr. 
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(which were in circulation until 1993). Dushanbe 
will pay Moscow the remaining $ 130 million 
through shares in a number of Tajik enterprises and 
industrial projects (such as the unfinished Rogun 
hydroelectric power station), a list of which has been 
presented to the Russian side. Tajikistan's parliament 
has already prepared the legislative basis for these 
joint-stock deals. Only two facilities that Dushanbe 
regards as strategic - the aluminium plant in Tursun-
Zade and the Nurek hydroelectric power station - 
will remain entirely Tajik state property. 
11   Y   Y 20/12/2000 
At the initiative of TJ, the UNGA proclaims the year 
2003 as the International Year of Freshwater, (note: 
under this framework, in 2003 TJ will organise the 
UN funded "Dushanbe Freshwater Forum"), to raise 
awareness on issues such as water resources quality 
and quantity and cooperation in water resources 
management. 
UN 
resolution 
UN Documents, 2000. 
Resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly [on the 
report of the Second 
Committee (A/55/582/Add.8)]  
55/196. International Year of 
Freshwater.  
12   Y   Y 16/01/2002 
Japan is likely to participate in the accomplishment 
of the construction of the Rogun and Sangudin 
hydroelectric power stations in Tajikistan, special 
envoy of the Japanese Prime Minister Muneo Suzuki 
said after the meeting with Tajik President Emomali 
Rakhmonov on Wednesday. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Ria Novosti, 2002. Japan is 
likely to participate in 
construction of two power 
stations in Tajikistan. 16 Jan. 
13   Y   Y 03/06/2002 
During Musharraf's visit to Dushanbe, Pakistan and 
Tajikistan agreed to set up an intergovernmental 
commission. Islamabad and Dushanbe also intend to 
jointly build the Rogun hydropower plant in 
Tajikistan and a highway connecting Pakistan and 
Tajikistan through Afghan territory. 
Joint 
statement/de
claration 
Interfax News Agency, 2002. 
Pakistani president leaves 
Dushanbe for Asian summit in 
Kazakhstan. 3 Jun. 
14   Y   Y 29/10/2002 
Chairman of the Barki Tojik open joint stock holding 
company (Tajikistan) Dzhurabek Nurmakhmatov 
and director general of one of the units of the 
Russian financial-industrial group Baltic 
Construction Company Oleg Toni on Tuesday will 
sign a contract in Dushanbe to build the Rogun 
hydroelectric station whose construction was 
Agreement 
Ria Novosti, 2002. Russians to 
complete construction of 
Rogun HPP in Tajikistan. 29 
Oct. 
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interrupted in 1992 due to the objective reasons. 
15   Y   Y 31/05/2003 
Talks between TJ deputy PM and Asian Bank 
officer. They mention Tajik president's initiative to 
hold an international water forum in Dushanbe this 
year. The sides also discussed the issue of 
completion of the construction of hydroelectric 
power stations. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 2003. Tajikistan: 
Asian bank ready to take part 
in joint water supply projects. 
31 May. 
16   Y   Y 01/09/2003 
TJ organizes the UN supported International Water 
Forum. Countries adopt the Dushanbe Water Appeal, 
that reiterates the importance of freshwater resources 
and calls on the United Nations, governments, 
organizations and stakeholders to commit 
themselves more fully to achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals and the targets agreed upon in 
the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. The 
Appeal also invites the United Nations to declare 
2005-2015 the International Decade of 'Water for 
Life. 
Water 
conference 
UN Documents, 2003. 
Dushanbe Water Appeal 
Included as an Annex to 
A/58/362. 
17   Y   Y 08/10/2004 
Tajik President Emomali Rahmonov and Czech 
President Vaclav Klaus have signed today an 
agreement on Czech-Tajik cooperation. The Czech 
Republic will take part for example in 
the Rogun water power station completion and the 
GUP Tadzikcement Dushanbe cement works 
reconstruction. 
Agreement 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 2004. Czech, Tajik 
presidents sign co-
operation agreement. 8 Oct. 
18   Y   Y 16/10/2004 
Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov said after a 
meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin 
in Dushanbe, that in all, the Russian aluminium giant 
RUSAL will participate in projects worth more than 
$1 billion in Tajikistan. Rusal will, for example, 
receive an as yet unspecified stake in the Rogun 
hydroelectric project for $560 million of investment 
in the Rogun dam's completion. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
Interfax News Agency, 2004. 
RUSAL to help build 
aluminum smelter in 
Tajikistan. 21 Oct. 
19   Y   Y 31/03/2005 
Pakistan and Tajikistan has signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) for sale of electric power 
to Pakistan and mutually beneficial cooperation in 
the field of hydro power development in particular 
high voltage transmission lines. The MOU was 
MOU 
Balochistan Times, 2005. Pak, 
Tajikistan ink MOU for sale of 
electric power to pak. 31 Mar. 
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signed after two days meeting of the Federal 
Minister for Water and Power Liaqat Ali Jatoi with 
the President, PM and his counterpart of Tajikistan 
at Dushanbe. Jatoi meanwhile visited a number of 
hydro-electric projects including Sarband, Sangtuda, 
Bighazi, Norun and Rogun. 
20 Y Y Y Y Y Y 30/05/2005 
TJ organised a 3-day "International conference on 
regional cooperation in transboundary river basins" 
in Dushanbe on 30 May as part of the Water for Life 
Decade [2005-15].  
Water 
conference 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2005. Tajik president 
urges action to tackle Central 
Asia water problems. 31 May. 
21   Y   Y 01/06/2005 
A session of the Tajik Assembly of Representatives 
has cancelled an old agreement (1994) between the 
Russian and Tajik governments to complete the 
construction of the Rogun hydro-electric power 
station on the River Vakhsh. Another reason for the 
cancellation of the agreement was the signing of a 
new agreement "On long-term cooperation between 
the Tajik government and RusAl. 
Cancelation 
of an 
agreement 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2005. Tajik-Russian 
power plant deal cancelled. 1 
Jun. 
22   Y   Y 19/09/2005 
Rahmon announced that construction of Rogun will 
begin with the involvement of Russian capital in late 
September. Rahmon stressed again the strategic 
importance of the unique hydroelectric power station 
not only for Tajikistan and Russia, but also for the 
neighbouring countries, specifically Afghanistan. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2005. Russia to start 
construction of Tajik power 
plant late September. 19 Sep. 
23   Y   Y 27/09/2005 
Tajik and Russian workers begin construction works 
at the Rogun site. 
Starting of 
works 
World Markets Analysis, 2005. 
Construction Kicks Off on 
3,600-MW Rogun HPP in 
Tajikistan. 28 Sep. 
24   Y    31/10/2006 
Tajikistan could complete the Rogun hydro plant on 
its own, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov said 
at a conference on the regional electricity market. 
“Efforts to complete the dam using budgeted money 
will start in 2007”, Rakhmonov said. Rakhmonov 
said the Rogun plant was currently valued at $804 
million. “It will cost $2 billion to finish the plant,” 
he said, without specifying whether Russian 
aluminium producer RUSAL would be involved. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Central Asia & Caucasus 
Business Weekly, 2006. 
Tajikistan could 
build Rogun hydro on its own – 
Rakhmonov. 31 Oct. 
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25   Y   Y 30/01/2007 
Russia will finish building the Rogun hydroelectric 
dam in Tajikistan and considers that only Russia and 
Tajikistan are capable of handling this huge project, 
Ramazan Abdulatipov, Russia's ambassador to 
Tajikistan, told a January 30 press conference in 
Dushanbe."The Rogun project is crucial to our 
partnership, but it has regrettably become a hostage 
to technical and technological disputes between 
specialists and experts," Abdulatipov said. "We need 
to come to terms and start implementing the project. 
This is what the Russian president and government 
want and a new inter- governmental agreement on 
the Rogun plant's construction is being drafted," 
Abdulatipov said, adding that the agreement should 
be signed as early as the first half of 2007. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Russia & CIS Metals and 
Mining Weekly, 2007. Russian 
ambassador says Russia to 
complete hydro plant in 
Tajikistan. 2 Feb. 
26   Y  Y  01/02/2007 
Uzbek Prime Minister Writes to his Tajik Colleague 
on Rogun Hydroelectric Power Station, requiring a 
detailed examination of the project , accusing TJ of 
"full ignorance on the part of the Government of the 
Republic of Tajikistan, which has not viewed 
possible after-effects and the proper planning and 
technical support, but yet continues to speedily 
undertake construction of this facility." 
Open Letter 
Mirziyoyev, 2007. Uzbek 
Prime Minister Writes to his 
Tajik Colleague on Rogun 
Hydrolelectric Power Station. 3 
Feb. 
 
27   Y  Y Y 06/02/2007 
Ramazan Abdulatipov, Russia's ambassador to 
Tajikistan, told at a press conference in Dushanbe 
that "Russia will finish building the Rogun 
hydroelectric dam in Tajikistan and considers that 
only Russia and Tajikistan are capable of handling 
this huge project". 
Declaration/
Speech 
Central Asia & Caucasus 
Business Weekly, 2007. Russia 
to complete Rogun hydro plant 
in Tajikistan – ambassador. 6 
Feb.  
28   Y  Y  28/04/2007 
Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov and Uzbek 
President Islam Karimov have discussed prospects 
for bilateral cooperation, as well as hydroelectricity 
problems, in a telephone conversation, the Tajik 
presidential press service said on Saturday. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
Russia & CIS Presidential 
Bulletin, 2007. Tajik, Uzbek 
leaders discuss prospects 
for cooperation. 28 Apr. 
29   Y    29/08/2007 
Tajik newspaper complains that current water 
management does not suit Tajikistan’s needs. The 
articles adds that the country has to build new 
hydroelectric power stations to improve the situation 
in terms of energy supplies in the country. 
Newspaper 
article 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2007. Tajik paper calls 
for new mechanism in 
energy, water use in Central 
Asia. 29 Aug. 
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30   Y   Y 29/08/2007 
Rahmon announced that Tajikistan has cancelled a 
deal with the giant Russian aluminium 
company, RusAl, to build Rogun, after the two sides 
failed to come to agreement over the height and type 
of dam to be built. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2007. Backgrounder: 
Tajikistan cancels giant 
Russian dam project. 11 Sep. 
31   Y   Y 04/10/2007 
Russian companies are prepared to take part in 
completing the construction of 
the Rogun hydroelectric power plant in Tajikistan, 
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Naryshkin 
said after a meeting with President of Tajikistan 
Emomali Rakhmon.He said the Rogun plant was "a 
big and ambitious project, in which Tajikistan and 
Russia are interested." Russia has already invested in 
its completion, Naryshkin said. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Russian Financial Control 
Monitor, 2007. Russian 
Companies Ready to Join 
Construction of Rogun Power 
Plant. 4 Oct.  
32   Y    01/01/2008 
Tajikistan allocates fund form the state budget for 
constructing Rogun. In 2008, 180 million Somoni, 
and in 2009 - 532 million Somoni in 2010 Rogun 
spent 650 million Somoni budget. According to the 
Government's Medium Term Program, in 2013, the 
Rogun will allocate at least 1.1 billion Somoni, and 
in 2014 - 1.8 million Somoni. 
Multiannual 
planning 
Avesta, 2011. Tajikistan is 
planning to allocate one billion 
for the completion of the 
Rogun. 26 Aug.  
33   Y  Y  24/01/2008 
A report published on the Uzbek newspaper Pravda 
Vostoka criticized Tajik hydroelectric power 
production projects, reminding that the international 
legal basis for the use of transboundary rivers and 
water streams should be observed in drawing up and 
implementing such projects, and also saying that 
they might cause environmental problems in the 
region. 
Newspaper 
article 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2008. Uzbek expert raps 
Tajik hydroelectric power 
station projects. 25 Jan. 
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34 Y  Y    25/01/2008 
Tajik Prime Minister Oqil Oqilov expressed the 
opinion that it is necessary to boost the construction 
of the [Kyrgyz] Kambarata power stations. "This 
winter demonstrated that we should speed up the 
construction of the Kambarata-1 and Kambarata-2 
hydroelectric power stations, whether we want it or 
not," Oqilov said. 
Declaration/
Speech 
AKIpress, 2008. Kyrgyz, Tajik 
premiers discuss electricity 
supply, transport. 25 Jan. 
35   Y   Y 07/03/2008 
Ukraine and Tajikistan have signed an action plan 
for 2008-2009. Ukraine is ready to take part in an 
international consortium to complete 
the Rogun Hydroelectric Station, Yushchenko said. 
“The Ukrainian side today officially announces its 
participation in the consortium to finish 
the Rogun Hydroelectric Station,” he said. 
The two turbines operating at the Rogun station were 
manufactured in Ukraine. "It is reasonable to 
suppose that the remaining six turbines will be 
Ukrainian," he said. 
Signing of 
an Action 
Plan 
Russia & CIS Oil and Gas 
Weekly, 2008. Ukraine, 
Tajikistan sign two-year action 
plan. 12 Mar.  
36   Y    29/04/2008 
Residents of Tajikistan have been asked by the 
President Rahmon and by Mayor Makhmadsaid 
Ubaidullayev of the capital, Dushanbe to give up a 
month's salary to help build the Rogun dam. Tajik 
authorities' request comes after an unusually cold 
winter caused widespread electricity shortages and 
claimed hundreds of victims nationwide. 
Ubaidullayev has calculated that if all the city's 
residents give up half their salaries in May and June, 
more than $10 million could be raised for the Rogun 
dam. 
Public 
Appeal 
The Associated Press, 2008. 
Residents of Central Asia's 
poorest nation asked to donate 
to major hydroelectric project. 
29 Apr. 
37  Y Y    13/05/2008 
Kazakhs President Nursultan Nazarbayev indicated 
that Astana was very interested in investing in Tajik 
hydro-power projects. "If a consortium will work on 
the Rogun hydroelectric power station, then 
Kazakhstan will take part, providing materials, 
helping with shares, and as investors," Nazarbayev 
said during a May 13 joint news conference. 
Declaration/
Speech 
RFE, 2008. Central Asia: 
Kazakh, Tajik Presidents Show 
Oil And Water Do Mix. 14 
May.  
38   Y    30/05/2008 
On May 30, Rahmon toured the Rogun construction 
site, where he announced the establishment of an 
"international consortium" that would complete the 
dam and get at least two of its six envisioned units 
operating within 4 ½ years. The consortium -- which 
Ramon said was set up with the help of the World 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2008. It is realistic to 
launch power plant's first unit 
in four years - Tajik leader. 31 
May; Eurasianet.org, 2008. 
Tajikistan: Government 
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Bank, and other unspecified international financial 
institutions -- would ensure "the right to freely 
participate in financing for all local and foreign 
investors." Calling the Rogun project "epoch-
making," Rahmon spoke confidently on May 30 that 
when the dam is completed, it "will not only cover 
the electricity needs of [our] country, but also that of 
neighboring states." Also: Rahmon once again called 
"on all patriots and honoured sons of the motherland 
to take an active part in the soonest completion of 
the construction of the first unit of the hydroelectric 
power station, and, as far as possible, to make their 
contribution to ensuring the country's energy 
independence". The country's all state radio and TV 
channels are today quoting him as saying this. 
Harbors Hydro-Power Dreams. 
3 Jun. 
39   Y   Y 06/06/2008 
Tajik Prime Minister Oqil Oqilov sent a letter to his 
Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, saying that 
Tajikistan was creating a consortium on the 
completion of the $3 billion hydropower station, 
with the assistance of the World Bank, and that the 
Central Asian state requested that Russia resume its 
participation in the project. A source in the Russian 
Foreign Ministry said that Russian electricity export-
import operator Inter RAO UES could take over 
the Rogun contract, replacing Russia's aluminium 
giant RusAl. 
Open Letter 
Ria Novosti, 2008. Tajikistan 
asks Russia to resume 
participation in hydro project. 6 
Jun. 
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40   Y   Y 27/06/2008 
Tajikistan organized the International Conference on 
Water Related Nature Disasters Reduction. It was 
supported by the UN, the World Water Council 
(WWC) and other international institutes. During the 
conference, Tajik President Rahmon reiterated his 
desire to expand Tajikistan's hydro-power capacity 
and urged the creation of an international consortium 
to develop Lake Sarez. 
Water 
conference 
 CAWaterinfo, 2008. 
International Conference on 
Water Related Disaster 
Reduction  
Dushanbe, Republic of 
Tajikistan, 27-28 Jun.  
41   Y  Y  03/12/2008 
Uzbekistan against construction of Tajik power plant 
on transboundary river. "We think that all decisions 
on using a watercourse of transboundary rivers, 
including on building hydro-technical facilities, 
should not, under no circumstances, damage the 
environment and infringe the interests of people, 
who live in the contiguous countries," the paper 
quoted the acting head of the State Committee for 
Environment Protection, Boriy Alixonov, as saying 
at an international environmental forum held in 
Ashgabat on 3 December. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2008. Uzbekistan against 
construction of Tajik power 
plant on transborder river. 16 
Dec. 
42   Y   Y 06/12/2008 
Ukraine and Tajikistan signed a series of documents 
here Thursday on enhancing bilateral cooperation in 
areas such as economy, trade, education, culture, 
agriculture and tourism. "We have agreed that our 
two countries would give priority to 
boosting cooperation in hydropower," Yushchenko 
said. Yushchenko noted that 87 % of the 
hydroelectric power equipment used in Tajikistan 
was supplied by Ukraine, and the equipment should 
be modernized. 
Agreement 
TendersInfo, 2008. Ukraine : 
Ukraine, Tajikistan sign 
documents on bilateral co-op. 6 
Dec. 
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43 Y  Y  Y Y 23/01/2009 
While visiting Uzbekistan, Medvedev stated that 
"Hydroelectric power stations in the Central Asian 
region must be built with consideration of the 
interests of all neighbouring states," adding that, “if 
there is no common accord of all parties, Russia will 
refrain from participation in such projects.” As a 
reaction to this, the MFA of Tajikistan had sent a 
note of protest to the Russian Federation embassy. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Tajikistan offended 
by Russian leader's remarks on 
water use in region – paper. 11 
Feb. 
 
44   Y  Y  27/01/2009 
“We will build the Roghun hydroelectric power 
station although somebody will be against it,” the 
deputy Tajik minister of energy and industry Pulod 
Muhiddinov said. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Tajikistan to go 
ahead with construction of 
power plant – official. 27 Jan. 
45   Y   Y 30/01/2009 
The government of Tajikistan has sent a protest note 
to the Russian government over a perceived breach 
of bilateral trust and agreements. The note refers to 
the words of Russian president Dmitry 
Medvedev during a state visit to Uzbekistan on 23 
January. 
Diplomatic 
note 
Global Insight, 2009. Tajikistan 
Protests Against Russia's 
Energy Deals with Uzbekistan. 
30 Jan. 
46   Y   Y 31/01/2009 
Bilateral co-operation talks have raised the 
possibility of Ukraine participating in the completion 
of the Rogun project in Tajikistan. Following talks, 
the leaders of both countries said a priority for them 
was to boost co-operation in hydro power, and noted 
that Ukraine had previously supplied much of the 
equipment to the sector in Tajikistan. They added 
that further co-operation in the construction of 
the Rogun project was of interest to Ukraine, and 
that a deal worth several hundred million US dollars 
was being considered. 
Talks on 
Rogun 
Water Power & Dam 
Construction, 2009. Ukraine 
interested in 
completing Rogun scheme. 31 
Jan. 
47   Y   Y 02/02/2009 
Rahmon has cancelled his visit to Moscow. "There is 
a big suspicion that the refusal is a response to a 
speech by Medvedev, who just over a week ago in 
Tashkent agreed with Uzbekistani President 
Islam Karimov that issues of constructing 
hydroelectric power stations should be decided 
collectively, taking account of the interests of all 
countries in the region," Daniil Kislov, founder and 
chief editor of the Fergana.ru news agency, told 
Gazeta.ru. 
Dipl. rel. 
Cooling 
BBC Monitoring Former 
Soviet Union, 2009. Tajik 
leader's Moscow visit 
cancellation shows cooling of 
relations with Russia. 6 Feb. 
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48   Y   Y 05/02/2009 
Iran intends to participate in completing the 
construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power 
station, the Iranian ambassador to Tajikistan, Ali 
Asghar Sherdust, told journalists last night. The 
diplomat said that an agreement on this was signed 
during the Tajik president's meeting with Iranian 
Minister of Commerce Masud Mir-Kazemi 
yesterday. 
Agreement 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Iran to take part in 
construction of Tajik power 
plant. 6 Feb.  
49   Y   Y 11/02/2009 
In a speech to the Foreign Policy Committee of the 
European Parliament, Tajik President Rahmon -- 
who is visiting Brussels for the first time and will 
meet with NATO and energy officials February 11 -- 
said the completion of the Rogun hydroelectric 
power station is of "vital importance" for his 
country. 
Declaration/
Speech 
RFE, 2009. EU, Tajikistan 
Move Toward Closer 
Cooperation. 11 Feb.  
50 Y  Y  Y  13/02/2009 
At a session of the Cabinet of Ministers on 13 
February, Uzbek President Islam Karimov said 
Uzbekistan did not mind Tajik and Kyrgyz energy 
projects if independent experts guarantee that the 
projects would not damage the environment, Uzbek 
TV reported the same day. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Uzbeks not against 
Tajik, Kyrgyz energy projects 
if ecology not harmed – leader. 
13 Feb.  
51    Y Y  25/02/2009 
Uzbek President Islam Karimov has said water 
problems in the Central Asian region should not be 
politicized, and shows good relationship with 
Turkmen president. Karimov said that projects on 
the construction of power plants on transboundary 
rivers in the region must undergo an international 
examination. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Tajikistan "on 
brink of energy collapse" – 
agency. 10 Feb.  
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52 Y  Y  Y  14/04/2009 
The Uzbek foreign ministry issued a formal 
statement warning that Rogun and Kambarata 
projects “pursue commercial interests and far-
reaching political objectives, but disregard the 
possible consequences and ignore the concerns of 
the neighbouring states”. 
Declaration/
Speech 
IWPR, 2009. Tashkent Sees 
Astana as Possible Ally on 
Water. 18 Apr.  
53 Y Y Y Y Y  15/04/2009 
In an annual address to parliament, Rahmon 
dismissed as “groundless” claims that hydroelectric 
schemes will reduce water flows and harm the 
environment. Two days later, Kyrgyzstan’s 
Kurmanbek Bakiev accused unspecified “other 
countries” of trying to “gain control over our 
strategic resources”. Meanwhile, UZ has been busy 
enlisting the other downstream states, Turkmenistan 
and Kazakhstan, to support its cause. 
Declaration/
Speech 
IWPR, 2009. Uzbek Overtures 
to Kazakstan on Water Dispute. 
30 Apr.  
54   Y   Y 16/04/2009 
At the 5th World Water Forum, Tajik President 
called upon the international community to assist 
Central Asian countries in resolving their water 
problems. One of the ways the president sees to 
preserve the region's water is to increase the 
reservoir capacity in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, both 
countries of the upper reaches, which would 
contribute to more efficient utilisation of this natural 
resource across the region and an increase in the 
production of hydroelectric power. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Central Asia Online, 2009. 
Water in Central Asia is a 
regional security problem. 24 
Mar. 
 
55     Y Y 23/04/2009 
UZ evidences WB support before IFAS meeting - 
The Gov. Newspaper of UZ "Pravda Vostoka" 
published a letter of WB President Robert Zoellick . 
The WB would like to clarify that it undertook 
responsibility to carry out preliminary study, paying 
a close attention to assessment of potential regional 
impacts. These studies will determine the technical, 
economic and financial viability of the proposed 
project, as well as its potential environmental and 
social impacts in light of the international 
Newspaper 
article 
AKIpress, 2009. World Bank 
to establish international 
commission of independents 
experts to scrutinize 
construction of hydroelectric 
power stations - response to 
President Karimov's letter. 28 
Apr.  
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agreements on the use of transboundary water 
resources. In this regard, I have taken into account 
and share Your concern regarding the delicate 
ecological balance of the region, and absolute 
necessity to ensure that the hydropower potential 
will not lead to a reduction of runoff water volume in 
states of the lower reaches, as well as the need to 
consider design of new buildings in seismic zones. 
56 Y Y Y Y Y  28/04/2009 
IFAS Summit in Almaty: the five Central Asian 
leaders met to discuss water issues related to the 
Aral Sea. The discussion on the interstate regulation 
of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers (both 
flowing into the Aral Sea) between upstream and 
downstream countries dominated the summit's 
agenda. It exposed some of the deepest divisions 
among the region's leaders. Uzbekistan's President 
Islam Karimov bullied upstream Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan for their plans to implement more 
assertive water management policies. Kazakhstan's 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev, in turn, 
demonstrated his upper hand by seeking to moderate 
the discussion, while Turkmenistan's Gurbanguly 
Berdimuhamedov called on others to seek a regional 
balance without clarifying how this might be 
achieved. The summit ended with the signing of an 
agreement without any specific detail on 
transnational water management. 
Joint 
statement/de
claration 
Agence France Presse, 2009. 
Central Asian water talks boil 
over into bickering. 28 Apr. ; 
AKIpress, 2009. President 
Bakiev hints neighboring 
countries that Kyrgyzstan 
needs compensation 
for water accumulation. 28 
Apr. 
57 Y  Y  Y  30/04/2009 
ALMATY follow-up: TJ paper "Tajikistan" accuses 
UZ of having created a "Plot hatched to mislead 
world community". "In fact, Mr Karimov's covert 
goal of intensifying a dispute over water and 
electricity in the region, which has been continuing 
for 17 years, is to attract the attention of the world 
community to investment projects for 
the construction of hydroelectric power stations in 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Islam Karimov knows 
well that every time he plays this card in a specific 
manner, the issue of foreign investment in the 
hydroelectric power stations in the region will be 
postponed for a certain time. This is because 
Tashkent's hue and cry has made international donor 
organizations to act cautiously. Seeing and knowing 
Newspaper 
article 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Tajik paper claims 
Uzbekistan to blame for demise 
of Aral Sea. 18 May. 
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this, Karimov is skilfully using this card. 
58   Y  Y Y 30/05/2009 
Tajik President Rahmon speaks about Rogun with 
participants in a session of the regional political 
dialogue between the EU troika and the Central 
Asian countries at the level of foreign ministers. "We 
adhere to the principled line which is based on the 
need to maintain balance of both national and 
regional interests. In this connection I would like to 
stress two important points. First, the hydro energy 
sector is not water consuming and it does not 
consume water without return. It just 
lets water through turbines of the hydroelectric 
power station. Unlike the hydro energy sector, 
irrigated farming takes the river flow without return, 
and even if returns, it returns part of water as a 
drained water of very bad quality. I have repeatedly 
said from various rostrums that none of Tajikistan's 
projects in this sector [energy sector] will not be 
aimed against our neighbours," Emomali Rahmon 
said. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. None of Tajik 
energy projects aimed against 
neighbours - leader. 1 Jun. 
59   Y  Y  15/06/2009 
If the construction of hydroelectric power stations 
has turned into a national idea for Tajikistan, then for 
Uzbekistan such idea is the issue of water usage 
because over 60 % of the Uzbek population live in 
rural areas, the assistant of the Uzbek ambassador to 
Tajikistan, Yuriy Nagay, told Asia-Plus. We need to 
listen to each other attentively and come to 
agreement," the assistant of the Uzbek diplomat 
convinced. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan should seek 
compromise on water row - 
Uzbek diplomat. 16 Jun.  
60   Y   Y 07/09/2009 
Tajikistan is offering to the countries of Central Asia 
to take part in the construction of new hydroelectric 
power plants in the republic for their needs. This 
proposal was made by Tajik President Emomali 
Rahmon at the World Climate Conference-3 in 
Geneva. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Russia & CIS Presidential 
Bulletin, 2009. Tajikistan 
offers its hydropower resources 
to central Asia. 7 Sep. 
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61   Y   Y 20/10/2009 
UKR company Electrotyazhmash signed a 
memorandum of intent and an agreement with Barki 
Tojik on cooperation in the construction and upgrade 
of hydro power plants, in particular concerning 
the Rogun hydro power plant. 
Agreement 
Interfax News Agency, 2009. 
Electrotyazhmash starts talks 
on creation of jv in Tajikistan. 
8 Dec. 
62   Y  Y  21/10/2009 
The former head of Barqi Tojik, Sharifkhon 
Samiyev, blames Uzbekistan for energy problems. “I 
think that energy issues between Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan have long acquired a political and not 
economic nature.”[Reporter Ramziddin 
Najmiddinov:] Everybody in Tajikistan believes that 
after construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power 
station and commissioning of the South-North and 
Tajikistan-Afghanistan power transmission lines, 
many energy problems in the country will be 
resolved. [Sharifkhon Samiyev:] I also believe in 
this. But one should look at things realistically. The 
issue of constructing Rogun is not resolved in one or 
two years. At the same time, Tajikistan's demand in 
electricity is growing every day." 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Tajik official 
blames Uzbekistan for energy 
problems. 7 Nov.  
63   Y  Y  24/11/2009 
Uzbek Ambassador to Tajikistan Shoqosim 
Shoislomov said in Dushanbe that Uzbekistan will 
end its participation in the Soviet-era electric power 
grid as of December 1. He said Uzbekistan has built 
a new power distribution system that can provide all 
of its regions with electricity and does not need the 
outdated electricity grid. Homidjon Orifov, the head 
of Tajikistan's National Committee for Dams, said 
Uzbekistan's move is most likely connected to the 
Tajik-Uzbek standoff regarding the construction of a 
new hydropower station near the Tajik city of 
Rogun. 
Withdrawal 
from a 
regional org. 
RFE, 2009. Tajikistan Reacts 
To Uzbek Decision To 
Quit Power Grid. 27 Nov.  
64   Y  Y  25/11/2009 
Husrav Goibov, deputy head of the CIS department 
at the Tajik Foreign Ministry, says that "The 
unilateral decision made by Uzbekistan to leave the 
Central Asian Unified Energy System runs counter 
Declaration/
Speech 
Interfax News Agency, 2009. 
Uzbekistan's withdrawal from 
central Asian power grid. 25 
Nov.  
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to the principles of neighbourliness and is politically 
motivated" 
65   Y  Y  01/12/2009 
UZ withdraws from Central Asian power grid. 
Uzbek officials say Tashkent's participation in the 
regional system endangers the flow of electricity to 
its domestic consumers. If UZ does not quickly 
reverse its decision, some Tajiks suggest Dushanbe 
will retaliate by restricting water supplies that 
Tashkent desperately needs to keep the country's 
cotton sector afloat during the spring and summer. 
Withdrawal 
from a 
regional org. 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Uzbekistan 
withdraws from Central 
Asian power grid from 1 
December. 1 Dec; RFE, 2009. 
Uzbekistan Withdrawing From 
Regional Power Grid. 1 Dec.  
66   Y    01/12/2009 
President Rakhmon urges Tajik families to buy 
Rogun HPP shares. "Some $600 million is currently 
needed to launch the first phase of the Roguna HPP, 
and for this purpose each family in the country, 
except for the poor ones, should spend at least 3,000 
somoni (4.353 somoni/$1) 
Declaration/
Speech 
Central Asia General 
Newswire, 2009. 
President Rakhmon urges Tajik 
families to buy Roguna HPP 
shares. 2 Dec. 
67   Y  Y  01/01/2010 
Since January, Tashkent has delayed thousands of 
rail carriages, citing “technical and logistical” issues. 
Dushanbe says Tashkent is trying to sabotage 
construction of a giant hydroelectric power plant, 
Rogun. 
Border 
tensions 
Eurasianet.org, 2010. Boxcar 
Diplomacy Puts Tajik 
Businesses At Tashkent’s 
Mercy. 6 Aug.  
68   Y    05/01/2010 
In his official address to Tajik citizens, President 
Rahmon announced that 2010 will be the year “when 
great resources will be mobilized” to construct the 
3,600 mw Rogun dam. “The construction of this site, 
important for our country, has turned into the arena 
of labour, bravery and generosity, trials of heroism, 
and, more so, our national idea,” said Rahmon. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Rahmon, E., 2010. Message 
from the president of the 
republic of Tajikistan to the 
people of Tajikistan. 5 Jan.  
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69   Y  Y  03/02/2010 
In a letter to his Tajik counterpart Akil Akilov, 
which appeared in the media before reaching the 
addressee, Uzbek Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoev 
called on Tajikistan to reconsider the construction of 
Rogun in order to prevent environmental dangers, 
maintain water balance, and provide continuing 
access to water for millions of people. He also stated 
“it is necessary to make an independent evaluation of 
the project before resuming the construction of the 
Rogun hydropower plant. The project was elaborated 
about 40 years ago and based on obsolete 
technologies”. 
Open Letter 
Global Insight, 2010. 
Uzbekistan Calls for 
Independent Assessment of 
Hydropower Project in 
Tajikistan. 4 Feb. 
70   Y  Y  07/02/2010 
Akilov sent an open letter to Mirziyoyev posted by 
the Khovar news agency. He emphasized the 
country’s sovereign right to build the dam to rectify 
energy deficits, which have plagued the country for 
years now but “have been impossible to cover by 
energy imports because of ongoing man-made 
obstacles.” He also referred to the project’s 
compliance with international law and the 2006 
assessment by the German Lahmeyer corporation. 
The latter allegedly confirmed that the project takes 
ecological issues into consideration, something 
Uzbekistan seriously questions. 
Open Letter 
Central Asia General 
Newswire, 2010. Tajik premier 
again affirms absence of Rogun 
HPP threat to Uzbekistan. 8 
Feb. 
 
71   Y  Y  08/02/2010 
The reaction of Uzbek side on Akilov’s letter has 
been to cut gas supplies to TJ. "Since Sunday, 
Uzbekistan has cut in half -- from 28,000 cubic 
metres of natural gas per hour to 15,000 cubic metres 
-- gas to Tajikistan," a company spokesman told 
AFP. 
Resource cut 
Agence France Presse, 2010. 
Uzbekistan cuts energy to 
Tajikistan amid tensions: 
company. 8 Feb. 
72   Y   Y 10/03/2010 
The World Bank announced that they will 
underwrite an environmental feasibility study for the 
proposed Rogun hydropower project. "If the Rogun 
project proves its financial and environmental 
sustainability, the World Bank will provide the 
financial aid and support to the government of 
Tajikistan for the establishment of a consortium that 
ESIA 
Eurasianet.org, 2010. 
Tajikistan: World Bank Offer 
Energizes Rogun Hydropower 
Project. 15 Mar. 
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will build this plant. The Tajik government and the 
World Bank will sign an appropriate memorandum 
on this issue," Konishi said. 
73   Y   Y 15/03/2010 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) strongly 
supports Rogun. President Emomali Rahmon met 
with Juan Miranda, ADB director general for Central 
and Western Asia. ADB expressed its readiness to 
help with assessments. Juan Miranda said "the Asian 
Develop Bank welcomes Tajikistan's energy policy 
and that the Rogun power plant construction plays a 
key role in it; and in the future the bank will make it 
a priority to support projects in this field within its 
cooperation with Tajikistan" 
Talks on 
Rogun 
Global Insight, 2002. 
Uzbekistan Calls for 
Independent Assessment of 
Hydropower Project in 
Tajikistan. 4 Feb.  
74 Y Y Y  Y  16/03/2010 
Nazarbayev visits Uzbekistan. A tendency for KZ-
UZ rapprochement is evident from 
Karimov's backing to Nazarbayev's initiative to 
convene the OSCE summit under the aegis of 
Kazakhstan chairmanship in this Organisation. 
According to Nursultan Nazarbayev, the 
environmental and anthropogenic security of and 
regulation of water flows at Rogun HPP in Tajikistan 
and Kambarata facilities in Kyrgyzstan need be 
appraised by international experts. "There ought to 
be no hydroelectric power plants in the region 
without results of the expertise obtained and 
studied," he said. The Kazakh leader underlined that 
ahead of his visit to Uzbekistan he had been in talks 
with Emomali Rahmon and Kurmanbek Bakiyev. "In 
principle they are ready for expert evaluation. 
Islam Karimov and I have come to an agreement we 
are now announcing - after the expert opinion is 
ready we are getting down to construction of new 
facilities". 
Talks on 
water/energy 
Eurasianet.org, 2010. 
Tajikistan: World Bank Offer 
Energizes Rogun Hydropower 
Project. 15 Mar.  
75   Y  Y  19/02/2010 
Uzbek newspaper Narodnoye Slovo reiterates need 
for expert examination of Rogun, stating that "the 
documentation of the project has become obsolete 
and the construction needs international 
examination". 
Newspaper 
article 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Uzbek paper 
reiterates need for expert 
examination of major Tajik 
power plant. 19 Feb.  
76   Y  Y  23/02/2010 
Tajik dam expert says no one has right to stop 
construction of Rogun plant. “The implementation of 
Declaration/
Speech 
CIS DEFENSE and 
SECURITY, 2010. Summits, 
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the project, which was launched back in Soviet era 
and which underwent all possible examinations in 
the Soviet era, is under way. The examination of the 
project was carried out by best specialists of leading 
institutes of the [former] Soviet Union,” Homidjon 
Arifov said. "Tajikistan does not need agreement of 
any country or international organization for the 
project of the Rogun hydroelectric power station. 
Nobody has the right to veto this project. The fact 
that the World Bank is currently conducting an 
ecological examination of the Rogun project is the 
goodwill of Tajikistan in case if in future the bank 
makes a decision to take part in financing the 
project," the expert said. 
maneuvers, jubilees. 29 Mar.  
 
77   Y Y   18/03/2010 
Tajik leader assures Turkmen counterpart energy 
projects not against neighbours. They signed 7 
agreements on cooperation. Speaking about the 
consumption of water resources in Turkmenistan, the 
Turkmen leader said the construction of lakes and 
reservoirs in Turkmenistan would help to protect the 
environment and use water rationally. 
General 
cooperation 
agreement 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Tajik leader assures 
Turkmen counterpart energy 
projects not against neighbours. 
18 Mar.  
78 Y  Y  Y Y 31/03/2010 
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov who 
is on a visit to Tashkent, has confirmed Russia's 
unchangeable position towards projects on the 
construction of major hydroelectric facilities in 
Central Asia. "Construction of major hydroelectric 
facilities in Central Asia should be carried out in 
full agreement with the neighbouring countries," 
Ivanov said answering questions of journalists about 
Russia's position towards the construction of the 
Roghun hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan and 
Kambar-Ata [hydroelectric power station] in 
Kyrgyzstan, and about water balance between 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Tajik dam expert 
says no one has right to stop 
construction of Roghun plant. 
24 Feb.  
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79 Y  Y  Y Y 03/05/2010 
Karimov, addressing the opening of the Asian 
Development Bank's (ADB) board of governors 
meeting in Tashkent, slammed his neighbours for 
what he said was a lack of foresight about the 
environmental impact of their policies. "In Uzbek we 
say 'where this is no water there is no life'. That's 
why, indeed, we treat this problem 
seriously," Karimov said. "Unfortunately, some of 
our neighbours do not treat this issue like-mindedly, 
especially the countries on the upstream of the 
rivers. They do not think about what kind of 
consequences it may lead to," he added. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Agence France Presse – 
English, 2010. Uzbek leader 
blasts neighbours in water row. 
3 May.  
80   Y  Y  09/06/2010 
Tajikistan will meet Uzbekistan's all demands so as 
to complete the construction of the Roghun 
hydroelectric power plant, [Tajik] Minister of 
Energy and Industry Sherali Gul has said at the high-
level international conference on medium term 
review of the progress of the implementation of the 
International Decade for Action "Water for Life" 
2005-2015, which is under way in Dushanbe. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Tajikistan to meet 
Uzbekistan's demands 
regarding power plant – 
minister. 10 Jun.  
81   Y  Y Y 07/10/2010 
The Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan sent an 
appeal to the World Bank demanding to inspect the 
project of the Rogun hydro power plant. The appeal 
read, "The Rogun Project was developed 40 years 
ago and does not meet modern realities. […] In our 
opinion, the World Bank is making a one-sided 
evaluation of the tender procedures for 
environmental assessment of construction of 
hydroelectric power station, and do not take into 
account the interests of all parties, including those 
countries which are located in the downstream of 
Amudarya river". 
Open Letter 
UzDaily, 2011. Ecological 
Movement of Uzbekistan sends 
letter to Europarliament. 21 
Jun.  
82   Y  Y  12/10/2010 
When asked why Uzbekistan is opposing the 
construction of Rogun, he stated “How can we let 
the residents of Uzbekistan live without water for 
eight years, while the Rogun water reservoir is being 
filled up? What will farmers be doing all this time?” 
Declaration/
Speech 
Interfax Central Asia & 
Caucasus Business Weekly, 
2010. Rogun project 
undermines Uzbekistan's water 
supplies – Karimov. 12 Oct.  
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83   Y  Y  18/10/2010 
The Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan publishes a 
report on negative effects of "Transboundary impact 
of the polluting substances emitted by the State 
Unitary Enterprise «Tajik aluminium 
company"(TALCO)"(the former Tajik aluminium 
factory) on population and environment of various 
areas of the Surkhan-Darya Region" 
Report 
Publishing 
The Ecological Movement of 
Uzbekistan, 2010. Letter to the 
Executive Secretary, The 
Inspection Panel 
P.O. Box 27566 Washington, 
D.C. 20038. 7 Oct.  
84   Y  Y  21/10/2010 
Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi and 
experts have dismissed Uzbek President Islam 
Karimov's concerns that the construction of a major 
hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan will lead to 
a shortage of irrigation and drinking water in 
Uzbekistan. "The accusations being levelled at 
Tajikistan in connection with the construction of the 
Rogun hydroelectric power station, and the 
allegations that the water will take eight years to 
accumulate - during which Uzbekistan will not 
get water - do not have any scientific or economic 
basis,". 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Tajik minister, 
experts flay Uzbek president's 
statement on hydropower 
project. 19 Nov.  
85 Y  Y  Y  22/11/2010 
Viktor Chub, head of the meteorology centre of 
Uzbekistan (Uzgidromet), believes that the 
construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power 
station (Tajikistan) and its launch in the planned 
operation mode will significantly influence the flow 
of Amu Darya. A similar situation will be observed 
with regard to the water flow in Syr Darya [river] 
after the Kambarata 2 hydroelectric power station 
and the Toktogul reservoir (Kyrgyzstan) switch to 
power generation mode. 
Newspaper 
article 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Uzbek expert 
against new hydro-energy 
projects in region. 23 Nov.  
86   Y  Y  01/11/2010 
UZ has unilaterally closed a post on its border with 
TJ without any explanation, a source in the Tajik 
Foreign Ministry has told Interfax today. 
Border 
tensions 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Uzbekistan closes 
post on border with Tajikistan 
– agency. 1 Nov.  
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87   Y  Y  16/11/2010 
Uzbekistan organised in Tashkent an international 
conference under the topic of “Transborder 
environmental problems of Central Asia: use of 
international legal mechanisms to resolve them”, 
attended by Over 60 representatives of international 
organizations and financial institutions from over 30 
countries attended the conference. Particularly, it 
was attended by specialists from the UN, OSCE, 
World Bank, World Health Organization, and others. 
The conference noted Rogun negative impact on 
regional environment. 
Water 
conference 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Uzbek conference 
notes Tajik plant's negative 
impact on regional 
environment. 1 Dec.  
88   Y  Y Y 22/11/2010 
The World Bank replied to the request made by the 
Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan stating that 
"Management considers that this Request for 
Inspection should be ineligible for the following 
reasons: i) the issues raised by the Requesters focus 
on potential harm that could derive from the 
construction, operation and/or failure of the 
proposed Rogun HPP, but not from the Assessment 
Studies that the Bank intends to finance; and ii) 
Management has no record of the Requesters’ 
attempt to raise their issues with it prior to the 
submission of the Request for Inspection". 
Open Letter 
The Inspection Panel, 2010.  
Report and Recommendation 
On Request for Inspection 
TAJIKISTAN: Energy Loss 
Reduction Project (Rogun 
HPP) (Credits 
Nos. 40930-TJ and H1780-TJ). 
89   Y  Y  02/12/2010 
State-run Uzbek TV carried a report December 2 that 
accused Tajik government officials of spreading lies 
to damage “the friendship between the Uzbek and 
Tajik peoples.” The Tajik people are suffering from 
the “arbitrariness” of their leaders, the report 
asserted, though “their gradually escalating tricks 
cannot damage stability in the Republic of 
Uzbekistan, or our good relations with the friendly 
[Tajik] people.” Regarding the delays at the border, 
the report added somewhat ominously, “our state 
borders have always been open to people with good 
intentions." 
TV Report 
Eurasianet.org, 2010. 
Uzbekistan vs. Tajikistan: 
Competition over Water 
Resources Intensifying. 8 Dec.  
90   Y  Y Y 18/01/2011 
An Uzbek diplomat previously briefed EUobserver 
that Tashkent wants EU help to stop neighbouring 
Tajikistan from completing the Rogun Dam on the 
Vakhsh River. He said the dam has the potential to 
cause a large-scale humanitarian disaster if it ever 
burst, flooding vast swathes of land in Uzbekistan 
and pushing refugees to the EU. 
Declaration/
Speech 
EUobserver.com, 2011. Uzbek 
massacre hangs over Barroso-
Karimov meeting. 18 Jan.  
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91   Y   Y 19/01/2011 
Tajikistan to help Pakistan counter its energy crisis 
with cooperation on hydroelectric sector. TJ 
Ambassador also said “I merely want to note, that 
some neighboring countries of Tajikistan continue to 
obstruct, even up to imposing a blockade of all roads 
and the delivery of goods, including railway transit", 
he said. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
Right Vision News, 2011. 
Pakistan: Tajikistan to help 
Pakistan counter its energy 
crisis: Ambassador. 19 Jan.  
92   Y   Y 08/03/2011 
Rahmon and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari 
signed a number of agreements as officials held 
wide-ranging talks on co-operation in agriculture, 
health and sports and physical training in Islamabad 
March 7-8, officials and business leaders said. They 
also signed a joint statement before Rahmon 
travelled to Karachi for more meetings. 
Pakistan expressed its readiness to help finance 
construction of Tajikistan’s Rogun hydroelectric 
power plant. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
- 
Agreements 
Central Asia Online, 2011. 
Pakistan, Tajikistan pledge to 
combat terror. 9 Mar.  
93  Y Y Y Y Y 15/03/2011 
Uzbekistan opposes Pakistan's plan to import 
electricity from Tajikistan. Arif Karimov met senior 
officials of the ministry of water and power last 
week and handed over his government`s `letter of 
disapproval` for the proposed project. He is reported 
to have said that all the low riparian states - not only 
Uzbekistan but Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan too - 
were opposed to the project because a mandatory 
Trans-boundary Environmental Impact Assessment 
(TEIA) report for the development of Rogun 
Hydropower project had not been shared by 
Tajikistan for clearance 
Talks on 
water/energy 
AKIpress, 2011. Uzbekistan 
opposes Pakistan's plan to 
import electricity from 
Tajikistan. 15 Mar.  
 
94   Y   Y 08/06/2011 
Rahmon asked EU to reconcile Central Asian 
countries. The European Union could help the 
Central Asian countries in searching for a 
compromise over the region's water and energy 
issues, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon told the 
European Parliament on Tuesday in France where he 
is on a formal visit. "None of our hydropower 
structures will ever work in someone's detriment, 
and if you look at the problem from a selfless and 
fair point of view, it will become obvious: it will 
only benefit all the countries and the region as a 
Declaration/
Speech 
Russia & CIS Military 
Newswire, 2011. Tajikistan 
asks EU to reconcile C. Asian 
countries. 8 Jun.  
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whole,", 
95   Y  Y Y 21/06/2011 
The Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan sent a 
letter to the President of the European Parliament 
Jerzy Buzek. "We have been induced to address you 
with this letter because of the ambiguous statements 
of the Member of the European Parliament Mr. 
Stevenson regarding the construction of the Rogun 
hydroelectric power station (HPS) in Tajikistan," the 
letter said. "On behalf of European Parliament he 
repeatedly acted through Tajik's Mass Media in 
favour of implementation of this rather disputable 
hydropower project in the riverhead of Amu- 
Darya," it added. 
Open Letter 
UzDaily, 2011. Ecological 
Movement of Uzbekistan sends 
letter to Europarliament. 21 
Jun.  
96   Y   Y 10/09/2011 
Tajik Defense Minister General Sherali Khairulloyev 
said that "Today, if necessary, the Islamic Republic 
of Iran's Armed Forces can reach Tajikistan in two 
hours, and if a military presence of the Tajik side in 
the similar plans and programs of the Islamic 
Republic is necessary, the representative units of 
Tajikistan's Armed Forces are also ready to travel to 
Iran," Khairulloyev said on Saturday. 
Declaration/
Speech 
FARS News Agency, 2011. 
Tajik DM Underscores 
Expansion of Military 
Cooperation with Iran. 10 Sep.  
97   Y  Y  16/11/2011 
Mysterious explosion damaged a bridge in Uzbek 
territory that caused key rail traffic between Termez 
in Uzbekistan and the Tajik city of Qurgonteppa to 
be shut down. The UZ described the incident as a 
terrorist act. Also: Rather than fix the track, the 
Uzbeks dismantled it. Tajikistan calls the actions a 
blockade. 
Flow of 
goods 
disruption 
Radio Free Europe, 2011. Tajik 
Railways Wants Probe With 
Uzbeks Of Alleged Terrorist 
Blast. 21 Nov. 
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Annex 4. Timeline of the Kambarata dam 
Key 
 
KG Kyrgyzstan KZ Kazakhstan TJ Tajikistan  TK Turkmenistan UZ Uzbekistan  
 
EXT Non-Central Asian actor  Y Involved in the event 
 
 
 KG KZ TJ TK UZ EXT DATE DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT 
TYPE OF 
EVENT 
SOURCE 
1 Y     Y 19/10/1992 
The Kyrgyz government is in talks with General 
Electric to build a hydro dam on the Naryn River, 
near the Chinese border. Preliminary agreement had 
been reached with GE on a complex of dams at 
Kambarata, costing dollars US$ 100 million. 
Talks on 
commercial 
cooperation 
FT Energy Newsletters, 1992. 
News: Russian Far East. 19 
Oct.  
2 Y      04/02/1994 
Work at Tash-Kumyr and Kambarata hydroelectric 
power stations has come to a standstill "due to a lack 
of money" . Workers there were paid only twice in 
1993. 
Interruption 
of works 
BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1994. Kyrgyzstan's 
Tash-Kumyr 
and Kambaratin power stations 
at a standstill. 4 Feb. 
3 Y      01/12/1997 
The Kyrgyz Prime Minister, Apas Dzhumagulov, 
has signed a resolution authorising tenders for 
investing in the construction of hydro power stations. 
The aim is to accelerate the construction of the 
Kambarata 2 plant in Naryn Region and the 
completion of the Tash-Kumyr and the Shamaldy 
Say stations in the Dzhalal-Abad Region. 
Resolution 
FT Energy Newsletters, 1997. 
Commission established for 
Kyrgyz tenders. 1 Dec.  
4 Y      01/04/1999 
Deputies in the upper house of Kyrgyzstan's 
parliament have adopted a draft programme for 
restructuring and privatising the national energy 
company Kyrgyzenergo. Two hydroelectric power 
stations, Kambarata GES-1 and GES-2, which are 
being constructed on the Naryn river, as well as 
some small hydroelectric plants will be transferred 
for concession. 
Resolution 
FT Energy Newsletters, 1999. 
Kyrgyz parliament votes to 
privatise. 1 Apr.  
 268 
 
5 Y Y     21/11/2000 
Kazakh Prime Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev 
expressed serious concern about the plans to build 
the Kambarata hydroelectric station in Kyrgyzstan 
with Kazakh funds and proposed that the project 
should be "blocked in every way". He thinks that it 
will lead to water being drawn away from the 
Toktogul hydroelectric station, which would have an 
adverse effect on water supplies in Kazakhstan. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2000. Kazakh 
government discusses water 
supplies to southern Regions. 
22 Nov. 
6 Y Y Y  Y  01/04/2003 
The four central Asian states of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are to 
collaborate for the construction of the Kambarata 
hydroelectric power plant in Kyrgyzstan. According 
to preliminary estimates, the construction of the first 
Kambarata hydroelectric power plant is expected to 
cost US$1.7B, and the second is estimated at 
approximately US$230M. It is expected that Central 
Asian states, Russia and the World Bank will 
provide funding for the projects. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
Water Power & Dam 
Construction, 2003. Central 
Asian states to participate in 
hydro. 30 Apr.  
 
7 Y Y Y  Y  13/05/2004 
Foreign Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic Askar 
Aytmatov in an interview with the Kyrgyz AKIpress 
on 13 May 2004 commented on the country's 
position regarding some issues relating to Kyrgyz-
Kazakh economic cooperation. "Moreover, currently 
an issue of the creation of an international water and 
energy consortium is being considered within the 
framework of CACO Central Asian Cooperation 
Organization. It is expected that an investment 
policy will be conducted within the framework of 
this consortium, which is aimed at the construction 
of new hydroelectric power stations - Kambarata-1 
and Kambarata-2 south-western Kyrgyzstan 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Sumary of World 
Broadcasts, 2004. Kyrgyzstan 
to develop cooperation with 
"fraternal" Kazakhstan – 
minister. 13 May. 
 
8 Y     Y 19/11/2004 
Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev visits Russia. An 
agreement was reached in accordance with which 
Kyrgyzstan would order equipment for electric 
power stations from St Petersburg enterprises worth 
1bn US dollars. The Russian side confirmed its 
intention to invest 1.5bn US dollars in building 
the Kambarata hydroelectric power station. The 
Russian budget for 2005 includes R100m for 
designing a feasibility study for the project. If the 
plan follows its initial programme then the 
construction of two hydroelectric power stations will 
Agreement 
BBC Sumary of World 
Broadcasts, 2004. Kyrgyz 
paper says recent breakthrough 
made in ties with Russia. 24 
Nov. 
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be started in 2005. 
9 Y     Y 19/04/2005 
Kyrgyz acting Foreign Minister Roza Otunbayeva 
declared that all earlier-agreed projects with Russian 
Aluminium company remain in force. Projects for 
the construction of the Kambarata hydropower plant 
and an aluminium works are of great significance for 
our country," Otunbayeva said. "These projects 
should be realized in the coming years," she said. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Interfax News Agency, 2005. 
Bishkek backs equal conditions 
for foreign investors. 19 Apr.  
10 Y     Y 11/05/2005 
Acting president of the Kirghiz 
Republic, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, declared in an 
interview that he had a meeting with Oleg Deripaska 
of RusAl, who has shown interest in 
the construction of aluminium works in our country. 
He is also interested in the power energy sector, the 
construction of the Kambarata hydroelectric power 
plant, Kambarata-1 and Kambarata-2. This will 
require ample investment, more than $2 billion. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Official Kremlin Int'l News 
Broadcast, 2005. Radio 
interview with Kyrgyzstan’s 
acting president and prime- 
minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev. 
11 May.  
11 Y     Y 08/08/2006 
Kyrgyzstan's OAO Power Plants and China's state 
grid company signed an agreement on long-term 
cooperation which envisions the construction and 
modernization of several power plants in Kyrgyzstan 
with the help of China, including the Uchkurgan 
Hydroelectric Plant and the Sarydzhaz 
and Kambarata hydroelectric plants. 
Agreement 
Central Asia & Caucasus 
Business Weekly, 2006. 
Kyrgyzstan, China expand 
energy cooperation. 8 Aug. 
  
12 Y     Y 22/09/2006 
Kyrgyz authorities provided 62 business projects for 
the review of Kazakhstani investors: including 
construction projects of two Kambarata hydro power 
plants worth over US$ 2 billion Kyrgyz first prime 
minister Daniar Usenov highlighted the project 
of Kambarata hydro power plants as a priority 
interest for the Kazakhstani side. 
Talks on 
commercial 
cooperation 
Kazakhstan General Newswire, 
2006. Kyrgyz authorities 
complain of Kazakh 
businessmen's passive attitude; 
Astana demands to spare its 
investors undue government 
pressure. 22 Sep.  
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13 Y     Y 15/12/2006 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia are launching a major 
energy-generating project to build the Kambarata-1 
and Kambarata-2 hydroelectric cascades in the 
Central Asian state, to be operated by Russian 
electricity monopoly Unified Energy System (UES), 
and designed to produce electricity for domestic 
needs and exports to Pakistan, Afghanistan and 
northern China. 
Joint 
statement/de
claration 
RIA Novosti, 2006. Russia, 
Kyrgyzstan embark on multi-
billion dollar energy project. 15 
Dec.  
14 Y     Y 26/02/2007 
Key Russian and Kyrgyz officials have agreed to 
partially write off and restructure Kyrgyzstan's debt 
to Russia of US$286 million. Kyrgyzstan also 
offered Russia the chance to partake in the 
construction of two hydro power stations 
in Kambarata. 
Talks on 
commercial 
cooperation 
Global Insight, 2007. Russia 
Promises Restructuring of 
Kyrgyzstan's Debt. 26 Feb. 
15 Y Y    Y 15/03/2007 
The Kyrgyz government intends to set up a joint 
venture with Kazakhstan and Russia to build 
two Kambarata hydroelectric power stations. 
Kyrgyzstan will own 34 % of the shares in the joint 
venture, and Russia and Kazakhstan 33 % each, First 
Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov said that 
according to preliminary estimates, about 2bn dollars 
were needed to build the two hydroelectric power 
stations, of which 1.7bn dollars would be spent 
on Kambarata 1 and 300m dollars on Kambarata 2. 
Kyrgyzstan has already invested a little more than 
US$ 150 million into building the Kambarata 2 
hydroelectric power station. In principle, Kazakhstan 
and Russia also must invest 150m dollars each. 
"The Kambarata projects have been included in a 
state economic development programme. The work 
on setting up the joint venture must be completed 
this year," Usenov said. 
Talks on 
commercial 
cooperation 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2007. Kazakhstan, Russia 
to build hydroelectric power 
stations in Kyrgyzstan. 15 Mar.  
16 Y Y     30/04/2007 
As an outcome of Nazarbayev's visit to Kyrgyzstan, 
a joint venture involving state-owned companies 
from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia is 
established. The new venture is expected to finish 
construction on two hydroelectric power stations 
located on the Naryn River, Kambarata 1 and 
Kambarata 2. 
Establishme
nt of a joint-
venture 
Eurasianet.org, 2007. 
Nazarbayev Flexes Diplomatic 
Muscle During Visit to 
Kyrgyzstan. 30 Apr.  
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17 Y      15/06/2007 
The Kyrgyz Parliament has rejected a bill that lifts a 
ban on selling the country's Kambarata-1 
and Kambarata-2 hydroelectric power plants to 
private owners. 
Resolution 
Central Asia General 
Newswire, 2007. Parliament 
refuses to allow privatization 
of Kambarata power plants. 15 
Jun.  
18 Y Y     09/07/2007 
Kazakhstan annulled Kyrgyzstan's debt for the usage 
of railways and spread the national tariffs onto the 
country, and contributed US$100 million to a 
US$120 million joint investment fund to be created. 
Kazakh delegation also announced its intention to 
bid in the tender for the Kambarata stations. 
Talks on 
commercial 
cooperation 
Global Insight, 2007. 
Kazakhstan Outmanoeuvres 
Russia Over Investment in 
Kyrgyzstan. 13 Jul.  
19 Y     Y 16/07/2007 
Representatives of Alcoa have arrived in Kyrgyzstan 
to study prospects for building an aluminium 
producing plant in the Jalal-Abad region 
and Alcoa's participation in the construction of the 
Kambarata hydroelectric power plants, the Kyrgyz 
Ministry of Industry, Energy and Fuel Resources 
said in a statement. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
Central Asia General 
Newswire, 2007. Alcoa, 
Kyrgyzstan consider building 
new aluminum plant. 16 Jul.  
20 Y     Y 18/09/2007 
Bakiyev expressed his wish to hold in Bishkek an 
international water and energy summit under the 
aegis of the European Union, and to set up in 
Kyrgyzstan an international water management 
academy, which could train highly skilled specialists 
in this field. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2007. Kyrgyz paper says 
sides agreed on disputed areas 
at talks with Tajik leader. 21 
Sep.  
 
21 Y     Y 19/11/2007 
South-Korean company KEPCO has expressed 
interest in taking part in the construction 
of Kambarata Hydropower Plant-1 and -2. 
Talks on 
commercial 
cooperation 
Central Asia General 
Newswire, 2007. Kyrgyzstan to 
raise $1.5 bln in private 
investments from South Korea. 
19 Nov.  
22 Y     Y 21/11/2007 
Mott MacDonald (UK), SNC-Lavalin International 
Inc. (Canada) and EDF (France) in cooperation with 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, have filed their bids for 
preparation of a feasibility study for investing in the 
construction of the Kambarata-1 and Kambarata-2 
hydropower plants. 
Bid filing 
Central Asia General 
Newswire, 2007. Three 
companies bid 
for Kambaratin hydropower 
plants. 21 Nov.  
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23 Y      01/01/2008 
The Government of the Kyrgyz Republic issues a 
decision to re-launch the construction of Kambarata 
2 hydropower station (360 MW). 
Adoption of 
legal 
instruments 
Ministry of Economy of 
Kyrgyzstan, 2008. Regulation 
of specific industries. 
24 Y      10/01/2008 
Bakiyev said that “The government should start with 
the possible emission of long- term bonds for large 
national projects, including Kambarata 1 and 2 and 
an international highway.” 
Declaration/
Speech 
Russia & CIS Business & 
Financial Daily, 2008. Bakiyev 
suggests issuing bonds for 
national projects. 10 Jan. 
25 Y     Y 15/01/2008 
EDF and PricewaterhouseCoopers have won the 
tender for an investment study of the Kambarata-1 
and Kambarata-2 hydropower plants in Kyrgyzstan, 
said Inter RAO UES - the organizer of the tender. 
The winner will sign the contract in early 2008. 
Contract 
Awarding 
AKIpress, 2008. Kyrgyz, Tajik 
premiers discuss electricity 
supply, transport. 25 Jan.  
26 Y      23/01/2008 
The Kyrgyz government has endorsed the draft 
budget and its own programme of action for 2008, in 
which a total of 1.2 billion Somoni are planned to be 
channelled into the construction of 
the Kambarata hydroelectric power station. 
Adoption of 
legal 
instruments 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2008. Kyrgyz 
government endorses draft 
budget for 2008. 28 Jan.  
27 Y  Y    25/01/2008 
Tajik Prime Minister Oqil Oqilov expressed the 
opinion that it is necessary to boost the construction 
of the [Kyrgyz] Kambarata power stations. "This 
winter demonstrated that we should speed up the 
construction of the Kambarata-1 and Kambarata-2 
hydroelectric power stations, whether we want it or 
not," Oqilov said. 
Declaration/
Speech 
AKIpress, 2008. Kyrgyz, Tajik 
premiers discuss electricity 
supply, transport. 25 Jan.  
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28 Y     Y 01/02/2008 
A contract has been awarded to Electricité de France 
(EDF) and PricewaterhouseCoopers to study the 
Kambarata-1 and 2 hydropower projects in the 
Kyrgyz Republic. 
Contract 
Awarding 
Water Power & Dam 
Construction, 2008. EDF to 
study Kambarata schemes in 
Kyrgyz Republic. 29 Feb.  
29 Y      07/05/2008 
The Parliament plans to appeal to the President 
requesting him to announce construction 
of Kambarata water power station 2 as all-nation 
project. This appeal is initiated so that people would 
have spirit and pride as the country is 
constructing Kambarata water power station using its 
own resources only, Speaker Madumarov said today. 
The lawmakers plan to contribute their one-week 
pay, while Parliament staff will contribute their one-
day pay making 640 thousand Somoni in total (some 
US$ 18 thousand) to support construction of the 
water power station and related facilities. 
Declaration/
Speech 
AKIpress, 2008. Parliament to 
ask President to announce 
construction 
of Kambarata water power 
station 2 as all-nation project. 7 
May.  
30 Y      08/05/2008 
Around $ 1.5 US billion investments are required for 
construction of Kambarata I and II until 2020. Such 
information came from the report made by the 
Ministry of Industry, Energy and Fuel Resources, 
specifically: 1) construction of Kambarata water 
power station No. 1 (1,900 MW) will require US$ 
1.2 billion (construction period: 2010-2020) 2) 
construction of Kambarata water power station No. 2 
(360 MW) will require US$ 280 million 
(construction period: 2007-2012). 
Other 
AKIpress, 2008. Kyrgyzstan 
needs $4US billion for 
construction of water power 
stations until 2020. 8 May.  
31 Y     Y 05/06/2008 
Russian energy firm Inter RAO has signed a contract 
with the winning bid team for the two Kambarata 
projects proposed to be built in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
The contract calls for the detailed feasibility study 
for the Kambarata projects by early next year. 
French energy utility Electricité de France (EDF) 
and international professional services 
firm Pricewaterhouse Coopers were named as the 
lowest bidders for the study in late December 2007. 
Contract 
Awarding 
Water Power & Dam 
Construction, 2008. Russian 
energy firm signs contract. 4 
Jun.  
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32 Y     Y 23/09/2008 
Russian equipment supplier Power Machines has 
received a contract to supply two turbines to the 360-
MW Kambarata 2 hydroelectric project on 
Kyrgyzstan's Naryn River. 
Contract 
Awarding 
Hydroworld, 2008. Russian 
supplier to equip Kyrgyzstan’s 
360 MW Kambarata 2. 25 Sep.  
33 Y     Y 01/10/2008 
KGZ and RUS signed agreements concerning 
participation of Russia in construction of Kambarata-
1 and -2 hydroelectric power plants and 
modernization of the republican oil and gas complex 
with Gazprom's help. 
Agreement 
The Russian Oil and Gas 
Report, 2008. Gazprom  
to take part in privatization of 
Kyrgyzstan. 13 Oct.  
34 Y     Y 09/10/2008 
The Russian and Kyrgyz presidents have ordered to 
accelerate the construction of the first and 
second Kambarata hydropower plants in Kyrgyzstan. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Central Asia General 
Newswire, 2008. Russian, 
Kyrgyz presidents want faster 
building of Kambarata HPP. 9 
Oct.  
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35 Y      28/11/2008 
The residents of Suzak rayon collected 1 million 
Somoni (roughly US$ 20 thousand) for construction 
of Kambarata-2 water power station. These funds 
were collected as a result of one-day pay 
contributions of workers from public budget 
financed organizations and other sources. 
Fund 
collection 
AKIpress, 2008. Suzak rayon 
residents collect 1 million som 
for construction of Kambarata-
2 water power station. 28 Nov.  
36 Y      17/12/2008 
Five years will be required to fill in the basin 
of Kambarata-1 water power station, said Prime 
Minister Igor Chudinov during a joint meeting of 
three parliamentary factions today. Russia will give 
$2US billion, including $1US.7 billion for 
construction of Kambarata-1,2 water power stations 
and $300US million for budget support. “Everything 
depends upon us now, how quickly we will hold 
talks,” he said. 
Other 
AKIpress, 2008. Five years 
required to fill in basin 
of Kambarata-1 water power 
station. 17 Dec. 
37 Y      25/12/2008 
Roza Otunbaeva, parliamentarian from the Social 
Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan, questions 
Kambarata. "Will the Russian US$ 1.7 billion loan 
for construction of Kambarata-1 water power station 
bring benefit for Kyrgyzstan and does it meet 
interests of Kyrgyzstan? Frankly speaking, this is a 
commercial loan. With this loan the public external 
debt of Kyrgyzstan will double. Why do we drive 
ourselves into the grave?" Roza Otunbaeva said 
Russia will primarily hire Russian citizens and will 
become an owner of Central Asian water. "So, we 
will benefit nothing. Prior to any agreements we 
should think about interests of the state," she said. 
Other 
AKIpress, 2008. Lawmaker 
questions benefit of Russian 
loan for construction 
of Kambarata-1 water power 
station for Kyrgyzstan. 25 Dec.  
 276 
 
38       15/01/2009 
Roza Otunbayeva thinks that the president will have 
to bear responsibility if he takes the 2bn-loan to be 
allocated by Russia. "I want to emphasize that this 
issue is trampling on Kyrgyzstan's national interests. 
A foreign state is taking advantage of a difficult 
economic situation to become owner of water. 
Kyrgyzstan itself has paved the way for Russia to 
own our water," she said. 
Other 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Kyrgyz ex-minister 
says president to be responsible 
for 2bn Russian loan. 15 Jan.  
39 Y  Y  Y Y 23/01/2009 
While visiting Uzbekistan, Medvedev stated that 
"Hydroelectric power stations in the Central Asian 
region must be built with consideration of the 
interests of all neighbouring states," adding that, "if 
there is no common accord of all parties, Russia will 
refrain from participation in such projects." As a 
reaction to this, the MFA of Tajikistan had sent a 
note of protest to the Russian Federation embassy. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Tajikistan offended 
by Russian leader's remarks on 
water use in region – paper. 11 
Feb. 
40 Y     Y 01/02/2009 
Russia has gone ahead bilaterally with Kyrgyzstan 
with a pledge of a loan of $1.7 billion to invest in the 
Kambarata hydro project. This decision coincided 
with Kyrgyzstan’s announcement that the US should 
leave the Manas airbase, which is currently serving 
as an important supply base for the war in 
Afghanistan. --> Follow up 1: "In July 2009, the 
U.S. signed a new lease for Manas. The Kyrgyz did 
not return the Russian money. Shortly before the 
overthrow of the Bakiyev regime in April 2010, they 
were still complaining that Russia had failed to open 
the credit line promised for Kambarata-1".--> Follow 
up 2: Karimov said at IFAS meeting in April 2009 
"Third countries which would very much like to take 
part in this discussion are also pursuing their own 
aims," Karimov noted in thinly veiled remarks that 
observers suggested were aimed at Moscow. 
Issue linkage 
Ministry of Economy of 
Kyrgyzstan, 2008. Regulation 
of specific industries; ICG, 
2010. Policy Briefing Asia 
Briefing N°102 
Bishkek/Brussels, 27 Apr. 
Eurasianet.org, 2009. 
Kazakhstan: Central Asian 
Leaders Clash over Water at 
Aral Sea Summit. 28 Apr.  
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41 Y      05/02/2009 
Construction of Kambarata-1 water power station 
will help Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan tackle dry 
hydrological cycle problems, Igor Chudinov told 
news conference today in Bishkek. "we would like to 
stress one more time that this will help tackle dry 
hydrological cycle problems. Toktogul hydroelectric 
station will remain the main regulator. But we will 
have the station higher with reserve of 5 billion of 
water that can be used in dry hydrological cycles. 
We will be able to produce additional 6 billion kWh 
without using water from Toktogul reservoir," Igor 
Chudinov said when describing advantages 
of Kambarata-1 water power station. The Prime 
Minister said it is unclear yet who will control water 
streams, but Toktogul water power station will be 
the property of Kyrgyzstan and the main regulator of 
water issues on Naryn river. 
Declaration/
Speech 
AKIpress, 2009. PM 
Chudinov: Construction 
of Kambarata-1 water power 
station to help Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan tackle dry 
hydrological cycle problems. 5 
Feb.  
42 Y  Y  Y  13/02/2009 
At a session of the Cabinet of Ministers on 13 
February, Uzbek President Islam Karimov said 
Uzbekistan did not mind Tajik and Kyrgyz energy 
projects if independent experts guarantee that the 
projects would not damage the environment, Uzbek 
TV reported the same day. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Uzbeks not against 
Tajik, Kyrgyz energy projects 
if ecology not harmed – leader. 
13 Feb.  
43    Y Y  25/02/2009 
Uzbek President Islam Karimov has said water 
problems in the Central Asian region should not be 
politicized, and shows good relationship with 
Turkmen president. Karimov said that projects on 
the construction of power plants on transboundary 
rivers in the region must undergo an international 
examination. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Tajikistan "on 
brink of energy collapse" – 
agency. 10 Feb.  
44   Y   Y 16/03/2009 
At the 5th World Water Forum, Tajik President 
called upon the international community to assist 
Central Asian countries in resolving their water 
problems. One of the ways the president sees to 
preserve the region's water is to increase the 
reservoir capacity in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, both 
countries of the upper reaches, which would 
contribute to more efficient utilisation of this natural 
resource across the region and an increase in the 
production of hydroelectric power. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Central Asia Online, 2009. 
Water in Central Asia is a 
regional security problem. 24 
Mar. 
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45 Y     Y 16/03/2009 
At the 5th World Water Forum, Kyrgyz PM 
Chudinov states that KG is ready for a constructive 
dialogue to discuss mutually beneficial proposals for 
the effective use of water resources. He also stated 
that “By putting these (Kambarata 1 and 2) water 
reservoir into operation, needs in electric energy of 
the republic will be fully satisfied and it will let work 
Toktogul hydro juncture in optimal regime, in which 
downstream countries are concerned. Project on 
construction of Kambarata HPS was regulated with 
neighboring republics in 80-ies of last century and 
passed ecological expertise.” 
Declaration/
Speech 
Speech of Prime-Minister of 
the Kyrgyz Republic I. 
Chudinov at the Fifth World 
Water Forum Summit 
(Istanbul, 16 March 2009). 
46 Y    Y  24/03/2009 
The Uzbek MFA publishes an article written by 
S.Zhigarev, Director of OJSC “Gidroproject” 
underlining problems deriving from Kambarata. "It 
goes without saying, and it is clear to any sober-
minded person that the 30-years-old projects must be 
subjected to an independent objective examination" 
Newspaper 
article 
Zhigarev, S., 2009. Problems 
Concerning Construction of the 
Kambarata Hydropower 
Station-1 in Kyrgyzstan. 23 
Mar.  
47 Y  Y  Y  14/04/2009 
The Uzbek foreign ministry issued a formal 
statement warning that Rogun and Kambarata 
projects “pursue commercial interests and far-
reaching political objectives, but disregard the 
possible consequences and ignore the concerns of 
the neighbouring states”. 
Declaration/
Speech 
IWPR, 2009. Tashkent Sees 
Astana as Possible Ally on 
Water. 18 Apr.  
48 Y Y Y Y Y  15/04/2009 
In an annual address to parliament, Rahmon 
dismissed as “groundless” claims that hydroelectric 
schemes will reduce water flows and harm the 
environment. Two days later, Kyrgyzstan’s 
Kurmanbek Bakiev accused unspecified “other 
countries” of trying to “gain control over our 
strategic resources”. Meanwhile, UZ has been busy 
Declaration/
Speech 
IWPR, 2009. Uzbek Overtures 
to Kazakstan on Water Dispute. 
30 Apr. 
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enlisting the other downstream states, Turkmenistan 
and Kazakhstan, to support its cause. 
49     Y Y 23/04/2009 
UZ evidences WB support before IFAS meeting - 
The Gov. Newspaper of UZ "Pravda Vostoka" 
published a letter of WB President Robert Zoellick . 
The WB would like to clarify that it undertook 
responsibility to carry out preliminary study, paying 
a close attention to assessment of potential regional 
impacts. These studies will determine the technical, 
economic and financial viability of the proposed 
project, as well as its potential environmental and 
social impacts in light of the international 
agreements on the use of transboundary water 
resources. In this regard, I have taken into account 
and share Your concern regarding the delicate 
ecological balance of the region, and absolute 
necessity to ensure that the hydropower potential 
will not lead to a reduction of runoff water volume in 
states of the lower reaches, as well as the need to 
consider design of new buildings in seismic zones. 
Newspaper 
article 
AKIpress, 2009. World Bank 
to establish international 
commission of independents 
experts to scrutinize 
construction of hydroelectric 
power stations - response to 
President Karimov's letter. 28 
Apr.  
50 Y Y Y Y Y  28/04/2009 
IFAS Summit in Almaty: the five Central Asian 
leaders met to discuss water issues related to the 
Aral Sea. The discussion on the interstate regulation 
of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers (both 
flowing into the Aral Sea) between upstream and 
downstream countries dominated the summit's 
agenda. It exposed some of the deepest divisions 
among the region's leaders. Uzbekistan's President 
Islam Karimov bullied upstream Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan for their plans to implement more 
assertive water management policies. Kazakhstan's 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev, in turn, 
demonstrated his upper hand by seeking to moderate 
the discussion, while Turkmenistan's Gurbanguly 
Berdimuhamedov called on others to seek a regional 
balance without clarifying how this might be 
achieved. The summit ended with the signing of an 
agreement without any specific detail on 
transnational water management. 
Joint 
statement/de
claration 
Agence France Presse, 2009. 
Central Asian water talks boil 
over into bickering. 28 Apr. ; 
AKIpress, 2009. President 
Bakiev hints neighboring 
countries that Kyrgyzstan 
needs compensation 
for water accumulation. 28 
Apr. 
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51 Y Y Y Y Y  28/04/2009 
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev [chairman 
of the Aral Sea summit] rebuked Kyrgyz president 
for bringing the issue of Kambarata at the summit, as 
only issues related the Aral Sea were being 
considered. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Kyrgyz president 
rebuked for unscheduled 
remarks at Aral Sea summit. 28 
Apr.  
52 Y  Y  Y  30/04/2009 
ALMATY follow-up: TJ paper "Tajikistan" accuses 
UZ of having created a "Plot hatched to mislead 
world community". "In fact, Mr Karimov's covert 
goal of intensifying a dispute over water and 
electricity in the region, which has been continuing 
for 17 years, is to attract the attention of the world 
community to investment projects for 
the construction of hydroelectric power stations in 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Islam Karimov knows 
well that every time he plays this card in a specific 
manner, the issue of foreign investment in the 
hydroelectric power stations in the region will be 
postponed for a certain time. This is because 
Tashkent's hue and cry has made international donor 
organizations to act cautiously. Seeing and knowing 
this, Karimov is skilfully using this card. 
Newspaper 
article 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Tajik paper claims 
Uzbekistan to blame for demise 
of Aral Sea. 18 May. 
53 Y   Y Y  05/05/2009 
ALMATY follow-up: President Bakiyev of 
Kyrgyzstan stated in May of 2009 that both phases 
of the Kambarata power project will be built, 
regardless of “who likes it or not,” a clear challenge 
to the objections of Tashkent and Ashgabat. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Eurasianet.org, 2009. 
Kyrgyzstan: Bakiyev Stands 
Up to Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan on Hydropower 
Projects. 6 May. 
54 Y    Y  13/06/2009 
Uzbek authorities decided to strengthen security on 
the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. Specifically, they dug 
ditches in the Suzak, Aksy and No’okat borderline 
regions of 
Kyrgyzstan and erected walls in the Rishtan rayon of 
Uzbekistan’s Ferghana region. One explanation for 
Uzbekistan’s decision relates to Kyrgyzstan’s 
intention to build the Kambarata hydro-electric 
station. Bishkek-based political scientist Mars 
Saryev views the current Uzbek policy as yet another 
sign of disapproval of such plans, and another way 
of raising difficulties for the Kyrgyz in realizing 
Issue linkage 
CACI Analyst, 2009. 
Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan: 
building a wall. 1 Jul.  
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their energy potential. 
55 Y    Y  15/09/2009 
An article by N. Koroleva(an official of Uzbekistan's 
State Nature Committee) in Uzbek newspaper 
Pravda Vostoka asks for independent feasibility 
studies of projects of new water facilities on Central 
Asian transboundary rivers should be examined 
independently. "The work of the Toktogul reservoir, 
the Kambarata -2 hydroelectric power station and 
the Kambarata-1 hydroelectric power station, which 
is being designed now, [all in Kyrgyzstan] has a 
significant transboundary effect on the environment 
of [central Uzbekistan's] Sirdaryo, Jizzax and 
Navoiy regions and will cause irreversible negative 
environmental consequences,". 
Newspaper 
article 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Uzbek report calls 
for independent scrutiny of 
Central Asian water projects. 8 
Oct.  
56 Y    Y  23/09/2009 
Uzbekistan suspends gas supplies to southern and 
northern Kyrgyzstan due $19US million gas debt 
owed. 
Resource cut 
AKIpress, 2009. Gas supplies 
resume in Osh. 14 Oct.  
57 Y    Y  24/09/2009 
Mahira Usmanova, researcher of the Seismology 
Institute of the National Academy of Sciences of 
Uzbekistan, says that "Hydroelectric facilities should 
not be constructed in Central Asia without 
consideration of seismic issues and geological risks". 
Ms Usmanova reminded that the Toktogul 
hydroelectric station lies in the area with radioactive 
toxic wastes storage facilities. In case the water has 
burst out from the dam, not only Kyrgyzstan, but 
also Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will be 
in danger. The Toktogul hydroelectric station in the 
tectonic fault zone. 
Declaration/
Speech 
AKIpress, 2009. Kyrgyz 
hydroelectric stations in highly 
seismic zone pose potential 
threat of cascade-wise 
destruction - Uzbek 
Seismology Institute. 24 Sep.  
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58 Y      06/10/2009 
Difficulties in getting the money from Russia for 
Kambarata, pushed the government to submit a bill 
to parliament that would nullify the law on 
constructing and running the Kambarata I 
and Kambarata II hydroelectric power stations. In 
addition, Otunbayeva criticised the government, 
saying that "Television advertisements about the 
construction have already pulled the wool over our 
eyes. It should be pointed out that the incumbent 
president's election programme was based exactly on 
this project. However, we see today that they are 
talking nonsense to people. It turns out that 
Kyrgyzstan is unable to complete this project on its 
own, without bringing investment,". 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Kyrgyz 
government cannot afford to 
fund major hydropower project 
– official. 6 Oct; BBC 
Monitoring Central Asia Unit, 
2009. Key hydropower project 
unfeasible without foreign help 
- Kyrgyz opposition MP. 7 Oct.  
59       09/10/2009 
The Kyrgyz parliament has declared the law "On the 
construction and use the Kambarata hydroelectric 
power stations" no longer valid. The head of the 
Kyrgyz State Committee for the Management of 
State Property, Tursun Turdumambetov, said that the 
law in force prevented the attraction of investment to 
complete the construction of the Kambarata-2 power 
plant, and that it went against the law "On joint stock 
companies". 
Resolution 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Kyrgyz parliament 
voids law banning power plants 
from being sold. 10 Oct.  
60 Y    Y  14/10/2009 
Uzbekistan resumes gas supply to Osh (gas was cut 
on September 23) 
Resumption 
of resource 
supply 
AKIpress, 2009. Gas supplies 
resume in Osh. 14 Oct.  
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61 Y     Y 23/10/2009 
Kyrgyzstan will use US$ 100 million of a US$ 300-
million state loan provided by Russia to build 
the Kambarata-2 hydroelectric power plant, Kyrgyz 
Finance Minister Marat Sultanov said in parliament 
on Friday. The fund recently suspended its efforts to 
fund the project. It is now waiting for Electric Power 
Plants to fulfil earlier agreed conditions, including 
the construction of the Kambarata-2 facility, an 
additional issue of shares for purchase by the fund 
and a business plan that would guarantee the 
project's seven-year payback period. 
Other 
Central Asia General 
Newswire, 2009. Kyrgyzstan to 
spend part of Russian loan 
on Kambarata-2. 23 Oct.  
62 Y Y  Y   23/12/2009 
Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev has said that 
downstream countries such as Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan will benefit from the construction of 
the Kambarata 2 hydroelectric power station. He said 
by constructing the power plant Kyrgyzstan would 
ensure uninterrupted power supply for local 
population and accumulate water for irrigation needs 
of downstream countries in the region. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Kyrgyz leader says 
neighbours to benefit from new 
power plant. 23 Dec.  
63 Y    Y  28/12/2009 
Uzbek President Islam Karimov held a meeting with 
Kyrgyz Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov to discuss 
prospects for developing bilateral cooperation. 
Following the talks, Kyrgyz Prime Minister Daniyar 
Usenov said his country would possibly carry out an 
international expert examination of the project of 
the Kambarata-1 hydroelectric power station. "The 
Uzbek side has informed the Kyrgyz one of its 
concern over plans to construct the Kambarata-1 
power plant in view of possible damage to the 
environment and the water and energy balance, as 
well as possible technological threats. For this 
reason, Uzbekistan has requested to carry out an 
international expert examination of the project under 
the aegis of the World Bank. The reservoir of the 
planned Kambarata-2 hydroelectric power station 
will contain 5bn cubic meter of water. This volume 
is large enough. Kyrgyzstan will benefit from the 
conduct of an expert examination of Kambarata-1. 
According to him, a delegation of the World Bank's 
Talks on 
dam 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2009. Kyrgyzstan may 
agree to probe into major water 
facilities – premier. 30 Dec.  
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Board of Directors visited the place allocated for the 
construction several weeks earlier. "I asked them to 
help and allocate a grant to carry out a thorough 
expert examination of Kabarata-1. All the major 
facilities should undergo an international 
examination. We see nothing bad in it," the Kyrgyz 
prime minister noted. 
64 Y Y   Y  13/02/2010 
Kyrgyz President Bakiev says that Central Asian 
states should live in peace and harmony. He is sure 
that the construction of the Kambarata hydroelectric 
power station will "only benefit our neighbors". "We 
will be able to save water. Once the Kambarata-2 
hydroelectric power station starts functioning, water 
will be regulated on a daily basis. We will be able to 
accumulate such a volume of water in the Toktogul 
water reservoir that will make it possible not to flood 
our neighbors in winter. We will be able to save 
water in winter and provide its necessary volumes in 
summer," he said. 
Declaration/
Speech 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Central Asian 
states should live in peace and 
harmony - Kyrgyz leader. 13 
Feb.  
65 Y     Y 27/02/2010 
Russia and Kyrgyzstan have agreed to conduct an 
international expert examination of the project to 
complete the two Kambarata hydropower plants in 
Kyrgyzstan, Russian Energy Minister Sergei 
Shmatko told reporters Saturday. 
Agreement 
Prime-Tass English-language 
Business Newswire, 2010. 
Russia, Kyrgyzstan agree on 
intl examination 
of Kambarata proj. 27 Feb.  
66 Y Y Y  Y  16/03/2010 
Nazarbayev visits Uzbekistan. A tendency for KZ-
UZ rapprochement is evident from 
Karimov's backing to Nazarbayev's initiative to 
convene the OSCE summit under the aegis of 
Kazakhstan chairmanship in this Organisation. 
According to Nursultan Nazarbayev, the 
environmental and anthropogenic security of and 
regulation of water flows at Rogun HPP in Tajikistan 
and Kambarata facilities in Kyrgyzstan need be 
appraised by international experts. "There ought to 
be no hydroelectric power plants in the region 
without results of the expertise obtained and 
studied," he said. The Kazakh leader underlined that 
ahead of his visit to Uzbekistan he had been in talks 
with Emomali Rahmon and Kurmanbek Bakiyev. "In 
principle they are ready for expert evaluation. 
Islam Karimov and I have come to an agreement we 
are now announcing - after the expert opinion is 
Talks on 
water/energy 
Eurasianet.org, 2010. 
Tajikistan: World Bank Offer 
Energizes Rogun Hydropower 
Project. 15 Mar.  
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ready we are getting down to construction of new 
facilities". 
67 Y    Y  30/03/2010 
A month has passed since Uzbekistan unilaterally 
closed the Kara-Suu-Avtodorozhnyy customs 
checkpoint. The true reasons behind this decision 
have remained unknown, but some human rights 
activists connect the closing of the checkpoint with 
the construction of the Kambarata hydroelectric 
power station, which the Uzbeks think can lead to a 
decrease in the volume of water flowing to 
Uzbekistan. 
Border 
closure 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Paper eyes recent 
closure of customs checkpoint 
on Uzbek-Kyrgyz border. 3 
Apr.  
68  Y Y  Y Y 31/03/2010 
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov who 
is on a visit to Tashkent, has confirmed Russia's 
unchangeable position towards projects on the 
construction of major hydroelectric facilities in 
Central Asia. "Construction of major hydroelectric 
facilities in Central Asia should be carried out in 
full agreement with the neighbouring countries," 
Ivanov said answering questions of journalists about 
Russia's position towards the construction of the 
Rogun hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan and 
Kambarata [hydroelectric power station] in 
Kyrgyzstan, and about water balance between 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. 
Talks on 
water/energy 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Tajik dam expert 
says no one has right to stop 
construction of Roghun plant. 
24 Feb.  
69 Y  Y  Y Y 03/05/2010 
Karimov, addressing the opening of the Asian 
Development Bank's (ADB) board of governors 
meeting in Tashkent, slammed his neighbours for 
what he said was a lack of foresight about the 
environmental impact of their policies. "In Uzbek we 
say 'where this is no water there is no life'. That's 
why, indeed, we treat this problem 
seriously," Karimov said. "Unfortunately, some of 
our neighbours do not treat this issue like-mindedly, 
especially the countries on the upstream of the 
rivers. They do not think about what kind of 
consequences it may lead to," he added. 
Declaration/
Speech 
Agence France Presse – 
English, 2010. Uzbek leader 
blasts neighbours in water row. 
3 May.  
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70 Y    Y  19/05/2010 
Uzbektransgaz, the state gas company of Uzbekistan, 
has cut delivery of gas to Osh in neighboring 
Kyrgyzstan by 50 % over back payments due of 
some 1.6 million Somoni (about US$ 10,000). 
Resource cut 
TendersInfo, 2010. 
Kyrgyzstan: Uzbekistan Cuts 
Gas Delivery to Kyrgyzstan. 22 
May.  
71 Y      30/08/2010 
KG launched Kambarata-2 US$ 200 million 
hydroelectric power station on Monday, its first 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Acting 
President Roza Otunbayeva pressed a symbolic red 
button to start the first unit of the Kambarata-2 hydro 
project. The project, funded partly by Russia, will 
allow Kyrgyzstan to generate more power but could 
divert water from its neighbours. 
Dam launch 
Reuters, 2010. Kyrgyzstan 
launches new hydroelectric 
power plant. 30 Aug.  
72 Y  Y  Y  22/11/2010 
Viktor Chub, head of the meteorology centre of 
Uzbekistan (Uzgidromet), believes that the 
construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power 
station (Tajikistan) and its launch in the planned 
operation mode will significantly influence the flow 
of Amu Darya. A similar situation will be observed 
with regard to the water flow in Syr Darya [river] 
after the Kambarata 2 hydroelectric power station 
and the Toktogul reservoir (Kyrgyzstan) switch to 
power generation mode. 
Newspaper 
article 
BBC Monitoring Central Asia 
Unit, 2010. Uzbek expert 
against new hydro-energy 
projects in region. 23 Nov.  
73 Y      29/11/2010 
Otunbaeva says Kambarata-1 hydropower project to 
be reviewed by international experts, following 
Uzbek requests. "I think construction of such big 
facilities should be reviewed. We will reach 
agreement on this issue with our neighbors," 
President Otunbaeva said. "We will discuss this 
problem in the spirit of cooperation. I think we will 
built the hydropower plant after review is 
completed" the President said. 
Declaration/
Speech 
AKIpress, 2010. President 
Otunbaeva says Kambar-Ata-1 
hydropower project to be 
reviewed by international 
experts. 29 Nov.  
74 Y     Y 10/02/2011 
At a meeting of a Russian-Kyrgyz intergovernmental 
commission, representatives of the Russian 
government agreed to develop a construction project 
for several hydropower plants on the Naryn River in 
Kyrgyzstan. The representatives of the Russian 
delegation also said that the construction 
Talks on 
dam 
Prime-Tass English-language 
Business Newswire, 2011. 
Russian government to mull 
electric power imports from 
Kyrgyzstan. 10 Feb.  
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of Kambarata-1 hydropower plant in Kyrgyzstan was 
expected to be completed with the participation of 
Russian companies. 
75 Y      02/05/2011 
Kyrgyzstan was forced to halt the first unit of its 
Kambarata-2 hydropower plant to repair damages 
just three months into operation. The damages 
occurred during the early stages of construction. 
Experts say the power plant was launched 
prematurely and that workers had not resolved 
problems resulting from a dam explosion in late 
2009 that went wrong, the news agency reported. 
Accident 
Central Asia Newswire, 2011. 
Kyrgyzstan forced to halt unit 
in Karambata-2 hydro plant. 2 
May.  
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